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<!DOCTYPE html>
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<p>We are part of Dartmouth’s interdisciplinary <a href="https://cognitive-science.dartmouth.edu/">Program in Cognitive Science</a>, and graduate students complete their PhD work in the <a href="https://pbs.dartmouth.edu/">Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences</a>.</p>
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<p>The lab’s research draws on a broad range of the methods employed across psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and computer science to better understand questions about how humans think both about the actual world and about non-actual
possibilities (sometimes called “possible worlds”).</p>
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<p>
We explore both how people think about possibilities themselves and how that influences the way that they think more generally, from the language they use, to the causal and moral judgments they make. Find our more about our
<a href="#research">research.</a>
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<h2>LATEST WORKS</h2>
<p>For a full list see <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=iwf2IBwAAAAJ&hl=en">Google Scholar</a> or <a href="https://publons.com/researcher/1245235/jonathan-phillips/">Publons</a></p>
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<ul>
<li><button class="filter" data-filter=".all">All</button></li>
<li><button class="filter" data-filter=".poss">Possibilities</button></li>
<li><button class="filter" data-filter=".causation">Causation</button></li>
<li><button class="filter" data-filter=".morality">Morality</button></li>
<li><button class="filter" data-filter=".tom">Theory of Mind</button></li>
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<ul id="mixed-items">
<div class="team" id="pubs">
<li class="all mix morality causation col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="1">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Immoral professors and malfunctioning tools</h3>
<img src="img/komPhil.jpeg">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>This paper sets a new standard for demonstrating that the effect of norm violations on causal selection is driven by changes in counterfactual relevance. We then outline a number important but unanswered
questions about this approach to causal reasoning.</p>
<h3>
<p><em><a href="http://www.jfkominsky.com">Jonathan Kominsky</a>, <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> </em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/cogs.12792"><i>Cognitive Science (2019)</i></a></strong></p>
<p> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/KominskyPhillips">github</a></p>
</h3>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix poss col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="2">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title"> How We Know What Not To Think </h3>
<img src="img/howWeKnow.PNG">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>Humans often represent and reason about unrealized possible actions. But how do we select possible actions that are worth considering from the infinity of unrealized actions better left ignored? We propose
that (1) across diverse cognitive tasks, the possible actions we consider are biased towards those of general practical utility and (2) a plausible primary function for this mechanism resides in decision
making.
</p>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/adammorris/publications-0">Adam Morris</a>, <a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu">Fiery Cushman</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661319302311"><i>Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2019)</i></a></strong></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix possibility semantics col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="3">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">New horizons for a theory of epistemic modals</h3>
<img src="img/horizon.jpg">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>
Recent debate over the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic modals has focused on intuitions about cross-contextual truth-value assessments. In this paper, we advocate a different approach to evaluating theories of epistemic modals. Our strategy focuses
on judgments of the incompatibility of two different epistemic possibility claims, or two different truth value assessments of a single epistemic possibility claim. We subject the predictions of existing
theories to empirical scrutiny, and argue that existing contextualist and relativist theories are unable to account for the full pattern of observed judgments. As a way of illustrating the theoretical
upshot of these results, we conclude by developing a novel theory of epistemic modals that is able to predict the results.
</p>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://www.justinkhoo.org">Justin Khoo</a> </em><br><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/qwIfzSJzXBXuXpkDqJ9F/full">Australasian Journal of Philosophy, (2018)</a><br>
<a href="downloads/KhooPhillips-2018.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/newHorizonsForEpistemicModals">github</a> <a href="https://osf.io/mhsfe/">OSF</a>
<a href="https://osf.io/czu2w">preprint</a>
<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C33&q=%22New+horizons+for+a+theory+of+epistemic+modals%22+phillips">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/khoo2018newHorizons.bib">.bib</a>
<a href="downloads/contextualTruth_handout.pdf">handout</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix causation col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="4">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Quantitative causal selection patterns in token causation</h3>
<img src="img/quantCause.PNG">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>This paper provides a quantitative exploration of the puzzling way that causal judgments are affected by the likelihood of the contributing causes, and uncovers some new patterns that are no current theories
are well-suited to capture. These results provide a new goalpost for anyone modeling causal selection judgments. </p>
<p><em><a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/adammorris/publications-0">Adam Morris</a>, <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://cicl.stanford.edu/member/tobias_gerstenberg/">Tobias Gerstenberg</a>, <a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu">Fiery Cushman</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0219704">PLoS ONE 14(8): e0219704 (2019)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> </strong></p>
<p> <a href="https://github.com/adammmorris/causality">github</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix morality causation possibility col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="5">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Sticky situations <br><br></h3>
<img src="img/sticky.jpg">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>
When do we judge that someone was forced to do what they did? One relatively well-established finding is that subjects tend to judge that agents were not forced to do actions when those actions violate norms. A surprising discovery of Young & Phillips
2011 is that this effect seems to disappear when we frame the relevant ‘force’-claim in the active rather than passive voice (pX forced Y to ϕq vs. pY was forced to ϕ by Xq). Young and Phillips found
a similar contrast when the scenario itself shifts attention from Y (the forcee) to X (the forcer). We propose that these effects can be (at least partly) explained by way of the role of attention in
the setting of quantifier domains which in turn play a role in the evaluation of ‘force’- claims.
