From bea7e3ec97d8b9a632211dea58c116dfc8657733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Iorga Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 22:44:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 01/20] Restore labels in the SP800-53 Rev 5.1.1 OSCAL catalog to their pre 1.2.1 version Committer: Michaela Iorga --- .../rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml | 19742 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10473 insertions(+), 9269 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml index ccb5271c..7e25adce 100644 --- a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml +++ b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml @@ -1,11 +1,9 @@ - - - + Electronic Version of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.1.1 Controls and SP 800-53A Rev 5.1.1 Assessment Procedures - 2023-12-13T20:16:00.000000-00:00 - 5.1.1+u3 - 1.1.1 + 2024-01-18T22:10:00.000000-00:00 + 5.1.1+u4 + 1.1.2 Electronic Version of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Controls and SP 800-53A Rev 5 Assessment Procedures @@ -14,7 +12,7 @@ 1.1.1 -

This revison of the SP 800-53 Revision 5 Catalog includes metadata and tagging reflecting richer control semantics, such as organizational vs system-level controls as indicated in SP800-53 Rev 5.1 Appendix C, and minor bug fixes in its content.

+

This OSCAL version of the SP 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 catalog restores the props/@name="labels". The SP 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 catalog includes one new control (IA-13) and three control enhancements, minor grammatical edits/clarifications that do not impact the implementation or outcome of the controls and introduces “leading 0s” to the control identifiers. A list of updates in Release 5.1.1 is available under [Supplemental Material](includes one new control (IA-13) and three control enhancements, minor grammatical edits/clarifications that do not impact the implementation or outcome of the controls and introduces “leading 0s” to the control identifiers.

 @@ -37,6 +35,16 @@

This revision of the OSCAL representation of the NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 published on November, 7, 2023, provides enhancements to data representation per community's suggestions.

 + + Electronic Version of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.1.1 Controls and SP 800-53A Rev 5.1.1 Assessment Procedures + 2023-12-13T20:16:00.000000-00:00 + 5.1.1+u3 + 1.1.1 + + +

This revision of the OSCAL representation of the NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 published on November, 7, 2023, provides enhancements to data representation per community's suggestions.

+ + @@ -78,14 +86,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the access control policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the access control procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -93,7 +101,7 @@ - + remove disable @@ -813,14 +824,15 @@ - +

the time period after which to automatically remove or disable temporary or emergency accounts is defined;

 - + + @@ -831,13 +843,13 @@

Management of temporary and emergency accounts includes the removal or disabling of such accounts automatically after a predefined time period rather than at the convenience of the system administrator. Automatic removal or disabling of accounts provides a more consistent implementation.

- +

temporary and emergency accounts are automatically after .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures for addressing account management

@@ -852,7 +864,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -862,7 +874,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms for implementing account management functions

 @@ -872,7 +884,7 @@ Disable Accounts - +

time period within which to disable accounts is defined;

@@ -880,14 +892,15 @@ - +

time period for account inactivity before disabling is defined;

 - + + @@ -914,24 +927,24 @@

Disabling expired, inactive, or otherwise anomalous accounts supports the concepts of least privilege and least functionality which reduce the attack surface of the system.

 - + - +

accounts are disabled within when the accounts have expired;

 - +

accounts are disabled within when the accounts are no longer associated with a user or individual;

 - +

accounts are disabled within when the accounts are in violation of organizational policy;

 - +

accounts are disabled within when the accounts have been inactive for .

 @@ -939,7 +952,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures for addressing account management

@@ -955,7 +968,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -965,7 +978,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms for implementing account management functions

 @@ -974,7 +987,8 @@ Automated Audit Actions - + + @@ -987,29 +1001,29 @@

Account management audit records are defined in accordance with AU-02 and reviewed, analyzed, and reported in accordance with AU-06.

 - + - +

account creation is automatically audited;

 - +

account modification is automatically audited;

 - +

account enabling is automatically audited;

 - +

account disabling is automatically audited;

 - +

account removal actions are automatically audited.

 @@ -1017,7 +1031,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing account management

@@ -1031,7 +1045,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1040,7 +1054,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions

 @@ -1050,14 +1064,15 @@ Inactivity Logout - +

the time period of expected inactivity or description of when to log out is defined;

 - + + @@ -1070,13 +1085,13 @@

Inactivity logout is behavior- or policy-based and requires users to take physical action to log out when they are expecting inactivity longer than the defined period. Automatic enforcement of inactivity logout is addressed by AC-11.

 - +

users are required to log out when .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing account management

@@ -1090,7 +1105,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1103,14 +1118,15 @@ Dynamic Privilege Management - +

dynamic privilege management capabilities are defined;

 - + + @@ -1122,13 +1138,13 @@

In contrast to access control approaches that employ static accounts and predefined user privileges, dynamic access control approaches rely on runtime access control decisions facilitated by dynamic privilege management, such as attribute-based access control. While user identities remain relatively constant over time, user privileges typically change more frequently based on ongoing mission or business requirements and the operational needs of organizations. An example of dynamic privilege management is the immediate revocation of privileges from users as opposed to requiring that users terminate and restart their sessions to reflect changes in privileges. Dynamic privilege management can also include mechanisms that change user privileges based on dynamic rules as opposed to editing specific user profiles. Examples include automatic adjustments of user privileges if they are operating out of their normal work times, if their job function or assignment changes, or if systems are under duress or in emergency situations. Dynamic privilege management includes the effects of privilege changes, for example, when there are changes to encryption keys used for communications.

 - +

are implemented.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing account management

@@ -1142,7 +1158,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1152,7 +1168,7 @@ - +

system or mechanisms implementing dynamic privilege management capabilities

 @@ -1162,14 +1178,15 @@ Privileged User Accounts - + - + + @@ -1195,24 +1212,24 @@

Privileged roles are organization-defined roles assigned to individuals that allow those individuals to perform certain security-relevant functions that ordinary users are not authorized to perform. Privileged roles include key management, account management, database administration, system and network administration, and web administration. A role-based access scheme organizes permitted system access and privileges into roles. In contrast, an attribute-based access scheme specifies allowed system access and privileges based on attributes.

 - + - +

privileged user accounts are established and administered in accordance with ;

 - +

privileged role or attribute assignments are monitored;

 - +

changes to roles or attributes are monitored;

 - +

access is revoked when privileged role or attribute assignments are no longer appropriate.

 @@ -1220,7 +1237,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing account management

@@ -1237,7 +1254,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1246,7 +1263,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing account management functions

mechanisms monitoring privileged role assignments

@@ -1257,14 +1274,15 @@ Dynamic Account Management - +

system accounts that are dynamically created, activated, managed, and deactivated are defined;

 - + + @@ -1276,24 +1294,24 @@

Approaches for dynamically creating, activating, managing, and deactivating system accounts rely on automatically provisioning the accounts at runtime for entities that were previously unknown. Organizations plan for the dynamic management, creation, activation, and deactivation of system accounts by establishing trust relationships, business rules, and mechanisms with appropriate authorities to validate related authorizations and privileges.

 - + - +

are created dynamically;

 - +

are activated dynamically;

 - +

are managed dynamically;

 - +

are deactivated dynamically.

 @@ -1301,7 +1319,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing account management

@@ -1315,7 +1333,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1325,7 +1343,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions

 @@ -1336,14 +1354,15 @@ - +

conditions for establishing shared and group accounts are defined;

 - + + @@ -1354,13 +1373,13 @@

Before permitting the use of shared or group accounts, organizations consider the increased risk due to the lack of accountability with such accounts.

 - +

the use of shared and group accounts is only permitted if are met.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing account management

@@ -1374,7 +1393,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1383,7 +1402,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing management of shared/group accounts

 @@ -1392,7 +1411,8 @@ Shared and Group Account Credential Change - + + @@ -1401,7 +1421,7 @@ Usage Conditions - +

circumstances and/or usage conditions to be enforced for system accounts are defined;

@@ -1409,14 +1429,15 @@ - +

system accounts subject to enforcement of circumstances and/or usage conditions are defined;

 - + + @@ -1427,13 +1448,13 @@

Specifying and enforcing usage conditions helps to enforce the principle of least privilege, increase user accountability, and enable effective account monitoring. Account monitoring includes alerts generated if the account is used in violation of organizational parameters. Organizations can describe specific conditions or circumstances under which system accounts can be used, such as by restricting usage to certain days of the week, time of day, or specific durations of time.

 - +

for are enforced.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing account management

@@ -1447,7 +1468,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1457,7 +1478,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing account management functions

 @@ -1467,7 +1488,7 @@ Account Monitoring for Atypical Usage - +

atypical usage for which to monitor system accounts is defined;

@@ -1475,14 +1496,15 @@ - +

personnel or roles to report atypical usage is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -1506,14 +1528,14 @@

Atypical usage includes accessing systems at certain times of the day or from locations that are not consistent with the normal usage patterns of individuals. Monitoring for atypical usage may reveal rogue behavior by individuals or an attack in progress. Account monitoring may inadvertently create privacy risks since data collected to identify atypical usage may reveal previously unknown information about the behavior of individuals. Organizations assess and document privacy risks from monitoring accounts for atypical usage in their privacy impact assessment and make determinations that are in alignment with their privacy program plan.

 - + - +

system accounts are monitored for ;

- +

atypical usage of system accounts is reported to .

 @@ -1521,7 +1543,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing account management

@@ -1538,7 +1560,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1547,7 +1569,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing account management functions

 @@ -1557,7 +1579,7 @@ Disable Accounts for High-risk Individuals - +

time period within which to disable accounts of individuals who are discovered to pose significant risk is defined;

@@ -1565,14 +1587,15 @@ - +

significant risks leading to disabling accounts are defined;

 - + + @@ -1585,13 +1608,13 @@

Users who pose a significant security and/or privacy risk include individuals for whom reliable evidence indicates either the intention to use authorized access to systems to cause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Such harm includes adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation. Close coordination among system administrators, legal staff, human resource managers, and authorizing officials is essential when disabling system accounts for high-risk individuals.

 - +

accounts of individuals are disabled within of discovery of .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing account management

@@ -1606,7 +1629,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1615,7 +1638,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing account management functions

 @@ -1625,7 +1648,8 @@ Access Enforcement - + + @@ -1687,13 +1711,13 @@

Access control policies control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users or processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (i.e., devices, files, records, domains) in organizational systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the system level and recognizing that systems can host many applications and services in support of mission and business functions, access enforcement mechanisms can also be employed at the application and service level to provide increased information security and privacy. In contrast to logical access controls that are implemented within the system, physical access controls are addressed by the controls in the Physical and Environmental Protection ( PE ) family.

 - +

approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources are enforced in accordance with applicable access control policies.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement

@@ -1708,7 +1732,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1718,7 +1742,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access control policy

 @@ -1726,7 +1750,8 @@ Restricted Access to Privileged Functions - + + @@ -1736,14 +1761,15 @@ - +

privileged commands and/or other actions requiring dual authorization are defined;

 - + + @@ -1756,13 +1782,13 @@

Dual authorization, also known as two-person control, reduces risk related to insider threats. Dual authorization mechanisms require the approval of two authorized individuals to execute. To reduce the risk of collusion, organizations consider rotating dual authorization duties. Organizations consider the risk associated with implementing dual authorization mechanisms when immediate responses are necessary to ensure public and environmental safety.

 - +

dual authorization is enforced for .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement and dual authorization

@@ -1777,7 +1803,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1787,7 +1813,7 @@ - +

Dual authorization mechanisms implementing access control policy

 @@ -1801,14 +1827,14 @@ - +

mandatory access control policy enforced over the set of covered subjects is defined;

 - +

mandatory access control policy enforced over the set of covered objects is defined;

@@ -1816,7 +1842,7 @@ - +

subjects to be explicitly granted privileges are defined;

@@ -1824,14 +1850,15 @@ - +

privileges to be explicitly granted to subjects are defined;

 - + + @@ -1876,62 +1903,62 @@

The trusted subjects described above are granted privileges consistent with the concept of least privilege (see AC-6 ). Trusted subjects are only given the minimum privileges necessary for satisfying organizational mission/business needs relative to the above policy. The control is most applicable when there is a mandate that establishes a policy regarding access to controlled unclassified information or classified information and some users of the system are not authorized access to all such information resident in the system. Mandatory access control can operate in conjunction with discretionary access control as described in AC-3(4) . A subject constrained in its operation by mandatory access control policies can still operate under the less rigorous constraints of AC-3(4), but mandatory access control policies take precedence over the less rigorous constraints of AC-3(4). For example, while a mandatory access control policy imposes a constraint that prevents a subject from passing information to another subject operating at a different impact or classification level, AC-3(4) permits the subject to pass the information to any other subject with the same impact or classification level as the subject. Examples of mandatory access control policies include the Bell-LaPadula policy to protect confidentiality of information and the Biba policy to protect the integrity of information.

 - + - +

is enforced over the set of covered subjects specified in the policy;

 - +

is enforced over the set of covered objects specified in the policy;

 - + - +

is uniformly enforced across the covered subjects within the system;

 - +

is uniformly enforced across the covered objects within the system;

 - + - +

and specifying that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from passing the information to unauthorized subjects or objects are enforced;

 - +

and specifying that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from granting its privileges to other subjects are enforced;

 - +

and specifying that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from changing one of more security attributes (specified by the policy) on subjects, objects, the system, or system components are enforced;

 - +

and specifying that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from choosing the security attributes and attribute values (specified by the policy) to be associated with newly created or modified objects are enforced;

 - +

and specifying that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from changing the rules governing access control are enforced;

 - +

and specifying that may explicitly be granted such that they are not limited by any defined subset (or all) of the above constraints are enforced.

 @@ -1939,7 +1966,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

mandatory access control policies

@@ -1954,7 +1981,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -1964,7 +1991,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms implementing mandatory access control

 @@ -1978,21 +2005,22 @@ - +

discretionary access control policy enforced over the set of covered subjects is defined;

 - +

discretionary access control policy enforced over the set of covered objects is defined;

 - + + @@ -2023,39 +2051,39 @@

When discretionary access control policies are implemented, subjects are not constrained with regard to what actions they can take with information for which they have already been granted access. Thus, subjects that have been granted access to information are not prevented from passing the information to other subjects or objects (i.e., subjects have the discretion to pass). Discretionary access control can operate in conjunction with mandatory access control as described in AC-3(3) and AC-3(15) . A subject that is constrained in its operation by mandatory access control policies can still operate under the less rigorous constraints of discretionary access control. Therefore, while AC-3(3) imposes constraints that prevent a subject from passing information to another subject operating at a different impact or classification level, AC-3(4) permits the subject to pass the information to any subject at the same impact or classification level. The policy is bounded by the system. Once the information is passed outside of system control, additional means may be required to ensure that the constraints remain in effect. While traditional definitions of discretionary access control require identity-based access control, that limitation is not required for this particular use of discretionary access control.

 - + - +

is enforced over the set of covered subjects specified in the policy;

 - +

is enforced over the set of covered objects specified in the policy;

 - +

and are enforced where the policy specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information can pass the information to any other subjects or objects;

 - +

and are enforced where the policy specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information can grant its privileges to other subjects;

 - +

and are enforced where the policy specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information can change security attributes on subjects, objects, the system, or the system’s components;

 - +

and are enforced where the policy specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information can choose the security attributes to be associated with newly created or revised objects;

 - +

and are enforced where the policy specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information can change the rules governing access control.

 @@ -2063,7 +2091,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

discretionary access control policies

@@ -2078,7 +2106,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2088,7 +2116,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing discretionary access control policy

 @@ -2098,14 +2126,15 @@ Security-relevant Information - +

security-relevant information to which access is prevented except during secure, non-operable system states is defined;

 - + + @@ -2118,13 +2147,13 @@

Security-relevant information is information within systems that can potentially impact the operation of security functions or the provision of security services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce system security and privacy policies or maintain the separation of code and data. Security-relevant information includes access control lists, filtering rules for routers or firewalls, configuration parameters for security services, and cryptographic key management information. Secure, non-operable system states include the times in which systems are not performing mission or business-related processing, such as when the system is offline for maintenance, boot-up, troubleshooting, or shut down.

 - +

access to is prevented except during secure, non-operable system states.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement

@@ -2137,7 +2166,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2147,7 +2176,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms preventing access to security-relevant information within the system

 @@ -2156,7 +2185,8 @@ Protection of User and System Information - + + @@ -2170,21 +2200,22 @@ - +

roles upon which to base control of access are defined;

 - +

users authorized to assume roles (defined in AC-03(07)_ODP[01]) are defined;

 - + + @@ -2196,19 +2227,19 @@

Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control policy that enforces access to objects and system functions based on the defined role (i.e., job function) of the subject. Organizations can create specific roles based on job functions and the authorizations (i.e., privileges) to perform needed operations on the systems associated with the organization-defined roles. When users are assigned to specific roles, they inherit the authorizations or privileges defined for those roles. RBAC simplifies privilege administration for organizations because privileges are not assigned directly to every user (which can be a large number of individuals) but are instead acquired through role assignments. RBAC can also increase privacy and security risk if individuals assigned to a role are given access to information beyond what they need to support organizational missions or business functions. RBAC can be implemented as a mandatory or discretionary form of access control. For organizations implementing RBAC with mandatory access controls, the requirements in AC-3(3) define the scope of the subjects and objects covered by the policy.

 - + - +

a role-based access control policy is enforced over defined subjects;

 - +

a role-based access control policy is enforced over defined objects;

 - +

access is controlled based on and .

 @@ -2216,7 +2247,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

role-based access control policies

@@ -2232,7 +2263,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2242,7 +2273,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing role-based access control policy

 @@ -2253,14 +2284,15 @@ - +

rules governing the timing of revocations of access authorizations are defined;

 - + + @@ -2272,14 +2304,14 @@

Revocation of access rules may differ based on the types of access revoked. For example, if a subject (i.e., user or process acting on behalf of a user) is removed from a group, access may not be revoked until the next time the object is opened or the next time the subject attempts to access the object. Revocation based on changes to security labels may take effect immediately. Organizations provide alternative approaches on how to make revocations immediate if systems cannot provide such capability and immediate revocation is necessary.

 - + - +

revocation of access authorizations is enforced, resulting from changes to the security attributes of subjects based on ;

 - +

revocation of access authorizations is enforced resulting from changes to the security attributes of objects based on .

 @@ -2287,7 +2319,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement

@@ -2300,7 +2332,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2310,7 +2342,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions

 @@ -2320,7 +2352,7 @@ Controlled Release - +

the outside system or system component to which to release information is defined;

@@ -2328,7 +2360,7 @@ - +

controls to be provided by the outside system or system component (defined in AC-03(09)_ODP[01]) are defined;

@@ -2336,14 +2368,15 @@ - +

controls used to validate appropriateness of information to be released are defined;

 - + + @@ -2369,14 +2402,14 @@

Controlled release of information requires systems to implement technical or procedural means to validate the information prior to releasing it to external systems. For example, if the system passes information to a system controlled by another organization, technical means are employed to validate that the security and privacy attributes associated with the exported information are appropriate for the receiving system. Alternatively, if the system passes information to a printer in organization-controlled space, procedural means can be employed to ensure that only authorized individuals gain access to the printer.

