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We had a discussion internally at Suredbits about doing this with a BIP32 scheme, which @nkohen shot down as it is probably not secure.
There was also a conversation about this in the LDK slack this morning between @NicolasDorier , @nkohen and @LLFourn about another nonce derivation scheme
Too summarize, I think we should be high skeptical of deterministic nonce generation schemes for an oracle, and probably should discourage it a oracle security section?
This should probably go in a "warning" section with #88
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
so the oracle doesn't store secret data in the database. But maybe it should do a query to check that it is attesting with what it said it would. I haven't made up my mind.
The concern isn't about deterministic nonce generation -- it's about public key derivation schemes like BIP32 non-hardened for nonces which is something you must never ever do.
In my personal oracle project I used a hardened bip 32 path and then tweaked the resulting key by sha256(R || event_label). This idea came from @LLFourn
We had a discussion internally at Suredbits about doing this with a BIP32 scheme, which @nkohen shot down as it is probably not secure.
There was also a conversation about this in the LDK slack this morning between @NicolasDorier , @nkohen and @LLFourn about another nonce derivation scheme
https://lightningdevkit.slack.com/archives/C012TKK8EJC/p1600233252138500
Too summarize, I think we should be high skeptical of deterministic nonce generation schemes for an oracle, and probably should discourage it a oracle security section?
This should probably go in a "warning" section with #88
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: