Potential vulnerability: topic names from ROS parameters

[tandf]

Hi,

We notice that you are using topic names from ROS parameters at the following locations:

teb_local_planner/scripts/visualize_velocity_profile.py

Line 43 in 0e83907

rospy.Subscriber(topic_name, FeedbackMsg, feedback_callback, queue_size = 1) # define feedback topic here!

teb_local_planner/scripts/cmd_vel_to_ackermann_drive.py

Line 56 in 0e83907

rospy.Subscriber(twist_cmd_topic, Twist, cmd_callback, queue_size=1)

teb_local_planner/scripts/cmd_vel_to_ackermann_drive.py

Line 57 in 0e83907

pub = rospy.Publisher(ackermann_cmd_topic, AckermannDriveStamped, queue_size=1)

For security reasons detailed below, we strongly suggest avoiding the usage of strings from parameters as topic names.

Although parameters are usually set in parameter files, they can also be changed by nodes. Specifically, other nodes in the same ROS application can also change the parameters listed above before it’s used, either by accident or intentionally (i.e., by potential attackers).
Such changes can lead to failures of normal functionalities. For example, if the ~twist_cmd_topic parameter is changed when running the cmd_vel_to_ackermann_drive node, it will listen to a wrong topic where no data is sent, and therefore will not send anything to /ackermann_cmd topic, and the robot will remain static. If an attacker exists, she can even change the control commands by first fooling the cmd_vel_to_ackermann_drive node to publish to a wrong topic like /ackermann_cmd_fake, and then forwarding messages from /ackermann_cmd_fake to /ackermann_cmd after changing the contents, which actually gives the attacker the capability to control the robot. Because ROS is an OSS (open-source software) community, third-party nodes are widely used in ROS applications, usually without complete vetting of their behavior, which gives the opportunity to potentially malicious actors to inject malicious code (e.g, by submitting hypocrite commits like in other OSS systems [1]) to infiltrate the ROS applications that use it (or software supply chain attacks, one of the primary means for real-world attackers today [2]).

We understand that using parameters to set topic names brings flexibility. Still, for the purpose of security, we strongly suggest that you avoid such vulnerable programming patterns if possible. For example, to avoid the exposure of this specific vulnerability, you may consider alternatives like remapping, which is designed for configuring names when launching the nodes.

[1] Q. Wu and K. Lu, “On the feasibility of stealthily introducing vulnerabilities in open-source software via hypocrite commits,” 2021, https://linuxreviews.org/images/d/d9/OpenSourceInsecurity.pdf.
[2] Supply chain attacks are the hacker’s new favourite weapon. and the threat is getting bigger. https://www.zdnet.com/article/supply-chain-attacks-are-the-hackers-new-favourite-weapon-and-the-threat-is-getting-bigger/.

[tandf]

Hi there, I wanted to follow up on this security vulnerability. Could you please let me know if there have been any updates or concerns regarding this issue? Thanks