 - + - +

information is released outside of the system only if the receiving provides ;

 - +

information is released outside of the system only if are used to validate the appropriateness of the information designated for release.

 @@ -2384,7 +2417,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement

@@ -2404,7 +2437,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2416,7 +2449,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions

 @@ -2426,7 +2459,7 @@ Audited Override of Access Control Mechanisms - +

conditions under which to employ an audited override of automated access control mechanisms are defined;

@@ -2434,14 +2467,15 @@ - +

roles allowed to employ an audited override of automated access control mechanisms are defined;

 - + + @@ -2457,13 +2491,13 @@

In certain situations, such as when there is a threat to human life or an event that threatens the organization’s ability to carry out critical missions or business functions, an override capability for access control mechanisms may be needed. Override conditions are defined by organizations and used only in those limited circumstances. Audit events are defined in AU-2 . Audit records are generated in AU-12.

 - +

an audited override of automated access control mechanisms is employed under by .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement

@@ -2477,7 +2511,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2486,7 +2520,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions

 @@ -2496,14 +2530,15 @@ Restrict Access to Specific Information Types - +

information types requiring restricted access to data repositories are defined;

 - + + @@ -2518,13 +2553,13 @@

Restricting access to specific information is intended to provide flexibility regarding access control of specific information types within a system. For example, role-based access could be employed to allow access to only a specific type of personally identifiable information within a database rather than allowing access to the database in its entirety. Other examples include restricting access to cryptographic keys, authentication information, and selected system information.

 - +

access to data repositories containing is restricted.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement

@@ -2537,7 +2572,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

organizational personnel with responsibilities for data repositories

@@ -2547,7 +2582,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions

 @@ -2557,14 +2592,15 @@ Assert and Enforce Application Access - +

system applications and functions requiring access assertion are defined;

 - + + @@ -2587,19 +2623,19 @@

Asserting and enforcing application access is intended to address applications that need to access existing system applications and functions, including user contacts, global positioning systems, cameras, keyboards, microphones, networks, phones, or other files.

 - + - +

as part of the installation process, applications are required to assert the access needed to the following system applications and functions: ;

 - +

an enforcement mechanism to prevent unauthorized access is provided;

- +

access changes after initial installation of the application are approved.

 @@ -2607,7 +2643,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement

@@ -2620,7 +2656,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2629,7 +2665,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions

 @@ -2640,14 +2676,15 @@ - +

attributes to assume access permissions are defined;

 - + + @@ -2658,19 +2695,19 @@

Attribute-based access control is an access control policy that restricts system access to authorized users based on specified organizational attributes (e.g., job function, identity), action attributes (e.g., read, write, delete), environmental attributes (e.g., time of day, location), and resource attributes (e.g., classification of a document). Organizations can create rules based on attributes and the authorizations (i.e., privileges) to perform needed operations on the systems associated with organization-defined attributes and rules. When users are assigned to attributes defined in attribute-based access control policies or rules, they can be provisioned to a system with the appropriate privileges or dynamically granted access to a protected resource. Attribute-based access control can be implemented as either a mandatory or discretionary form of access control. When implemented with mandatory access controls, the requirements in AC-3(3) define the scope of the subjects and objects covered by the policy.

 - + - +

the attribute-based access control policy is enforced over defined subjects;

 - +

the attribute-based access control policy is enforced over defined objects;

 - +

access is controlled based on .

 @@ -2678,7 +2715,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement

@@ -2692,7 +2729,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2701,7 +2738,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions

 @@ -2711,7 +2748,7 @@ Individual Access - +

mechanisms enabling individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information are defined;

@@ -2719,14 +2756,15 @@ - +

elements of personally identifiable information to which individuals have access are defined;

 - + + @@ -2742,13 +2780,13 @@

Individual access affords individuals the ability to review personally identifiable information about them held within organizational records, regardless of format. Access helps individuals to develop an understanding about how their personally identifiable information is being processed. It can also help individuals ensure that their data is accurate. Access mechanisms can include request forms and application interfaces. For federal agencies, PRIVACT processes can be located in systems of record notices and on agency websites. Access to certain types of records may not be appropriate (e.g., for federal agencies, law enforcement records within a system of records may be exempt from disclosure under the PRIVACT ) or may require certain levels of authentication assurance. Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel to determine appropriate mechanisms and access rights or limitations.

 - +

are provided to enable individuals to have access to of their personally identifiable information.

 - +

Access mechanisms (e.g., request forms and application interfaces)

access control policy

@@ -2766,7 +2804,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2776,7 +2814,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions

mechanisms enabling individual access to personally identifiable information

@@ -2796,35 +2834,36 @@ - +

a mandatory access control policy enforced over the set of covered subjects specified in the policy is defined;

 - +

a mandatory access control policy enforced over the set of covered objects specified in the policy is defined;

 - +

a discretionary access control policy enforced over the set of covered subjects specified in the policy is defined;

 - +

a discretionary access control policy enforced over the set of covered objects specified in the policy is defined;

 - + + @@ -2845,30 +2884,30 @@

Simultaneously implementing a mandatory access control policy and a discretionary access control policy can provide additional protection against the unauthorized execution of code by users or processes acting on behalf of users. This helps prevent a single compromised user or process from compromising the entire system.

 - + - + - +

is enforced over the set of covered subjects specified in the policy;

 - +

is enforced over the set of covered objects specified in the policy;

 - + - +

is enforced over the set of covered subjects specified in the policy;

 - +

is enforced over the set of covered objects specified in the policy.

 @@ -2878,7 +2917,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access enforcement

@@ -2893,7 +2932,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -2903,7 +2942,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing mandatory and discretionary access control policy

 @@ -2914,14 +2953,15 @@ Information Flow Enforcement - +

information flow control policies within the system and between connected systems are defined;

 - + + @@ -2953,13 +2993,13 @@

Organizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations within systems and between connected systems. Flow control is based on the characteristics of the information and/or the information path. Enforcement occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict system services, provide a packet-filtering capability based on header information, or provide a message-filtering capability based on message content. Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering and/or inspection mechanisms (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical to information flow enforcement. Control enhancements 3 through 32 primarily address cross-domain solution needs that focus on more advanced filtering techniques, in-depth analysis, and stronger flow enforcement mechanisms implemented in cross-domain products, such as high-assurance guards. Such capabilities are generally not available in commercial off-the-shelf products. Information flow enforcement also applies to control plane traffic (e.g., routing and DNS).

 - +

approved authorizations are enforced for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems based on .

 - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -2978,7 +3018,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy architecture development responsibilities

@@ -2988,7 +3028,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

 @@ -3010,56 +3050,56 @@ - +

security attributes to be associated with information, source, and destination objects are defined;

 - +

privacy attributes to be associated with information, source, and destination objects are defined;

 - +

information objects to be associated with information security attributes are defined;

 - +

information objects to be associated with privacy attributes are defined;

 - +

source objects to be associated with information security attributes are defined;

 - +

source objects to be associated with privacy attributes are defined;

 - +

destination objects to be associated with information security attributes are defined;

 - +

destination objects to be associated with privacy attributes are defined;

@@ -3067,14 +3107,15 @@ - +

information flow control policies as a basis for enforcement of flow control decisions are defined;

 - + + @@ -3085,14 +3126,14 @@

Information flow enforcement mechanisms compare security and privacy attributes associated with information (i.e., data content and structure) and source and destination objects and respond appropriately when the enforcement mechanisms encounter information flows not explicitly allowed by information flow policies. For example, an information object labeled Secret would be allowed to flow to a destination object labeled Secret, but an information object labeled Top Secret would not be allowed to flow to a destination object labeled Secret. A dataset of personally identifiable information may be tagged with restrictions against combining with other types of datasets and, thus, would not be allowed to flow to the restricted dataset. Security and privacy attributes can also include source and destination addresses employed in traffic filter firewalls. Flow enforcement using explicit security or privacy attributes can be used, for example, to control the release of certain types of information.

 - + - +

associated with , , and are used to enforce as a basis for flow control decisions;

 - +

associated with , , and are used to enforce as a basis for flow control decisions.

 @@ -3100,7 +3141,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -3116,7 +3157,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -3126,7 +3167,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

 @@ -3136,14 +3177,15 @@ Processing Domains - +

information flow control policies to be enforced by use of protected processing domains are defined;

 - + + @@ -3155,13 +3197,13 @@

Protected processing domains within systems are processing spaces that have controlled interactions with other processing spaces, enabling control of information flows between these spaces and to/from information objects. A protected processing domain can be provided, for example, by implementing domain and type enforcement. In domain and type enforcement, system processes are assigned to domains, information is identified by types, and information flows are controlled based on allowed information accesses (i.e., determined by domain and type), allowed signaling among domains, and allowed process transitions to other domains.

 - +

protected processing domains are used to enforce as a basis for flow control decisions.

 - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -3176,7 +3218,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -3184,7 +3226,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

 @@ -3194,14 +3236,15 @@ Dynamic Information Flow Control - +

information flow control policies to be enforced are defined;

 - + + @@ -3213,13 +3256,13 @@

Organizational policies regarding dynamic information flow control include allowing or disallowing information flows based on changing conditions or mission or operational considerations. Changing conditions include changes in risk tolerance due to changes in the immediacy of mission or business needs, changes in the threat environment, and detection of potentially harmful or adverse events.

 - +

are enforced.

 - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -3234,7 +3277,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -3243,7 +3286,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

 @@ -3253,7 +3296,7 @@ Flow Control of Encrypted Information - +

information flow control mechanisms that encrypted information is prevented from bypassing are defined;

@@ -3261,7 +3304,7 @@ - + block strip @@ -3549,21 +3596,22 @@ - +

security policy identifying actions to be taken after a filter processing failure are defined;

 - +

privacy policy identifying actions to be taken after a filter processing failure are defined;

 - + + @@ -3581,23 +3629,23 @@

Organization-defined security or privacy policy filters can address data structures and content. For example, security or privacy policy filters for data structures can check for maximum file lengths, maximum field sizes, and data/file types (for structured and unstructured data). Security or privacy policy filters for data content can check for specific words, enumerated values or data value ranges, and hidden content. Structured data permits the interpretation of data content by applications. Unstructured data refers to digital information without a data structure or with a data structure that does not facilitate the development of rule sets to address the impact or classification level of the information conveyed by the data or the flow enforcement decisions. Unstructured data consists of bitmap objects that are inherently non-language-based (i.e., image, video, or audio files) and textual objects that are based on written or printed languages. Organizations can implement more than one security or privacy policy filter to meet information flow control objectives.

 - + - + - +

information flow control is enforced using as a basis for flow control decisions for ;

 - +

information flow control is enforced using as a basis for flow control decisions for ;

 - +

data after a filter processing failure in accordance with ;

data after a filter processing failure in accordance with .

@@ -3606,7 +3654,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -3623,7 +3671,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -3632,7 +3680,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

security and privacy policy filters

@@ -3643,7 +3691,7 @@ Human Reviews - +

information flows requiring the use of human reviews are defined;

@@ -3651,14 +3699,15 @@ - +

conditions under which the use of human reviews for information flows are to be enforced are defined;

 - + + @@ -3670,13 +3719,13 @@

Organizations define security or privacy policy filters for all situations where automated flow control decisions are possible. When a fully automated flow control decision is not possible, then a human review may be employed in lieu of or as a complement to automated security or privacy policy filtering. Human reviews may also be employed as deemed necessary by organizations.

 - +

human reviews are used for under .

 - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -3694,7 +3743,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -3704,7 +3753,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms enforcing the use of human reviews

 @@ -3723,35 +3772,36 @@ - +

security policy filters that privileged administrators have the capability to enable and disable are defined;

 - +

privacy policy filters that privileged administrators have the capability to enable and disable are defined;

 - +

conditions under which privileged administrators have the capability to enable and disable security policy filters are defined;

 - +

conditions under which privileged administrators have the capability to enable and disable privacy policy filters are defined;

 - + + @@ -3762,14 +3812,14 @@

For example, as allowed by the system authorization, administrators can enable security or privacy policy filters to accommodate approved data types. Administrators also have the capability to select the filters that are executed on a specific data flow based on the type of data that is being transferred, the source and destination security domains, and other security or privacy relevant features, as needed.

 - + - +

capability is provided for privileged administrators to enable and disable under ;

 - +

capability is provided for privileged administrators to enable and disable under .

 @@ -3777,7 +3827,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

information flow information policies

@@ -3795,7 +3845,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for enabling/disabling security and privacy policy filters

system/network administrators

@@ -3805,7 +3855,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

security and privacy policy filters

@@ -3820,21 +3870,22 @@ - +

security policy filters that privileged administrators have the capability to configure to support different security and privacy policies are defined;

 - +

privacy policy filters that privileged administrators have the capability to configure to support different security and privacy policies are defined;

 - + + @@ -3845,14 +3896,14 @@

Documentation contains detailed information for configuring security or privacy policy filters. For example, administrators can configure security or privacy policy filters to include the list of inappropriate words that security or privacy policy mechanisms check in accordance with the definitions provided by organizations.

 - + - +

capability is provided for privileged administrators to configure to support different security or privacy policies;

 - +

capability is provided for privileged administrators to configure to support different security or privacy policies.

 @@ -3860,7 +3911,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -3877,7 +3928,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for configuring security and privacy policy filters

system/network administrators

@@ -3887,7 +3938,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

security and privacy policy filters

@@ -3898,14 +3949,15 @@ Data Type Identifiers - +

data type identifiers to be used to validate data essential for information flow decisions are defined;

 - + + @@ -3916,13 +3968,13 @@

Data type identifiers include filenames, file types, file signatures or tokens, and multiple internal file signatures or tokens. Systems only allow transfer of data that is compliant with data type format specifications. Identification and validation of data types is based on defined specifications associated with each allowed data format. The filename and number alone are not used for data type identification. Content is validated syntactically and semantically against its specification to ensure that it is the proper data type.

 - +

when transferring information between different security domains, are used to validate data essential for information flow decisions.

 - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -3937,7 +3989,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -3946,7 +3998,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

 @@ -3956,14 +4008,15 @@ Decomposition into Policy-relevant Subcomponents - +

policy-relevant subcomponents into which to decompose information for submission to policy enforcement mechanisms are defined;

 - + + @@ -3974,13 +4027,13 @@

Decomposing information into policy-relevant subcomponents prior to information transfer facilitates policy decisions on source, destination, certificates, classification, attachments, and other security- or privacy-related component differentiators. Policy enforcement mechanisms apply filtering, inspection, and/or sanitization rules to the policy-relevant subcomponents of information to facilitate flow enforcement prior to transferring such information to different security domains.

 - +

when transferring information between different security domains, information is decomposed into for submission to policy enforcement mechanisms.

 - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -3994,7 +4047,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -4003,7 +4056,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

 @@ -4017,21 +4070,22 @@ - +

security policy filters to be implemented that require fully enumerated formats restricting data structure and content have been defined;

 - +

privacy policy filters to be implemented that require fully enumerated formats restricting data structure and content are defined;

 - + + @@ -4042,14 +4096,14 @@

Data structure and content restrictions reduce the range of potential malicious or unsanctioned content in cross-domain transactions. Security or privacy policy filters that restrict data structures include restricting file sizes and field lengths. Data content policy filters include encoding formats for character sets, restricting character data fields to only contain alpha-numeric characters, prohibiting special characters, and validating schema structures.

 - + - +

when transferring information between different security domains, implemented require fully enumerated formats that restrict data structure and content;

 - +

when transferring information between different security domains, implemented require fully enumerated formats that restrict data structure and content.

 @@ -4057,7 +4111,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -4075,7 +4129,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -4084,7 +4138,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

security and privacy policy filters

@@ -4100,28 +4154,29 @@ - +

unsanctioned information to be detected is defined;

 - +

security policy that requires the transfer of unsanctioned information between different security domains to be prohibited is defined (if selected);

 - +

privacy policy that requires the transfer of organization-defined unsanctioned information between different security domains to be prohibited is defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -4133,19 +4188,19 @@

Unsanctioned information includes malicious code, information that is inappropriate for release from the source network, or executable code that could disrupt or harm the services or systems on the destination network.

 - + - +

when transferring information between different security domains, information is examined for the presence of ;

 - +

when transferring information between different security domains, transfer of is prohibited in accordance with the ;

 - +

when transferring information between different security domains, transfer of is prohibited in accordance with the .

 @@ -4153,7 +4208,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -4169,7 +4224,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

organizational personnel with privacy responsibilities

@@ -4178,7 +4233,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

 @@ -4187,7 +4242,8 @@ Information Transfers on Interconnected Systems - + + @@ -4196,13 +4252,14 @@ Domain Authentication - + - + + @@ -4216,13 +4273,13 @@

Attribution is a critical component of a security and privacy concept of operations. The ability to identify source and destination points for information flowing within systems allows the forensic reconstruction of events and encourages policy compliance by attributing policy violations to specific organizations or individuals. Successful domain authentication requires that system labels distinguish among systems, organizations, and individuals involved in preparing, sending, receiving, or disseminating information. Attribution also allows organizations to better maintain the lineage of personally identifiable information processing as it flows through systems and can facilitate consent tracking, as well as correction, deletion, or access requests from individuals.

 - +

source and destination points are uniquely identified and authenticated by for information transfer.

 - +

Access control policy

information flow control policies

@@ -4239,7 +4296,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -4248,7 +4305,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy

 @@ -4257,7 +4314,8 @@ Security Attribute Binding - + + @@ -4270,21 +4328,22 @@ - +

security policy filters to be implemented on metadata are defined (if selected);

 - +

privacy policy filters to be implemented on metadata are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -4295,14 +4354,14 @@

All information (including metadata and the data to which the metadata applies) is subject to filtering and inspection. Some organizations distinguish between metadata and data payloads (i.e., only the data to which the metadata is bound). Other organizations do not make such distinctions and consider metadata and the data to which the metadata applies to be part of the payload.

 - + - +

when transferring information between different security domains, are implemented on metadata;

 - +

when transferring information between different security domains, are implemented on metadata.

 @@ -4310,7 +4369,7 @@ - +

Information flow enforcement policy

information flow control policies

@@ -4326,7 +4385,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information flow enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -4337,7 +4396,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions

security and policy filters

@@ -4348,7 +4407,7 @@ Approved Solutions - +

solutions in approved configurations to control the flow of information across security domains are defined;

@@ -4356,14 +4415,15 @@ - +

information to be controlled when it flows across security domains is defined;

 - + + @@ -4374,13 +4434,13 @@

Organizations define approved solutions and configurations in cross-domain policies and guidance in accordance with the types of information flows across classification boundaries. The National Security Agency (NSA) National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office provides a listing of approved cross-domain solutions. Contact ncdsmo@nsa.gov for more information.

 - +

are employed to control the flow of across security domains.

 - +

Information flow enforcement policy

information flow control policies

@@ -4396,7 +4456,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information flow enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -4405,7 +4465,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions

 @@ -4419,14 +4479,14 @@ - +

mechanisms and/or techniques used to logically separate information flows are defined (if selected);

 - +

mechanisms and/or techniques used to physically separate information flows are defined (if selected);

@@ -4435,14 +4495,15 @@ - +

required separations by types of information are defined;

 - + + @@ -4455,14 +4516,14 @@

Enforcing the separation of information flows associated with defined types of data can enhance protection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit and by enabling flow control by transmission paths that are not otherwise achievable. Types of separable information include inbound and outbound communications traffic, service requests and responses, and information of differing security impact or classification levels.

 - + - +

information flows are separated logically using to accomplish ;

 - +

information flows are separated physically using to accomplish .

 @@ -4470,7 +4531,7 @@ - +

Information flow enforcement policy

information flow control policies

@@ -4486,7 +4547,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information flow enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -4496,7 +4557,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions

 @@ -4505,7 +4566,8 @@ Access Only - + + @@ -4516,13 +4578,13 @@

The system provides a capability for users to access each connected security domain without providing any mechanisms to allow users to transfer data or information between the different security domains. An example of an access-only solution is a terminal that provides a user access to information with different security classifications while assuredly keeping the information separate.

 - +

access is provided from a single device to computing platforms, applications, or data that reside in multiple different security domains while preventing information flow between the different security domains.

 - +

Information flow enforcement policy

procedures addressing information flow enforcement

@@ -4535,7 +4597,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information flow enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -4544,7 +4606,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions

 @@ -4554,14 +4616,15 @@ Modify Non-releasable Information - +

modification action implemented on non-releasable information is defined;

 - + + @@ -4573,13 +4636,13 @@

Modifying non-releasable information can help prevent a data spill or attack when information is transferred across security domains. Modification actions include masking, permutation, alteration, removal, or redaction.

 - +

when transferring information between security domains, non-releasable information is modified by implementing .

 - +

Information flow enforcement policy

procedures addressing information flow enforcement

@@ -4592,7 +4655,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information flow enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -4601,7 +4664,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions

 @@ -4610,7 +4673,8 @@ Internal Normalized Format - + + @@ -4621,14 +4685,14 @@

Converting data into normalized forms is one of most of effective mechanisms to stop malicious attacks and large classes of data exfiltration.

 - + - +

when transferring information between different security domains, incoming data is parsed into an internal, normalized format;

 - +

when transferring information between different security domains, the data is regenerated to be consistent with its intended specification.

 @@ -4636,7 +4700,7 @@ - +

Information flow enforcement policy

procedures addressing information flow enforcement

@@ -4649,7 +4713,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information flow enforcement responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -4658,7 +4722,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions

 @@ -4668,7 +4732,7 @@ Data Sanitization - + lock the account or node for lock the account or node until released by an administrator @@ -6011,7 +6095,7 @@ - +

time period for an account or node to be locked is defined (if selected);

@@ -6019,7 +6103,7 @@ - +

delay algorithm for the next logon prompt is defined (if selected);

@@ -6027,14 +6111,15 @@ - +

other action to be taken when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded is defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -6058,14 +6143,14 @@

The need to limit unsuccessful logon attempts and take subsequent action when the maximum number of attempts is exceeded applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a local or network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined, organization-defined time period. If a delay algorithm is selected, organizations may employ different algorithms for different components of the system based on the capabilities of those components. Responses to unsuccessful logon attempts may be implemented at the operating system and the application levels. Organization-defined actions that may be taken when the number of allowed consecutive invalid logon attempts is exceeded include prompting the user to answer a secret question in addition to the username and password, invoking a lockdown mode with limited user capabilities (instead of full lockout), allowing users to only logon from specified Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, requiring a CAPTCHA to prevent automated attacks, or applying user profiles such as location, time of day, IP address, device, or Media Access Control (MAC) address. If automatic system lockout or execution of a delay algorithm is not implemented in support of the availability objective, organizations consider a combination of other actions to help prevent brute force attacks. In addition to the above, organizations can prompt users to respond to a secret question before the number of allowed unsuccessful logon attempts is exceeded. Automatically unlocking an account after a specified period of time is generally not permitted. However, exceptions may be required based on operational mission or need.

 - + - +

a limit of consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during is enforced;

 - +

automatically when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.

 @@ -6073,7 +6158,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing unsuccessful logon attempts

@@ -6086,7 +6171,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

system developers

@@ -6095,7 +6180,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access control policy for unsuccessful logon attempts

 @@ -6103,7 +6188,8 @@ Automatic Account Lock - + + @@ -6112,7 +6198,7 @@ Purge or Wipe Mobile Device - +

mobile devices to be purged or wiped of information are defined;

@@ -6121,7 +6207,7 @@ - +

purging and wiping requirements and techniques to be used when mobile devices are purged or wiped of information are defined;

@@ -6129,14 +6215,15 @@ - +

the number of consecutive, unsuccessful logon attempts before the information is purged or wiped from mobile devices is defined;

 - + + @@ -6150,13 +6237,13 @@

A mobile device is a computing device that has a small form factor such that it can be carried by a single individual; is designed to operate without a physical connection; possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and includes a self-contained power source. Purging or wiping the device applies only to mobile devices for which the organization-defined number of unsuccessful logons occurs. The logon is to the mobile device, not to any one account on the device. Successful logons to accounts on mobile devices reset the unsuccessful logon count to zero. Purging or wiping may be unnecessary if the information on the device is protected with sufficiently strong encryption mechanisms.

 - +

information is purged or wiped from based on after consecutive, unsuccessful device logon attempts.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing unsuccessful logon attempts on mobile devices

@@ -6171,7 +6258,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -6179,7 +6266,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access control policy for unsuccessful device logon attempts

 @@ -6189,14 +6276,15 @@ Biometric Attempt Limiting - +

the number of unsuccessful biometric logon attempts is defined;

 - + + @@ -6208,13 +6296,13 @@

Biometrics are probabilistic in nature. The ability to successfully authenticate can be impacted by many factors, including matching performance and presentation attack detection mechanisms. Organizations select the appropriate number of attempts for users based on organizationally-defined factors.

 - +

unsuccessful biometric logon attempts are limited to .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing unsuccessful logon attempts on biometric devices

@@ -6227,7 +6315,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -6235,7 +6323,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access control policy for unsuccessful logon attempts

 @@ -6245,7 +6333,7 @@ Use of Alternate Authentication Factor - +

authentication factors allowed to be used that are different from the primary authentication factors are defined;

@@ -6253,7 +6341,7 @@ - +

the number of consecutive, invalid logon attempts through the use of alternative factors for which to enforce a limit by a user is defined;

@@ -6261,14 +6349,15 @@ - +

time period during which a user can attempt logons through alternative factors is defined;

 - + + @@ -6288,14 +6377,14 @@

The use of alternate authentication factors supports the objective of availability and allows a user who has inadvertently been locked out to use additional authentication factors to bypass the lockout.

 - + - +

that are different from the primary authentication factors are allowed to be used after the number of organization-defined consecutive invalid logon attempts have been exceeded;

 - +

a limit of consecutive invalid logon attempts through the use of the alternative factors by the user during a is enforced.

 @@ -6303,7 +6392,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing unsuccessful logon attempts for primary and alternate authentication factors

@@ -6316,7 +6405,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -6324,7 +6413,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access control policy for unsuccessful logon attempts

 @@ -6336,7 +6425,7 @@ - +

system use notification message or banner to be displayed by the system to users before granting access to the system is defined;

@@ -6344,14 +6433,15 @@ - +

conditions for system use to be displayed by the system before granting further access are defined;

 - + + @@ -6404,51 +6494,51 @@

System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners displayed before individuals log in to systems. System use notifications are used only for access via logon interfaces with human users. Notifications are not required when human interfaces do not exist. Based on an assessment of risk, organizations consider whether or not a secondary system use notification is needed to access applications or other system resources after the initial network logon. Organizations consider system use notification messages or banners displayed in multiple languages based on organizational needs and the demographics of system users. Organizations consult with the privacy office for input regarding privacy messaging and the Office of the General Counsel or organizational equivalent for legal review and approval of warning banner content.

 - + - +

is displayed to users before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines;

- +

the system use notification states that users are accessing a U.S. Government system;

 - +

the system use notification states that system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;

 - +

the system use notification states that unauthorized use of the system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties; and

 - +

the system use notification states that use of the system indicates consent to monitoring and recording;

 - +

the notification message or banner is retained on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the system;

 - + - +

for publicly accessible systems, system use information is displayed before granting further access to the publicly accessible system;

 - +

for publicly accessible systems, any references to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities are displayed;

 - +

for publicly accessible systems, a description of the authorized uses of the system is included.

 @@ -6458,7 +6548,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

privacy and security policies, procedures addressing system use notification

@@ -6477,7 +6567,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -6487,7 +6577,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing system use notification

 @@ -6496,7 +6586,8 @@ Previous Logon Notification - + + @@ -6508,13 +6599,13 @@

Previous logon notification is applicable to system access via human user interfaces and access to systems that occurs in other types of architectures. Information about the last successful logon allows the user to recognize if the date and time provided is not consistent with the user’s last access.

 - +

the user is notified, upon successful logon to the system, of the date and time of the last logon.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing previous logon notification

@@ -6527,7 +6618,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -6536,7 +6627,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access control policy for previous logon notification

 @@ -6544,7 +6635,8 @@ Unsuccessful Logons - + + @@ -6555,13 +6647,13 @@

Information about the number of unsuccessful logon attempts since the last successful logon allows the user to recognize if the number of unsuccessful logon attempts is consistent with the user’s actual logon attempts.

 - +

the user is notified, upon successful logon, of the number of unsuccessful logon attempts since the last successful logon.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing previous logon notification

@@ -6574,7 +6666,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -6583,7 +6675,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access control policy for previous logon notification

 @@ -6593,7 +6685,7 @@ Successful and Unsuccessful Logons - + initiating a device lock after of inactivity requiring the user to initiate a device lock before leaving the system unattended @@ -6853,14 +6949,15 @@ - +

time period of inactivity after which a device lock is initiated is defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -6881,14 +6978,14 @@

Device locks are temporary actions taken to prevent logical access to organizational systems when users stop work and move away from the immediate vicinity of those systems but do not want to log out because of the temporary nature of their absences. Device locks can be implemented at the operating system level or at the application level. A proximity lock may be used to initiate the device lock (e.g., via a Bluetooth-enabled device or dongle). User-initiated device locking is behavior or policy-based and, as such, requires users to take physical action to initiate the device lock. Device locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of systems, such as when organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays.

 - + - +

further access to the system is prevented by ;

 - +

device lock is retained until the user re-establishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.

 @@ -6896,7 +6993,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing session lock

@@ -6910,7 +7007,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -6919,7 +7016,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access control policy for session lock

 @@ -6927,7 +7024,8 @@ Pattern-hiding Displays - + + @@ -6938,13 +7036,13 @@

The pattern-hiding display can include static or dynamic images, such as patterns used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery life indicator, or a blank screen with the caveat that controlled unclassified information is not displayed.

 - +

information previously visible on the display is concealed, via device lock, with a publicly viewable image.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing session lock

@@ -6957,7 +7055,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -6966,7 +7064,7 @@ - +

System session lock mechanisms

 @@ -6978,14 +7076,15 @@ - +

conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect are defined;

 - + + @@ -6998,13 +7097,13 @@

Session termination addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions (in contrast to SC-10 , which addresses the termination of network connections associated with communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect)). A logical session (for local, network, and remote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses an organizational system. Such user sessions can be terminated without terminating network sessions. Session termination ends all processes associated with a user’s logical session except for those processes that are specifically created by the user (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated. Conditions or trigger events that require automatic termination of the session include organization-defined periods of user inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, or time-of-day restrictions on system use.

 - +

a user session is automatically terminated after .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing session termination

@@ -7018,7 +7117,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -7027,7 +7126,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms implementing user session termination

 @@ -7036,14 +7135,15 @@ User-initiated Logouts - +

information resources for which a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions is required are defined;

 - + + @@ -7055,13 +7155,13 @@

Information resources to which users gain access via authentication include local workstations, databases, and password-protected websites or web-based services.

 - +

a logout capability is provided for user-initiated communications sessions whenever authentication is used to gain access to .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing session termination

@@ -7075,7 +7175,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -7084,7 +7184,7 @@ - +

System session termination mechanisms

logout capabilities for user-initiated communications sessions

@@ -7094,7 +7194,8 @@ Termination Message - + + @@ -7105,13 +7206,13 @@

Logout messages for web access can be displayed after authenticated sessions have been terminated. However, for certain types of sessions, including file transfer protocol (FTP) sessions, systems typically send logout messages as final messages prior to terminating sessions.

 - +

an explicit logout message is displayed to users indicating the termination of authenticated communication sessions.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing session termination

@@ -7125,7 +7226,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -7134,7 +7235,7 @@ - +

System session termination mechanisms

display of logout messages

@@ -7146,14 +7247,15 @@ - +

time until the end of session for display to users is defined;

 - + + @@ -7164,13 +7266,13 @@

To increase usability, notify users of pending session termination and prompt users to continue the session. The pending session termination time period is based on the parameters defined in the AC-12 base control.

 - +

an explicit message to users is displayed indicating that the session will end in .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing session termination

@@ -7184,7 +7286,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -7193,7 +7295,7 @@ - +

System session termination mechanisms

display of end of session time

@@ -7204,7 +7306,8 @@ Supervision and Review — Access Control - + + @@ -7214,14 +7317,15 @@ Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authentication - +

user actions that can be performed on the system without identification or authentication are defined;

 - + + @@ -7241,21 +7345,21 @@

Specific user actions may be permitted without identification or authentication if organizations determine that identification and authentication are not required for the specified user actions. Organizations may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication, including when individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible federal systems, when individuals use mobile phones to receive calls, or when facsimiles are received. Organizations identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but may, under certain circumstances, allow identification or authentication mechanisms to be bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switch that commands bypass of the logon functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored use. Permitting actions without identification or authentication does not apply to situations where identification and authentication have already occurred and are not repeated but rather to situations where identification and authentication have not yet occurred. Organizations may decide that there are no user actions that can be performed on organizational systems without identification and authentication, and therefore, the value for the assignment operation can be none.

- + - +

that can be performed on the system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational mission and business functions are identified;

 - + - +

user actions not requiring identification or authentication are documented in the security plan for the system;

 - +

a rationale for user actions not requiring identification or authentication is provided in the security plan for the system.

 @@ -7265,7 +7369,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing permitted actions without identification or authentication

@@ -7279,7 +7383,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -7288,7 +7392,8 @@ Necessary Uses - + + @@ -7297,7 +7402,8 @@ Automated Marking - + + @@ -7335,56 +7441,56 @@ - +

types of security attributes to be associated with information security attribute values for information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission are defined;

 - +

types of privacy attributes to be associated with privacy attribute values for information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission are defined;

 - +

security attribute values for types of security attributes are defined;

 - +

privacy attribute values for types of privacy attributes are defined;

 - +

systems for which permitted security attributes are to be established are defined;

 - +

systems for which permitted privacy attributes are to be established are defined;

 - +

security attributes defined as part of AC-16a that are permitted for systems are defined;

 - +

privacy attributes defined as part of AC-16a that are permitted for systems are defined;

@@ -7393,28 +7499,29 @@ - +

attribute values or ranges for established attributes are defined;

 - +

the frequency at which to review security attributes for applicability is defined;

 - +

the frequency at which to review privacy attributes for applicability is defined;

 - + + @@ -7470,68 +7577,68 @@

Organizations can define the types of attributes needed for systems to support missions or business functions. There are many values that can be assigned to a security attribute. By specifying the permitted attribute ranges and values, organizations ensure that attribute values are meaningful and relevant. Labeling refers to the association of attributes with the subjects and objects represented by the internal data structures within systems. This facilitates system-based enforcement of information security and privacy policies. Labels include classification of information in accordance with legal and compliance requirements (e.g., top secret, secret, confidential, controlled unclassified), information impact level; high value asset information, access authorizations, nationality; data life cycle protection (i.e., encryption and data expiration), personally identifiable information processing permissions, including individual consent to personally identifiable information processing, and contractor affiliation. A related term to labeling is marking. Marking refers to the association of attributes with objects in a human-readable form and displayed on system media. Marking enables manual, procedural, or process-based enforcement of information security and privacy policies. Security and privacy labels may have the same value as media markings (e.g., top secret, secret, confidential). See MP-3 (Media Marking).

 - + - + - +

the means to associate with for information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission are provided;

 - +

the means to associate with for information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission are provided;

 - + - +

attribute associations are made;

 - +

attribute associations are retained with the information;

 - + - +

the following permitted security attributes are established from the attributes defined in AC-16_ODP[01] for : ;

 - +

the following permitted privacy attributes are established from the attributes defined in AC-16_ODP[02] for : ;

 - +

the following permitted attribute values or ranges for each of the established attributes are determined: ;

 - +

changes to attributes are audited;

 - + - +

are reviewed for applicability ;

 - +

are reviewed for applicability .

 @@ -7541,7 +7648,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing the association of security and privacy attributes to information in storage, in process, and in transmission

@@ -7555,7 +7662,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -7564,7 +7671,7 @@ - +

Organizational capability supporting and maintaining the association of security and privacy attributes to information in storage, in process, and in transmission

 @@ -7584,49 +7691,50 @@ - +

subjects with which security attributes are to be dynamically associated as information is created and combined are defined;

 - +

objects with which security attributes are to be dynamically associated as information is created and combined are defined;

 - +

subjects with which privacy attributes are to be dynamically associated as information is created and combined are defined;

 - +

objects with which privacy attributes are to be dynamically associated as information is created and combined are defined;

 - +

security policies requiring dynamic association of security attributes with subjects and objects are defined;

 - +

privacy policies requiring dynamic association of privacy attributes with subjects and objects are defined;

 - + + @@ -7637,24 +7745,24 @@

Dynamic association of attributes is appropriate whenever the security or privacy characteristics of information change over time. Attributes may change due to information aggregation issues (i.e., characteristics of individual data elements are different from the combined elements), changes in individual access authorizations (i.e., privileges), changes in the security category of information, or changes in security or privacy policies. Attributes may also change situationally.

 - + - +

security attributes are dynamically associated with in accordance with the following security policies as information is created and combined: ;

 - +

security attributes are dynamically associated with in accordance with the following security policies as information is created and combined: ;

 - +

privacy attributes are dynamically associated with in accordance with the following privacy policies as information is created and combined: ;

 - +

privacy attributes are dynamically associated with in accordance with the following privacy policies as information is created and combined: .

 @@ -7662,7 +7770,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing dynamic association of security and privacy attributes to information

@@ -7676,7 +7784,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -7685,7 +7793,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms implementing dynamic association of security and privacy attributes to information

 @@ -7694,7 +7802,8 @@ Attribute Value Changes by Authorized Individuals - + + @@ -7705,14 +7814,14 @@

The content or assigned values of attributes can directly affect the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify attributes to authorized individuals.

 - + - +

authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are provided with the capability to define or change the value of associated security attributes;

 - +

authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are provided with the capability to define or change the value of associated privacy attributes.

