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tlsproof.c
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tlsproof.c
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#include "nssrenam.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "keyhi.h"
#include "pkcs11.h"
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "prtime.h"
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "secmod.h"
#include "secmodi.h"
#include "sslerr.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "stdarg.h"
#include "tls13con.h"
#include "tls13hkdf.h"
#include "secutil.h"
#include "tlsproof.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <regex.h>
// Enable for Performance Measuremeants, uses [Measure] tags
//#define EV_MEASURE_COMP
#ifdef EV_MEASURE_COMP
// #undef TRACE
#endif
char* SALT_TREE_LABEL = "TLS-NSaltTree";
PRUint8 merkle_root_marker = 0;
PRUint8 hash_chain_marker = 1;
static SECStatus tlsproof_handleMessageRequest(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf);
static SECStatus tlsproof_handleMessageResponse(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf);
static SECStatus requires_plaintext_saving(int proof_type){
return ((proof_type & last_message_proof) != 0) || ((proof_type & hidden_plaintext_proof) != 0)|| ((proof_type & plaintext_proof) != 0);
}
PK11SymKey* create_sym_key_for_salt(RecordProofInfo* rpi, PRUint8* keydata){
PK11SlotInfo* slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
SECItem keyItem;
keyItem.data = keydata;
keyItem.len = rpi->salt_size;
/* turn the SECItem into a key object */
PK11SymKey* sym_key = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &keyItem, NULL);
return sym_key;
}
// TODO: Non-linear search
// TODO: Change signature
static PRBool is_hidden_chunk(PRUint16* hidden_chunk_ids, PRUint16 num_hidden_chunks, PRUint16 chunk_id){
int i;
for(i = 0; i < num_hidden_chunks; ++i){
if(hidden_chunk_ids[i] == chunk_id){
return PR_TRUE;
}
}
return PR_FALSE;
}
static PRUint16 get_chunk_length2(RecordProofInfo* rpi, PRUint16 chunk_index){
if (chunk_index + 1 < rpi->num_chunks){
return rpi->chunk_size;
} else {
return rpi->record_length - rpi->chunk_size * chunk_index;
}
}
static PRUint16 get_chunk_length(RecordProofInfo* rpi){
return get_chunk_length2(rpi, rpi->chunk_index);
}
static SECStatus allocate_salts(RecordProofInfo* rpi){
int i;
rpi->salts = (PRUint8**) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PRUint8*) * rpi->num_chunks);
if(rpi->salts == NULL){
#ifdef TRACE
SSL_TRC(10, ("Error! Couldn't allocate memory!"));
#endif
return SECFailure;
}
// Allocate salts
rpi->salts[0] = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(rpi->salt_size * rpi->num_chunks);
if(rpi->salts[0] == NULL){
#ifdef TRACE
SSL_TRC(10, ("Error! Couldn't allocate memory!"));
#endif
return SECFailure;
}
for(i = 1; i < rpi->num_chunks; ++i){
rpi->salts[i] = rpi->salts[i-1] + rpi->salt_size;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
// TODO: Unify
static PRUint8** allocate_string_array(PRUint16 salt_size, PRUint16 num_chunks){
int i;
PRUint8** salts = (PRUint8**) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PRUint8*) * num_chunks);
salts[0] = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(salt_size * num_chunks);
if(salts[0] == NULL){
#ifdef TRACE
SSL_TRC(10, ("Error! Couldn't allocate memory!"));
#endif
return NULL;
}
for(i = 1; i < num_chunks; ++i){
salts[i] = salts[i-1] + salt_size;
}
return salts;
}
static PRUint16 num_skipped_leaves(RecordProofInfo* rpi, int level, PRUint16 chunk_index){
if(level == rpi->tree_levels){
return 1;
}
if(level == 0){
return rpi->num_chunks;
}
// Compute the maximal number of children