</p>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0776/">Matthew Mandelkern</a> </em><br><a href="https://journals.linguisticsociety.org/proceedings/index.php/SALT/article/view/28.474">Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT), 28 (2018)</a><br>
<a href="https://osf.io/crxdq/">OSF</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/stickySituations">github</a> <a href="https://aspredicted.org/6qa2t.pdf">pre-registration</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix semantics tom col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="6">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Knowledge wh and False Beliefs <br><br></h3>
<img src="img/know-wh2.png">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>We consider the phenomenon of false-belief sensitivity–a challenge to the common approach to knowledge <i>wh</i>. Across six experiments, our results provide evidence that truth judgments of knowledge <i>wh</i> ascriptions are affected by both the presence of false beliefs and the proportion of the subject’s beliefs that are false.</p>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="https://sites.google.com/view/brgeorge/">B R George</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://academic.oup.com/jos/article/35/3/467/4986223?guestAccessKey=d0ea973b-38fe-44cd-8430-d1adaeed4d23">Journal of Semantics (2018)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> </strong></p>
<p> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/Knowledge_wh">github</a> <a href="https://osf.io/csefx/">OSF</a> <a href="https://osf.io/3wvnq/">preprint</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=%22Non-reducibility+with+knowledge+wh%3A+Experimental+investigations%22&btnG=">scholar</a>
<a href="downloads/phillips2018know-wh.bib">.bib</a> <a href="downloads/Know_Wh_Handout.pdf">handout</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix poss freedom col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="7">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">The psychological representation of modality</h3>
<img src="img/modality.png">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>We argue that recent work on the impact of physical law, morality and probability on people’s judgments provides evidence for a more general hypothesis about the kind of cognition people use to think about
possibilities. We suggest that this aspect of cognition is best understood using an idea developed within work in formal semantics: modality.</p>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="downloads/psychologyofModality.pdf">Mind & Language (2018)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> For a quick and easy summary, check out this <a href="https://phillipsjs.github.io/modality/2018/03/14/the-psychological-representation-of-modality/">blog post</a>!</strong></p>
<p> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0,6&q=the+psychological+representation+of+modality">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2018psychological.bib">.bib</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix tom col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="8">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Factive theory of mind <br><br></h3>
<img src="img/factiveToM.png">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>We offer an account on which tracking another agent’s understanding of the world and keeping that representation separate from one’s own are the essential features of a capacity for theory of mind. Using
this, we demonstrate how to tell when factive representations, e.g., what others see, hear, or know, provide evidence for theory of mind.</p>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="https://philpapers.org/profile/18479">Aaron Norby</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mila.12267">Mind & Langauge (2018) </a></strong></p>
<p> <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mila.12267">preprint</a> <a href="https://osf.io/xdk9b/">supplement</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix poss col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="9">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Differentiating could from should <br><br></h3>
<img src="img/shtulman.png">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>We show that young children have difficulty distinguishing immoral events from impossible ones, and impossible events from immoral ones. The ability to differentiate between the possibiity and wrongness
of different kinds of abnormal events is a developmental achievement.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://sites.oxy.edu/shtulman/">Andrew Shtulman</a>, <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="downloads/JECP_Modality2017.pdf">Journal of Child Development (2018)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> </strong></p>
<p> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Differentiating+could+from+should%3A+Developmental+changes+in+modal+cognition&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="https://osf.io/d4xs5/">OSF</a>
<a href="downloads/spp2017_poster.pdf">poster</a> <a href="downloads/shtulman2018.bib">.bib</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix morality poss col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="10">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Morality constrains the default representation</h3>
<img src="img/implicit.jpg">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>Three studies differentiate explicit reasoning about possibilities from default implicit representations, demonstrate that human adults often default to treating immoral and irrational events as impossible,
and demonstrate that high-level cognitive judgments rely on default implicit representations of possibility rather than explicit reasoning.</p>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu/">Fiery Cushman</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/114/18/4649.abstract">Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2017)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> Check out some of the coverage in <a href="https://aeon.co/ideas/but-you-cant-do-that-why-immoral-actions-seem-impossible">Aeon</a>, <a href="http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/04/study-finds-people-equate-immorality-with-impossibility/">Harvard Gazette</a>, <a href="https://www.byuradio.org/episode/346d3d6d-a5d8-4e14-9a73-c29ac39b8905?playhead=4140&autoplay=true">a radio interview</a>, or <a href="https://www.thesciencebreaker.com/breaks/psychology/by-default-people-treat-immoral-actions-as-impossible">Science Breakers</a></strong></p>
<p> <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/suppl/2017/04/17/1619717114.DCSupplemental/pnas.201619717SI.pdf#nameddest=STXT">Supporting Information</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2017possibility.bib">.bib</a>
<a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/implicitModality">github</a>
<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Morality+constrains+the+default+representation+of+what+is+possible&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="https://imperfectcognitions.blogspot.co.uk/2017/08/morality-constrains-what-we-implicitly.html">blog post</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix morality possibiity col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="11">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">True Happiness <br><br></h3>
<img src="img/trueHappiness.jpg">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>Five studies demonstrate that the orindary concept of happiness deviates from the definition used by researchers studying happiness: the ordinary concept is sensitive to the perceived <i>moral</i> value
of the life lived.</p>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="https://www.cov.com/en/professionals/m/christian-mott">Christian Mott</a>, <a href="http://www.juliandefreitas.com/">Julian De Freitas</a>, <a href="https://www.colorado.edu/clinicalpsychology/june-gruber-phd">June Gruber</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/xge/146/2/165/">Journal of Experimental Psychology: General (2017)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> See the discussion of this work at <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/experiments-in-philosophy/201702/what-does-it-take-be-truly-happy">Psychology Today</a> or <a href="http://peasoup.us/2018/03/jonathan-phillips-and-joshua-knobe-the-ordinary-concept-of-happiness/">PEA Soup</a></strong></p>
<p> <a href="downloads/Phillipsetal_truehappinessFinal.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness">github</a> <a href="downloads/happinessPoster.pdf">poster</a>
<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=True+happiness%3A+The+role+of+morality+in+the+folk+concept+of+happiness.&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2017trueHappiness.bib">.bib</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix causation col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="12">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Causation and norms of proper functioning</h3>
<img src="img/stillRelevant.png">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>We demonstrate that causal judgments of inanimate objects are highly sensitive to whether the object violated a prescriptive norm by malfunctioning and that this effect is well-explained by changes in the
relevance of counterfactual alternatives.