 @@ -7720,7 +7829,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing the change of security and privacy attribute values

@@ -7735,7 +7844,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for changing values of security and privacy attributes

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -7744,7 +7853,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms permitting changes to values of security and privacy attributes

 @@ -7765,49 +7874,50 @@ - +

security attributes that require association and integrity maintenance are defined;

 - +

privacy attributes that require association and integrity maintenance are defined;

 - +

subjects requiring the association and integrity of security attributes to such subjects to be maintained are defined;

 - +

objects requiring the association and integrity of security attributes to such objects to be maintained are defined;

 - +

subjects requiring the association and integrity of privacy attributes to such subjects to be maintained are defined;

 - +

objects requiring the association and integrity of privacy attributes to such objects to be maintained are defined;

 - + + @@ -7818,24 +7928,24 @@

Maintaining the association and integrity of security and privacy attributes to subjects and objects with sufficient assurance helps to ensure that the attribute associations can be used as the basis of automated policy actions. The integrity of specific items, such as security configuration files, may be maintained through the use of an integrity monitoring mechanism that detects anomalies and changes that deviate from known good baselines. Automated policy actions include retention date expirations, access control decisions, information flow control decisions, and information disclosure decisions.

 - + - +

the association and integrity of to is maintained;

 - +

the association and integrity of to is maintained.

 - +

the association and integrity of to is maintained;

 - +

the association and integrity of to is maintained.

 @@ -7843,7 +7953,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing the association of security and privacy attributes to information

@@ -7857,7 +7967,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

system developers

@@ -7865,7 +7975,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms maintaining association and integrity of security and privacy attributes to information

 @@ -7888,63 +7998,64 @@ - +

security attributes to be associated with subjects by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are defined;

 - +

security attributes to be associated with objects by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are defined;

 - +

privacy attributes to be associated with subjects by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are defined;

 - +

privacy attributes to be associated with objects by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are defined;

 - +

subjects requiring the association of security attributes by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are defined;

 - +

objects requiring the association of security attributes by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are defined;

 - +

subjects requiring the association of privacy attributes by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are defined;

 - +

objects requiring the association of privacy attributes by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are defined;

 - + + @@ -7955,24 +8066,24 @@

Systems, in general, provide the capability for privileged users to assign security and privacy attributes to system-defined subjects (e.g., users) and objects (e.g., directories, files, and ports). Some systems provide additional capability for general users to assign security and privacy attributes to additional objects (e.g., files, emails). The association of attributes by authorized individuals is described in the design documentation. The support provided by systems can include prompting users to select security and privacy attributes to be associated with information objects, employing automated mechanisms to categorize information with attributes based on defined policies, or ensuring that the combination of the security or privacy attributes selected is valid. Organizations consider the creation, deletion, or modification of attributes when defining auditable events.

 - + - +

authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are provided with the capability to associate with ;

 - +

authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are provided with the capability to associate with ;

 - +

authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are provided with the capability to associate with ;

 - +

authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are provided with the capability to associate with .

 @@ -7980,7 +8091,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing the association of security and privacy attributes to information

@@ -7996,7 +8107,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for associating security and privacy attributes to information

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -8005,7 +8116,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting user associations of security and privacy attributes to information

 @@ -8016,7 +8127,7 @@ - +

special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions to be used for each object that the system transmits to output devices are defined;

@@ -8025,14 +8136,15 @@ - +

human-readable, standard naming conventions for the security and privacy attributes to be displayed in human-readable form on each object that the system transmits to output devices are defined;

 - + + @@ -8043,14 +8155,14 @@

System outputs include printed pages, screens, or equivalent items. System output devices include printers, notebook computers, video displays, smart phones, and tablets. To mitigate the risk of unauthorized exposure of information (e.g., shoulder surfing), the outputs display full attribute values when unmasked by the subscriber.

 - + - +

security attributes are displayed in human-readable form on each object that the system transmits to output devices to identify using ;

 - +

privacy attributes are displayed in human-readable form on each object that the system transmits to output devices to identify using .

 @@ -8058,7 +8170,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing display of security and privacy attributes in human-readable form

@@ -8074,7 +8186,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

system developers

@@ -8082,7 +8194,7 @@ - +

System output devices displaying security and privacy attributes in human-readable form on each object

 @@ -8110,77 +8222,78 @@ - +

security attributes to be associated with subjects are defined;

 - +

security attributes to be associated with objects are defined;

 - +

privacy attributes to be associated with subjects are defined;

 - +

privacy attributes to be associated with objects are defined;

 - +

subjects to be associated with information security attributes are defined;

 - +

objects to be associated with information security attributes are defined;

 - +

subjects to be associated with privacy attributes are defined;

 - +

objects to be associated with privacy attributes are defined;

 - +

security policies that require personnel to associate and maintain the association of security and privacy attributes with subjects and objects;

 - +

privacy policies that require personnel to associate and maintain the association of security and privacy attributes with subjects and objects;

 - + + @@ -8191,24 +8304,24 @@

Maintaining attribute association requires individual users (as opposed to the system) to maintain associations of defined security and privacy attributes with subjects and objects.

 - + - +

personnel are required to associate and maintain the association of with in accordance with ;

 - +

personnel are required to associate and maintain the association of with in accordance with ;

 - +

personnel are required to associate and maintain the association of with in accordance with ;

 - +

personnel are required to associate and maintain the association of with in accordance with .

 @@ -8216,7 +8329,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing association of security and privacy attributes with subjects and objects

@@ -8227,7 +8340,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for associating and maintaining association of security and privacy attributes with subjects and objects

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -8236,7 +8349,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting associations of security and privacy attributes to subjects and objects

 @@ -8245,7 +8358,8 @@ Consistent Attribute Interpretation - + + @@ -8256,14 +8370,14 @@

To enforce security and privacy policies across multiple system components in distributed systems, organizations provide a consistent interpretation of security and privacy attributes employed in access enforcement and flow enforcement decisions. Organizations can establish agreements and processes to help ensure that distributed system components implement attributes with consistent interpretations in automated access enforcement and flow enforcement actions.

 - + - +

a consistent interpretation of security attributes transmitted between distributed system components is provided;

 - +

a consistent interpretation of privacy attributes transmitted between distributed system components is provided.

 @@ -8271,7 +8385,7 @@ - +

Access control policies and procedures

procedures addressing consistent interpretation of security and privacy attributes transmitted between distributed system components

@@ -8287,7 +8401,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for providing consistent interpretation of security and privacy attributes used in access enforcement and information flow enforcement actions

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -8296,7 +8410,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access enforcement and information flow enforcement functions

 @@ -8310,21 +8424,22 @@ - +

techniques and technologies to be implemented in associating security attributes to information are defined;

 - +

techniques and technologies to be implemented in associating privacy attributes to information are defined;

 - + + @@ -8337,14 +8452,14 @@

The association of security and privacy attributes to information within systems is important for conducting automated access enforcement and flow enforcement actions. The association of such attributes to information (i.e., binding) can be accomplished with technologies and techniques that provide different levels of assurance. For example, systems can cryptographically bind attributes to information using digital signatures that support cryptographic keys protected by hardware devices (sometimes known as hardware roots of trust).

 - + - +

are implemented in associating security attributes to information;

 - +

are implemented in associating privacy attributes to information.

 @@ -8352,7 +8467,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing association of security and privacy attributes to information

@@ -8366,7 +8481,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for associating security and privacy attributes to information

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -8375,7 +8490,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing techniques or technologies associating security and privacy attributes to information

 @@ -8389,21 +8504,22 @@ - +

techniques or procedures used to validate regrading mechanisms for security attributes are defined;

 - +

techniques or procedures used to validate regrading mechanisms for privacy attributes are defined;

 - + + @@ -8414,14 +8530,14 @@

A regrading mechanism is a trusted process authorized to re-classify and re-label data in accordance with a defined policy exception. Validated regrading mechanisms are used by organizations to provide the requisite levels of assurance for attribute reassignment activities. The validation is facilitated by ensuring that regrading mechanisms are single purpose and of limited function. Since security and privacy attribute changes can directly affect policy enforcement actions, implementing trustworthy regrading mechanisms is necessary to help ensure that such mechanisms perform in a consistent and correct mode of operation.

 - + - +

security attributes associated with information are changed only via regrading mechanisms validated using ;

 - +

privacy attributes associated with information are changed only via regrading mechanisms validated using .

 @@ -8429,7 +8545,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing reassignment of security attributes to information

@@ -8443,7 +8559,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for reassigning association of security and privacy attributes to information

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -8452,7 +8568,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing techniques or procedures for reassigning association of security and privacy attributes to information

 @@ -8461,7 +8577,8 @@ Attribute Configuration by Authorized Individuals - + + @@ -8472,14 +8589,14 @@

The content or assigned values of security and privacy attributes can directly affect the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Thus, it is important for systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify the type and value of attributes available for association with subjects and objects to authorized individuals only.

 - + - +

authorized individuals are provided with the capability to define or change the type and value of security attributes available for association with subjects and objects;

 - +

authorized individuals are provided with the capability to define or change the type and value of privacy attributes available for association with subjects and objects.

 @@ -8487,7 +8604,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing configuration of security and privacy attributes by authorized individuals

@@ -8501,7 +8618,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for defining or changing security and privacy attributes associated with information

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -8510,7 +8627,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing capability for defining or changing security and privacy attributes

 @@ -8520,7 +8637,8 @@ Remote Access - + + @@ -8562,28 +8680,28 @@

Remote access is access to organizational systems (or processes acting on behalf of users) that communicate through external networks such as the Internet. Types of remote access include dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations use encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity for remote connections. The use of encrypted VPNs provides sufficient assurance to the organization that it can effectively treat such connections as internal networks if the cryptographic mechanisms used are implemented in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Still, VPN connections traverse external networks, and the encrypted VPN does not enhance the availability of remote connections. VPNs with encrypted tunnels can also affect the ability to adequately monitor network communications traffic for malicious code. Remote access controls apply to systems other than public web servers or systems designed for public access. Authorization of each remote access type addresses authorization prior to allowing remote access without specifying the specific formats for such authorization. While organizations may use information exchange and system connection security agreements to manage remote access connections to other systems, such agreements are addressed as part of CA-3 . Enforcing access restrictions for remote access is addressed via AC-3.

 - + - + - +

usage restrictions are established and documented for each type of remote access allowed;

 - +

configuration/connection requirements are established and documented for each type of remote access allowed;

 - +

implementation guidance is established and documented for each type of remote access allowed;

 - +

each type of remote access to the system is authorized prior to allowing such connections.

 @@ -8591,7 +8709,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing remote access implementation and usage (including restrictions)

@@ -8605,7 +8723,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for managing remote access connections

system/network administrators

@@ -8614,7 +8732,7 @@ - +

Remote access management capability for the system

 @@ -8622,7 +8740,8 @@ Monitoring and Control - + + @@ -8638,14 +8757,14 @@

Monitoring and control of remote access methods allows organizations to detect attacks and help ensure compliance with remote access policies by auditing the connection activities of remote users on a variety of system components, including servers, notebook computers, workstations, smart phones, and tablets. Audit logging for remote access is enforced by AU-2 . Audit events are defined in AU-2a.

 - + - +

automated mechanisms are employed to monitor remote access methods;

 - +

automated mechanisms are employed to control remote access methods.

 @@ -8653,7 +8772,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing remote access to the system

@@ -8667,7 +8786,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -8676,7 +8795,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms monitoring and controlling remote access methods

 @@ -8685,7 +8804,8 @@ Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption - + + @@ -8699,13 +8819,13 @@

Virtual private networks can be used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is an example of a cryptographic protocol that provides end-to-end communications security over networks and is used for Internet communications and online transactions.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms are implemented to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing remote access to the system

@@ -8719,7 +8839,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -8728,7 +8848,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms protecting confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions

 @@ -8737,7 +8857,8 @@ Managed Access Control Points - + + @@ -8749,13 +8870,13 @@

Organizations consider the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative DHS TIC requirements for external network connections since limiting the number of access control points for remote access reduces attack surfaces.

 - +

remote accesses are routed through authorized and managed network access control points.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing remote access to the system

@@ -8769,7 +8890,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -8777,7 +8898,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms routing all remote accesses through managed network access control points

 @@ -8791,21 +8912,22 @@ - +

needs requiring execution of privileged commands via remote access are defined;

 - +

needs requiring access to security-relevant information via remote access are defined;

 - + + @@ -8826,33 +8948,33 @@

Remote access to systems represents a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. As such, restricting the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access reduces the exposure of the organization and the susceptibility to threats by adversaries to the remote access capability.

 - + - + - +

the execution of privileged commands via remote access is authorized only in a format that provides assessable evidence;

 - +

access to security-relevant information via remote access is authorized only in a format that provides assessable evidence;

 - +

the execution of privileged commands via remote access is authorized only for the following needs: ;

 - +

access to security-relevant information via remote access is authorized only for the following needs: ;

 - +

the rationale for remote access is documented in the security plan for the system.

 @@ -8860,7 +8982,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing remote access to the system

@@ -8873,7 +8995,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -8881,7 +9003,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing remote access management

 @@ -8890,7 +9012,8 @@ Monitoring for Unauthorized Connections - + + @@ -8898,7 +9021,8 @@ Protection of Mechanism Information - + + @@ -8912,13 +9036,13 @@

Remote access to organizational information by non-organizational entities can increase the risk of unauthorized use and disclosure about remote access mechanisms. The organization considers including remote access requirements in the information exchange agreements with other organizations, as applicable. Remote access requirements can also be included in rules of behavior (see PL-4 ) and access agreements (see PS-6).

 - +

information about remote access mechanisms is protected from unauthorized use and disclosure.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing remote access to the system

@@ -8928,7 +9052,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for implementing or monitoring remote access to the system

system users with knowledge of information about remote access mechanisms

@@ -8939,7 +9063,8 @@ Additional Protection for Security Function Access - + + @@ -8947,7 +9072,8 @@ Disable Nonsecure Network Protocols - + + @@ -8956,14 +9082,15 @@ Disconnect or Disable Access - +

the time period within which to disconnect or disable remote access to the system is defined;

 - + + @@ -8974,13 +9101,13 @@

The speed of system disconnect or disablement varies based on the criticality of missions or business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote access to systems.

 - +

the capability to disconnect or disable remote access to the system within is provided.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing disconnecting or disabling remote access to the system

@@ -8993,7 +9120,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -9002,7 +9129,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing capability to disconnect or disable remote access to system

 @@ -9012,7 +9139,7 @@ Authenticate Remote Commands - +

mechanisms implemented to authenticate remote commands are defined;

@@ -9020,14 +9147,15 @@ - +

remote commands to be authenticated by mechanisms are defined;

 - + + @@ -9041,13 +9169,13 @@

Authenticating remote commands protects against unauthorized commands and the replay of authorized commands. The ability to authenticate remote commands is important for remote systems for which loss, malfunction, misdirection, or exploitation would have immediate or serious consequences, such as injury, death, property damage, loss of high value assets, failure of mission or business functions, or compromise of classified or controlled unclassified information. Authentication mechanisms for remote commands ensure that systems accept and execute commands in the order intended, execute only authorized commands, and reject unauthorized commands. Cryptographic mechanisms can be used, for example, to authenticate remote commands.

 - +

are implemented to authenticate .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing authentication of remote commands

@@ -9060,7 +9188,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -9069,7 +9197,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing authentication of remote commands

 @@ -9079,7 +9207,8 @@ Wireless Access - + + @@ -9111,28 +9240,28 @@

Wireless technologies include microwave, packet radio (ultra-high frequency or very high frequency), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols that provide authenticator protection and mutual authentication.

 - + - + - +

configuration requirements are established for each type of wireless access;

 - +

connection requirements are established for each type of wireless access;

 - +

implementation guidance is established for each type of wireless access;

 - +

each type of wireless access to the system is authorized prior to allowing such connections.

 @@ -9140,7 +9269,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing wireless access implementation and usage (including restrictions)

@@ -9155,7 +9284,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for managing wireless access connections

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -9163,7 +9292,7 @@ - +

Wireless access management capability for the system

 @@ -9172,14 +9301,15 @@ Authentication and Encryption - + - + + @@ -9193,14 +9323,14 @@

Wireless networking capabilities represent a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. To protect systems with wireless access points, strong authentication of users and devices along with strong encryption can reduce susceptibility to threats by adversaries involving wireless technologies.

 - + - +

wireless access to the system is protected using authentication of ;

 - +

wireless access to the system is protected using encryption.

 @@ -9208,7 +9338,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing wireless implementation and usage (including restrictions)

@@ -9221,7 +9351,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -9230,7 +9360,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing wireless access protections to the system

 @@ -9239,7 +9369,8 @@ Monitoring Unauthorized Connections - + + @@ -9247,7 +9378,8 @@ Disable Wireless Networking - + + @@ -9259,13 +9391,13 @@

Wireless networking capabilities that are embedded within system components represent a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. Disabling wireless capabilities when not needed for essential organizational missions or functions can reduce susceptibility to threats by adversaries involving wireless technologies.

 - +

when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities embedded within system components are disabled prior to issuance and deployment.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing wireless implementation and usage (including restrictions)

@@ -9278,7 +9410,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -9286,7 +9418,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms managing the disabling of wireless networking capabilities internally embedded within system components

 @@ -9295,7 +9427,8 @@ Restrict Configurations by Users - + + @@ -9308,14 +9441,14 @@

Organizational authorizations to allow selected users to configure wireless networking capabilities are enforced, in part, by the access enforcement mechanisms employed within organizational systems.

 - + - +

users allowed to independently configure wireless networking capabilities are identified;

 - +

users allowed to independently configure wireless networking capabilities are explicitly authorized.

 @@ -9323,7 +9456,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing wireless implementation and usage (including restrictions)

@@ -9336,7 +9469,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -9344,7 +9477,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms authorizing independent user configuration of wireless networking capabilities

 @@ -9353,7 +9486,8 @@ Antennas and Transmission Power Levels - + + @@ -9365,14 +9499,14 @@

Actions that may be taken to limit unauthorized use of wireless communications outside of organization-controlled boundaries include reducing the power of wireless transmissions so that the transmissions are less likely to emit a signal that can be captured outside of the physical perimeters of the organization, employing measures such as emissions security to control wireless emanations, and using directional or beamforming antennas that reduce the likelihood that unintended receivers will be able to intercept signals. Prior to taking such mitigating actions, organizations can conduct periodic wireless surveys to understand the radio frequency profile of organizational systems as well as other systems that may be operating in the area.

 - + - +

radio antennas are selected to reduce the probability that signals from wireless access points can be received outside of organization-controlled boundaries;

 - +

transmission power levels are calibrated to reduce the probability that signals from wireless access points can be received outside of organization-controlled boundaries.