PRUint16 max_leaves = 1 << ( rpi->tree_levels - level);
if(max_leaves + chunk_index > rpi->num_chunks){
// All the remaining
PORT_Assert(rpi->num_chunks - chunk_index < rpi->num_chunks);
return rpi->num_chunks - chunk_index;
}else{
// Maximum possible
PORT_Assert(max_leaves < rpi->num_chunks);
return max_leaves;
}
}
static SECStatus free_rpi(RecordProofInfo* rpi){
// Hack to get around the const
PRUint8* tmp;
if(rpi->salts != NULL){
PORT_Free(rpi->salts[0]);
PORT_Free(rpi->salts);
rpi->salts = NULL;
}
if(rpi->num_hashes > 0){
PORT_Free(rpi->hash_locs);
rpi->hash_locs = NULL;
if(!rpi->initialized_from_proof){
PORT_Free(rpi->proof_merkle_hashes[0]);
}
PORT_Free(rpi->proof_merkle_hashes);
rpi->proof_merkle_hashes = NULL;
rpi->num_hashes = 0;
}
if(rpi->num_salts > 0){
PORT_Free(rpi->salt_locs);
rpi->salt_locs = NULL;
rpi->num_salts = 0;
}
if(rpi->num_hidden_chunks > 0){
PORT_Free(rpi->hidden_chunk_ids);
rpi->hidden_chunk_ids = NULL;
rpi->num_hidden_chunks = 0;
// Inflated the record -> free it
if(rpi->initialized_from_proof){
PORT_Memcpy(&tmp, &(rpi->record), sizeof(PRUint8*));
PORT_Free(tmp);
}
}
if(rpi->ctx != NULL){
PK11_DestroyContext(rpi->ctx, PR_TRUE);
}
if(rpi->hmac != NULL){
HMAC_Destroy(rpi->hmac, PR_FALSE);
PORT_Free(rpi->hmac);
rpi->hmac = NULL;
}
if(rpi->hmac_info != NULL){
PORT_Free(rpi->hmac_info);
}
PORT_Free(rpi);
rpi = NULL;
return SECSuccess;
}
// Inflate the record by putting 'X' where content was censored
static SECStatus inflate_record(RecordProofInfo* rpi, PRUint8* compressed_record){
int i;
int j;
PRUint16 num_normal_records = 0;
PRUint16 chunk_length;
PRUint16 offset = 0;
PRUint8 *record = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(rpi->record_length);
for(i = 0; i < rpi->num_chunks; ++i){
chunk_length = get_chunk_length2(rpi, i);
if(is_hidden_chunk(rpi->hidden_chunk_ids, rpi->num_hidden_chunks, i)){
for(j = 0; j < chunk_length; ++j){
// Put this for hidden chunks
record[offset] = 'X';
offset++;
}
}else{
// Copy normal records
PORT_Memcpy(record + offset, compressed_record + (num_normal_records * rpi->chunk_size), chunk_length);
offset += chunk_length;
num_normal_records++;
}
}
PORT_Assert(offset == rpi->record_length);
rpi->record = record;
return SECSuccess;
}
// Recompute the hidden chunks from the proof contents
static SECStatus compute_hidden_chunks_from_proof(RecordProofInfo* rpi){
int i;
int j;
PRUint16 hidden_chunk_ids[rpi->num_chunks];
PRUint16 num_skipped;
rpi->num_hidden_chunks = 0;
for(i = 0; i < rpi->num_hashes; ++i){
num_skipped = num_skipped_leaves(rpi, rpi->hash_locs[i].tree_level, rpi->hash_locs[i].chunk_index);
for(j = 0; j < num_skipped; ++j){
// Save all the skipped leaves as hidden
hidden_chunk_ids[rpi->num_hidden_chunks] = rpi->hash_locs[i].chunk_index + j;
rpi->num_hidden_chunks++;
}
}
if(rpi->num_hidden_chunks == 0){
rpi->hidden_chunk_ids = NULL;
}else{
rpi->hidden_chunk_ids = (PRUint16*) PORT_Alloc(rpi->num_hidden_chunks * sizeof(PRUint16));
if(rpi->hidden_chunk_ids == NULL) return SECFailure;
PORT_Memcpy(rpi->hidden_chunk_ids, hidden_chunk_ids, rpi->num_hidden_chunks * sizeof(PRUint16));
#ifdef TRACE
SSL_TRC(25, ("Recomputed Hidden Chunk IDs:"));
// TODO: Make nicer
for(i = 0; i < rpi->num_hidden_chunks; ++i){
SSL_TRC(25, ("%u", rpi->hidden_chunk_ids[i]));
}
#endif
}
return SECSuccess;
}
// Compute the compressed record length
static PRUint16 compute_compressed_record_padding(RecordProofInfo* rpi){
int j;
PRBool last_censored = PR_FALSE;
PRUint16 compressed_record_padding = 0;
// Subtract the size for censored chunks
for(j = 0; j < rpi->num_hidden_chunks; ++j){
last_censored = (rpi->hidden_chunk_ids[j] == rpi->num_chunks - 1) | last_censored;
}
// Last chunk is a special case. If not censored, and necessary, pad it