</p>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://www.jfkominsky.com">Jonathan Kominsky</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2017/papers/0183/index.html">Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (2017)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> </strong></p>
<p> <a href="https://osf.io/2x3p3/">OSF repository</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/stillRelevant">github</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Causation+and+norms+of+proper+functioning%3A+Counterfactuals+are+%28still%29+relevant.&btnG=">scholar</a>
<a href="downloads/stillRelevant_poster.pdf">poster</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2017stillRelevant.bib">.bib</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix morality causation col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="14">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Unifying morality's influence on non-moral judgments</h3>
<img src="img/RoA.png">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>Past work has demonstrated that people’s moral judgments can influence their judgments about freedom, causation, the doing/allowing distinction, and intentional action. Nine studies show that the effect
of morality in these four domains can be explained in a unified manner by changes in the relevance of alternative possibilities.</p>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=oia0_vsAAAAJ&hl=en">Jamie Luguri</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027715300457">Cognition (2015)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> Here’s a summary <a href="http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/2015/09/unifying-moralitys-effect-on-non-moral-cognition.html">blog post</a></strong></p>
<p> <a href="downloads/Phillipsetal_truehappinessFinal.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/RoA">github</a> <a href="downloads/RoA_Poster.pdf">poster</a>
<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Unifying+morality%E2%80%99s+influence+on+non-moral+judgments%3A+The+relevance+of+alternative+possibilities&btnG=">scholar</a>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix tom col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="13">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Knowledge before belief<br><br></h3>
<img src="img/manifesto.png">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>Drawing on evidence from a wide range of fields in cognitive science that employ diverse methodologies, we find, across every field and method, robust evidence that knowledge is a more basic mental-state
representation than belief, and that representations of knowledge do not depend on representations of belief.
</p>
<h3>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://wesleybuckwalter.org/">Wesley Buckwlater</a>, <a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu">Fiery Cushman</a>, <a href="https://sites.google.com/view/uwaterloocclab">Ori Friedman</a>, <a href="https://www.victoria.ac.nz/psyc/about/staff/alia-martin">Alia Martin</a>, <a href="http://john.turri.org/">John Turri</a>, <a href="http://caplab.yale.edu/">Laurie Santos</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9951/2f791f124e3cf1f6a2e45b4118c66246c973.pdf">41st annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2015/6) </a></strong></p>
</h3>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix tom col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="15">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">A second look at automatic theory of mind</h3>
<img src="img/KTE.PNG">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>Recent research by Kovács, Téglás, & Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represent other agents’ beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed.
In a series of eight studies, we replicate the previous findings but demonstrate that the effects found in this work arose from artifacts in the experimental paradigm.</p>
<p><em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/~dco/">Desmond Ong</a>, <a href="https://uclouvain.academia.edu/AndrewSurtees">Andrew Surtees</a>, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/jeanxin">Jean Xin</a>, <a href="#">Samantha Williams</a>, <a href="http://saxelab.mit.edu/">Rebecca Saxe</a>, <a href="http://langcog.stanford.edu/">Michael Frank</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="http://pss.sagepub.com/content/26/9/1353">Psychological Science (2015)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> Here’s a <a href="http://babieslearninglanguage.blogspot.com/2014/11/is-mind-reading-automatic-replication.html">blog post</a> about this work, and here’s an important <a href="http://babieslearninglanguage.blogspot.com/2015/05/an-update-on-automatic-belief-encoding.html">update</a> (both by Michael Frank)</strong></p>
<p> <a href="downloads/POSXWSF-psychsci-inpress.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/langcog/KTE">github</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=A+second+look+at+automatic+theory+of+mind%3A+Reconsidering+Kov%C3%A1cs%2C+T%C3%A9gl%C3%A1s%2C+and+Endress+(2010)&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="http://rawgit.com/langcog/KTE/master/KTE_Study1a/index.html">demo</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2015second.bib">.bib</a> <a href="downloads/KTE_markdown.html">markdown version </a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix possibility semantics morality col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="16">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Causal superseding<br><br></h3>
<img src="img/causalSuperseding.PNG">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>When agents violate norms, they are typically judged to be more of a cause of resulting outcomes. In this paper, we suggest that norm violations also affect the causality attributed to other agents, a phenomenon
we refer to as ‘causal superseding’.
