From 1bab91bb3c763783f8558909bdab7efa8e4ab2d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jo Van Bulck <jovanbulck@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2021 12:08:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #37 from gianlu33/sancus-untag

Add `sancus_untag` functions and fix `sancus_unwrap_with_key`
---
 src/sancus_support/sm_support.h | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 89 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/sancus_support/sm_support.h b/src/sancus_support/sm_support.h
index 0537f12..5b9f11d 100644
--- a/src/sancus_support/sm_support.h
+++ b/src/sancus_support/sm_support.h
@@ -340,8 +340,47 @@ always_inline int is_buffer_outside_region(void *start_p, void *end_p,
   return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Performs constant time comparison between to buffers
+ * Returns 0 if the first `n` bytes of the two buffers are equal, -1 otherwise
+ * NOTE: Function copied from NaCL's libsodium, re-use allowed under ISC license.
+ */
+always_inline int constant_time_cmp(const unsigned char *x_,
+                                    const unsigned char *y_,
+                                    const unsigned int n)
+{
+    const volatile unsigned char *volatile x =
+        (const volatile unsigned char *volatile) x_;
+    const volatile unsigned char *volatile y =
+        (const volatile unsigned char *volatile) y_;
+    volatile unsigned int d = 0U;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        d |= x[i] ^ y[i];
+    }
+
+    return (1 & ((d - 1) >> 8)) - 1;
+}
+
 /**
  * Disable the protection of the calling module.
+ * DANGEROUS: Disable the protection of the calling module.
+ *
+ * NOTE: On Sancus cores that support interruptible enclaves, the
+ * compiler/runtime does _not_ transparently take care of atomicity concerns
+ * when disabling enclaves, i.e., secure linking is currently not meant to be
+ * interrupt-safe. If this SM is being called by another one, the other SM may
+ * be interrupted between the sm_verify check and the actual call into the
+ * function. If sancus_disable is executed in this window, an attacker could
+ * fully control the SM call and the return to the other SM.
+
+ * Thus, for callee SMs that may disable themselves, local attestation through
+ * sancus_verify and jumping to callee SM entry point needs to happen
+ * atomically. This concern is left to the application developer, e.g., SMs
+ * should not call sancus_disable when they might still be called by a
+ * trusted caller SM (and the caller SM can verify this is indeed not the case
+ * by local attestation of the callee SM code section).
  */
 always_inline void sancus_disable(void *continuation)
 {
@@ -492,6 +531,51 @@ always_inline int sancus_wrap(const void* ad, size_t ad_len,
     return sancus_wrap_with_key(NULL, ad, ad_len, body, body_len, cipher, tag);
 }
 
+/**
+ * The same as sancus_wrap_with_key() but only produces the MAC of the message.
+ */
+always_inline int sancus_tag_with_key(const void* key,
+                                      const void* body, size_t body_len,
+                                      void* tag)
+{
+    return sancus_wrap_with_key(key, body, body_len, NULL, 0, NULL, tag);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The same as sancus_wrap() but only produces the MAC of the message.
+ */
+always_inline int sancus_tag(const void* body, size_t body_len, void* tag)
+{
+    return sancus_wrap(body, body_len, NULL, 0, NULL, tag);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify if the MAC computed over `body` matches with the content of `tag`
+ */
+always_inline int sancus_untag_with_key(const void* key, const void* body,
+                                        size_t body_len, const void* tag)
+{
+    unsigned char computed_tag[SANCUS_TAG_SIZE];
+
+    // compute MAC over `body`
+    if ( !sancus_tag_with_key(key, body, body_len, computed_tag) ) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    // compare MAC with provided reference `tag`
+    return (constant_time_cmp(tag, computed_tag, SANCUS_TAG_SIZE) == 0);
+}
+
+/**
+* Verify if the MAC computed over `body` matches with the content of `tag`
+*
+* This is the same as sancus_untag_with_key using the key of the caller module.
+*/
+always_inline int sancus_untag(const void* body, size_t body_len, const void* tag)
+{
+    return sancus_untag_with_key(NULL, body, body_len, tag);
+}
+
 /**
  * Unwrap a message using the Sancus authenticated encryption features.
  *
@@ -503,6 +587,11 @@ always_inline int sancus_unwrap_with_key(const void* key,
                                          size_t cipher_len,
                                          const void* tag, void* body)
 {
+    // fix: if cipher_len is zero, just compare the MACs using sancus_untag
+    if(cipher_len == 0) {
+      return sancus_untag_with_key(key, ad, ad_len, tag);
+    }
+
     void* ad_end = (char*)ad + ad_len;
     void* cipher_end = (char*)cipher + cipher_len;
     int ret;
@@ -542,24 +631,6 @@ always_inline int sancus_unwrap(const void* ad, size_t ad_len,
                                   tag, body);
 }
 
-/**
- * The same as sancus_wrap() but only produces the MAC of the message.
- */
-always_inline int sancus_tag(const void* body, size_t body_len, void* tag)
-{
-    return sancus_wrap(body, body_len, NULL, 0, NULL, tag);
-}
-
-/**
- * The same as sancus_wrap_with_key() but only produces the MAC of the message.
- */
-always_inline int sancus_tag_with_key(const void* key,
-                                      const void* body, size_t body_len,
-                                      void* tag)
-{
-    return sancus_wrap_with_key(key, body, body_len, NULL, 0, NULL, tag);
-}
-
 /**
  * Get the Sancus ID of the module loaded at @p addr.
  */