BEP: 344 Title: Implement EIP-6780: SELFDESTRUCT only in same transaction Status: Candidate Type: Standards Created: 2024-01-15
As part of Cancun upgrade, Implement EIP-6780: SELFDESTRUCT only in same transaction is required to be implemented to BSC.
This EIP changes the functionality of the SELFDESTRUCT
opcode. The new functionality will be only to send all Ether in the account to the target, except that the current behaviour is preserved when SELFDESTRUCT
is called in the same transaction a contract was created.
The SELFDESTRUCT
opcode requires large changes to the state of an account, in particular removing all code and storage. This will not be possible in the future with Verkle trees: Each account will be stored in many different account keys, which will not be obviously connected to the root account.
This EIP implements this change. Applications that only use SELFDESTRUCT
to retrieve funds will still work. Applications that only use SELFDESTRUCT
in the same transaction as they created a contract will also continue to work without any changes.
The behaviour of SELFDESTRUCT
is changed in the following way:
-
When
SELFDESTRUCT
is executed in a transaction that is not the same as the contract callingSELFDESTRUCT
was created:- The current execution frame halts.
SELFDESTRUCT
does not delete any data (including storage keys, code, or the account itself).SELFDESTRUCT
transfers the entire account balance to the target.- Note that if the target is the same as the contract calling
SELFDESTRUCT
there is no net change in balances. Unlike the prior specification, Ether will not be burnt in this case. - Note that no refund is given since EIP-3529.
- Note that the rules of EIP-2929 regarding
SELFDESTRUCT
remain unchanged.
-
When
SELFDESTRUCT
is executed in the same transaction as the contract was created:SELFDESTRUCT
continues to behave as it did prior to this EIP, this includes the following actions- The current execution frame halts.
SELFDESTRUCT
deletes data as previously specified.SELFDESTRUCT
transfers the entire account balance to the target- The account balance of the contact calling
SELFDESTRUCT
is set to0
.
- Note that if the target is the same as the contract calling
SELFDESTRUCT
that Ether will be burnt. - Note that no refund is given since EIP-3529.
- Note that the rules of EIP-2929 regarding
SELFDESTRUCT
remain unchanged.
A contract is considered created at the beginning of a create transaction or when a CREATE series operation begins execution (CREATE, CREATE2, and other operations that deploy contracts in the future). If a balance exists at the contract's new address it is still considered to be a contract creation.
The SELFDESTRUCT
opcode remains deprecated as specified in EIP-6049. Any use in newly deployed contracts is strongly discouraged even if this new behaviour is taken into account, and future changes to the EVM might further reduce the functionality of the opcode.
Getting rid of the SELFDESTRUCT
opcode has been considered in the past, and there are currently no strong reasons to use it. This EIP implements a behavior that will attempt to leave some common uses of SELFDESTRUCT
working, while reducing the complexity of the change on EVM implementations that would come from contract versioning.
Handling the account creation and contract creation as two distinct and possibly separate events is needed for use cases such as counterfactual accounts. By allowing the SELFDESTRUCT
to delete the account at contract creation time it will not result in stubs of counterfactually instantiated contracts that never had any on-chain state other than a balance prior to the contract creation. These accounts would never have any storage and thus the trie updates to delete the account would be limited to the account node, which is the same impact a regular transfer of ether would have.
This EIP requires a hard fork, since it modifies consensus rules.
Contracts that depended on re-deploying contracts at the same address using CREATE2
(after a SELFDESTRUCT
) will no longer function properly if the created contract does not call SELFDESTRUCT
within the same transaction.
Previously it was possible to burn ether by calling SELFDESTRUCT
targeting the executing contract as the beneficiary. If the contract existed prior to the transaction the ether will not be burned. If the contract was newly created in the transaction the ether will be burned, as before.
The following applications of SELFDESTRUCT
will be broken and applications that use it in this way are not safe anymore:
-
Where
CREATE2
is used to redeploy a contract in the same place in order to make a contract upgradable. This is not supported anymore and ERC-2535 or other types of proxy contracts should be used instead. -
Where a contract depended on burning Ether via a
SELFDESTRUCT
with the contract as beneficiary, in a contract not created within the same transaction.
The content is licensed under CC0.
Guillaume Ballet (@gballet), Vitalik Buterin (@vbuterin), Dankrad Feist (@dankrad), "EIP-6780: SELFDESTRUCT only in same transaction [DRAFT]," Ethereum Improvement Proposals, no. 6780, March 2023. [Online serial]. Available: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-6780.