You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
In the vast majority of Cosmos-based DPOS networks, the veto vote is used to punish spam proposals by removing the fee that was paid to submit it.
A lesser-known functionality is that if 33.3% of the vote is a veto, the proposal will fail. This mechanism was implemented because validators with 33.3% voting power from the validator set could cause a chain halt by refusing to perform an upgrade. This meant that a veto would enable them to kill the proposal with a minority vote if they really disagreed with how a proposal outcome was trending, in an effort to prevent a chain halt.
We believe that if 33.3% of the validator set refuses to perform an upgrade, a hard fork should be the next logical step rather than blocking the majority's will.
Hyperia Network is unique in this regard, as we have decided to minimize validator involvement in the governance aspect of the chain. We believe it is best to separate these roles, allowing validators to focus on validation and delegators on governance. This separation helps avoid potential conflicts of interest, such as prioritizing business decisions over delegators' needs or succumbing to external pressures to vote a certain way.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
In the vast majority of Cosmos-based DPOS networks, the veto vote is used to punish spam proposals by removing the fee that was paid to submit it.
A lesser-known functionality is that if 33.3% of the vote is a veto, the proposal will fail. This mechanism was implemented because validators with 33.3% voting power from the validator set could cause a chain halt by refusing to perform an upgrade. This meant that a veto would enable them to kill the proposal with a minority vote if they really disagreed with how a proposal outcome was trending, in an effort to prevent a chain halt.
We believe that if 33.3% of the validator set refuses to perform an upgrade, a hard fork should be the next logical step rather than blocking the majority's will.
Hyperia Network is unique in this regard, as we have decided to minimize validator involvement in the governance aspect of the chain. We believe it is best to separate these roles, allowing validators to focus on validation and delegators on governance. This separation helps avoid potential conflicts of interest, such as prioritizing business decisions over delegators' needs or succumbing to external pressures to vote a certain way.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: