Attack Vector Taxonomy

This page lists all the known attack vectors of a fully trust-minimized clr.fund, with the purpose of deciding which to address vs. which to circumvent via trusted mechanisms for the MVP and each subsequent phase

This is a work in progress -- please add attack vectors that are missing

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Attacks aiming to acquire an outsize share of the matching funds

• Making contributions to a given recipient from fake (aka sybil) accounts -- this is what using BrightId is meant to prevent
• Bribing individuals to contribute to a given recipient -- this is what MACI is meant to prevent
• Fill up the recipient list for a given round so that you are the only one who can receive funds
• others?

Denial of service attacks aiming to prevent clr.fund from functioning

• Message-based DOS attack: fill up the message tree with spam to prevent others from sending messages
• Contributor-based DOS attack: fill up the user tree to prevent others from contributing
• Recipient-based DOS attack: fill up the recipient list with spam to prevent others from signing up as recipients
• others?

Other attack objectives?