 @@ -9380,7 +9514,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing wireless implementation and usage (including restrictions)

@@ -9393,7 +9527,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -9401,7 +9535,7 @@ - +

Calibration of transmission power levels for wireless access

radio antenna signals for wireless access

@@ -9413,7 +9547,8 @@ Access Control for Mobile Devices - + + @@ -9456,28 +9591,28 @@

Usage restrictions and authorization to connect may vary among organizational systems. For example, the organization may authorize the connection of mobile devices to its network and impose a set of usage restrictions, while a system owner may withhold authorization for mobile device connection to specific applications or impose additional usage restrictions before allowing mobile device connections to a system. Adequate security for mobile devices goes beyond the requirements specified in AC-19 . Many safeguards for mobile devices are reflected in other controls. AC-20 addresses mobile devices that are not organization-controlled.

 - + - + - +

configuration requirements are established for organization-controlled mobile devices, including when such devices are outside of the controlled area;

 - +

connection requirements are established for organization-controlled mobile devices, including when such devices are outside of the controlled area;

 - +

implementation guidance is established for organization-controlled mobile devices, including when such devices are outside of the controlled area;

 - +

the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems is authorized.

 @@ -9485,7 +9620,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing access control for mobile device usage (including restrictions)

@@ -9500,7 +9635,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel using mobile devices to access organizational systems

system/network administrators

@@ -9509,7 +9644,7 @@ - +

Access control capability for mobile device connections to organizational systems

configurations of mobile devices

@@ -9518,7 +9653,8 @@ Use of Writable and Portable Storage Devices - + + @@ -9526,7 +9662,8 @@ Use of Personally Owned Portable Storage Devices - + + @@ -9534,7 +9671,8 @@ Use of Portable Storage Devices with No Identifiable Owner - + + @@ -9543,7 +9681,7 @@ Restrictions for Classified Information - +

security officials responsible for the review and inspection of unclassified mobile devices and the information stored on those devices are defined;

@@ -9551,14 +9689,15 @@ - +

security policies restricting the connection of classified mobile devices to classified systems are defined;

 - + + @@ -9598,38 +9737,38 @@

None.

 - + - +

the use of unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information is prohibited unless specifically permitted by the authorizing official;

 - + - +

prohibition of the connection of unclassified mobile devices to classified systems is enforced on individuals permitted by an authorizing official to use unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information;

 - +

approval by the authorizing official for the connection of unclassified mobile devices to unclassified systems is enforced on individuals permitted to use unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information;

 - +

prohibition of the use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces within unclassified mobile devices is enforced on individuals permitted by an authorizing official to use unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information;

 - + - +

random review and inspection of unclassified mobile devices and the information stored on those devices by are enforced;

 - +

following of the incident handling policy is enforced if classified information is found during a random review and inspection of unclassified mobile devices;

 @@ -9638,7 +9777,7 @@ - +

the connection of classified mobile devices to classified systems is restricted in accordance with .

 @@ -9646,7 +9785,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

incident handling policy

@@ -9661,7 +9800,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for random reviews/inspections of mobile devices

organizational personnel using mobile devices in facilities containing systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information

@@ -9672,7 +9811,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms prohibiting the use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces with mobile devices

 @@ -9682,7 +9821,7 @@ Full Device or Container-based Encryption - + establish identify @@ -9759,7 +9899,7 @@ - +

terms and conditions consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external systems are defined (if selected);

@@ -9768,7 +9908,7 @@ - +

controls asserted to be implemented on external systems consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external systems are defined (if selected);

@@ -9777,14 +9917,15 @@ - +

types of external systems prohibited from use are defined;

 - + + @@ -9823,23 +9964,23 @@

External systems used to access public interfaces to organizational systems are outside the scope of AC-20 . Organizations establish specific terms and conditions for the use of external systems in accordance with organizational security policies and procedures. At a minimum, terms and conditions address the specific types of applications that can be accessed on organizational systems from external systems and the highest security category of information that can be processed, stored, or transmitted on external systems. If the terms and conditions with the owners of the external systems cannot be established, organizations may impose restrictions on organizational personnel using those external systems.

 - + - + - +

is/are consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external systems, allowing authorized individuals to access the system from external systems (if applicable);

 - +

is/are consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external systems, allowing authorized individuals to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external systems (if applicable);

 - +

the use of is prohibited (if applicable).

 @@ -9847,7 +9988,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing the use of external systems

@@ -9861,7 +10002,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for defining terms and conditions for use of external systems to access organizational systems

system/network administrators

@@ -9870,7 +10011,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing terms and conditions on the use of external systems

 @@ -9878,7 +10019,8 @@ Limits on Authorized Use - + + @@ -9898,14 +10040,14 @@

Limiting authorized use recognizes circumstances where individuals using external systems may need to access organizational systems. Organizations need assurance that the external systems contain the necessary controls so as not to compromise, damage, or otherwise harm organizational systems. Verification that the required controls have been implemented can be achieved by external, independent assessments, attestations, or other means, depending on the confidence level required by organizations.

 - + - +

authorized individuals are permitted to use an external system to access the system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only after verification of the implementation of controls on the external system as specified in the organization’s security and privacy policies and security and privacy plans (if applicable);

 - +

authorized individuals are permitted to use an external system to access the system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only after retention of approved system connection or processing agreements with the organizational entity hosting the external system (if applicable).

 @@ -9913,7 +10055,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing the use of external systems

@@ -9925,7 +10067,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -9933,7 +10075,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing limits on use of external systems

 @@ -9943,14 +10085,15 @@ Portable Storage Devices — Restricted Use - +

restrictions on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external systems are defined;

 - + + @@ -9963,13 +10106,13 @@

Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external systems include restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices may be used.

 - +

the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals is restricted on external systems using .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing the use of external systems

@@ -9982,7 +10125,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for restricting or prohibiting the use of organization-controlled storage devices on external systems

system/network administrators

@@ -9991,7 +10134,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing restrictions on the use of portable storage devices

 @@ -10001,14 +10144,15 @@ Non-organizationally Owned Systems — Restricted Use - +

restrictions on the use of non-organizationally owned systems or system components to process, store, or transmit organizational information are defined;

 - + + @@ -10019,13 +10163,13 @@

Non-organizationally owned systems or system components include systems or system components owned by other organizations as well as personally owned devices. There are potential risks to using non-organizationally owned systems or components. In some cases, the risk is sufficiently high as to prohibit such use (see AC-20 b. ). In other cases, the use of such systems or system components may be allowed but restricted in some way. Restrictions include requiring the implementation of approved controls prior to authorizing the connection of non-organizationally owned systems and components; limiting access to types of information, services, or applications; using virtualization techniques to limit processing and storage activities to servers or system components provisioned by the organization; and agreeing to the terms and conditions for usage. Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding legal issues associated with using personally owned devices, including requirements for conducting forensic analyses during investigations after an incident.

 - +

the use of non-organizationally owned systems or system components to process, store, or transmit organizational information is restricted using .

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing the use of external systems

@@ -10038,7 +10182,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for restricting or prohibiting the use of non-organizationally owned systems, system components, or devices

system/network administrators

@@ -10047,7 +10191,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing restrictions on the use of non-organizationally owned systems, components, or devices

 @@ -10058,14 +10202,15 @@ - +

network-accessible storage devices prohibited from use in external systems are defined;

 - + + @@ -10076,13 +10221,13 @@

Network-accessible storage devices in external systems include online storage devices in public, hybrid, or community cloud-based systems.

 - +

the use of is prohibited in external systems.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing use of network-accessible storage devices in external systems

@@ -10097,7 +10242,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for prohibiting the use of network-accessible storage devices in external systems

system/network administrators

@@ -10106,7 +10251,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms prohibiting the use of network-accessible storage devices in external systems

 @@ -10115,7 +10260,8 @@ Portable Storage Devices — Prohibited Use - + + @@ -10130,13 +10276,13 @@

Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external systems include a complete prohibition of the use of such devices. Prohibiting such use is enforced using technical methods and/or nontechnical (i.e., process-based) methods.

 - +

the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals is prohibited on external systems.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing use of portable storage devices in external systems

@@ -10150,7 +10296,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for prohibiting the use of portable storage devices in external systems

system/network administrators

@@ -10164,7 +10310,7 @@ - +

information-sharing circumstances where user discretion is required to determine whether access authorizations assigned to a sharing partner match the information’s access and use restrictions are defined;

@@ -10173,14 +10319,15 @@ - +

automated mechanisms or manual processes that assist users in making information-sharing and collaboration decisions are defined;

 - + + @@ -10207,14 +10354,14 @@

Information sharing applies to information that may be restricted in some manner based on some formal or administrative determination. Examples of such information include, contract-sensitive information, classified information related to special access programs or compartments, privileged information, proprietary information, and personally identifiable information. Security and privacy risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, and policies can provide useful inputs to these determinations. Depending on the circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the individual, group, or organizational level. Information may be defined by content, type, security category, or special access program or compartment. Access restrictions may include non-disclosure agreements (NDA). Information flow techniques and security attributes may be used to provide automated assistance to users making sharing and collaboration decisions.

 - + - +

authorized users are enabled to determine whether access authorizations assigned to a sharing partner match the information’s access and use restrictions for ;

 - +

are employed to assist users in making information-sharing and collaboration decisions.

 @@ -10222,7 +10369,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing user-based collaboration and information sharing (including restrictions)

@@ -10241,7 +10388,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for information-sharing/collaboration decisions

organizational personnel with responsibility for acquisitions/contractual agreements

@@ -10251,7 +10398,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms or manual process implementing access authorizations supporting information-sharing/user collaboration decisions

 @@ -10260,14 +10407,15 @@ Automated Decision Support - +

automated mechanisms employed to enforce information-sharing decisions by authorized users are defined;

 - + + @@ -10278,13 +10426,13 @@

Automated mechanisms are used to enforce information sharing decisions.

 - +

are employed to enforce information-sharing decisions by authorized users based on access authorizations of sharing partners and access restrictions on information to be shared.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing user-based collaboration and information sharing (including restrictions)

@@ -10299,7 +10447,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -10308,7 +10456,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms implementing access authorizations supporting information-sharing/user collaboration decisions

 @@ -10319,14 +10467,15 @@ - +

information-sharing restrictions to be enforced by information search and retrieval services are defined;

 - + + @@ -10337,13 +10486,13 @@

Information search and retrieval services identify information system resources relevant to an information need.

 - +

information search and retrieval services that enforce are implemented.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing user-based collaboration and information sharing (including restrictions)

@@ -10358,7 +10507,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with access enforcement responsibilities for system search and retrieval services

system/network administrators

@@ -10368,7 +10517,7 @@ - +

System search and retrieval services enforcing information-sharing restrictions

 @@ -10379,14 +10528,15 @@ Publicly Accessible Content - +

the frequency at which to review the content on the publicly accessible system for non-public information is defined;

 - + + @@ -10416,31 +10566,31 @@

In accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines, the public is not authorized to have access to nonpublic information, including information protected under the PRIVACT and proprietary information. Publicly accessible content addresses systems that are controlled by the organization and accessible to the public, typically without identification or authentication. Posting information on non-organizational systems (e.g., non-organizational public websites, forums, and social media) is covered by organizational policy. While organizations may have individuals who are responsible for developing and implementing policies about the information that can be made publicly accessible, publicly accessible content addresses the management of the individuals who make such information publicly accessible.

 - + - +

designated individuals are authorized to make information publicly accessible;

 - +

authorized individuals are trained to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain non-public information;

 - +

the proposed content of information is reviewed prior to posting onto the publicly accessible system to ensure that non-public information is not included;

 - + - +

the content on the publicly accessible system is reviewed for non-public information ;

 - +

non-public information is removed from the publicly accessible system, if discovered.

 @@ -10450,7 +10600,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing publicly accessible content

@@ -10466,7 +10616,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for managing publicly accessible information posted on organizational systems

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -10474,7 +10624,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing management of publicly accessible content

 @@ -10485,7 +10635,7 @@ - +

data mining prevention and detection techniques are defined;

@@ -10493,14 +10643,15 @@ - +

data storage objects to be protected against unauthorized data mining are defined;

 - + + @@ -10515,13 +10666,13 @@

EO 13587 requires the establishment of an insider threat program for deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, including the safeguarding of sensitive information from exploitation, compromise, or other unauthorized disclosure. Data mining protection requires organizations to identify appropriate techniques to prevent and detect unnecessary or unauthorized data mining. Data mining can be used by an insider to collect organizational information for the purpose of exfiltration.

 - +

are employed for to detect and protect against unauthorized data mining.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures for preventing and detecting data mining

@@ -10541,7 +10692,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for implementing data mining detection and prevention techniques for data storage objects

legal counsel

@@ -10551,7 +10702,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing data mining prevention and detection

 @@ -10561,7 +10712,7 @@ Access Control Decisions - + organization-level mission/business process-level @@ -10875,7 +11030,7 @@ - +

an official to manage the awareness and training policy and procedures is defined;

@@ -10883,7 +11038,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which the current awareness and training policy is reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -10891,7 +11046,7 @@ - +

events that would require the current awareness and training policy to be reviewed and updated are defined;

@@ -10899,7 +11054,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which the current awareness and training procedures are reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -10907,14 +11062,15 @@ - +

events that would require procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

 - + + @@ -10969,72 +11125,72 @@

Awareness and training policy and procedures address the controls in the AT family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of awareness and training policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to awareness and training policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

 - + - + - +

an awareness and training policy is developed and documented;

- +

the awareness and training policy is disseminated to ;

 - +

awareness and training procedures to facilitate the implementation of the awareness and training policy and associated access controls are developed and documented;

 - +

the awareness and training procedures are disseminated to .

 - + - + - +

the awareness and training policy addresses purpose;

 - +

the awareness and training policy addresses scope;

 - +

the awareness and training policy addresses roles;

 - +

the awareness and training policy addresses responsibilities;

 - +

the awareness and training policy addresses management commitment;

 - +

the awareness and training policy addresses coordination among organizational entities;

 - +

the awareness and training policy addresses compliance; and

 - +

the awareness and training policy is consistent with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and

 @@ -11043,35 +11199,35 @@ - +

the is designated to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the awareness and training policy and procedures;

 - + - + - +

the current awareness and training policy is reviewed and updated ;

- +

the current awareness and training policy is reviewed and updated following ;

 - + - +

the current awareness and training procedures are reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current awareness and training procedures are reviewed and updated following .

 @@ -11083,7 +11239,7 @@ - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -11093,7 +11249,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with awareness and training responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -11113,28 +11269,28 @@ - +

the frequency at which to provide security literacy training to system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors) after initial training is defined;

 - +

the frequency at which to provide privacy literacy training to system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors) after initial training is defined;

 - +

events that require security literacy training for system users are defined;

 - +

events that require privacy literacy training for system users are defined;

@@ -11142,7 +11298,7 @@ - +

techniques to be employed to increase the security and privacy awareness of system users are defined;

@@ -11150,7 +11306,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which to update literacy training and awareness content is defined;

@@ -11158,14 +11314,15 @@ - +

events that would require literacy training and awareness content to be updated are defined;

 - + + @@ -11222,42 +11379,42 @@

Awareness techniques include displaying posters, offering supplies inscribed with security and privacy reminders, displaying logon screen messages, generating email advisories or notices from organizational officials, and conducting awareness events. Literacy training after the initial training described in AT-2a.1 is conducted at a minimum frequency consistent with applicable laws, directives, regulations, and policies. Subsequent literacy training may be satisfied by one or more short ad hoc sessions and include topical information on recent attack schemes, changes to organizational security and privacy policies, revised security and privacy expectations, or a subset of topics from the initial training. Updating literacy training and awareness content on a regular basis helps to ensure that the content remains relevant. Events that may precipitate an update to literacy training and awareness content include, but are not limited to, assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.

 - + - + - + - +

security literacy training is provided to system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors) as part of initial training for new users;

 - +

privacy literacy training is provided to system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors) as part of initial training for new users;

 - +

security literacy training is provided to system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors) thereafter;

 - +

privacy literacy training is provided to system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors) thereafter;

 - + - +

security literacy training is provided to system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors) when required by system changes or following ;

 - +

privacy literacy training is provided to system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors) when required by system changes or following ;

 @@ -11266,26 +11423,26 @@ - +

are employed to increase the security and privacy awareness of system users;

 - + - +

literacy training and awareness content is updated ;

 - +

literacy training and awareness content is updated following ;

 - +

lessons learned from internal or external security incidents or breaches are incorporated into literacy training and awareness techniques.

 @@ -11293,7 +11450,7 @@ - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -11308,7 +11465,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for literacy training and awareness

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -11317,7 +11474,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms managing information security and privacy literacy training

 @@ -11325,7 +11482,8 @@ Practical Exercises - + + @@ -11341,13 +11499,13 @@

Practical exercises include no-notice social engineering attempts to collect information, gain unauthorized access, or simulate the adverse impact of opening malicious email attachments or invoking, via spear phishing attacks, malicious web links.

 - +

practical exercises in literacy training that simulate events and incidents are provided.

 - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -11360,7 +11518,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel who receive literacy training and awareness

organizational personnel with responsibilities for security awareness training

@@ -11369,7 +11527,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing cyber-attack simulations in practical exercises

 @@ -11378,7 +11536,8 @@ Insider Threat - + + @@ -11391,14 +11550,14 @@

Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can include behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction; attempts to gain access to information not required for job performance; unexplained access to financial resources; bullying or harassment of fellow employees; workplace violence; and other serious violations of policies, procedures, directives, regulations, rules, or practices. Literacy training includes how to communicate the concerns of employees and management regarding potential indicators of insider threat through channels established by the organization and in accordance with established policies and procedures. Organizations may consider tailoring insider threat awareness topics to the role. For example, training for managers may be focused on changes in the behavior of team members, while training for employees may be focused on more general observations.

 - + - +

literacy training on recognizing potential indicators of insider threat is provided;

 - +

literacy training on reporting potential indicators of insider threat is provided.

 @@ -11406,7 +11565,7 @@ - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -11419,7 +11578,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel who receive literacy training and awareness

organizational personnel with responsibilities for literacy training and awareness

@@ -11430,7 +11589,8 @@ Social Engineering and Mining - + + @@ -11442,24 +11602,24 @@

Social engineering is an attempt to trick an individual into revealing information or taking an action that can be used to breach, compromise, or otherwise adversely impact a system. Social engineering includes phishing, pretexting, impersonation, baiting, quid pro quo, thread-jacking, social media exploitation, and tailgating. Social mining is an attempt to gather information about the organization that may be used to support future attacks. Literacy training includes information on how to communicate the concerns of employees and management regarding potential and actual instances of social engineering and data mining through organizational channels based on established policies and procedures.

 - + - +

literacy training on recognizing potential and actual instances of social engineering is provided;

 - +

literacy training on reporting potential and actual instances of social engineering is provided;

 - +

literacy training on recognizing potential and actual instances of social mining is provided;

 - +

literacy training on reporting potential and actual instances of social mining is provided.

