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<div style="position:absolute; top:50px;"><a name="1">Page 1</a></div>
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<br></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT; font-size:23px">Comprehensive Report
<br></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT; font-size:18px">of the Special Advisor to the DCI on
<br></span><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT; font-size:18px">Iraq’s WMD With
<br>Addendums
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<br>[Excerpted Key Findings from the “Duelfer Report”]
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<br>[30 September 2004]
<br>30 September 2004
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<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:173px; top:923px; width:264px; height:29px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:20px">Regime Strategic Intent
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:997px; width:79px; height:16px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:11px">Key Findings
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1025px; width:450px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end
<br>sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when
<br>sanctions were lifted.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1068px; width:465px; height:72px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making.</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px"> He initiated most of the strategic
<br>thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait),
<br>maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international com-
<br>munity. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on
<br>strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq’s strategic
<br>policy.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1152px; width:468px; height:72px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">of the Regime. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign
<br>intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any
<br>WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and
<br>jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1236px; width:470px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime.</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">
<br>OFF rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came
<br>to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to
<br>provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1296px; width:452px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their
<br>international support.</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px"> Iraq was within striking distance of a </span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">de facto</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px"> end to the sanctions regime, both in
<br>terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1344px; width:469px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanc-
<br>tions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that
<br>which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion,
<br>irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic
<br>missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1411px; width:468px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy.</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px"> All senior level Iraqi offi cials considered Iran to be Iraq’s
<br>principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and infl uence in the Arab world
<br>were also considerations, but secondary.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1459px; width:467px; height:72px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the
<br>value of WMD. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during
<br>the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks
<br>on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred
<br>Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role
<br>in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fi re.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1543px; width:469px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions.</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px"> Neither
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">was there an identifi able group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieu-
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">tenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent,
<br>but fi rm, verbal comments and directions to them.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:1639px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">1
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: black 1px solid; left:570px; top:968px; width:41px; height:100px;"></span>
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<div style="position:absolute; top:1734px;"><a name="3">Page 3</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1840px; width:149px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Note on Methodological Approach
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1864px; width:466px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Interviews with former Regime offi cials who were active in Iraq’s governing, economic, security, and intel-
<br>ligence structures were critical to ISG’s assessment of the former Regime’s WMD strategy. </span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">While some
<br>detainees’ statements were made to minimize their involvement or culpability leading to potential prosecution,
<br>in some cases those who were interviewed spoke relatively candidly and at length about the Regime’s strategic
<br>intent.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1931px; width:463px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">ISG analysts—because of unprecedented access to detainees—undertook interviews of national policy
<br>makers, the leadership of the intelligence and security services, and Qusay’s inner circle, as well as concen-
<br>trated debriefs of core Regime leaders in custody, to identify cross-Regime issues and perceptions.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:1979px; width:465px; height:71px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">As part of the effort aimed at the core leadership, analysts also gave detainees “homework” to give them
<br>more opportunity to discuss in writing various aspects of former Regime strategy. Many of these responses
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">were lengthy and detailed. Secretary of the President, ‘Abd Hamid Al Khatab Al Nasiri, Deputy Prime
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">Minister Tariq ‘Aziz ‘Aysa, and Minister of Military Industry ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh
<br>answered questions in writing several times, providing information on both the former Regime and the mind-
<br>set of those who ran it.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:2063px; width:450px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">Saddam’s debriefer was fully aware of ISG’s information needs and developed a strategy to elicit candid
<br>answers and insights into Saddam’s personality and role in strategy-related issues. Remarks from the
<br>debriefer are included.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:2111px; width:455px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) </span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">Analysts also used working groups to study themes and trends—such as intelligence and security service
<br>activity, weaponization, dual-use/break-out capabilities and timeline analysis—that cut across ISG’s func-
<br>tional teams, as well as to pool efforts to debrief members of the core leadership.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:2159px; width:468px; height:71px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Analysts used subsource development and document exploitation to crosscheck detainee testimony, lever-
<br>age detainees in debriefs, and to fi ll gaps in information. </span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">For example, analysts interviewing Huwaysh gained
<br>insights into his personality from subsources, while translated technical and procurement-related documents
<br>were critical to verifying the accuracy of his testimony. Likewise, we confronted Vice President Taha Yasin
<br>Ramadan Al Jizrawi with a captured document indicating his major role in allocating oil contracts and he
<br>divulged details on corruption stemming from the UN’s OFF program.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:2238px; width:467px; height:95px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Nonetheless, the interview process had several shortcomings. </span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">Detainees were very concerned about their fate
<br>and therefore would not be willing to implicate themselves in sensitive matters of interest such as WMD, in
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">light of looming prosecutions. Debriefers noted the use of passive interrogation resistance techniques collec-
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">tively by a large number of detainees to avoid their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues; place blame
<br>or knowledge with individuals who were not in a position to contradict the detainee’s statements, such as
<br>deceased individuals or individuals who were not in custody or who had fl ed the country; and provide debrief-
<br>ers with previously known information. However, the reader should keep in mind the Arab proverb: “Even a
<br>liar tells many truths.”