</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.jfkominsky.com">Jonathan Kominsky</a>, <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://cicl.stanford.edu/member/tobias_gerstenberg/">Tobias Gerstenberg</a>, <a href="http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/david_lagnado.html">David Lagnado</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a></em></p>
<p><strong><a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027715000220">Cognition (2015)</a></strong></p>
<p class="text-danger"><strong> </strong></p>
<p> <a href="downloads/causalSuperseding.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=%22Causal+superseding%22+kominsky+phillips&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/KominskyCogSci.pdf">CogSci proceeding</a> <a href="downloads/kominsky2015causal.bib">.bib</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix causality morality col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="17">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">Manipulating Morality <br><br></h3>
<img src="img/manipulating.jpg">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>
The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party,
we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur.
</p>
<p><b>Manipulating Morality: Third-Party Intentions Alters Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/alexshawyale/">Alex Shaw</a> </em><br><a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.12194/abstract">Cognitive Science (2014)</a><br>
<a href="downloads/Phillips_Manipulating_Morality.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/Manipulation">github</a> <a href="https://osf.io/sdupw/">osf</a>
<a href="http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/2016/01/knowledge-of-being-manipulated-does-not-affect-moral-responsibility-what.html">update</a> <a href="http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/2014/08/the-manipulation-argument-experimental-style.html">blog</a> <a href="http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2014/11/18/influenced-by-others-less-at-fault/">media</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Manipulating+Morality%3A+Third-Party+Intentions+Alter+Moral+Judgments+by+Changing+Causal+Reasoning&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2014manipulating.bib">.bib</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="all mix possibility morality col-md-4 col-xs-6" data-my-order="18">
<div class="block">
<h3 id="pub_title">The paradox of moral focus<br><br></h3>
<img src="img/paradox.jpg">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="pub_title"> Abstract</h3>
<p>
When we evaluate moral agents, we consider many factors, including whether the agent acted freely, or under duress or coercion. In turn, moral evaluations have been shown to influence our (non-moral) evaluations of these same factors. For example, when
we judge an agent to have acted immorally, we are subsequently more likely to judge the agent to have acted freely, not under force. Here, we investigate the cognitive signatures of this effect in interpersonal
situations, in which one agent (“forcer”) forces another agent (“forcee”) to act either immorally or morally. The structure of this relationship allowed us to ask questions about both the “forcer” and
the “forcee.” Paradoxically, participants judged that the “forcer” forced the “forcee” to act immorally (i.e. X forced Y), but that the “forcee” was not forced to act immorally (i.e. Y was not forced
by X).
</p>
<a href="http://moralitylab.bc.edu/">Liane Young</a>, <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> </em><br><a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027711000175">Cognition (2011)</a><br>
<a href="downloads/YoungPhillipsCognitionIP.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=%22The+paradox+of+moral+focus%22&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6q04z6jf">CogSci proceeding</a> <a href="downloads/young2011paradox.bib">.bib</a></p>
</div>
</div>
</li>
</div>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div id="publications_mobile">
<h3 id="full-list">Full List</h3>
<p><b>How we know what not to think</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/adammorris/publications-0">Adam Morris</a>, <a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu">Fiery Cushman</a> </em><br><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661319302311"><i>Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2019)</i></a><br></p>
<p><b>Knowledge before belief</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://wesleybuckwalter.org/">Wesley Buckwlater</a>, <a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu">Fiery Cushman</a>, <a href="https://sites.google.com/view/uwaterloocclab">Ori Friedman</a>, <a href="https://www.victoria.ac.nz/psyc/about/staff/alia-martin">Alia Martin</a>, <a href="http://john.turri.org/">John Turri</a>, <a href="http://caplab.yale.edu/">Laurie Santos</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a> </em><br>
<a href="http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9951/2f791f124e3cf1f6a2e45b4118c66246c973.pdf">41st annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2015/6)</a><br></p>
<p><b>Immoral professors and malfunctioning tools: Counterfactual relevance accounts explain the effect of norm violations on causal selection</b> <br>
<em><a href="http://www.jfkominsky.com">Jonathan Kominsky</a>, Jonathan Phillips </em><br><a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/KominskyPhillips/blob/master/manuscript/KominskyPhillips_Revision_final.pdf"><i>Cognitive Science (2019)</i></a><br>
<a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/KominskyPhillips">github</a>
</p>
<p><b>Factive theory of mind</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="https://philpapers.org/profile/18479">Aaron Norby</a> </em><br><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mila.12267">Mind & Langauge (2017)</a><br><a href="downloads/factiveToM.pdf">preprint</a>
<a href="https://osf.io/xdk9b/">supplement</a></p>
<p><b>Quantitative causal selection patterns in token causation</b> <br>
<em><a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/adammorris/publications-0">Adam Morris</a>, <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a>, <a href="http://cicl.stanford.edu/member/tobias_gerstenberg/">Tobias Gerstenberg</a>, <a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu">Fiery Cushman</a> </em><br>
<a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0219704">PLoS ONE 14(8): e0219704 (2019)</a><br><a href="https://github.com/adammmorris/causality">github</a></p>
<p><b>Sticky situations: <i>Force</i> and quantifier domains</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0776/">Matthew Mandelkern</a> </em><br><a href="https://journals.linguisticsociety.org/proceedings/index.php/SALT/article/view/28.474">Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT), 28 (2018)</a><br>
<a href="https://osf.io/crxdq/">OSF</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/stickySituations">github</a> <a href="https://aspredicted.org/6qa2t.pdf">pre-registration</a></p>
<p><b>Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy</b> <br>
<em><a href="https://sites.google.com/site/floriancova/">Florian Cova</a>, <a href="http://brentstrickland.net/">Brent Strickland</a>, … <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , et al. </em><br><a href="https://osf.io/7f5hs/">Review of Philosophy and Psychology (<i>in press</i>)</a><br>
<a href="https://osf.io/dvkpr/">OSF</a>
</p>
<p><b>New horizons for a theory of epistemic modals</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="http://web.mit.edu/jkhoo/www/">Justin Khoo</a> </em><br><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/qwIfzSJzXBXuXpkDqJ9F/full">Australasian Journal of Philosophy, (2018)</a><br>
<a href="downloads/KhooPhillips-2018.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/newHorizonsForEpistemicModals">github</a> <a href="https://osf.io/mhsfe/">OSF</a> <a href="https://osf.io/czu2w">preprint</a>
<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C33&q=%22New+horizons+for+a+theory+of+epistemic+modals%22+phillips">scholar</a>
<a href="downloads/khoo2018newHorizons.bib">.bib</a> <a href="downloads/contextualTruth_handout.pdf">handout</a></p>
<p><b>Knowledge wh and False Beliefs: Experimental Investigations</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/marblesandunicorns/">B R George</a> </em><br><a href="https://academic.oup.com/jos/article/35/3/467/4986223?guestAccessKey=d0ea973b-38fe-44cd-8430-d1adaeed4d23">Journal of Semantics (2018)</a><br>
<a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/Knowledge_wh">github</a> <a href="https://osf.io/csefx/">OSF</a> <a href="https://osf.io/3wvnq/">preprint</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=%22Non-reducibility+with+knowledge+wh%3A+Experimental+investigations%22&btnG=">scholar</a>
<a href="downloads/phillips2018know-wh.bib">.bib</a> <a href="downloads/Know_Wh_Handout.pdf">handout</a></p>
<p><b>The psychological representation of modality</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a> </em><br><a href="downloads/psychologyofModality.pdf">Mind & Language (2018)</a><br><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0,6&q=the+psychological+representation+of+modality">scholar</a>
<a href="downloads/phillips2018psychological.bib">.bib</a>
</p>
<p><b>Differentiating could from should: Developmental changes in modal cognition</b> <br>
<em><a href="https://sites.oxy.edu/shtulman/">Andrew Shtulman</a>, <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> </em><br><a href="downloads/JECP_Modality2017.pdf">Journal of Child Development (2018)</a><br><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Differentiating+could+from+should%3A+Developmental+changes+in+modal+cognition&btnG=">scholar</a>
<a href="https://osf.io/d4xs5/">OSF</a> <a href="downloads/spp2017_poster.pdf">poster</a> <a href="downloads/shtulman2018.bib">.bib</a></p>
<p><b>Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="http://www.jfkominsky.com">Jonathan Kominsky</a> </em><br><a href="https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2017/papers/0183/index.html">Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (2017)</a><br>
<a href="https://osf.io/2x3p3/">OSF repository</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/stillRelevant">github</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Causation+and+norms+of+proper+functioning%3A+Counterfactuals+are+%28still%29+relevant.&btnG=">scholar</a>
<a href="downloads/stillRelevant_poster.pdf">poster</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2017stillRelevant.bib">.bib</a></p>
<p><b>Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu/">Fiery Cushman</a> </em><br><a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/114/18/4649.abstract">Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2017)</a><br>
<a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/suppl/2017/04/17/1619717114.DCSupplemental/pnas.201619717SI.pdf#nameddest=STXT">Supporting Information</a>
<a href="downloads/phillips2017possibility.bib">.bib</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/implicitModality">github</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Morality+constrains+the+default+representation+of+what+is+possible&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="https://imperfectcognitions.blogspot.co.uk/2017/08/morality-constrains-what-we-implicitly.html">blog post</a></p>
<p><b>True happiness: The role of morality in the folk concept of happiness</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="https://www.cov.com/en/professionals/m/christian-mott">Christian Mott</a>, <a href="http://www.juliandefreitas.com/">Julian De Freitas</a>, <a href="https://www.colorado.edu/clinicalpsychology/june-gruber-phd">June Gruber</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a> </em><br>
<a href="http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/xge/146/2/165/">Journal of Experimental Psychology: General (2017)</a><br><a href="downloads/Phillipsetal_truehappinessFinal.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/trueHappiness">github</a> <a href="downloads/happinessPoster.pdf">poster</a>
<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=True+happiness%3A+The+role+of+morality+in+the+folk+concept+of+happiness.&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2017trueHappiness.bib">.bib</a></p>
<p><b>Unifying morality’s influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=oia0_vsAAAAJ&hl=en">Jamie Luguri</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a> </em><br><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027715300457">Cognition (2015)</a><br>
<a href="downloads/Phillipsetal_truehappinessFinal.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/RoA">github</a> <a href="downloads/RoA_Poster.pdf">poster</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Unifying+morality%E2%80%99s+influence+on+non-moral+judgments%3A+The+relevance+of+alternative+possibilities&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2015unifying.bib">.bib</a></p>
<p><b>A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010)</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/~dco/">Desmond Ong</a>, <a href="https://uclouvain.academia.edu/AndrewSurtees">Andrew Surtees</a>, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/jeanxin">Jean Xin</a>, <a href="#">Samantha Williams</a>, <a href="http://saxelab.mit.edu/">Rebecca Saxe</a>, <a href="http://langcog.stanford.edu/">Michael Frank</a> </em><br>