if(!last_censored && get_chunk_length2(rpi, rpi->num_chunks - 1) != rpi->chunk_size){
compressed_record_padding = rpi->chunk_size - get_chunk_length2(rpi, rpi->num_chunks - 1);
}
return compressed_record_padding;
}
// Compute the compressed record length
static PRUint16 compute_compressed_record_length(RecordProofInfo* rpi){
int j;
PRUint16 compressed_record_length = rpi->record_length;
// Subtract the size for censored chunks
for(j = 0; j < rpi->num_hidden_chunks; ++j){
compressed_record_length -= get_chunk_length2(rpi, rpi->hidden_chunk_ids[j]);
}
// Add Padding if necessary
compressed_record_length += compute_compressed_record_padding(rpi);
return compressed_record_length;
}
static void init_hmac_context(RecordProofInfo* rpi){
const char *kLabelPrefix = "TLS 1.3, ";
const unsigned int kLabelPrefixLen = strlen(kLabelPrefix);
PRUint8* ptr;
rpi->hmac = NULL;
rpi->hmac_info_len = 2 + 1 + kLabelPrefixLen + strlen(SALT_TREE_LABEL) + 1;
rpi->hmac_info = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(rpi->hmac_info_len);
ptr = rpi->hmac_info;
ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(rpi->salt_size, 2, ptr);
ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(kLabelPrefixLen + strlen(SALT_TREE_LABEL), 1, ptr);
PORT_Memcpy(ptr, kLabelPrefix, kLabelPrefixLen);
ptr += kLabelPrefixLen;
PORT_Memcpy(ptr, SALT_TREE_LABEL, strlen(SALT_TREE_LABEL));
ptr += strlen(SALT_TREE_LABEL);
ptr = ssl_EncodeUintX(0, 1, ptr);
PORT_Assert((ptr - rpi->hmac_info) == rpi->hmac_info_len);
}
// Initialize the record information from information in the proof
static RecordProofInfo* init_proof_info_from_plaintext_proof(ProofPar* proofPar, PlaintextProofNode* proofNode, PRUint8* compressed_record, ProofMerkleNode* hash_locs, PRUint8** proof_merkle_hashes, ProofSalt* salt_locs){
RecordProofInfo rpival = { .salt_size = proofPar->salt_size, .hash_size = proofPar->hash_size, .chunk_size = proofPar->chunk_size, .hash_type = proofPar->hash_type, .num_chunks = (PRUint32) ceil((double)proofNode->len_record/proofPar->chunk_size), .tree_levels = (PRUint32) ceil(log(rpival.num_chunks)/log(2)), .gen_orig = proofNode->gen_orig, .hkdf_mechanism = tls13_GetHkdfMechanismForHash(rpival.hash_type)};
rpival.record_length = proofNode->len_record;
rpival.salt_index = 0;
rpival.chunk_index = 0;
rpival.num_hashes = 0;
rpival.hash_locs = hash_locs;
rpival.proof_merkle_hashes = proof_merkle_hashes;
rpival.salt_locs = salt_locs;
rpival.num_salts = 0;
rpival.initialized_from_proof = PR_TRUE;
rpival.ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(rpival.hash_type));
// Copy, do this to allow const values
RecordProofInfo* rpi = (RecordProofInfo*) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(RecordProofInfo));
PORT_Memcpy(rpi, &rpival, sizeof(rpival));
if(allocate_salts(rpi) != SECSuccess) return NULL;
rpi->hidden_chunk_ids = NULL;
rpi->num_hidden_chunks = 0;
rpi->record = compressed_record;
init_hmac_context(rpi);
return rpi;
}
// Initialize the record information from information in the proof
static RecordProofInfo* init_proof_info_from_proof(ProofPar* proofPar, HiddenPlaintextProofNode* proofNode, PRUint8* compressed_record, ProofMerkleNode* hash_locs, PRUint8** proof_merkle_hashes, ProofSalt* salt_locs){
RecordProofInfo rpival = { .salt_size = proofPar->salt_size, .hash_size = proofPar->hash_size, .chunk_size = proofPar->chunk_size, .hash_type = proofPar->hash_type, .num_chunks = (PRUint32) ceil((double)proofNode->len_record/proofPar->chunk_size), .tree_levels = (PRUint32) ceil(log(rpival.num_chunks)/log(2)), .gen_orig = proofNode->gen_orig, .hkdf_mechanism = tls13_GetHkdfMechanismForHash(rpival.hash_type)};
rpival.record_length = proofNode->len_record;
rpival.salt_index = 0;
rpival.chunk_index = 0;
rpival.num_hashes = proofNode->num_hashes;
rpival.hash_locs = hash_locs;
rpival.proof_merkle_hashes = proof_merkle_hashes;
rpival.salt_locs = salt_locs;
rpival.num_salts = proofNode->num_salts;
rpival.initialized_from_proof = PR_TRUE;
rpival.ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(rpival.hash_type));
// Copy, do this to allow const values
RecordProofInfo* rpi = (RecordProofInfo*) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(RecordProofInfo));
PORT_Memcpy(rpi, &rpival, sizeof(rpival));
if(allocate_salts(rpi) != SECSuccess) return NULL;
if(rpi->num_hashes > 0){
if(compute_hidden_chunks_from_proof(rpi) != SECSuccess) return NULL;
}else{
rpi->hidden_chunk_ids = NULL;
rpi->num_hidden_chunks = 0;
rpi->record = compressed_record;
}
init_hmac_context(rpi);
return rpi;
}
// Initialize the record information
static RecordProofInfo* init_proof_info(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8* record, PRUint16 record_length, PRBool received){
RecordProofInfo rpival = { .hash_size = tls13_GetHashSize(ss), .salt_size = ss->xtnData.salt_size, .chunk_size = ss->xtnData.chunk_size, .hash_type = tls13_GetHash(ss), .num_chunks = (PRUint32) ceil((double)record_length/rpival.chunk_size), .tree_levels = (PRUint32) ceil(log(rpival.num_chunks)/log(2)), .gen_orig = received ^ ss->sec.isServer, .hkdf_mechanism = tls13_GetHkdfMechanismForHash(rpival.hash_type)};
rpival.record = record;
rpival.record_length = record_length;
rpival.salt_index = 0;
rpival.chunk_index = 0;
rpival.num_hashes = 0;
rpival.hash_locs = NULL;
rpival.proof_merkle_hashes = NULL;
rpival.hidden_chunk_ids = NULL;
rpival.num_hidden_chunks = 0;
rpival.salt_locs = NULL;
rpival.num_salts = 0;
rpival.initialized_from_proof = PR_FALSE;
rpival.ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(rpival.hash_type));
#ifdef TRACE
SSL_TRC(50, ("[TLS-N] Num_chunks: %i\n", rpival.num_chunks));
#endif
// Copy, do this to allow const values
RecordProofInfo* rpi = (RecordProofInfo*) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(RecordProofInfo));
PORT_Memcpy(rpi, &rpival, sizeof(rpival));
if(allocate_salts(rpi) != SECSuccess) return NULL;
init_hmac_context(rpi);
return rpi;
}
static
SECStatus find_sensitive_chunks(RecordProofInfo *rpi){
char *reg_str[] = {
"[&\\?]passwd=([^&[:space:]]*)[&[:space:]]",
"[&\\?]pass=([^&[:space:]]*)[&[:space:]]",
"[&\\?]access_token=([^&[:space:]]*)[&[:space:]]",
"Cookie:(.*)\n",
"Authorization:(.*)\n",
NULL
};
regex_t regex;
PRInt16 reti;
PRUint16 offset = 0;
PRUint16* hidden_chunk_ids = NULL;
// Number of hidden chunks
PRUint16 num_hidden = 0;
PRUint16 startchunk;
PRUint16 stopchunk;
int i;
int reg_ex_id = 0;
while(reg_str[reg_ex_id] != NULL) {
// TODO: Compile this once
// Compile regular expression
reti = regcomp(®ex, reg_str[reg_ex_id], REG_EXTENDED);
if (reti) {
#ifdef TRACE
ssl_Trace("[TLS-N] Error: Could not compile regex\n");
#endif
exit(1);
}
size_t ngroups = regex.re_nsub + 1;
regmatch_t *groups = (regmatch_t *) PORT_Alloc(ngroups * sizeof(regmatch_t));
regmatch_t pmatch;
offset = 0;
// Search for sensitive chunks
while(offset < rpi->record_length){
reti = regexec(®ex, (char*) rpi->record+offset, ngroups, groups, 0);
if (!reti) {
size_t g_idx;
for (g_idx = 1; g_idx < ngroups; g_idx++){
pmatch = groups[g_idx];
startchunk = (offset+pmatch.rm_so)/rpi->chunk_size;
stopchunk = (offset+pmatch.rm_eo)/rpi->chunk_size;
// Mark the hidden chunks
for(i = startchunk; i <= stopchunk; ++i){
// If already hidden
if(!is_hidden_chunk(hidden_chunk_ids, num_hidden, i)){
hidden_chunk_ids = (PRUint16*) PORT_Realloc(hidden_chunk_ids, (num_hidden + 1)* sizeof(PRUint16));