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:2342px; width:466px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">Some former Regime offi cials, such as ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid Al Tikriti (Chemical ‘Ali), never gave substantial
<br>information, despite speaking colorfully and at length. He never discussed actions, which would implicate him
<br>in a crime. Moreover, for some aspects of the Regime’s WMD strategy, like the role of the Military Industri-
<br>alization Commission (MIC), analysts could only speak with a few senior-level offi cials, which limited ISG’s
<br>assessment to the perspectives of these individuals.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:2481px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">2
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<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:2682px; width:292px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Former Iraqi Regime Offi cials Varied in Their Level of Cooperation
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:2706px; width:468px; height:131px;"><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">The quality of cooperation and assistance provided to ISG by former senior Iraqi Regime offi cials in custody
<br>varied widely. Some obstructed all attempts to elicit information on WMD and illicit activities of the former
<br>Regime. Others, however, were keen to help clarify every issue, sometimes to the point of self-incrimination.
<br>The two extremes of cooperation are epitomized by ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid—a key Presidential Adviser and RCC
<br>member—and Sabir ‘Abd-al-Aziz Husayn Al Duri, a former Lieutenant General who served in both the Direc-
<br>torate of General Military Intelligence and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid was loquacious
<br>on many subjects, but remained adamant in denying any involvement in the use of CW in attacks on the Kurds
<br>and dissembling in any discussion of the subject. His circumlocution extends to most other sensitive subjects of
<br>Regime behavior. By contrast, Sabir has been forthcoming to the point of direct association with a wide range
<br>of Iraqi activities, including the management of Kuwaiti prisoners, the organization of assassinations abroad
<br>by the former Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), and the torture of political prisoners.
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<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:209px; top:4291px; width:193px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:20px">Regime Finance
<br>and Procurement
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:4365px; width:79px; height:16px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:11px">Key Findings
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:4393px; width:465px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF (March 2003), Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of
<br>himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those objectives, Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, to
<br>portray a strong military capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab
<br>leader. Saddam recognized that the reconstitution of Iraqi WMD enhanced both his security and image. Conse-
<br>quently, Saddam needed to end UN-imposed sanctions to fulfi ll his goals.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:4460px; width:466px; height:107px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Saddam severely under estimated the economic and military costs of invading Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in
<br>1990, as well as underestimating the subsequent international condemnation of his invasion of Kuwait. He did
<br>not anticipate this condemnation, nor the subsequent imposition, comprehensiveness, severity, and longev-
<br>ity of UN sanctions. His initial belief that UN sanctions would not last, resulting in his country’s economic
<br>decline, changed by 1998 when the UNSC did not lift sanctions after he believed resolutions were fulfi lled.
<br>Although Saddam had reluctantly accepted the UN’s Oil for Food (OFF) program by 1996, he soon recog-
<br>nized its economic value and additional opportunities for further manipulation and infl uence of the UNSC Iraq
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">661 Sanctions Committee member states. Therefore, he resigned himself to the continuation of UN sanctions
<br>understanding that they would become a “paper tiger” regardless of continued US resolve to maintain them.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:4575px; width:466px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Throughout sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to formulate and implement strategies, poli-
<br>cies, and methods to terminate the UN’s sanctions regime established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an
<br>effective diplomatic and economic strategy of generating revenue and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi
<br>intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations’ member states and other
<br>international players’ resolve to enforce compliance, while capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:4643px; width:453px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• From Saddam’s perspective, UN sanctions hindered his ability to rule Iraq with complete authority and
<br>autonomy. In the long run, UN sanctions also interfered with his efforts to establish a historic legacy.
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">According to Saddam and his senior advisors, the UN, at the behest of the US, placed an economic
<br>strangle hold on Iraq</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">. The UN controlled Saddam’s main source of revenue (oil exports) and determined
<br>what Iraq could import.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:4715px; width:469px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• UN sanctions curbed Saddam’s ability to import weapons, technology, and expertise into Iraq. Sanctions also
<br>limited his ability to fi nance his military, intelligence, and security forces to deal with his perceived and real
<br>external threats.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:4763px; width:461px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• In short, Saddam considered UN sanctions as a form of economic war and the UN’s OFF program and
<br>Northern and Southern Watch Operations as campaigns of that larger economic war orchestrated by the US
<br>and UK. His evolving strategy centered on breaking free of UN sanctions in order to liberate his economy
<br>from the economic strangle-hold so he could continue to pursue his political and personal objectives.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:4823px; width:469px; height:95px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">One aspect of Saddam’s strategy of unhinging the UN’s sanctions against Iraq, centered on Saddam’s efforts
<br>to infl uence certain UN SC permanent members, such as Russia, France, and China and some nonpermanent
<br>(Syria, Ukraine) members to end UN sanctions. </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<br>(MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and international public
<br>opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF program by diplo-
<br>matic and economic means. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the fi ve permanent members and foment
<br>international public support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign
<br>and an extensive diplomatic effort.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:4926px; width:466px; height:71px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Another element of this strategy involved circumventing UN sanctions and the OFF program by means of
<br>“Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam to gener-
<br>ate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN. The successful implementation of the Protocols,
<br>continued oil smuggling efforts, and the manipulation of UN OFF contracts emboldened Saddam to pursue his
<br>military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997 and peaking in 2001. These efforts covered conventional arms,
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">dual-use goods acquisition, and some WMD-related programs.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:5007px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">1
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: black 1px solid; left:570px; top:4436px; width:41px; height:100px;"></span>