<a href="http://pss.sagepub.com/content/26/9/1353">Psychological Science (2015)</a><br><a href="downloads/POSXWSF-psychsci-inpress.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/langcog/KTE">github</a>
<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=A+second+look+at+automatic+theory+of+mind%3A+Reconsidering+Kov%C3%A1cs%2C+T%C3%A9gl%C3%A1s%2C+and+Endress+(2010)&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="http://rawgit.com/langcog/KTE/master/KTE_Study1a/index.html">demo</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2015second.bib">.bib</a> <a href="downloads/KTE_markdown.html">markdown version </a></p>
<p><b>Causal superseding</b> <br>
<em><a href="http://www.jfkominsky.com">Jonathan Kominsky</a>, <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="http://cicl.stanford.edu/member/tobias_gerstenberg/">Tobias Gerstenberg</a>, <a href="http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/david_lagnado.html">David Lagnado</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a> </em><br>
<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027715000220">Cognition (2015)</a><br><a href="downloads/causalSuperseding.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=%22Causal+superseding%22+kominsky+phillips&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/KominskyCogSci.pdf">CogSci proceeding</a> <a href="downloads/kominsky2015causal.bib">.bib</a></p>
<p><b>The good in happiness</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="https://www.tue.nl/en/research/researchers/sven-nyholm/">Sven Nyholm</a>, <a href="http://liao.shen-yi.org/">Shen-yi Liao</a> </em><br><a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=DDvKBQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT257&dq=%22The+good+in+happiness%22&ots=sn4HBKGuLN&sig=363TrU4wqd-ZogCbLMK3iLMTGsY#v=onepage&q=%22The%20good%20in%20happiness%22&f=false">Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy (2014)</a><br>
<a href="downloads/theGoodinHappiness.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="http://allbeingwellblog.com/jonathan-philips-on-the-concept-of-happiness/">interview</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=%22The+good+in+happiness%22+phillips&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2014good.bib">.bib</a></p>
<p><b>Manipulating morality: Third-party intentions alter moral judgments by changing causal reasoning</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/alexshawyale/">Alex Shaw</a> </em><br><a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.12194/abstract">Cognitive Science (2014)</a><br>
<a href="downloads/Phillips_Manipulating_Morality.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/Manipulation">github</a> <a href="https://osf.io/sdupw/">osf</a> <a href="http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/2016/01/knowledge-of-being-manipulated-does-not-affect-moral-responsibility-what.html">update</a> <a href="http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/2014/08/the-manipulation-argument-experimental-style.html">blog</a> <a href="http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2014/11/18/influenced-by-others-less-at-fault/">media</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Manipulating+Morality%3A+Third-Party+Intentions+Alter+Moral+Judgments+by+Changing+Causal+Reasoning&btnG=">scholar</a>
<a href="downloads/phillips2014manipulating.bib">.bib</a>
</p>
<p><b>The paradox of moral focus</b> <br>
<em><a href="http://moralitylab.bc.edu/">Liane Young</a>, <a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> </em><br><a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027711000175">Cognition (2011)</a><br><a href="downloads/YoungPhillipsCognitionIP.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=%22The+paradox+of+moral+focus%22&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6q04z6jf">CogSci proceeding</a> <a href="downloads/young2011paradox.bib">.bib</a></p>
<p><b>The ordinary concept of happiness (and others like it)</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="https://philosophy.berkeley.edu/people/detail/179">Luke Misenheimer</a>, <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a> </em><br><a href="http://emr.sagepub.com/content/3/3/320.abstract">Emotion Review (2011)</a><br>
<a href="downloads/LoveandHappiness.pdf">preprint</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=%22The+ordinary+concept+of+happiness+%28and+others+like+it%29%22&btnG=">scholar</a>
<a href="...downloads/phillips2011ordinary.bib">.bib</a>
<a href="downloads/LovHapSupp.pdf">supplementary materials</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SPkcOBEuUD0">YouTube</a></p>
<p><b>Moral judgments and intuitions about freedom</b> <br>
<em><a href="/phillips.html">Jonathan Phillips</a> , <a href="http://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a> </em><br><a href="">Emotion Review (2009)</a><br><a href="downloads/Freedom.pdf">preprint</a>
<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Moral+judgments+and+intuitions+about+freedom&btnG=">scholar</a> <a href="downloads/phillips2009moral.bib">.bib</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0dTQh__09ro">YouTube</a></p>
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<h2>Research</h2>
<p>Our lab draws on the methods used across a number of disciplines (psychology, philosophy, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science) to answer central questions about how the human mind works. A primary topic we focus on is how humans
represent and reason about non-actual possibilities—the vast infinity of things that didn’t (or have not yet) happened. Our understanding of what is possible is central to many of our most impressive, and uniquely human capacities:
causal reasoning, theory of mind, planning, linguistic communication, moral judgment, and so on. Our work focus on these aspects of high-level cognition, both separately, and jointly by developing an understanding of the way that
they all draw on a common underlying capacity to think about what is merely possible.</p>
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<h4 class="media-heading">Possibilities</h4>
<p>A main line of research has been to demonstrate the role that <em>value</em> plays in constraining which possibilities humans default to considering. Partly this work has just been an effort to uncover the empirical phenomenon:
We’ve found that when adults are forced to decide what things are possibility when answering quickly (thus relying a default understanding of possibility), <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/04/17/1619717114.full.pdf">they begin to treat immoral actions as impossible</a>.