// TODO: Sort we can do a fast lookup
hidden_chunk_ids[num_hidden] = i;
num_hidden++;
}
}
// Adjust the offset so that we continue searching in the next chunk
offset += pmatch.rm_eo;
}
} else if(reti == REG_NOMATCH){
break;
} else {
#ifdef TRACE
char msgbuf[128];
regerror(reti, ®ex, msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf));
ssl_Trace("Regex match failed: %s\n", msgbuf);
#endif
return SECFailure;
}
}
// Free memory allocated by regcomp
regfree(®ex);
reg_ex_id++;
PORT_Free(groups);
}
rpi->hidden_chunk_ids = hidden_chunk_ids;
rpi->num_hidden_chunks = num_hidden;
return SECSuccess;
}
static PRUint16
ceil_div8(PRUint16 num){
PRUint16 res = num >> 3;
if ((num & 7) != 0){
res++;
}
return res;
}
/*
static SECStatus
tlsproof_hash_begin(sslSocket *ss, PK11Context ** out_ctx)
{
PK11Context *ctx = NULL;
ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(tls13_GetHash(ss)));
if (!ctx) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (PK11_DigestBegin(ctx) != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
*out_ctx = ctx;
return SECSuccess;
}*/
static SECStatus
tlsproof_hash_begin2(PK11Context * ctx)
{
if (PK11_DigestBegin(ctx) != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
tlsproof_hash_zeroes(PK11Context *ctx, const PRUint32 inbuf_len){
// No more padding
return SECSuccess;
PRUint8 buf[inbuf_len];
bzero(buf, inbuf_len);
if (PK11_DigestOp(ctx,
buf,
inbuf_len) != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
tlsproof_hash_op(PK11Context *ctx, const void* inbuf, const PRUint32 inbuf_len){
if (PK11_DigestOp(ctx,
inbuf,
inbuf_len) != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
// Hash in Network-Byte order
static SECStatus
tlsproof_hash_op_nbo(PK11Context *ctx, const void* inbuf, const PRUint32 inbuf_len){
// TODO decide whether to do this or not
return tlsproof_hash_op(ctx, inbuf, inbuf_len);
PRUint16 tmp2;
PRUint32 tmp4;
if(inbuf_len == 2){
tmp2 = htobe16(* (PRUint16*)inbuf);
return tlsproof_hash_op(ctx, &tmp2, inbuf_len);
}else if(inbuf_len == 4){
tmp4 = htobe32(* (PRUint32*)inbuf);
return tlsproof_hash_op(ctx, &tmp4, inbuf_len);
}else{
PORT_Assert(0);
return SECFailure;
}
}
/*
static SECStatus
tlsproof_hash_finish(sslSocket *ss, PK11Context *ctx, PRUint8* outbuf, unsigned int outbuf_len){
unsigned int len;
SECStatus rv;
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, outbuf, &len, outbuf_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss));
PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
return SECSuccess;
}*/
static SECStatus
tlsproof_hash_finish2(PK11Context *ctx, PRUint8* outbuf, unsigned int outbuf_len){
unsigned int len;
SECStatus rv;
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, outbuf, &len, outbuf_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*When a message of content type tlsproof message is received it is tranfered to this
*function. It will look at the sub-type and transfert it to the correct function*/
SECStatus
tlsproof_HandleMessage(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf)
{
SECStatus rv;
TLSProofMessageType proofMessageType;
PRInt32 length;
if(!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss,ssl_tls13_tls_proof_xtn))
return SECFailure;
length = origBuf->len;
if(length <= 0) return SECFailure;
//Get the sub-content type
proofMessageType = origBuf->buf[0];
//Call the corresponding function
switch(proofMessageType){
case tlsproof_message_type_request:
rv = tlsproof_handleMessageRequest(ss,origBuf);
if(rv != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
break;
case tlsproof_message_type_response:
rv = tlsproof_handleMessageResponse(ss, origBuf);
if(rv != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
