diff --git a/draft-dekater-scion-pki.md b/draft-dekater-scion-pki.md
index 3895e88..5898e23 100644
--- a/draft-dekater-scion-pki.md
+++ b/draft-dekater-scion-pki.md
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ There are two types of TRC updates: regular and sensitive. A **regular TRC updat
 
 The CP-PKI does not explicitly support certificate revocation. Instead, it relies on the two mechanisms described above and on short-lived certificates. This approach constitutes an attractive alternative to a revocation system for the following reasons:
 
-- Both short-lived certificates and revocation lists MUST be signed by a CA. Instead of periodically signing a new revocation list, the CA can simply re-issue all the non-revoked certificates. Although the overhead of signing multiple certificates is greater than that of signing a single revocation list, the overall complexity of the system is reduced. In the CP-PKI the number of certificates that each CA must renew is manageable as it is limited to at most the number of ASes within an ISD.
+- Both short-lived certificates and revocation lists must be signed by a CA. Instead of periodically signing a new revocation list, the CA can simply re-issue all the non-revoked certificates. Although the overhead of signing multiple certificates is greater than that of signing a single revocation list, the overall complexity of the system is reduced. In the CP-PKI the number of certificates that each CA must renew is manageable as it is limited to at most the number of ASes within an ISD.
 - Even with a revocation system, a compromised key cannot be instantaneously revoked. Through their validity period, both short-lived certificates and revocation lists implicitly define an attack window (i.e., a period during which an attacker who managed to compromise a key could use it before it becomes invalid). In both cases, the CA must consider a tradeoff between efficiency and security when picking this validity period.
 
 ## Overview of Certificates, Keys, and Roles