xml files like ".project" are parsed vulnerable against all sorts of XXE attacks. The user just needs to open any evil project or update an open project with a vulnerable file (for example for review a foreign repository or patch).
Vulnerablility was found by static code analysis (SonarLint).
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE price [
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:49416/evil">]>
<projectDescription>
<name>p</name>
<comment>&xxe;</comment>
</projectDescription>
Similar patches including junit test that shows the vulnerability have already applied to PDE (see eclipse-pde/eclipse.pde#667). A solution to platform should be the same: just reject parsing any XML that contains any DOCTYPE
.
No known workaround. User can only avoid to get/open any foreign files with eclipse. Firewall rules against loss of data (but not against XML bomb).
Impact
xml files like ".project" are parsed vulnerable against all sorts of XXE attacks. The user just needs to open any evil project or update an open project with a vulnerable file (for example for review a foreign repository or patch).
Vulnerablility was found by static code analysis (SonarLint).
Example
.project
file:Patches
Similar patches including junit test that shows the vulnerability have already applied to PDE (see eclipse-pde/eclipse.pde#667). A solution to platform should be the same: just reject parsing any XML that contains any
DOCTYPE
.Workarounds
No known workaround. User can only avoid to get/open any foreign files with eclipse. Firewall rules against loss of data (but not against XML bomb).
References
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html
https://rules.sonarsource.com/java/RSPEC-2755
https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/issues/8 (Report for multiple projects affected)