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<div style="position:absolute; top:5102px;"><a name="7">Page 7</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5208px; width:466px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• Once money began to fl ow into Iraq, the Regime’s authorities, aided by foreign companies and some foreign
<br>governments, devised and implemented methods and techniques to procure illicit goods from foreign suppli-
<br>ers.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5256px; width:465px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• To implement its procurement efforts, Iraq under Saddam, created a network of Iraqi front companies, some
<br>with close relationships to high-ranking foreign government offi cials. These foreign government offi cials, in
<br>turn, worked through their respective ministries, state-run companies and ministry-sponsored front compa-
<br>nies, to procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq’s WMD-related, conventional arms, and/or
<br>dual-use goods programs.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5328px; width:460px; height:72px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">The Regime fi nanced these government-sanctioned programs by several illicit revenue streams that
<br>amassed more that $11 billion from the early 1990s to OIF outside the UN-approved methods</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">. The most
<br>profi table stream concerned Protocols or government-to-government agreements that generated over $7.5
<br>billion for Saddam. Iraq earned an additional $2 billion from kickbacks or surcharges associated with the
<br>UN’s OFF program; $990 million from oil “cash sales” or smuggling; and another $230 million from other
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">surcharge impositions.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5436px; width:140px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Analysis of Iraqi Financial Data
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5460px; width:468px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">The Iraqi revenue analysis presented in this report is based on government documents and fi nancial databases,
<br>spreadsheets, and other records obtained from SOMO, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, and the Central Bank of Iraq
<br>(CBI), and other Ministries. These sources appear to be of good quality and consistent with other pre- and
<br>post-Operation Iraqi Freedom information. All Iraqi revenue data and derived fi gures in this report have been
<br>calculated in current dollars.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5539px; width:458px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Saddam directed the Regime’s key ministries and governmental agencies to devise and implement strategies,
<br>policies, and techniques to discredit the UN sanctions, harass UN personnel in Iraq, and discredit the US. At
<br>the same time, according to reporting, he also wanted to obfuscate Iraq’s refusal to reveal the nature of its
<br>WMD and WMD-related programs, their capabilities, and his intentions.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5594px; width:459px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Saddam used the IIS to undertake the most sensitive procurement missions. Consequently, the IIS facili-
<br>tated the import of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods into Iraq through countries like Syria, Jordan,
<br>Belarus and Turkey</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">.</span><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px">
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5643px; width:460px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• The IIS had representatives in most of Iraq’s embassies in these foreign countries using a variety of offi cial
<br>covers. One type of cover was the “commercial attaches” that were sent to make contacts with foreign busi-
<br>nesses. The attaches set up front companies, facilitated the banking process and transfers of funds as deter-
<br>mined, and approved by the senior offi cials within the Government.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5703px; width:463px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• The MFA played a critical role in facilitating Iraq’s procurement of military goods, dual-use goods pertain-
<br>ing to WMD, transporting cash and other valuable goods earned by illicit oil revenue, and forming and
<br>implementing a diplomatic strategy to end UN sanctions and the subsequent UN OFF program by nefarious
<br>means.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5763px; width:461px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• Saddam used the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientifi c Research (MHESR) through its universities
<br>and research programs to maintain, develop, and acquire expertise, to advance or preserve existent research
<br>projects and developments, and to procure goods prohibited by UN SC sanctions.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:5811px; width:457px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• The Ministry of Oil (MoO) controlled the oil voucher distribution program that used oil to infl uence UN
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">members to support Iraq’s goals. </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px"> Saddam personally approved and removed all names of voucher recipi-
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:5849px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">2
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: black 1px solid; left:72px; top:5435px; width:468px; height:87px;"></span>
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<div style="position:absolute; top:5944px;"><a name="8">Page 8</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:81px; top:6050px; width:456px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">ents. He made all modifi cations to the list, adding or deleting names at will. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Other senior Iraqi leaders
<br>could nominate or recommend an individual or organization to be added or subtracted from the voucher list,
<br>and ad hoc allocation committees met to review and update the allocations.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:6098px; width:468px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Iraq under Saddam successfully devised various methods to acquire and import items prohibited under UN
<br>sanctions. </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Numerous Iraqi and foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit items, hid the identity of the end
<br>user, and/or changed the fi nal destination of the commodity to get it to the region. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">For a cut of the profi ts,
<br>these trade intermediaries moved, and in many cases smuggled, the prohibited items through land, sea, and air
<br>entry points along the Iraqi border.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:6165px; width:464px; height:83px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">By mid-2000 the exponential growth of Iraq’s illicit revenue, increased international sympathy for Iraq’s
<br>humanitarian plight, and increased complicity by Iraqi’s neighbors led elements within Saddam’s Regime to
<br>boast that the UN sanctions were slowly eroding. In July 2000, the ruling Iraqi Ba’athist paper, Al-Thawrah,
<br>claimed victory over UN sanctions, stating that Iraq was accelerating its pace to develop its national economy
<br>despite the UN “blockade.” In August 2001, Iraqi Foreign Minister Sabri stated in an Al-Jazirah TV interview
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">that UN sanctions efforts had collapsed at the same time Baghdad had been making steady progress on its eco-
<br>nomic, military, Arab relations, and international affairs.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:6257px; width:467px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• Companies in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen assisted Saddam with the acquisition of pro-
<br>hibited items through deceptive trade practices. In the case of Syria and Yemen, this included support from
<br>agencies or personnel within the government itself.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:6305px; width:469px; height:37px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• Numerous ministries in Saddam’s Regime facilitated the smuggling of illicit goods through Iraq’s borders,
<br>ports, and airports. The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and the Military Industiralization Commission (MIC),
<br>however, were directly responsible for skirting UN monitoring and importing prohibited items for Saddam.
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<div style="position:absolute; top:6786px;"><a name="9">Page 9</a></div>
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<div style="position:absolute; top:7628px;"><a name="10">Page 10</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:210px; top:7679px; width:189px; height:29px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:20px">Delivery Systems
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:7729px; width:79px; height:18px;"><span style="font-family: IOAPJI+TimesNewRomanPS-BoldMT; font-size:13px">Key Findings
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:7759px; width:462px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery
<br>capability, and by 1991 Baghdad had purchased the missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis
<br>for nearly all of its future missile system developments. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">The Soviet Union was a key supplier of missile hard-
<br>ware and provided 819 Scud-B missiles and ground support equipment.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:7814px; width:466px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Iraq’s experiences with long-range delivery systems in the Iran/Iraq war were a vital lesson to Iraqi Presi-
<br>dent Saddam Husayn.</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px"> The successful Iraqi response to the Iranian long-range bombardment of Baghdad, lead-
<br>ing to the War of the Cities, probably saved Saddam.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:7858px; width:464px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">By 1991, Iraq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify some of its delivery systems to increase
<br>their range and to develop WMD dissemination options, with the Al Husayn being a fi rst step in this direc-
<br>tion. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">The next few years of learning and experiments confi rmed that the Regime’s goal was for an effective
<br>long-range WMD delivery capability and demonstrated the resourcefulness of Iraq’s scientists and technicians.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:7913px; width:457px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Iraq failed in its efforts to acquire longer-range delivery systems to replace inventory exhausted in the
<br>Iran/Iraq war. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">This was a forcing function that drove Iraq to develop indigenous delivery system production
<br>capabilities.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:7956px; width:465px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Desert Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and inspections brought many of Iraq’s delivery system
<br>programs to a halt. While much of Iraq’s long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was
<br>eliminated, Iraq until late 1991 kept some items hidden to assist future reconstitution of the force. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">This deci-
<br>sion and Iraq’s intransigence during years of inspection left many UN questions unresolved.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8012px; width:458px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• Coalition airstrikes effectively targeted much of Iraq’s delivery systems infrastructure, and UN inspections
<br>dramatically impeded further developments of long-range ballistic missiles.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8047px; width:467px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">It appears to have taken time, but Iraq eventually realized that sanctions were not going to end quickly.
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">This forced Iraq to</span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px"> </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">sacrifi ce its long-range delivery force in an attempt to bring about a quick end to the sanc-
<br>tions.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:8096px; width:466px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• After the fl ight of Husayn Kamil in 1995, Iraq admitted that it had hidden Scud-variant missiles and compo-
<br>nents to aid future reconstitution but asserted that these items had been unilaterally destroyed by late 1991.
<br>The UN could not verify these claims and thereafter became more wary of Iraq’s admissions and instituted a
<br>Regime of more intrusive inspections.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8155px; width:467px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debrief-
<br>ings of Iraqi offi cials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles
<br>after 1991.</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8204px; width:463px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">While other WMD programs were strictly prohibited, the UN permitted Iraq to develop and possess delivery
<br>systems provided their range did not exceed 150 km.</span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px"> </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">This freedom allowed Iraq to keep its scientists and tech-
<br>nicians employed and to keep its infrastructure and manufacturing base largely intact by pursuing programs
<br>nominally in compliance with the UN limitations</span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">. </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">This positioned Iraq for a potential breakout capability</span><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px">.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8259px; width:466px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• Between 1991 and 1998, Iraq had declared development programs underway for liquid- and solid-propellant
<br>ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8294px; width:459px; height:24px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Iraq’s decisions in 1996 to accept the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) and later in 1998 to cease coopera-
<br>tion with UNSCOM and IAEA spurred a period of increased activity in delivery systems development. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">The
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:577px; top:7908px; width:13px; height:91px;"><span style="font-family: IOADCF+Helvetica-Bold; font-size:4px">s
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<div style="position:absolute; top:8470px;"><a name="11">Page 11</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8567px; width:464px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">pace of ongoing missile programs accelerated, and the Regime authorized its scientists to design missiles with
<br>ranges in excess of 150 km that, if developed, would have been clear violations of UNSCR 687.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8598px; width:453px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• By 2002, Iraq had provided the liquid-propellant Al Samud II—a program started in 2001—and the solid-
<br>propellant Al Fat’h to the military and was pursuing a series of new small UAV systems.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8634px; width:469px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000
<br>km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and
<br>only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam’s continu-
<br>ing desire—up to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—for a long-range delivery capability.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8694px; width:469px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Procurements supporting delivery system programs expanded after the 1998 departure of the UN inspectors.
<br>Iraq also hired outside expertise to assist its development programs.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8726px; width:465px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• ISG uncovered evidence that technicians and engineers from Russia reviewed the designs and assisted devel-
<br>opment of the Al Samud II during its rapid evolution. ISG also found that Iraq had entered into negotiations
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">with North Korean and Russian entities for more capable missile systems.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8774px; width:467px; height:71px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• According to contract information exploited by ISG, Iraq imported at least 380 SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant
<br>engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. While Iraq claims these engines were for the Al Samud
<br>II program, the numbers involved appear in excess of immediate requirements, suggesting they could have
<br>supported the longer range missiles using clusters of SA-2 engines. Iraq also imported missile guidance and
<br>control systems from entities in countries like Belarus, Russia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
<br>(Note: FRY is currently known as Serbia and Montenegro but is referred to as FRY in this section.)