Moreover, children early in development judge immoral and imprudent actions to be impossible, even on reflection. The other part of this work has been to make sense of this phenomenon theoretically and formally. We’ve recently
argued that value plays a similar role in which possible actions are considered in first-person decision making, and that this similarity is not merely a coincidence. We’ve also tried to provide a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mila.12165">philosophically-oriented overview</a> of how the resulting psychological picture of how we represent possibilities fits with theoretical work on judgments that require us to represent alternative possibilities.</p>
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<h4 class="media-heading">Causation</h4>
<p>A paradigm example of the kind of cognition that depend on representations of alternative possibilities is our judgments about <em>what caused what</em>. If you’re trying to figure out what the cause of a forest fire was, for
example, part of what we do is consider what would have happened if things had happened differently: What if the person hadn’t made a campfire when there was a fire warning? Or what if there hadn’t been a drought? What
is particularly interesting is that people share a strong tendency to consider certain kinds of counterfactuals and not others. We don’t tend to consider counterfactual possibilities in which there was no oxygen in the
air and so the forest fire didn’t occur. Our work has investigated the way that that our ideas about what is <em>normal</em> shape our causal judgments because people tend to focus on counterfactuals that are more normal,
ones in which <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027715000220">people do the right thing</a>, <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0219704">likely events occur</a>,
and <a href="https://github.com/phillipsjs/KominskyPhillips/blob/master/manuscript/KominskyPhillips_AcceptMinor_Formatted.pdf">things function normally</a>.</p>
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<h4 class="media-heading">Freedom and Responsibility</h4>
<p>Another example of cognition involving alternative possibilities is how we judge whether someone was forced to do something and whether they were responsible for what they did. Typically, we only judge that someone was forced
to do something when we don’t think it was possible for them to do something else instead. And we typically don’t hold other people response for their actions when they had no better alternative. Our work has demonstrated
that judgments of force and responsibility <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/04/17/1619717114.full.pdf">depend on default representations of possibility</a>, and that these judgments are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40646387.pdf">surprisingly influenced by our moral judgments</a> because we tend to not treat immoral alternative actions as possible. In fact, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027711000175">the impact of morality can lead to paradoxical patterns of judgments</a>,
where we judge that a person <em>S</em> was forced to do some action <em>a</em> by another person <em>P</em>, but that <em>P</em> did not force <em>S</em> to <em>a</em>.</p>
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<h4 class="media-heading">Theory of Mind</h4>
<p>Research on theory of mind has primarily focused on demonstrating and understanding the ability to represent others’ non-factive mental states, e.g., others’ beliefs in the false belief task. Our work has instead focused on
how people represent others’ factive mental states, like what others <em>know</em>. We have developed a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mila.12267">simple and theoretically motivated account</a> on which tracking another agent’s understanding of the world and keeping that representation separate from one’s own are the essential features of a capacity for theory of mind. In ongoing work, we’ve review the theory
of mind literature from across the cognitive sciences (research from comparative cognition, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, linguistics, experimental philosophy, etc.) and find that across almost every measure,
factive representations, like what others <em>know</em> are more basic than non-factive representations like what others <em>believe</em>.</p>
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<h4 class="media-heading">Semantics</h4>
<p>In our work on language, our lab largely focuses on developing formal semantic theories of modal terms—words like ‘might’ or ‘could’. Specifically, we’ve tried to provide an account of the meaning of these terms that integrates
our emerging understanding of how people represent non-actual possibilities at a psychological level with standard semantics accounts that have been developed over the past half century in linguistics and philosophy. In
pursuing this work, we have often tested the unique predictions of these formal models in experimental studies that form part of the growing tradition of work on experimental semantics. For a few examples, see our work
on <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jos/article-pdf/35/3/467/27083956/ffy004.pdf">knowledge-wh</a>, <a href="http://www.journals.linguisticsociety.org/proceedings/index.php/SALT/article/viewFile/28.474/4059">force</a>,
and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00048402.2018.1484499">epsitemic modals</a>.</p>
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<h2>Team</h2>
<p><strong>We are looking for a new lab manager to join our team</strong> <a href="#joinus">(see openings)</a> <strong>!</strong></p>
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<h2>Principal Investigator </h2>
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<h2 id="sub"><label for="check01">Principal Investigator <i class="fa fa-angle-down" aria-hidden="true"></i></label></h2>
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<h3 id="name">Jonathan Phillips</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> Assistant Professor, Program in Cognitive Science</li>
<li>Graduate Advisor, Psychological and Brian Sciences</li>
<li>Affiliated Assistant Professor, Philosophy</li>
<a href="[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
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<h2>Graduate Researchers</h2>
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<h3 id="name">Catherine Holland <span>PhD Student, starting Sep. 2019</span></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> Bachelor of Science in Psychology from Yale University </li>
<li> Lab Manager with <a href="https://nel.mit.edu/">Drazen Prelec</a> at MIT </li>
<li> Lab Manager with <a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu/index.php">Fiery Cushman</a> and <a href="http://www.joshua-greene.net/">Joshua Greene</a> at Harvard University </li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected] ">[email protected] </a>
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<h2>Undergraduate Researchers</h2>
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<h3 id="name">Eliza Jane Schaeffer</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> Cognitive Science Major ‘20 </li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>
</ul>
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<h3 id="name">Hailey Scherer</h3>
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<li> Cognitive Science Major '20</li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