break;
default:
return SECFailure;
break;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*Set *val to TRUE if the negotiation was succsessfull or set *val to FALSE if
* the negotiation failed*/
SECStatus SSL_TLSProofIsNegociated(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool *val)
{
*val = PR_FALSE;
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
if (!ss) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_TLSProofIsNegociated",
SSL_GETPID(), fd));
return SECFailure;
}
if(ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss,ssl_tls13_tls_proof_xtn))
*val = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*Call by a client to send the proof request*/
SECStatus SSL_TLSProofRequestProof(PRFileDesc *fd)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
PRInt32 sent = -1;
PRInt32 rqLength = TLS_PROOF_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIZE;
TLSProofMessageType request = tlsproof_message_type_request;
//Hold lock to send messages
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
if(!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss,ssl_tls13_tls_proof_xtn))
return SECFailure;
//Send the proof request
sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, content_tls_proof_message, (PRUint8 *) &request, rqLength, 0);
if(sent > 0) rv = SECSuccess;
SSL_TRC(15, ("Proof request sent."));
ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
return rv;
}
// TODO: const and int
static PRInt32 salt_is_in_proof(ProofSalt* salt_locs, PRUint16 num_proof_salts, int level, PRUint16 salt_index){
int i;
for(i = 0; i < num_proof_salts; ++i){
if(salt_locs[i].tree_level == level && salt_locs[i].salt_index == salt_index){
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
SECStatus my_hkdf_expand(RecordProofInfo* rpi, PRUint8* outbuf, PRUint8* inbuf){
/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
* key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
*/
CK_BYTE i;
unsigned iterations = PR_ROUNDUP(2 * rpi->salt_size, rpi->hash_size) / rpi->hash_size;
if(rpi->hmac == NULL){
rpi->hmac = HMAC_Create(HASH_GetHashObject(rpi->hash_type), inbuf, rpi->salt_size, 0);
}else{
HMAC_Init(rpi->hmac, HASH_GetHashObject(rpi->hash_type), inbuf, rpi->salt_size, 0);
}
for (i = 1; i <= iterations; ++i) {
unsigned len;
HMAC_Begin(rpi->hmac);
if (i > 1) {
HMAC_Update(rpi->hmac, outbuf + ((i - 2) * rpi->hash_size), rpi->hash_size);
}
HMAC_Update(rpi->hmac, rpi->hmac_info, rpi->hmac_info_len);
HMAC_Update(rpi->hmac, &i, 1);
HMAC_Finish(rpi->hmac, outbuf + ((i - 1) * rpi->hash_size), &len, rpi->hash_size);
PORT_Assert(len == rpi->hash_size);
}
return SECSuccess;
}
//SECStatus compute_salt_tree2(RecordProofInfo* rpi, const int level, PK11SymKey* int_salt_secret){
SECStatus compute_salt_tree2(RecordProofInfo* rpi, const int level, PRUint8* int_salt_secret){
PRUint8 new_salt[2 * rpi->salt_size];
// PK11SymKey* left;
// PK11SymKey* right;
PRUint8* left;
PRUint8* right;
if(rpi->salt_index >= rpi->num_chunks){
return SECSuccess;
}
// Special case: single chunk
if(rpi->num_chunks == 1){
PORT_Memcpy(rpi->salts[rpi->salt_index], int_salt_secret, rpi->salt_size);
rpi->salt_index += 1;
return SECSuccess;
}
my_hkdf_expand(rpi, new_salt, int_salt_secret);
// if(tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(int_salt_secret, rpi->hash_type, NULL, 0, rpi->salt_tree_label, rpi->salt_tree_label_len, new_salt, 2 * rpi->salt_size) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
// if(tlsproof_hash_begin2(rpi->ctx) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
// if(tlsproof_hash_op(rpi->ctx, int_salt_secret, rpi->salt_size) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