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8857px; width:461px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">In late 2002 Iraq was under increasing pressure from the international community to allow UN inspectors
<br>to return. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Iraq in November accepted UNSCR 1441 and invited inspectors back into the country. In Decem-
<br>ber Iraq presented to the UN its Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration (CAFCD) in response to
<br>UNSCR 1441.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8913px; width:468px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• While the CAFCD was judged to be incomplete and a rehash of old information, it did provide details on the
<br>Al Samud II, Al Fat’h, new missile-related facilities, and new small UAV designs.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8949px; width:467px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• In February 2003 the UN convened an expert panel to discuss the Al Samud II and Al Fat’h programs, which
<br>resulted in the UN’s decision to prohibit the Al Samud II and order its destruction. Missile destruction began
<br>in early March but was incomplete when the inspectors were withdrawn later that month.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:8997px; width:466px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">The CAFCD and United Nations Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspec-
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">tions provided a brief glimpse into what Iraq had accomplished in four years without an international presence
<br>on the ground.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9040px; width:470px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px"> Given Iraq’s investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network,
<br>skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam
<br>clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9083px; width:452px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• Iraq built a new and larger liquid-rocket engine test stand capable, with some modifi cation, of supporting
<br>engines or engine clusters larger than the single SA-2 engine used in the Al Samud II.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9119px; width:447px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• Iraq built or refurbished solid-propellant facilities and equipment, including a large propellant mixer, an
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">aging oven, and a casting pit that could support large diameter motors.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9155px; width:458px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">• Iraq’s investing in studies into new propellants and manufacturing technologies demonstrated its desire for
<br>more capable or effective delivery systems.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:9217px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">2
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: gray 1px solid; left:0px; top:9312px; width:612px; height:792px;"></span>
<div style="position:absolute; top:9312px;"><a name="12">Page 12</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:262px; top:9363px; width:88px; height:29px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:20px">Nuclear
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9417px; width:79px; height:16px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:11px">Key Findings
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9444px; width:465px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px">Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and signifi cance of the pre-1991
<br>Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progres-
<br>sively decayed after that date.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9488px; width:458px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf war. ISG found no evidence to sug-
<br>gest concerted efforts to restart the program.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9524px; width:470px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Although Saddam clearly assigned a high value to the nuclear progress and talent that had been developed up
<br>to the 1991 war, the program ended and the intellectual capital decayed in the succeeding years.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9560px; width:467px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px">Nevertheless, after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital developed
<br>during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Senior Iraqis—several of them from the Regime’s inner circle—told ISG
<br>they assumed Saddam would restart a nuclear program once UN sanctions ended.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9603px; width:401px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any Iranian threat.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9627px; width:452px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px">Initially, Saddam chose to conceal his nuclear program in its entirety, as he did with Iraq’s BW pro-
<br>gram. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the pro-
<br>gram and destroy or surrender components of the program.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9670px; width:446px; height:24px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px">In the wake of Desert Storm, Iraq took steps to conceal key elements of its program and to preserve
<br>what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientifi c community.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9702px; width:457px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Baghdad undertook a variety of measures to conceal key elements of its nuclear program from successive
<br>UN inspectors, including specifi c direction by Saddam Husayn to hide and preserve documentation associ-
<br>ated with Iraq’s nuclear program.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9750px; width:467px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG, for example, uncovered two specifi c instances in which scientists involved in uranium enrichment kept
<br>documents and technology. Although apparently acting on their own, they did so with the belief and anticipa-
<br>tion of resuming uranium enrichment efforts in the future.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9798px; width:456px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual core of the former weapons program, Baghdad
<br>transferred many nuclear scientists to related jobs in the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The work
<br>undertaken by these scientists at the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9845px; width:458px; height:24px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px">As with other WMD areas, Saddam’s ambitions in the nuclear area were secondary to his prime objec-
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px">tive of ending UN sanctions.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9877px; width:465px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Iraq, especially after the defection of Husayn Kamil in 1995, sought to persuade the IAEA that Iraq had met
<br>the UN’s disarmament requirements so sanctions would be lifted.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9913px; width:439px; height:24px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px">ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities that would have aided the reconstitution of the
<br>nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:9944px; width:467px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) The activities of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission sustained some talent and limited research with poten-
<br>tial relevance to a reconstituted nuclear program.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:577px; top:9711px; width:13px; height:40px;"><span style="font-family: IOADCF+Helvetica-Bold; font-size:2px">r
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<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:10059px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">1
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: black 1px solid; left:570px; top:9688px; width:41px; height:86px;"></span>
<span style="position:absolute; border: gray 1px solid; left:0px; top:10154px; width:612px; height:792px;"></span>
<div style="position:absolute; top:10154px;"><a name="13">Page 13</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:10260px; width:467px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Specifi c projects, with signifi cant development, such as the efforts to build a rail gun and a copper vapor
<br>laser could have been useful in a future effort to restart a nuclear weapons program, but ISG found no indica-
<br>tions of such purpose. As funding for the MIC and the IAEC increased after the introduction of the Oil-for-
<br>Food program, there was some growth in programs that involved former nuclear weapons scientists and
<br>engineers.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:10332px; width:467px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program from leaving either their jobs or
<br>Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received signifi cant pay raises in
<br>a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that
<br>Iraq retained technical knowledge.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:10901px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">2