 @@ -11467,7 +11627,7 @@ - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -11480,7 +11640,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel who receive literacy training and awareness

organizational personnel with responsibilities for literacy training and awareness

@@ -11492,14 +11652,15 @@ Suspicious Communications and Anomalous System Behavior - +

indicators of malicious code are defined;

 - + + @@ -11511,13 +11672,13 @@

A well-trained workforce provides another organizational control that can be employed as part of a defense-in-depth strategy to protect against malicious code coming into organizations via email or the web applications. Personnel are trained to look for indications of potentially suspicious email (e.g., receiving an unexpected email, receiving an email containing strange or poor grammar, or receiving an email from an unfamiliar sender that appears to be from a known sponsor or contractor). Personnel are also trained on how to respond to suspicious email or web communications. For this process to work effectively, personnel are trained and made aware of what constitutes suspicious communications. Training personnel on how to recognize anomalous behaviors in systems can provide organizations with early warning for the presence of malicious code. Recognition of anomalous behavior by organizational personnel can supplement malicious code detection and protection tools and systems employed by organizations.

 - +

literacy training on recognizing suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in organizational systems using is provided.

 - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -11530,7 +11691,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel who receive literacy training and awareness

organizational personnel with responsibilities for basic literacy training and awareness

@@ -11541,7 +11702,8 @@ Advanced Persistent Threat - + + @@ -11553,13 +11715,13 @@

An effective way to detect advanced persistent threats (APT) and to preclude successful attacks is to provide specific literacy training for individuals. Threat literacy training includes educating individuals on the various ways that APTs can infiltrate the organization (e.g., through websites, emails, advertisement pop-ups, articles, and social engineering). Effective training includes techniques for recognizing suspicious emails, use of removable systems in non-secure settings, and the potential targeting of individuals at home.

 - +

literacy training on the advanced persistent threat is provided.

 - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -11572,7 +11734,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel who receive literacy training and awareness

organizational personnel with responsibilities for basic literacy training and awareness

@@ -11583,7 +11745,8 @@ Cyber Threat Environment - + + @@ -11603,14 +11766,14 @@

Since threats continue to change over time, threat literacy training by the organization is dynamic. Moreover, threat literacy training is not performed in isolation from the system operations that support organizational mission and business functions.

 - + - +

literacy training on the cyber threat environment is provided;

 - +

system operations reflects current cyber threat information.

 @@ -11618,7 +11781,7 @@ - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -11631,7 +11794,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel who receive literacy training and awareness

organizational personnel with responsibilities for basic literacy training and awareness

@@ -11648,14 +11811,14 @@ - +

roles and responsibilities for role-based security training are defined;

 - +

roles and responsibilities for role-based privacy training are defined;

@@ -11663,7 +11826,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which to provide role-based security and privacy training to assigned personnel after initial training is defined;

@@ -11671,7 +11834,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which to update role-based training content is defined;

@@ -11679,14 +11842,15 @@ - +

events that require role-based training content to be updated are defined;

 - + + @@ -11742,42 +11906,42 @@

Comprehensive role-based training addresses management, operational, and technical roles and responsibilities covering physical, personnel, and technical controls. Role-based training also includes policies, procedures, tools, methods, and artifacts for the security and privacy roles defined. Organizations provide the training necessary for individuals to fulfill their responsibilities related to operations and supply chain risk management within the context of organizational security and privacy programs. Role-based training also applies to contractors who provide services to federal agencies. Types of training include web-based and computer-based training, classroom-style training, and hands-on training (including micro-training). Updating role-based training on a regular basis helps to ensure that the content remains relevant and effective. Events that may precipitate an update to role-based training content include, but are not limited to, assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.

 - + - + - + - +

role-based security training is provided to before authorizing access to the system, information, or performing assigned duties;

 - +

role-based privacy training is provided to before authorizing access to the system, information, or performing assigned duties;

 - +

role-based security training is provided to thereafter;

 - +

role-based privacy training is provided to thereafter;

 - + - +

role-based security training is provided to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities when required by system changes;

 - +

role-based privacy training is provided to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities when required by system changes;

 @@ -11786,21 +11950,21 @@ - + - +

role-based training content is updated ;

 - +

role-based training content is updated following ;

 - +

lessons learned from internal or external security incidents or breaches are incorporated into role-based training.

 @@ -11808,7 +11972,7 @@ - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -11823,7 +11987,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for role-based security and privacy training

organizational personnel with assigned system security and privacy roles and responsibilities

@@ -11831,7 +11995,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms managing role-based security and privacy training

 @@ -11840,7 +12004,7 @@ Environmental Controls - +

personnel or roles to be provided with initial and refresher training in the employment and operation of environmental controls are defined;

@@ -11848,14 +12012,15 @@ - +

the frequency at which to provide refresher training in the employment and operation of environmental controls is defined;

 - + + @@ -11872,13 +12037,13 @@

Environmental controls include fire suppression and detection devices or systems, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, smoke detectors, temperature or humidity, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and power within the facility.

 - +

are provided with initial and refresher training in the employment and operation of environmental controls.

 - +

Security and privacy awareness and training policy

procedures addressing security and privacy training implementation

@@ -11892,7 +12057,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for role-based security and privacy training

organizational personnel with responsibilities for employing and operating environmental controls

@@ -11903,7 +12068,7 @@ Physical Security Controls - +

personnel or roles to be provided with initial and refresher training in the employment and operation of physical security controls is/are defined;

@@ -11911,14 +12076,15 @@ - +

the frequency at which to provide refresher training in the employment and operation of physical security controls is defined;

 - + + @@ -11933,13 +12099,13 @@

Physical security controls include physical access control devices, physical intrusion and detection alarms, operating procedures for facility security guards, and monitoring or surveillance equipment.

 - +

is/are provided with initial and refresher training in the employment and operation of physical security controls.

 - +

Security and privacy awareness and training policy

procedures addressing security and privacy training implementation

@@ -11953,7 +12119,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for role-based security and privacy training

organizational personnel with responsibilities for employing and operating physical security controls

@@ -11963,7 +12129,8 @@ Practical Exercises - + + @@ -11975,14 +12142,14 @@

Practical exercises for security include training for software developers that addresses simulated attacks that exploit common software vulnerabilities or spear or whale phishing attacks targeted at senior leaders or executives. Practical exercises for privacy include modules with quizzes on identifying and processing personally identifiable information in various scenarios or scenarios on conducting privacy impact assessments.

 - + - +

practical exercises in security training that reinforce training objectives are provided;

 - +

practical exercises in privacy training that reinforce training objectives are provided.

 @@ -11990,7 +12157,7 @@ - +

Security and privacy awareness and training policy

procedures addressing security and privacy awareness training implementation

@@ -12004,7 +12171,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for role-based security and privacy training

organizational personnel who participate in security and privacy awareness training

@@ -12014,7 +12181,8 @@ Suspicious Communications and Anomalous System Behavior - + + @@ -12023,7 +12191,7 @@ Processing Personally Identifiable Information - +

personnel or roles to be provided with initial and refresher training in the employment and operation of personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls is/are defined;

@@ -12031,14 +12199,15 @@ - +

the frequency at which to provide refresher training in the employment and operation of personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls is defined;

 - + + @@ -12054,13 +12223,13 @@

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls include the organization’s authority to process personally identifiable information and personally identifiable information processing purposes. Role-based training for federal agencies addresses the types of information that may constitute personally identifiable information and the risks, considerations, and obligations associated with its processing. Such training also considers the authority to process personally identifiable information documented in privacy policies and notices, system of records notices, computer matching agreements and notices, privacy impact assessments, PRIVACT statements, contracts, information sharing agreements, memoranda of understanding, and/or other documentation.

 - +

are provided with initial and refresher training in the employment and operation of personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls.

 - +

Security and privacy awareness and training policy

procedures addressing security and privacy awareness training implementation

@@ -12080,7 +12249,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for role-based security and privacy training

organizational personnel who participate in security and privacy awareness training

@@ -12092,14 +12261,15 @@ Training Records - +

time period for retaining individual training records is defined;

 - + + @@ -12124,23 +12294,23 @@

Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual supervisors at the discretion of the organization. The National Archives and Records Administration provides guidance on records retention for federal agencies.

 - + - + - +

information security and privacy training activities, including security and privacy awareness training and specific role-based security and privacy training, are documented;

 - +

information security and privacy training activities, including security and privacy awareness training and specific role-based security and privacy training, are monitored;

 - +

individual training records are retained for .

 @@ -12148,7 +12318,7 @@ - +

Security and privacy awareness and training policy

procedures addressing security and privacy training records

@@ -12160,14 +12330,14 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy training record retention responsibilities

 - +

Mechanisms supporting the management of security and privacy training records

 @@ -12176,7 +12346,8 @@ Contacts with Security Groups and Associations - + + @@ -12185,7 +12356,7 @@ Training Feedback - +

frequency at which to provide feedback on organizational training results is defined;

@@ -12193,14 +12364,15 @@ - +

personnel to whom feedback on organizational training results will be provided is/are assigned;

 - + + @@ -12211,13 +12383,13 @@

Training feedback includes awareness training results and role-based training results. Training results, especially failures of personnel in critical roles, can be indicative of a potentially serious problem. Therefore, it is important that senior managers are made aware of such situations so that they can take appropriate response actions. Training feedback supports the evaluation and update of organizational training described in AT-2b and AT-3b.

 - +

feedback on organizational training results is provided to .

 - +

Security awareness and training policy

procedures addressing security training records

@@ -12228,14 +12400,14 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security training record retention responsibilities

 - +

Mechanisms supporting the management of security training records

 @@ -12252,14 +12424,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the audit and accountability policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the audit and accountability procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -12267,7 +12439,7 @@ - + reject delay - + + @@ -13339,14 +13527,14 @@

Organizations have the capability to reject or delay the processing of network communications traffic if audit logging information about such traffic is determined to exceed the storage capacity of the system audit logging function. The rejection or delay response is triggered by the established organizational traffic volume thresholds that can be adjusted based on changes to audit log storage capacity.

 - + - +

configurable network communications traffic volume thresholds reflecting limits on audit log storage capacity are enforced;

 - +

network traffic is if network traffic volume is above configured thresholds.

 @@ -13354,7 +13542,7 @@ - +

Audit and accountability policy

procedures addressing response to audit processing failures

@@ -13368,7 +13556,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit and accountability responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -13381,7 +13569,7 @@ Shutdown on Failure - + vulnerability scanning information performance data @@ -13818,14 +14013,15 @@ - +

data/information collected from other sources to be analyzed is defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -13839,13 +14035,13 @@

Integrated analysis of audit records does not require vulnerability scanning, the generation of performance data, or system monitoring. Rather, integrated analysis requires that the analysis of information generated by scanning, monitoring, or other data collection activities is integrated with the analysis of audit record information. Security Information and Event Management tools can facilitate audit record aggregation or consolidation from multiple system components as well as audit record correlation and analysis. The use of standardized audit record analysis scripts developed by organizations (with localized script adjustments, as necessary) provides more cost-effective approaches for analyzing audit record information collected. The correlation of audit record information with vulnerability scanning information is important in determining the veracity of vulnerability scans of the system and in correlating attack detection events with scanning results. Correlation with performance data can uncover denial-of-service attacks or other types of attacks that result in the unauthorized use of resources. Correlation with system monitoring information can assist in uncovering attacks and in better relating audit information to operational situations.

 - +

analysis of audit records is integrated with analysis of to further enhance the ability to identify inappropriate or unusual activity.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -13859,7 +14055,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit review, analysis, and reporting responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -13867,7 +14063,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing the capability to integrate analysis of audit records with analysis of data/information sources

 @@ -13876,7 +14072,8 @@ Correlation with Physical Monitoring - + + @@ -13888,13 +14085,13 @@

The correlation of physical audit record information and the audit records from systems may assist organizations in identifying suspicious behavior or supporting evidence of such behavior. For example, the correlation of an individual’s identity for logical access to certain systems with the additional physical security information that the individual was present at the facility when the logical access occurred may be useful in investigations.

 - +

information from audit records is correlated with information obtained from monitoring physical access to further enhance the ability to identify suspicious, inappropriate, unusual, or malevolent activity.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

procedures addressing audit review, analysis, and reporting

@@ -13909,7 +14106,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit review, analysis, and reporting responsibilities

organizational personnel with physical access monitoring responsibilities

@@ -13918,7 +14115,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing the capability to correlate information from audit records with information from monitoring physical access

 @@ -13928,7 +14125,7 @@ Permitted Actions - + - + + @@ -13948,13 +14146,13 @@

Organizations specify permitted actions for system processes, roles, and users associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit records through system account management activities. Specifying permitted actions on audit record information is a way to enforce the principle of least privilege. Permitted actions are enforced by the system and include read, write, execute, append, and delete.

 - +

the permitted actions for each associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit record information are specified.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

procedures addressing process, role and/or user permitted actions from audit review, analysis, and reporting

@@ -13965,7 +14163,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit review, analysis, and reporting responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -13973,7 +14171,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting permitted actions for the review, analysis, and reporting of audit information

 @@ -13982,7 +14180,8 @@ Full Text Analysis of Privileged Commands - + + @@ -13998,13 +14197,13 @@

Full text analysis of privileged commands requires a distinct environment for the analysis of audit record information related to privileged users without compromising such information on the system where the users have elevated privileges, including the capability to execute privileged commands. Full text analysis refers to analysis that considers the full text of privileged commands (i.e., commands and parameters) as opposed to analysis that considers only the name of the command. Full text analysis includes the use of pattern matching and heuristics.

 - +

a full text analysis of logged privileged commands in a physically distinct component or subsystem of the system or other system that is dedicated to that analysis is performed.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

procedures addressing audit review, analysis, and reporting

@@ -14019,7 +14218,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit review, analysis, and reporting responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -14027,7 +14226,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing the capability to perform a full text analysis of audited privilege commands

 @@ -14036,7 +14235,8 @@ Correlation with Information from Nontechnical Sources - + + @@ -14049,13 +14249,13 @@

Nontechnical sources include records that document organizational policy violations related to harassment incidents and the improper use of information assets. Such information can lead to a directed analytical effort to detect potential malicious insider activity. Organizations limit access to information that is available from nontechnical sources due to its sensitive nature. Limited access minimizes the potential for inadvertent release of privacy-related information to individuals who do not have a need to know. The correlation of information from nontechnical sources with audit record information generally occurs only when individuals are suspected of being involved in an incident. Organizations obtain legal advice prior to initiating such actions.

 - +

information from non-technical sources is correlated with audit record information to enhance organization-wide situational awareness.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -14070,7 +14270,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit review, analysis, and reporting responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -14078,7 +14278,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing capability to correlate information from non-technical sources

 @@ -14087,7 +14287,8 @@ Audit Level Adjustment - + + @@ -14096,7 +14297,8 @@ Audit Record Reduction and Report Generation - + + @@ -14128,30 +14330,30 @@

Audit record reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit log information and organizes it into a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. Audit record reduction and report generation capabilities do not always emanate from the same system or from the same organizational entities that conduct audit logging activities. The audit record reduction capability includes modern data mining techniques with advanced data filters to identify anomalous behavior in audit records. The report generation capability provided by the system can generate customizable reports. Time ordering of audit records can be an issue if the granularity of the timestamp in the record is insufficient.

 - + - + - +

an audit record reduction and report generation capability is provided that supports on-demand audit record review, analysis, and reporting requirements and after-the-fact investigations of incidents;

 - +

an audit record reduction and report generation capability is implemented that supports on-demand audit record review, analysis, and reporting requirements and after-the-fact investigations of incidents;

 - + - +

an audit record reduction and report generation capability is provided that does not alter the original content or time ordering of audit records;

 - +

an audit record reduction and report generation capability is implemented that does not alter the original content or time ordering of audit records.

 @@ -14161,7 +14363,7 @@ - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -14176,7 +14378,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit reduction and report generation responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -14184,7 +14386,7 @@ - +

Audit reduction and report generation capability

 @@ -14193,14 +14395,15 @@ Automatic Processing - +

fields within audit records that can be processed, sorted, or searched are defined;

 - + + @@ -14212,14 +14415,14 @@

Events of interest can be identified by the content of audit records, including system resources involved, information objects accessed, identities of individuals, event types, event locations, event dates and times, Internet Protocol addresses involved, or event success or failure. Organizations may define event criteria to any degree of granularity required, such as locations selectable by a general networking location or by specific system component.

 - + - +

the capability to process, sort, and search audit records for events of interest based on are provided;

 - +

the capability to process, sort, and search audit records for events of interest based on are implemented.

 @@ -14227,7 +14430,7 @@ - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -14243,7 +14446,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit reduction and report generation responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -14252,7 +14455,7 @@ - +

Audit reduction and report generation capability

 @@ -14261,7 +14464,8 @@ Automatic Sort and Search - + + @@ -14271,14 +14475,15 @@ Time Stamps - +

granularity of time measurement for audit record timestamps is defined;

 - + + @@ -14299,14 +14504,14 @@

Time stamps generated by the system include date and time. Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. Granularity of time measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between system clocks and reference clocks (e.g., clocks synchronizing within hundreds of milliseconds or tens of milliseconds). Organizations may define different time granularities for different system components. Time service can be critical to other security capabilities such as access control and identification and authentication, depending on the nature of the mechanisms used to support those capabilities.

 - + - +

internal system clocks are used to generate timestamps for audit records;

 - +

timestamps are recorded for audit records that meet and that use Coordinated Universal Time, have a fixed local time offset from Coordinated Universal Time, or include the local time offset as part of the timestamp.

 @@ -14314,7 +14519,7 @@ - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -14328,7 +14533,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -14337,7 +14542,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing timestamp generation

 @@ -14345,7 +14550,8 @@ Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source - + + @@ -14353,7 +14559,8 @@ Secondary Authoritative Time Source - + + @@ -14363,14 +14570,15 @@ Protection of Audit Information - +

personnel or roles to be alerted upon detection of unauthorized access, modification, or deletion of audit information is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -14404,14 +14612,14 @@

Audit information includes all information needed to successfully audit system activity, such as audit records, audit log settings, audit reports, and personally identifiable information. Audit logging tools are those programs and devices used to conduct system audit and logging activities. Protection of audit information focuses on technical protection and limits the ability to access and execute audit logging tools to authorized individuals. Physical protection of audit information is addressed by both media protection controls and physical and environmental protection controls.

 - + - +

audit information and audit logging tools are protected from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion;

 - +

are alerted upon detection of unauthorized access, modification, or deletion of audit information.

 @@ -14419,7 +14627,7 @@ - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -14435,7 +14643,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit and accountability responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -14445,7 +14653,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing audit information protection

 @@ -14453,7 +14661,8 @@ Hardware Write-once Media - + + @@ -14466,13 +14675,13 @@

Writing audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media applies to the initial generation of audit trails (i.e., the collection of audit records that represents the information to be used for detection, analysis, and reporting purposes) and to the backup of those audit trails. Writing audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media does not apply to the initial generation of audit records prior to being written to an audit trail. Write-once, read-many (WORM) media includes Compact Disc-Recordable (CD-R), Blu-Ray Disc Recordable (BD-R), and Digital Versatile Disc-Recordable (DVD-R). In contrast, the use of switchable write-protection media, such as tape cartridges, Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives, Compact Disc Re-Writeable (CD-RW), and Digital Versatile Disc-Read Write (DVD-RW) results in write-protected but not write-once media.