// if(tlsproof_hash_finish2(rpi->ctx, new_salt, sizeof(new_salt)) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
// Split into left and right
// left = create_sym_key_for_salt(rpi, new_salt);
// right = create_sym_key_for_salt(rpi, new_salt + rpi->salt_size);
left = new_salt;
right = new_salt + rpi->salt_size;
// Leaf Detection: A leaf is on the last level or is within the last two indices
// Left side
// Check if leaf
if(level == rpi->tree_levels - 1){
// Save salt values if bottom is reached
PORT_Memcpy(rpi->salts[rpi->salt_index], left, rpi->salt_size);
rpi->salt_index += 1;
} else {
// Go to lower level
if(compute_salt_tree2(rpi, level+1, left) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
}
if(rpi->salt_index >= rpi->num_chunks){
return SECSuccess;
}
// Right side
// Check if leaf
if(level == rpi->tree_levels - 1){
PORT_Assert(rpi->salt_index < rpi->num_chunks);
PORT_Memcpy(rpi->salts[rpi->salt_index], right, rpi->salt_size);
rpi->salt_index += 1;
} else {
if(compute_salt_tree2(rpi, level+1, right) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
}
// PK11_FreeSymKey(left);
// PK11_FreeSymKey(right);
return SECSuccess;
}
// int_salt_secret has salt_size
// salt_index is the next free index
SECStatus compute_salt_tree(RecordProofInfo* rpi, PRUint8* int_salt_secret){
rpi->salt_index = 0;
// PK11SymKey* int_salt_key = create_sym_key_for_salt(rpi, int_salt_secret);
// SECStatus rv = compute_salt_tree2(rpi, 0, int_salt_key);
SECStatus rv = compute_salt_tree2(rpi, 0, int_salt_secret);
PORT_Assert(rpi->num_chunks == rpi->salt_index);
// PK11_FreeSymKey(int_salt_key);
return rv;
}
SECStatus compute_salts_from_proof_salts2(RecordProofInfo* rpi, const int level, PRUint8** proof_salts){
PRInt32 in_proof_index;
if(rpi->salt_index >= rpi->num_chunks){
return SECSuccess;
}
// Special case: single chunk
if(rpi->num_chunks == 1){
// Handle this differently
PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE);
}
// If this part is in the proof
in_proof_index = salt_is_in_proof(rpi->salt_locs, rpi->num_salts, level, rpi->salt_index);
if(in_proof_index != -1){
// Just copy it, if it is a final salt
if(level == rpi->tree_levels){
PORT_Memcpy(rpi->salts[rpi->salt_index], proof_salts[in_proof_index], rpi->salt_size);
rpi->salt_index += 1;
return SECSuccess;
} else {
// Take it from the proof and run the normal subtree execution
return compute_salt_tree2(rpi, level, proof_salts[in_proof_index]);
}
}
// Useless leaf
if(level == rpi->tree_levels){
rpi->salt_index += 1;
return SECSuccess;
}
// Traverse down
if(compute_salts_from_proof_salts2(rpi, level+1, proof_salts) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
if(rpi->salt_index >= rpi->num_chunks){
return SECSuccess;
}
if(compute_salts_from_proof_salts2(rpi, level+1, proof_salts) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus compute_salts_from_proof_salts(RecordProofInfo* rpi, PRUint8** proof_salts){
rpi->salt_index = 0;
return compute_salts_from_proof_salts2(rpi, 0, proof_salts);
}
SECStatus compute_proof_salts2(RecordProofInfo* rpi, const int level, PRUint8* int_salt_secret, PRBool* nonsensitive_subtree, ProofSalt* nonsense_loc, PRUint8* hash_for_nonsense){
PRUint8 new_salt[rpi->hash_size];
PRUint8* left;
PRUint8* right;
PRBool left_nonsensitive;
PRBool right_nonsensitive;
ProofSalt left_loc;
ProofSalt right_loc;
PRUint8 left_hash_for_nonsense[rpi->hash_size];
PRUint8 right_hash_for_nonsense[rpi->hash_size];
PRUint16 orig_salt_index = rpi->salt_index;
if(rpi->salt_index >= rpi->num_chunks){
return SECSuccess;
}
// Special case: single chunk
if(rpi->num_chunks == 1){
// These cases should be handled separately
PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE);
}
my_hkdf_expand(rpi, new_salt, int_salt_secret);
// Split into left and right
left = new_salt;
right = new_salt + rpi->salt_size;
// Leaf Detection: A leaf is on the last level or is within the last two indices
// Check if lowest level
if(level == rpi->tree_levels - 1){
left_nonsensitive = ! is_hidden_chunk(rpi->hidden_chunk_ids, rpi->num_hidden_chunks, rpi->salt_index);
right_nonsensitive = (rpi->salt_index+1 < rpi->num_chunks) && !is_hidden_chunk(rpi->hidden_chunk_ids, rpi->num_hidden_chunks, rpi->salt_index+1);
// If both are not hidden, push it up
if(left_nonsensitive && right_nonsensitive){
*nonsensitive_subtree = PR_TRUE;
nonsense_loc->tree_level = level;
nonsense_loc->salt_index = rpi->salt_index;
PORT_Memcpy(hash_for_nonsense, int_salt_secret, rpi->hash_size);
rpi->salt_index += 2;
return SECSuccess;
}
*nonsensitive_subtree = PR_FALSE;
if(left_nonsensitive){
rpi->salt_locs[rpi->num_salts].tree_level = level + 1;
rpi->salt_locs[rpi->num_salts].salt_index = rpi->salt_index;
PORT_Memcpy(rpi->salts[rpi->num_salts], left, rpi->salt_size);
rpi->num_salts++;
}
rpi->salt_index += 1;
if(rpi->salt_index >= rpi->num_chunks){
*nonsensitive_subtree = left_nonsensitive;
return SECSuccess;
}
if(right_nonsensitive){
rpi->salt_locs[rpi->num_salts].tree_level = level + 1;
rpi->salt_locs[rpi->num_salts].salt_index = rpi->salt_index;
PORT_Memcpy(rpi->salts[rpi->num_salts], right, rpi->salt_size);
rpi->num_salts++;
}
rpi->salt_index += 1;
PORT_Assert(rpi->salt_index <= rpi->num_chunks);
} else {
// Go to lower level
if(compute_proof_salts2(rpi, level+1, left, &left_nonsensitive, &left_loc, left_hash_for_nonsense) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
if(rpi->salt_index >= rpi->num_chunks){
if (left_nonsensitive){
// If only left is around, push it up
*nonsensitive_subtree = PR_TRUE;
nonsense_loc->tree_level = left_loc.tree_level;
nonsense_loc->salt_index = left_loc.salt_index;
PORT_Memcpy(hash_for_nonsense, left_hash_for_nonsense, rpi->hash_size);
} else {
*nonsensitive_subtree = PR_FALSE;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
if(compute_proof_salts2(rpi, level+1, right, &right_nonsensitive, &right_loc, right_hash_for_nonsense) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure;
// Merge the two sides
if(left_nonsensitive && right_nonsensitive){
// Both hidden
*nonsensitive_subtree = PR_TRUE;
nonsense_loc->tree_level = level;
nonsense_loc->salt_index = orig_salt_index;
PORT_Memcpy(hash_for_nonsense, int_salt_secret, rpi->hash_size);
} else {
*nonsensitive_subtree = PR_FALSE;
if (left_nonsensitive){
PORT_Memcpy(rpi->salts[rpi->num_salts], left_hash_for_nonsense, rpi->salt_size);
PORT_Memcpy(&(rpi->salt_locs[rpi->num_salts]), &left_loc, sizeof(ProofSalt));
rpi->num_salts++;
} else if (right_nonsensitive){
PORT_Memcpy(rpi->salts[rpi->num_salts], right_hash_for_nonsense, rpi->salt_size);
PORT_Memcpy(&(rpi->salt_locs[rpi->num_salts]), &right_loc, sizeof(ProofSalt));
rpi->num_salts++;
}
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus compute_proof_salts(RecordProofInfo* rpi, PRUint8* int_salt_secret){
PRBool sensitive_subtree;
rpi->num_salts = 0;
rpi->salt_index = 0;
if(rpi->salt_locs == NULL){
rpi->salt_locs = (ProofSalt*) PORT_Alloc((rpi->num_chunks - rpi->num_hidden_chunks)* sizeof(ProofSalt));
}
return compute_proof_salts2(rpi, 0, int_salt_secret, &sensitive_subtree, NULL, NULL);
// TODO: Assertion
}
// outbuf has to be of length hash_size
static SECStatus compute_proof_merkle_hashes2(RecordProofInfo* rpi, int level, PRUint8* outbuf, PRBool *am_hidden, ProofMerkleNode* hidden_loc){
PRUint8 left_child[rpi->hash_size];
PRUint8 right_child[rpi->hash_size];