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: gray 1px solid; left:0px; top:10996px; width:612px; height:792px;"></span>
<div style="position:absolute; top:10996px;"><a name="14">Page 14</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:252px; top:11047px; width:105px; height:29px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:20px">Chemical
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11101px; width:79px; height:16px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:11px">Key Findings
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11129px; width:457px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions
<br>were judged favorable:
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11160px; width:470px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a
<br>weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the Iran-Iraq war—and contributed to deter-
<br>ring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11208px; width:468px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq
<br>unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">There are no credible indications
<br>that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire
<br>to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11263px; width:456px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) The scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other factors, precluded an examination of
<br>the entire stockpile; however, ISG inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">deployment of chemical weapons.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11311px; width:470px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Iraq’s</span><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:8px"> </span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">CW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under
<br>sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military
<br>and civilian organizations, followed by an infl ux of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to
<br>reinvigorate its industrial base.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11367px; width:462px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Poor policies and management in the early 1990s left the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) fi nancially
<br>unsound and in a state of almost complete disarray.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11403px; width:468px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Saddam implemented a number of changes to the Regime’s organizational and programmatic structures after
<br>the departure of Husayn Kamil.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11439px; width:455px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Iraq’s acceptance of the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program was the foundation of Iraq’s economic recovery and
<br>sparked a fl ow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied to projects for Iraq’s chemical industry.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11474px; width:467px; height:71px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base
<br>needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from
<br>the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction
<br>and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW-
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">related efforts.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:577px; top:11476px; width:13px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADCF+Helvetica-Bold; font-size:2px">l
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<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11554px; width:466px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponiza-
<br>tion experts from the former CW program.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11590px; width:466px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of
<br>these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which would have
<br>enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11638px; width:455px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due to sanc-
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">tions. ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:11743px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">1
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: black 1px solid; left:570px; top:11458px; width:41px; height:86px;"></span>
<span style="position:absolute; border: gray 1px solid; left:0px; top:11838px; width:612px; height:792px;"></span>
<div style="position:absolute; top:11838px;"><a name="15">Page 15</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11944px; width:453px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infra-
<br>structure, although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not
<br>regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom
<br>(OIF).
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:11999px; width:445px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG did not discover chemical process or production units confi gured to produce key precursors or CW
<br>agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfi guring and
<br>‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12047px; width:464px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefi ngs, that Iraq at OIF probably
<br>had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12083px; width:465px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in signifi cant
<br>quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no
<br>credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">existing procurement networks for sanctioned items.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12143px; width:465px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dual-
<br>use process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activi-
<br>ties, if required by the Regime.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12187px; width:455px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use pro-
<br>cess plants.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12222px; width:468px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Iraq’s historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the
<br>capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences
<br>for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have signifi cantly jeopardized its chances of having sanctions lifted or
<br>no longer enforced if the UN or foreign entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization
<br>activities.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12290px; width:461px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experi-
<br>mental CW rounds. The available evidence is insuffi cient to determine the nature of the effort or the time-
<br>frame of activities.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12338px; width:455px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which
<br>had previously been adapted for fi lling with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of
<br>weaponization activities.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12386px; width:462px; height:36px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Saddam’s Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi offi cers and included
<br>the concept of a “red-line” or last line of defense. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">However, ISG has no information that the plan ever
<br>included a trigger for CW use.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12429px; width:463px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq, informa-
<br>tion acquired after OIF does not confi rm the inclusion of CW in Iraq’s tactical planning for OIF. We believe
<br>these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12477px; width:461px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have been highly compartmentalized
<br>within the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence that any fi eld elements knew about plans for CW use
<br>during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:12585px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">2
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: gray 1px solid; left:0px; top:12680px; width:612px; height:792px;"></span>
<div style="position:absolute; top:12680px;"><a name="16">Page 16</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12786px; width:469px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Uday—head of the Fedayeen Saddam—attempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according
<br>to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12822px; width:464px; height:60px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003
<br>a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for
<br>intelligence operations. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform
<br>from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was
<br>planned. (See Annex A.)
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12889px; width:468px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents
<br>in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents
<br>including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12937px; width:469px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research
<br>or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Inter-
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">views with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS’ activities