 - +

audit trails are written to hardware-enforced, write-once media.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -14489,7 +14698,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit and accountability responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -14499,7 +14708,7 @@ - +

System media storing audit trails

 @@ -14509,14 +14718,15 @@ Store on Separate Physical Systems or Components - +

the frequency of storing audit records in a repository is defined;

 - + + @@ -14529,13 +14739,13 @@

Storing audit records in a repository separate from the audited system or system component helps to ensure that a compromise of the system being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records. Storing audit records on separate physical systems or components also preserves the confidentiality and integrity of audit records and facilitates the management of audit records as an organization-wide activity. Storing audit records on separate systems or components applies to initial generation as well as backup or long-term storage of audit records.

 - +

audit records are stored in a repository that is part of a physically different system or system component than the system or component being audited.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -14550,7 +14760,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit and accountability responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -14560,7 +14770,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing the backing up of audit records

 @@ -14569,7 +14779,8 @@ Cryptographic Protection - + + @@ -14583,13 +14794,13 @@

Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of audit information include signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography. This enables the distribution of the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining the confidentiality of the secret key used to generate the hash.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit information and audit tools are implemented.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -14605,7 +14816,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit and accountability responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -14615,7 +14826,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms protecting the integrity of audit information and tools

 @@ -14625,14 +14836,15 @@ Access by Subset of Privileged Users - +

a subset of privileged users or roles authorized to access management of audit logging functionality is defined;

 - + + @@ -14644,13 +14856,13 @@

Individuals or roles with privileged access to a system and who are also the subject of an audit by that system may affect the reliability of the audit information by inhibiting audit activities or modifying audit records. Requiring privileged access to be further defined between audit-related privileges and other privileges limits the number of users or roles with audit-related privileges.

 - +

access to management of audit logging functionality is authorized only to .

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -14668,7 +14880,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with audit and accountability responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -14677,7 +14889,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms managing access to audit functionality

 @@ -14687,7 +14899,7 @@ Dual Authorization - + record view @@ -16069,14 +16301,15 @@ - +

circumstances under which the content of a user session can be audited are defined;

 - + + @@ -16104,35 +16337,35 @@

Session audits can include monitoring keystrokes, tracking websites visited, and recording information and/or file transfers. Session audit capability is implemented in addition to event logging and may involve implementation of specialized session capture technology. Organizations consider how session auditing can reveal information about individuals that may give rise to privacy risk as well as how to mitigate those risks. Because session auditing can impact system and network performance, organizations activate the capability under well-defined situations (e.g., the organization is suspicious of a specific individual). Organizations consult with legal counsel, civil liberties officials, and privacy officials to ensure that any legal, privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties issues, including the use of personally identifiable information, are appropriately addressed.

 - + - + - +

are provided with the capability to the content of a user session under ;

 - +

the capability for to the content of a user session under is implemented;

 - + - +

session auditing activities are developed in consultation with legal counsel and in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines;

 - +

session auditing activities are integrated in consultation with legal counsel and in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines;

 - +

session auditing activities are used in consultation with legal counsel and in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines;

 @@ -16142,7 +16375,7 @@ - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -16156,7 +16389,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -16167,7 +16400,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing user session auditing capability

 @@ -16175,7 +16408,8 @@ System Start-up - + + @@ -16187,13 +16421,13 @@

The automatic initiation of session audits at startup helps to ensure that the information being captured on selected individuals is complete and not subject to compromise through tampering by malicious threat actors.

 - +

session audits are initiated automatically at system start-up.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -16207,7 +16441,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -16216,7 +16450,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing user session auditing capability

 @@ -16225,7 +16459,8 @@ Capture and Record Content - + + @@ -16233,7 +16468,8 @@ Remote Viewing and Listening - + + @@ -16246,14 +16482,14 @@

None.

 - + - +

the capability for authorized users to remotely view and hear content related to an established user session in real time is provided;

 - +

the capability for authorized users to remotely view and hear content related to an established user session in real time is implemented.

 @@ -16261,7 +16497,7 @@ - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -16275,7 +16511,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -16286,7 +16522,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing user session auditing capability

 @@ -16296,7 +16532,8 @@ Alternate Audit Logging Capability - + + @@ -16305,7 +16542,7 @@ Cross-organizational Audit Logging - +

methods for coordinating audit information among external organizations when audit information is transmitted across organizational boundaries are defined;

@@ -16313,14 +16550,15 @@ - +

audit information to be coordinated among external organizations when audit information is transmitted across organizational boundaries is defined;

 - + + @@ -16335,13 +16573,13 @@

When organizations use systems or services of external organizations, the audit logging capability necessitates a coordinated, cross-organization approach. For example, maintaining the identity of individuals who request specific services across organizational boundaries may often be difficult, and doing so may prove to have significant performance and privacy ramifications. Therefore, it is often the case that cross-organizational audit logging simply captures the identity of individuals who issue requests at the initial system, and subsequent systems record that the requests originated from authorized individuals. Organizations consider including processes for coordinating audit information requirements and protection of audit information in information exchange agreements.

 - +

for coordinating among external organizations when audit information is transmitted across organizational boundaries are employed.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -16355,7 +16593,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for coordinating audit information among external organizations

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -16363,7 +16601,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing cross-organizational auditing

 @@ -16371,7 +16609,8 @@ Identity Preservation - + + @@ -16386,13 +16625,13 @@

Identity preservation is applied when there is a need to be able to trace actions that are performed across organizational boundaries to a specific individual.

 - +

the identity of individuals in cross-organizational audit trails is preserved.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -16406,7 +16645,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with cross-organizational audit responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -16414,7 +16653,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing cross-organizational auditing (if applicable)

 @@ -16424,7 +16663,7 @@ Sharing of Audit Information - +

organizations with which cross-organizational audit information is to be shared are defined;

@@ -16432,14 +16671,15 @@ - +

cross-organizational sharing agreements to be used when providing cross-organizational audit information to organizations are defined;

 - + + @@ -16452,13 +16692,13 @@

Due to the distributed nature of the audit information, cross-organization sharing of audit information may be essential for effective analysis of the auditing being performed. For example, the audit records of one organization may not provide sufficient information to determine the appropriate or inappropriate use of organizational information resources by individuals in other organizations. In some instances, only individuals’ home organizations have the appropriate knowledge to make such determinations, thus requiring the sharing of audit information among organizations.

 - +

cross-organizational audit information is provided to based on .

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -16470,7 +16710,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for sharing cross-organizational audit information

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -16481,14 +16721,15 @@ Disassociability - +

measures to disassociate individuals from audit information transmitted across organizational boundaries are defined;

 - + + @@ -16499,13 +16740,13 @@

Preserving identities in audit trails could have privacy ramifications, such as enabling the tracking and profiling of individuals, but may not be operationally necessary. These risks could be further amplified when transmitting information across organizational boundaries. Implementing privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques can disassociate individuals from audit information and reduce privacy risk while maintaining accountability.

 - +

are implemented to disassociate individuals from audit information transmitted across organizational boundaries.

 - +

Audit and accountability policy

system security plan

@@ -16520,7 +16761,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for sharing cross-organizational audit information

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -16528,7 +16769,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing disassociability

 @@ -16546,14 +16787,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the assessment, authorization, and monitoring procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -16561,7 +16802,7 @@ - + announced unannounced @@ -17057,7 +17301,7 @@ - + interconnection security agreements information exchange security agreements @@ -17216,7 +17462,7 @@ - +

the type of agreement used to approve and manage the exchange of information is defined (if selected);

@@ -17224,14 +17470,15 @@ - +

the frequency at which to review and update agreements is defined;

 - + + @@ -17269,48 +17516,48 @@

Authorizing officials determine the risk associated with system information exchange and the controls needed for appropriate risk mitigation. The types of agreements selected are based on factors such as the impact level of the information being exchanged, the relationship between the organizations exchanging information (e.g., government to government, government to business, business to business, government or business to service provider, government or business to individual), or the level of access to the organizational system by users of the other system. If systems that exchange information have the same authorizing official, organizations need not develop agreements. Instead, the interface characteristics between the systems (e.g., how the information is being exchanged. how the information is protected) are described in the respective security and privacy plans. If the systems that exchange information have different authorizing officials within the same organization, the organizations can develop agreements or provide the same information that would be provided in the appropriate agreement type from CA-3a in the respective security and privacy plans for the systems. Organizations may incorporate agreement information into formal contracts, especially for information exchanges established between federal agencies and nonfederal organizations (including service providers, contractors, system developers, and system integrators). Risk considerations include systems that share the same networks.

 - + - +

the exchange of information between the system and other systems is approved and managed using ;

 - + - +

the interface characteristics are documented as part of each exchange agreement;

 - +

security requirements are documented as part of each exchange agreement;

 - +

privacy requirements are documented as part of each exchange agreement;

 - +

controls are documented as part of each exchange agreement;

 - +

responsibilities for each system are documented as part of each exchange agreement;

 - +

the impact level of the information communicated is documented as part of each exchange agreement;

 - +

agreements are reviewed and updated .

 @@ -17318,7 +17565,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing system connections

@@ -17339,7 +17586,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for developing, implementing, or approving system interconnection agreements

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -17349,7 +17596,8 @@ Unclassified National Security System Connections - + + @@ -17357,7 +17605,8 @@ Classified National Security System Connections - + + @@ -17365,7 +17614,8 @@ Unclassified Non-national Security System Connections - + + @@ -17373,7 +17623,8 @@ Connections to Public Networks - + + @@ -17381,7 +17632,8 @@ Restrictions on External System Connections - + + @@ -17389,7 +17641,8 @@ Transfer Authorizations - + + @@ -17405,13 +17658,13 @@

To prevent unauthorized individuals and systems from making information transfers to protected systems, the protected system verifies—via independent means— whether the individual or system attempting to transfer information is authorized to do so. Verification of the authorization to transfer information also applies to control plane traffic (e.g., routing and DNS) and services (e.g., authenticated SMTP relays).

 - +

individuals or systems transferring data between interconnecting systems have the requisite authorizations (i.e., write permissions or privileges) prior to accepting such data.

 - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing system connections

@@ -17432,7 +17685,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for managing connections to external systems

network administrators

@@ -17441,7 +17694,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing restrictions on external system connections

 @@ -17450,7 +17703,8 @@ Transitive Information Exchanges - + + @@ -17471,14 +17725,14 @@

Transitive or downstream information exchanges are information exchanges between the system or systems with which the organizational system exchanges information and other systems. For mission-essential systems, services, and applications, including high value assets, it is necessary to identify such information exchanges. The transparency of the controls or protection measures in place in such downstream systems connected directly or indirectly to organizational systems is essential to understanding the security and privacy risks resulting from those information exchanges. Organizational systems can inherit risk from downstream systems through transitive connections and information exchanges, which can make the organizational systems more susceptible to threats, hazards, and adverse impacts.

 - + - +

transitive (downstream) information exchanges with other systems through the systems identified in CA-03a are identified;

 - +

measures are taken to ensure that transitive (downstream) information exchanges cease when the controls on identified transitive (downstream) systems cannot be verified or validated.

 @@ -17486,7 +17740,7 @@ - +

Access control policy

procedures addressing system connections

@@ -17507,7 +17761,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for managing connections to external systems

network administrators

@@ -17516,7 +17770,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing restrictions on external system connections

 @@ -17526,7 +17780,8 @@ Security Certification - + + @@ -17535,14 +17790,15 @@ Plan of Action and Milestones - +

the frequency at which to update an existing plan of action and milestones based on the findings from control assessments, independent audits or reviews, and continuous monitoring activities is defined;

 - + + @@ -17569,14 +17825,14 @@

Plans of action and milestones are useful for any type of organization to track planned remedial actions. Plans of action and milestones are required in authorization packages and subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB.

 - + - +

a plan of action and milestones for the system is developed to document the planned remediation actions of the organization to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during the assessment of the controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system;

 - +

existing plan of action and milestones are updated based on the findings from control assessments, independent audits or reviews, and continuous monitoring activities.

 @@ -17584,7 +17840,7 @@ - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

procedures addressing plan of action and milestones

@@ -17599,7 +17855,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with plan of action and milestones development and implementation responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -17607,7 +17863,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms for developing, implementing, and maintaining plan of action and milestones

 @@ -17616,14 +17872,15 @@ Automation Support for Accuracy and Currency - +

automated mechanisms used to ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of the plan of action and milestones for the system are defined;

 - + + @@ -17635,13 +17892,13 @@

Using automated tools helps maintain the accuracy, currency, and availability of the plan of action and milestones and facilitates the coordination and sharing of security and privacy information throughout the organization. Such coordination and information sharing help to identify systemic weaknesses or deficiencies in organizational systems and ensure that appropriate resources are directed at the most critical system vulnerabilities in a timely manner.

 - +

are used to ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of the plan of action and milestones for the system.

 - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

procedures addressing plan of action and milestones

@@ -17656,7 +17913,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with plan of action and milestones development and implementation responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -17664,7 +17921,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms for developing, implementing, and maintaining a plan of action and milestones

 @@ -17675,14 +17932,15 @@ Authorization - +

frequency at which to update the authorizations is defined;

 - + + @@ -17732,38 +17990,38 @@

Authorizing officials issue ongoing authorizations of systems based on evidence produced from implemented continuous monitoring programs. Robust continuous monitoring programs reduce the need for separate reauthorization processes. Through the employment of comprehensive continuous monitoring processes, the information contained in authorization packages (i.e., security and privacy plans, assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones) is updated on an ongoing basis. This provides authorizing officials, common control providers, and system owners with an up-to-date status of the security and privacy posture of their systems, controls, and operating environments. To reduce the cost of reauthorization, authorizing officials can leverage the results of continuous monitoring processes to the maximum extent possible as the basis for rendering reauthorization decisions.

 - + - +

a senior official is assigned as the authorizing official for the system;

 - +

a senior official is assigned as the authorizing official for common controls available for inheritance by organizational systems;

 - + - +

before commencing operations, the authorizing official for the system accepts the use of common controls inherited by the system;

 - +

before commencing operations, the authorizing official for the system authorizes the system to operate;

 - +

the authorizing official for common controls authorizes the use of those controls for inheritance by organizational systems;

 - +

the authorizations are updated .

 @@ -17771,7 +18029,7 @@ - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

procedures addressing authorization

@@ -17782,7 +18040,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authorization responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -17790,7 +18048,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms that facilitate authorizations and updates

 @@ -17798,7 +18056,8 @@ Joint Authorization — Intra-organization - + + @@ -17811,14 +18070,14 @@

Assigning multiple authorizing officials from the same organization to serve as co-authorizing officials for the system increases the level of independence in the risk-based decision-making process. It also implements the concepts of separation of duties and dual authorization as applied to the system authorization process. The intra-organization joint authorization process is most relevant for connected systems, shared systems, and systems with multiple information owners.

 - + - +

a joint authorization process is employed for the system;

 - +

the joint authorization process employed for the system includes multiple authorizing officials from the same organization conducting the authorization.

 @@ -17826,7 +18085,7 @@ - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

procedures addressing authorization

@@ -17840,7 +18099,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authorization responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -17848,7 +18107,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms that facilitate authorizations and updates

 @@ -17857,7 +18116,8 @@ Joint Authorization — Inter-organization - + + @@ -17870,14 +18130,14 @@

Assigning multiple authorizing officials, at least one of whom comes from an external organization, to serve as co-authorizing officials for the system increases the level of independence in the risk-based decision-making process. It implements the concepts of separation of duties and dual authorization as applied to the system authorization process. Employing authorizing officials from external organizations to supplement the authorizing official from the organization that owns or hosts the system may be necessary when the external organizations have a vested interest or equities in the outcome of the authorization decision. The inter-organization joint authorization process is relevant and appropriate for connected systems, shared systems or services, and systems with multiple information owners. The authorizing officials from the external organizations are key stakeholders of the system undergoing authorization.

 - + - +

a joint authorization process is employed for the system;

 - +

the joint authorization process employed for the system includes multiple authorizing officials with at least one authorizing official from an organization external to the organization conducting the authorization.

 @@ -17885,7 +18145,7 @@ - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

procedures addressing authorization

@@ -17899,7 +18159,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authorization responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -17907,7 +18167,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms that facilitate authorizations and updates

 @@ -17928,7 +18188,7 @@ - +

system-level metrics to be monitored are defined;

@@ -17936,7 +18196,7 @@ - +

frequencies at which to monitor control effectiveness are defined;

@@ -17944,42 +18204,43 @@ - +

frequencies at which to assess control effectiveness are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the security status of the system is reported are defined;

 - +

frequency at which the security status of the system is reported is defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the privacy status of the system is reported are defined;

 - +

frequency at which the privacy status of the system is reported is defined;

 - + + @@ -18078,65 +18339,65 @@

Automation supports more frequent updates to hardware, software, and firmware inventories, authorization packages, and other system information. Effectiveness is further enhanced when continuous monitoring outputs are formatted to provide information that is specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, and timely. Continuous monitoring activities are scaled in accordance with the security categories of systems. Monitoring requirements, including the need for specific monitoring, may be referenced in other controls and control enhancements, such as AC-2g, AC-2(7), AC-2(12)(a), AC-2(7)(b), AC-2(7)(c), AC-17(1), AT-4a, AU-13, AU-13(1), AU-13(2), CM-3f, CM-6d, CM-11c, IR-5, MA-2b, MA-3a, MA-4a, PE-3d, PE-6, PE-14b, PE-16, PE-20, PM-6, PM-23, PM-31, PS-7e, SA-9c, SR-4, SC-5(3)(b), SC-7a, SC-7(24)(b), SC-18b, SC-43b , and SI-4.

 - + - +

a system-level continuous monitoring strategy is developed;

 - +

system-level continuous monitoring is implemented in accordance with the organization-level continuous monitoring strategy;

 - +

system-level continuous monitoring includes establishment of the following system-level metrics to be monitored: ;

 - + - +

system-level continuous monitoring includes established for monitoring;

 - +

system-level continuous monitoring includes established for assessment of control effectiveness;

 - +

system-level continuous monitoring includes ongoing control assessments in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy;

 - +

system-level continuous monitoring includes ongoing monitoring of system and organization-defined metrics in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy;

 - +

system-level continuous monitoring includes correlation and analysis of information generated by control assessments and monitoring;

 - +

system-level continuous monitoring includes response actions to address the results of the analysis of control assessment and monitoring information;

 - + - +

system-level continuous monitoring includes reporting the security status of the system to ;

 - +

system-level continuous monitoring includes reporting the privacy status of the system to .

 @@ -18146,7 +18407,7 @@ - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

organizational continuous monitoring strategy

@@ -18166,7 +18427,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with continuous monitoring responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18175,7 +18436,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing continuous monitoring

mechanisms supporting response actions to address assessment and monitoring results

@@ -18185,7 +18446,8 @@ Independent Assessment - + + @@ -18197,13 +18459,13 @@

Organizations maximize the value of control assessments by requiring that assessments be conducted by assessors with appropriate levels of independence. The level of required independence is based on organizational continuous monitoring strategies. Assessor independence provides a degree of impartiality to the monitoring process. To achieve such impartiality, assessors do not create a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted, assess their own work, act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving, or place themselves in advocacy positions for the organizations acquiring their services.