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<h3 id="name">Kyra Spaulding</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> Cognitive Science Major '20</li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
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<h3 id="name">Aneett Gawerc</h3>
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<li> Cognitive Science Major '20</li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
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<h3 id="name">Julian Grunauer</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> Cognitive Science Major '21 </li>
<li> Research Assistant </li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
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<h3 id="name">Donovan Fernandes</h3>
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<li> Cognitive Science Major '21</li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
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<h3 id="name">Clare Kennedy</h3>
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<li> Harvard Psychology '21 </li>
<a href="mailto:"> [email protected] </a>
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<img src="img/people/lidia.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name">Lidia Balanovich</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> Dartmouth '22 </li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide3 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/LeBaron.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name">Hannah LeBaron</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> Dartmouth '22 </li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide3 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/jasper.jpeg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name">Japser Meyer</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li>Philosophy Major '22</li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide3 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/Mills.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name">Tracey Mills</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li>Computer Science Major '22</li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide3 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/stick.png" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name">Isabelle Morris</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li>Cognitive Science Major '21</li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide3 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/stick.png" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name">Darley Sackitey</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li>Cognitive Science Major '21</li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide3 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/schneider.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name">Nathan Schneider</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li>Computer Science Major '22</li>
<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="subt2 col-md-12">
<h2>Collaborators and Affiliates </h2>
</div>
<input id="check04" type="checkbox" name="menu" />
<h2 id="sub"><label for="check04">Collaborators and Affiliates <i class="fa fa-angle-down" aria-hidden="true"></i></label></h2>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/young.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="http://moralitylab.bc.edu/">Liane Young</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2012-2020 </li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Associate Professor, Boston College, Psychology)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/bernhard.png" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="https://psychology.fas.harvard.edu/people/regan-bernhard">Regan Bernhard</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2017-2020</li>
<li>Role: Affiliated post doc (Harvard University, Psychology)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/cushman.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu/">Fiery Cushman</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li>2015-2020</li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Assistant Professor, Harvard University, Psychology)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/gerstenberg.jpeg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="http://cicl.stanford.edu/member/tobias_gerstenberg/">Tobi Gerstenberg</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2015-2020 </li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Assistant Professor, Stanford University, Psychology)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/icard.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="https://web.stanford.edu/~icard/">Thomas Icard</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2018-2020</li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Assistant Professor, Stanford University, Philosophy)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/khoo.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="http://www.justinkhoo.org/">Justin Khoo</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2016-2020</li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Assistant Professor, MIT, Philosophy)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/knobe.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="https://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/">Joshua Knobe</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2011-2020 </li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Professor, Yale University, Cognitive Science)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/kominsky.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="http://www.jfkominsky.com/">Jonathan Kominsky</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2014-2020 </li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Post doc, Harvard University, Psychology)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/kratzer.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="https://people.umass.edu/kratzer/">Angelika Kratzer</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2016-2020 </li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Emeritus Professor, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Linguistics)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/mandelkern.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0776/">Matthew Madelkern</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2016-2020</li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Oxford, All Souls College)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/morris.jpg" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/adammorris/publications-0">Adam Morris</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2017-2020 </li>
<li>Role: Affiliated graduate student (Harvard University, Psychology)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/roskies.png" alt="">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name"><a href="https://www.dartmouth.edu/~adinar/Adinas_homepage/Homepage.html">Adina Roskies</a></h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2017-2020 </li>
<li>Role: Affiliated researcher (Professor, Dartmouth College, Philosophy)</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="col-md-3 col-sm-4 col-xs-6 resphide4 wow zoomIn">
<div class="peeps block wow fadeInLeft" data-wow-delay=".3s">
<img src="img/people/peanut.JPG" alt="cute doge">
<div class="team-overlay">
<h3 id="name">Peanut</h3>
<ul style="overflow: hidden">
<li> 2010-2020 </li>
<li>Role: Cute pupper </li>
</ul>
</div>