<br>in this area.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:12997px; width:378px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:13021px; width:316px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:13045px; width:468px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemi-
<br>cal weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents,
<br>interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities
<br>noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:13101px; width:463px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depot—the storage site that was
<br>judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no
<br>CW activity, unlike previously assessed.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:577px; top:13160px; width:13px; height:48px;"><span style="font-family: IOADCF+Helvetica-Bold; font-size:2px">l
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<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:13427px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">3
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: black 1px solid; left:570px; top:13142px; width:41px; height:86px;"></span>
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<div style="position:absolute; top:13522px;"><a name="17">Page 17</a></div>
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<div style="position:absolute; top:14364px;"><a name="18">Page 18</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:251px; top:14416px; width:109px; height:29px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:20px">Biological
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14469px; width:79px; height:16px;"><span style="font-family: IOADEF+Times-Bold; font-size:11px">Key Findings
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14497px; width:444px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">The Biological Warfare (BW) program was born of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and this service
<br>retained its connections with the program either directly or indirectly throughout its existence.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14528px; width:466px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) The IIS provided the BW program with security and participated in biological research, probably for its own
<br>purposes, from the beginning of Iraq’s BW effort in the early 1970s until the fi nal days of Saddam Husayn’s
<br>Regime.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14576px; width:462px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">In 1991, Saddam Husayn regarded BW as an integral element of his arsenal of WMD weapons, and would
<br>have used it if the need arose.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14607px; width:463px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) At a meeting of the Iraqi leadership immediately prior to the Gulf war in 1991, Saddam Husayn personally
<br>authorized the use of BW weapons against Israel, Saudi Arabia and US forces. Although the exact nature of
<br>the circumstances that would trigger use was not spelled out, they would appear to be a threat to the leader-
<br>ship itself or the US resorting to “</span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">unconventional harmful types of weapons.</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">”
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14667px; width:468px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Saddam envisaged all-out use. For example, all Israeli cities were to be struck and all the BW weapons at his
<br>disposal were to be used. Saddam specifi ed that the “</span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">many years</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">” agents, presumably anthrax spores, were
<br>to be employed against his foes.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14715px; width:455px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">ISG judges that Iraq’s actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate that the state intended to preserve its
<br>BW capability and return to a steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the
<br>opportunity arose.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14759px; width:466px; height:71px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG assesses that in 1991, Iraq clung to the objective of gaining war-winning weapons with the strategic
<br>intention of achieving the ability to project its power over much of the Middle East and beyond. Biologi-
<br>cal weapons were part of that plan. With an eye to the future and aiming to preserve some measure of its
<br>BW capability, Baghdad in the years immediately after Desert Storm sought to save what it could of its BW
<br>infrastructure and covertly continue BW research, hide evidence of that and earlier efforts, and dispose of its
<br>existing weapons stocks.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14843px; width:459px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) From 1992 to 1994, Iraq greatly expanded the capability of its Al Hakam facility. Indigenously produced 5
<br>cubic meter fermentors were installed, electrical and water utilities were expanded, and massive new con-
<br>struction to house its desired 50 cubic meter fermentors were completed.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14891px; width:469px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) With the economy at rock bottom in late 1995, ISG judges that Baghdad abandoned its existing BW program
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">in the belief that it constituted a potential embarrassment, whose discovery would undercut Baghdad’s ability
<br>to reach its overarching goal of obtaining relief from UN sanctions.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:14938px; width:467px; height:60px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain
<br>advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW
<br>program or was conducting BW-specifi c work for military purposes. </span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">Indeed, from the mid-1990s, despite
<br>evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of
<br>discussion or even interest in BW at the Presidential level.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15005px; width:466px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Iraq would have faced great diffi culty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability. Nev-
<br>ertheless, after 1996 Iraq still had a signifi cant dual-use capability—some declared—readily useful for BW
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">if the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover, Iraq still possessed its most important BW
<br>asset, the scientifi c know-how of its BW cadre.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15061px; width:456px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Any attempt to create a new BW program after 1996 would have encountered a range of major hurdles.
<br>The years following Desert Storm wrought a steady degradation of Iraq’s industrial base: new equipment
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">and spare parts for existing machinery became diffi cult and expensive to obtain, standards of maintenance
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:15111px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">1
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:577px; top:14929px; width:13px; height:52px;"><span style="font-family: IOADCF+Helvetica-Bold; font-size:2px">l
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<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADCF+Helvetica-Bold; font-size:5px">B
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: black 1px solid; left:570px; top:14912px; width:41px; height:86px;"></span>
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<div style="position:absolute; top:15206px;"><a name="19">Page 19</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:80px; top:15312px; width:453px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">declined, staff could not receive training abroad, and foreign technical assistance was almost impossible to
<br>get. Additionally, Iraq’s infrastructure and public utilities were crumbling. New large projects, particularly
<br>if they required special foreign equipment and expertise, would attract international attention. UN monitor-
<br>ing of dual-use facilities up to the end of 1998, made their use for clandestine purpose complicated and risk
<br>laden.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15384px; width:461px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a
<br>few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a
<br>course.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15427px; width:470px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) In spite of the diffi culties noted above, a BW capability is technically the easiest WMD to attain. Although
<br>equipment and facilities were destroyed under UN supervision in 1996, Iraq retained technical BW know-
<br>how through the scientists that were involved in the former program. ISG has also identifi ed civilian facilities
<br>and equipment in Iraq that have dual-use application that could be used for the production of agent.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15487px; width:463px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons
<br>and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document
<br>complete destruction. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after Operation Iraqi
<br>Freedom (OIF).
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15543px; width:465px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) After the passage of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 in April 1991, Iraqi leaders decided not
<br>to declare the offensive BW program and in consequence ordered all evidence of the program erased. Iraq
<br>declared that BW program personnel sanitized the facilities and destroyed the weapons and their contents.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15591px; width:464px; height:71px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Iraq declared the possession of 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads containing BW agent. ISG
<br>assesses that the evidence for the original number of bombs is uncertain. ISG judges that Iraq clandestinely
<br>destroyed at least 132 bombs and 25 missiles. ISG continued the efforts of the UN at the destruction site but
<br>found no remnants of further weapons. This leaves the possibility that the fragments of up to 25 bombs may
<br>remain undiscovered. Of these, any that escaped destruction would probably now only contain degraded
<br>agent.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15675px; width:466px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG does not have a clear account of bulk agent destruction. Offi cial Iraqi sources and BW personnel, state
<br>that Al Hakam staff destroyed stocks of bulk agent in mid 1991. However, the same personnel admit con-
<br>cealing details of the movement and destruction of bulk BW agent in the fi rst half of 1991. Iraq continued to
<br>present information known to be untrue to the UN up to OIF. Those involved did not reveal this until several
<br>months after the confl ict.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15747px; width:460px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al ‘Azzawi, head of the bacterial program claims she retained BW seed stocks until
<br>early 1992 when she destroyed them. ISG has not found a means of verifying this. Some seed stocks were
<br>retained by another Iraqi offi cial until 2003 when they were recovered by ISG.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15794px; width:468px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">ISG is aware of BW-applicable research since 1996, but ISG judges it was not conducted in connection with
<br>a BW program.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15826px; width:404px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG has uncovered no evidence of illicit research conducted into BW agents by universities or
<br>research organizations.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:15862px; width:467px; height:83px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) The work conducted on a biopesticide (</span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">Bacillus thuringiensis</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">) at Al Hakam until 1995 would serve to main-
<br>tain the basic skills required by scientists to produce and dry anthrax spores (</span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">Bacillus anthracis</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">) but ISG has
<br>not discovered evidence suggesting this was the Regime’s intention. However in 1991, research and produc-
<br>tion on biopesticide and single cell protein (SCP) was selected by Iraq to provide cover for Al Hakam’s role
<br>in Iraq’s BW program. Similar work conducted at the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(TABRC) up to OIF also maintained skills that were applicable to BW, but again, ISG found no evidence to
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">suggest that this was the intention.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:15953px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">2
<br></span></div><span style="position:absolute; border: gray 1px solid; left:0px; top:16048px; width:612px; height:792px;"></span>
<div style="position:absolute; top:16048px;"><a name="20">Page 20</a></div>
<div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:16154px; width:468px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Similarly, ISG found no information to indicate that the work carried out by TABRC into Single Cell Protein
<br>(SCP) was a cover story for continuing research into the production of BW agents, such as </span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">C. botulinum</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px"> and
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADJF+Times-Italic; font-size:8px">B. anthracis</span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">, after the destruction of Al Hakam through to OIF.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:72px; top:16202px; width:459px; height:35px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) TABRC conducted research and development (R&D) programs to enable indigenous manufacture of bacte-
<br>rial growth media. Although these media are suitable for the bulk production of BW agents, ISG has found
<br>no evidence to indicate that their development and testing were specifi cally for this purpose.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:16250px; width:464px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Although Iraq had the basic capability to work with variola major (smallpox), ISG found no evidence that it
<br>retained any stocks of smallpox or actively conducted research into this agent for BW intentions.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:16286px; width:464px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work including research into BW agents for
<br>assassination purposes until the mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the
<br>work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development of BW
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">agent.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:16341px; width:470px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) The security services operated a series of laboratories in the Baghdad area. Iraq should have declared these
<br>facilities and their equipment to the UN, but they did not. Neither the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)
<br>nor the UN Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were aware of their existence
<br>or inspected them.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:16401px; width:465px; height:47px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Some of the laboratories possessed equipment capable of supporting research into BW agents for military
<br>purposes, but ISG does not know whether this occurred although there is no evidence of it. The laboratories
<br>were probably the successors of the Al Salman facility, located three kilometers south of Salman Pak, which
<br>was destroyed in 1991, and they carried on many of the same activities, including forensic work.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:16461px; width:463px; height:71px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Under the aegis of the intelligence service, a secretive team developed assassination instruments using
<br>poisons or toxins for the Iraqi state. A small group of scientists, doctors and technicians conducted secret
<br>experiments on human beings, resulting in their deaths. The aim was probably the development of poisons,
<br>including ricin and afl atoxin to eliminate or debilitate the Regime’s opponents. It appears that testing on
<br>humans continued until the mid 1990s. There is no evidence to link these tests with the development of BW
<br>agents for military use.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:16557px; width:469px; height:23px;"><span style="font-family: IOADGF+Times-BoldItalic; font-size:8px">In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent
<br>production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:16589px; width:464px; height:71px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) Prior to OIF there was information indicating Iraq had planned and built a breakout BW capability, in the
<br>form of a set of mobile production units, capable of producing BW agent at short notice in suffi cient quanti-
<br>ties to weaponize. Although ISG has conducted a thorough investigation of every aspect of this information,
<br>it has not found any equipment suitable for such a program, nor has ISG positively identifi ed any sites. No
<br>documents have been uncovered. Interviews with individuals suspected of involvement have all proved
<br>negative.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:577px; top:16613px; width:13px; height:52px;"><span style="font-family: IOADCF+Helvetica-Bold; font-size:2px">l
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<br>o
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<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:16673px; width:394px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility in regards to the breakout program.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:71px; top:16697px; width:455px; height:59px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">(cid:127) ISG thoroughly examined two trailers captured in 2003, suspected of being mobile BW agent production
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">units, and investigated the associated evidence. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers almost certainly designed
<br></span><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">and built the equipment exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. It is impractical to use the equipment
<br>for the production and weaponization of BW agent. ISG judges that it cannot therefore be part of any BW
<br>program.
<br></span></div><div style="position:absolute; border: textbox 1px solid; writing-mode:lr-tb; left:303px; top:16795px; width:5px; height:11px;"><span style="font-family: IOADAF+Times-Roman; font-size:8px">3
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<div style="position:absolute; top:0px;">Page: <a href="#1">1</a>, <a href="#2">2</a>, <a href="#3">3</a>, <a href="#4">4</a>, <a href="#5">5</a>, <a href="#6">6</a>, <a href="#7">7</a>, <a href="#8">8</a>, <a href="#9">9</a>, <a href="#10">10</a>, <a href="#11">11</a>, <a href="#12">12</a>, <a href="#13">13</a>, <a href="#14">14</a>, <a href="#15">15</a>, <a href="#16">16</a>, <a href="#17">17</a>, <a href="#18">18</a>, <a href="#19">19</a>, <a href="#20">20</a></div>
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