 - +

independent assessors or assessment teams are employed to monitor the controls in the system on an ongoing basis.

 - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

organizational continuous monitoring strategy

@@ -18221,7 +18483,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with continuous monitoring responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18231,7 +18493,8 @@ Types of Assessments - + + @@ -18239,7 +18502,8 @@ Trend Analyses - + + @@ -18251,19 +18515,19 @@

Trend analyses include examining recent threat information that addresses the types of threat events that have occurred in the organization or the Federal Government, success rates of certain types of attacks, emerging vulnerabilities in technologies, evolving social engineering techniques, the effectiveness of configuration settings, results from multiple control assessments, and findings from Inspectors General or auditors.

 - + - +

trend analysis is employed to determine if control implementations used in the continuous monitoring process need to be modified based on empirical data;

 - +

trend analysis is employed to determine if the frequency of continuous monitoring activities used in the continuous monitoring process needs to be modified based on empirical data;

 - +

trend analysis is employed to determine if the types of activities used in the continuous monitoring process need to be modified based on empirical data.

 @@ -18271,7 +18535,7 @@ - +

Organizational continuous monitoring strategy

system-level continuous monitoring strategy

@@ -18290,7 +18554,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with continuous monitoring responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18298,7 +18562,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting trend analyses

 @@ -18307,7 +18571,8 @@ Risk Monitoring - + + @@ -18332,20 +18597,20 @@

Risk monitoring is informed by the established organizational risk tolerance. Effectiveness monitoring determines the ongoing effectiveness of the implemented risk response measures. Compliance monitoring verifies that required risk response measures are implemented. It also verifies that security and privacy requirements are satisfied. Change monitoring identifies changes to organizational systems and environments of operation that may affect security and privacy risk.

 - +

risk monitoring is an integral part of the continuous monitoring strategy;

- +

effectiveness monitoring is included in risk monitoring;

 - +

compliance monitoring is included in risk monitoring;

 - +

change monitoring is included in risk monitoring.

 @@ -18353,7 +18618,7 @@ - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

organizational continuous monitoring strategy

@@ -18371,7 +18636,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with continuous monitoring responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18379,7 +18644,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting risk monitoring

 @@ -18393,21 +18658,22 @@ - +

actions to validate that policies are established are defined;

 - +

actions to validate that implemented controls are operating in a consistent manner are defined;

 - + + @@ -18419,14 +18685,14 @@

Security and privacy controls are often added incrementally to a system. As a result, policies for selecting and implementing controls may be inconsistent, and the controls could fail to work together in a consistent or coordinated manner. At a minimum, the lack of consistency and coordination could mean that there are unacceptable security and privacy gaps in the system. At worst, it could mean that some of the controls implemented in one location or by one component are actually impeding the functionality of other controls (e.g., encrypting internal network traffic can impede monitoring). In other situations, failing to consistently monitor all implemented network protocols (e.g., a dual stack of IPv4 and IPv6) may create unintended vulnerabilities in the system that could be exploited by adversaries. It is important to validate—through testing, monitoring, and analysis—that the implemented controls are operating in a consistent, coordinated, non-interfering manner.

 - + - +

are employed to validate that policies are established;

 - +

are employed to validate that implemented controls are operating in a consistent manner.

 @@ -18434,7 +18700,7 @@ - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

organizational continuous monitoring strategy

@@ -18451,7 +18717,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with continuous monitoring responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18459,7 +18725,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting consistency analyses

 @@ -18469,14 +18735,15 @@ Automation Support for Monitoring - +

automated mechanisms used to ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of monitoring results for the system are defined;

 - + + @@ -18489,13 +18756,13 @@

Using automated tools for monitoring helps to maintain the accuracy, currency, and availability of monitoring information which in turns helps to increase the level of ongoing awareness of the system security and privacy posture in support of organizational risk management decisions.

 - +

are used to ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of monitoring results for the system.

 - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

organizational continuous monitoring strategy

@@ -18513,7 +18780,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with continuous monitoring responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18521,7 +18788,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting automated monitoring

 @@ -18532,7 +18799,7 @@ Penetration Testing - +

frequency at which to conduct penetration testing on systems or system components is defined;

@@ -18541,14 +18808,15 @@ - +

systems or system components on which penetration testing is to be conducted are defined;

 - + + @@ -18565,13 +18833,13 @@

Organizations can use the results of vulnerability analyses to support penetration testing activities. Penetration testing can be conducted internally or externally on the hardware, software, or firmware components of a system and can exercise both physical and technical controls. A standard method for penetration testing includes a pretest analysis based on full knowledge of the system, pretest identification of potential vulnerabilities based on the pretest analysis, and testing designed to determine the exploitability of vulnerabilities. All parties agree to the rules of engagement before commencing penetration testing scenarios. Organizations correlate the rules of engagement for the penetration tests with the tools, techniques, and procedures that are anticipated to be employed by adversaries. Penetration testing may result in the exposure of information that is protected by laws or regulations, to individuals conducting the testing. Rules of engagement, contracts, or other appropriate mechanisms can be used to communicate expectations for how to protect this information. Risk assessments guide the decisions on the level of independence required for the personnel conducting penetration testing.

 - +

penetration testing is conducted on .

 - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

procedures addressing penetration testing

@@ -18586,7 +18854,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with control assessment responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18595,7 +18863,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting penetration testing

 @@ -18603,7 +18871,8 @@ Independent Penetration Testing Agent or Team - + + @@ -18616,13 +18885,13 @@

Independent penetration testing agents or teams are individuals or groups who conduct impartial penetration testing of organizational systems. Impartiality implies that penetration testing agents or teams are free from perceived or actual conflicts of interest with respect to the development, operation, or management of the systems that are the targets of the penetration testing. CA-2(1) provides additional information on independent assessments that can be applied to penetration testing.

 - +

an independent penetration testing agent or team is employed to perform penetration testing on the system or system components.

 - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

procedures addressing penetration testing

@@ -18637,7 +18906,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with assessment responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18648,14 +18917,15 @@ Red Team Exercises - +

red team exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise organizational systems are defined;

 - + + @@ -18667,13 +18937,13 @@

Red team exercises extend the objectives of penetration testing by examining the security and privacy posture of organizations and the capability to implement effective cyber defenses. Red team exercises simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise mission and business functions and provide a comprehensive assessment of the security and privacy posture of systems and organizations. Such attempts may include technology-based attacks and social engineering-based attacks. Technology-based attacks include interactions with hardware, software, or firmware components and/or mission and business processes. Social engineering-based attacks include interactions via email, telephone, shoulder surfing, or personal conversations. Red team exercises are most effective when conducted by penetration testing agents and teams with knowledge of and experience with current adversarial tactics, techniques, procedures, and tools. While penetration testing may be primarily laboratory-based testing, organizations can use red team exercises to provide more comprehensive assessments that reflect real-world conditions. The results from red team exercises can be used by organizations to improve security and privacy awareness and training and to assess control effectiveness.

 - +

are employed to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise organizational systems in accordance with applicable rules of engagement.

 - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

procedures addressing penetration testing

@@ -18691,7 +18961,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with assessment responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18700,7 +18970,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting the employment of red team exercises

 @@ -18710,7 +18980,7 @@ Facility Penetration Testing - +

frequency at which to employ penetration testing that attempts to bypass or circumvent controls associated with physical access points to the facility is defined;

@@ -18718,14 +18988,15 @@ - + - + + @@ -18739,13 +19010,13 @@

Penetration testing of physical access points can provide information on critical vulnerabilities in the operating environments of organizational systems. Such information can be used to correct weaknesses or deficiencies in physical controls that are necessary to protect organizational systems.

 - +

the penetration testing process includes attempts to bypass or circumvent controls associated with physical access points to facility.

 - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

procedures addressing penetration testing

@@ -18763,7 +19034,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with assessment responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18772,7 +19043,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting the employment of red team exercises

 @@ -18784,7 +19055,7 @@ - +

system components or classes of components requiring internal connections to the system are defined;

@@ -18792,7 +19063,7 @@ - +

conditions requiring termination of internal connections are defined;

@@ -18800,14 +19071,15 @@ - +

frequency at which to review the continued need for each internal connection is defined;

 - + + @@ -18843,43 +19115,43 @@

Internal system connections are connections between organizational systems and separate constituent system components (i.e., connections between components that are part of the same system) including components used for system development. Intra-system connections include connections with mobile devices, notebook and desktop computers, tablets, printers, copiers, facsimile machines, scanners, sensors, and servers. Instead of authorizing each internal system connection individually, organizations can authorize internal connections for a class of system components with common characteristics and/or configurations, including printers, scanners, and copiers with a specified processing, transmission, and storage capability or smart phones and tablets with a specific baseline configuration. The continued need for an internal system connection is reviewed from the perspective of whether it provides support for organizational missions or business functions.

 - + - +

internal connections of to the system are authorized;

 - + - +

for each internal connection, the interface characteristics are documented;

 - +

for each internal connection, the security requirements are documented;

 - +

for each internal connection, the privacy requirements are documented;

 - +

for each internal connection, the nature of the information communicated is documented;

 - +

internal system connections are terminated after ;

 - +

the continued need for each internal connection is reviewed .

 @@ -18887,7 +19159,7 @@ - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

access control policy

@@ -18905,7 +19177,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for developing, implementing, or authorizing internal system connections

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18913,7 +19185,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting internal system connections

 @@ -18921,7 +19193,8 @@ Compliance Checks - + + @@ -18935,14 +19208,14 @@

Compliance checks include verification of the relevant baseline configuration.

 - + - +

security compliance checks are performed on constituent system components prior to the establishment of the internal connection;

 - +

privacy compliance checks are performed on constituent system components prior to the establishment of the internal connection.

 @@ -18950,7 +19223,7 @@ - +

Assessment, authorization, and monitoring policy

access control policy

@@ -18968,7 +19241,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for developing, implementing, or authorizing internal system connections

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -18976,7 +19249,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting compliance checks

 @@ -18994,14 +19267,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the configuration management policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the configuration management procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -19009,7 +19282,7 @@ - + when @@ -19741,7 +20023,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which the configuration control element convenes is defined (if selected);

@@ -19749,14 +20031,15 @@ - +

configuration change conditions that prompt the configuration control element to convene are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -19820,64 +20103,64 @@

Configuration change control for organizational systems involves the systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition of system changes, including system upgrades and modifications. Configuration change control includes changes to baseline configurations, configuration items of systems, operational procedures, configuration settings for system components, remediate vulnerabilities, and unscheduled or unauthorized changes. Processes for managing configuration changes to systems include Configuration Control Boards or Change Advisory Boards that review and approve proposed changes. For changes that impact privacy risk, the senior agency official for privacy updates privacy impact assessments and system of records notices. For new systems or major upgrades, organizations consider including representatives from the development organizations on the Configuration Control Boards or Change Advisory Boards. Auditing of changes includes activities before and after changes are made to systems and the auditing activities required to implement such changes. See also SA-10.

 - + - +

the types of changes to the system that are configuration-controlled are determined and documented;

 - + - +

proposed configuration-controlled changes to the system are reviewed;

 - +

proposed configuration-controlled changes to the system are approved or disapproved with explicit consideration for security and privacy impact analyses;

 - +

configuration change decisions associated with the system are documented;

 - +

approved configuration-controlled changes to the system are implemented;

 - +

records of configuration-controlled changes to the system are retained for ;

 - + - +

activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the system are monitored;

 - +

activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the system are reviewed;

 - + - +

configuration change control activities are coordinated and overseen by ;

 - +

the configuration control element convenes .

 @@ -19887,7 +20170,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system configuration change control

@@ -19906,7 +20189,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with configuration change control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -19916,7 +20199,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for configuration change control

mechanisms that implement configuration change control

@@ -19926,7 +20209,7 @@ Automated Documentation, Notification, and Prohibition of Changes - +

mechanisms used to automate configuration change control are defined;

@@ -19934,7 +20217,7 @@ - +

approval authorities to be notified of and request approval for proposed changes to the system are defined;

@@ -19942,7 +20225,7 @@ - +

the time period after which to highlight changes that have not been approved or disapproved is defined;

@@ -19950,14 +20233,15 @@ - +

personnel to be notified when approved changes are complete is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -19993,34 +20277,34 @@

None.

 - + - +

are used to document proposed changes to the system;

 - +

are used to notify of proposed changes to the system and request change approval;

 - +

are used to highlight proposed changes to the system that have not been approved or disapproved within ;

 - +

are used to prohibit changes to the system until designated approvals are received;

 - +

are used to document all changes to the system;

 - +

are used to notify when approved changes to the system are completed.

 @@ -20028,7 +20312,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system configuration change control

@@ -20047,7 +20331,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with configuration change control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -20058,7 +20342,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for configuration change control

automated mechanisms implementing configuration change control activities

@@ -20068,7 +20352,8 @@ Testing, Validation, and Documentation of Changes - + + @@ -20080,19 +20365,19 @@

Changes to systems include modifications to hardware, software, or firmware components and configuration settings defined in CM-6 . Organizations ensure that testing does not interfere with system operations that support organizational mission and business functions. Individuals or groups conducting tests understand security and privacy policies and procedures, system security and privacy policies and procedures, and the health, safety, and environmental risks associated with specific facilities or processes. Operational systems may need to be taken offline, or replicated to the extent feasible, before testing can be conducted. If systems must be taken offline for testing, the tests are scheduled to occur during planned system outages whenever possible. If the testing cannot be conducted on operational systems, organizations employ compensating controls.

 - + - +

changes to the system are tested before finalizing the implementation of the changes;

 - +

changes to the system are validated before finalizing the implementation of the changes;

 - +

changes to the system are documented before finalizing the implementation of the changes.

 @@ -20100,7 +20385,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

configuration management plan

@@ -20118,7 +20403,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with configuration change control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -20129,7 +20414,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for configuration change control

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing, testing, validating, and documenting system changes

@@ -20140,14 +20425,15 @@ Automated Change Implementation - +

mechanisms used to automate the implementation of changes and deployment of the updated baseline across the installed base are defined;

 - + + @@ -20158,14 +20444,14 @@

Automated tools can improve the accuracy, consistency, and availability of configuration baseline information. Automation can also provide data aggregation and data correlation capabilities, alerting mechanisms, and dashboards to support risk-based decision-making within the organization.

 - + - +

changes to the current system baseline are implemented using ;

 - +

the updated baseline is deployed across the installed base using .

 @@ -20173,7 +20459,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

configuration management plan

@@ -20190,7 +20476,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with configuration change control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -20201,7 +20487,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for configuration change control

automated mechanisms implementing changes to current system baseline

@@ -20216,14 +20502,14 @@ - +

security representatives required to be members of the change control element are defined;

 - +

privacy representatives required to be members of the change control element are defined;

@@ -20231,14 +20517,15 @@ - +

the configuration change control element of which the security and privacy representatives are to be members is defined;

 - + + @@ -20249,14 +20536,14 @@

Information security and privacy representatives include system security officers, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, or system privacy officers. Representation by personnel with information security and privacy expertise is important because changes to system configurations can have unintended side effects, some of which may be security- or privacy-relevant. Detecting such changes early in the process can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security and privacy posture of systems. The configuration change control element referred to in the second organization-defined parameter reflects the change control elements defined by organizations in CM-3g.

 - + - +

are required to be members of the ;

 - +

are required to be members of the .

 @@ -20264,7 +20551,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system configuration change control

@@ -20276,7 +20563,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with configuration change control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -20285,7 +20572,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for configuration change control

 @@ -20295,14 +20582,15 @@ Automated Security Response - +

security responses to be automatically implemented are defined;

 - + + @@ -20313,13 +20601,13 @@

Automated security responses include halting selected system functions, halting system processing, and issuing alerts or notifications to organizational personnel when there is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item.

 - +

are automatically implemented if baseline configurations are changed in an unauthorized manner.

 - +

System security plan

configuration management policy

@@ -20335,7 +20623,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with configuration change control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -20346,7 +20634,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for configuration change control

automated mechanisms implementing security responses to unauthorized changes to the baseline configurations

@@ -20357,14 +20645,15 @@ Cryptography Management - +

controls provided by cryptographic mechanisms that are to be under configuration management are defined;

 - + + @@ -20376,13 +20665,13 @@

The controls referenced in the control enhancement refer to security and privacy controls from the control catalog. Regardless of the cryptographic mechanisms employed, processes and procedures are in place to manage those mechanisms. For example, if system components use certificates for identification and authentication, a process is implemented to address the expiration of those certificates.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms used to provide are under configuration management.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system configuration change control

@@ -20396,7 +20685,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with configuration change control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -20407,7 +20696,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for configuration change control

cryptographic mechanisms implementing organizational security safeguards (controls)

@@ -20418,7 +20707,7 @@ Review System Changes - +

the frequency at which changes are to be reviewed is defined;

@@ -20426,14 +20715,15 @@ - +

the circumstances under which changes are to be reviewed are defined;

 - + + @@ -20447,13 +20737,13 @@

Indications that warrant a review of changes to the system and the specific circumstances justifying such reviews may be obtained from activities carried out by organizations during the configuration change process or continuous monitoring process.

 - +

changes to the system are reviewed or when to determine whether unauthorized changes have occurred.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system configuration change control

@@ -20469,7 +20759,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with configuration change control responsibilities

organizational personnel with security responsibilities

@@ -20479,7 +20769,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for configuration change control

mechanisms implementing audit records for changes

@@ -20490,14 +20780,15 @@ Prevent or Restrict Configuration Changes - +

the circumstances under which changes are to be prevented or restricted are defined;

 - + + @@ -20508,13 +20799,13 @@

System configuration changes can adversely affect critical system security and privacy functionality. Change restrictions can be enforced through automated mechanisms.

 - +

changes to the configuration of the system are prevented or restricted under .

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system configuration change control

@@ -20533,7 +20824,8 @@ Impact Analyses - + + @@ -20557,14 +20849,14 @@

Organizational personnel with security or privacy responsibilities conduct impact analyses. Individuals conducting impact analyses possess the necessary skills and technical expertise to analyze the changes to systems as well as the security or privacy ramifications. Impact analyses include reviewing security and privacy plans, policies, and procedures to understand control requirements; reviewing system design documentation and operational procedures to understand control implementation and how specific system changes might affect the controls; reviewing the impact of changes on organizational supply chain partners with stakeholders; and determining how potential changes to a system create new risks to the privacy of individuals and the ability of implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Impact analyses also include risk assessments to understand the impact of the changes and determine if additional controls are required.

 - + - +

changes to the system are analyzed to determine potential security impacts prior to change implementation;

 - +

changes to the system are analyzed to determine potential privacy impacts prior to change implementation.

 @@ -20572,7 +20864,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing security impact analyses for changes to the system

@@ -20592,7 +20884,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibility for conducting security impact analyses

organizational personnel with responsibility for conducting privacy impact analyses

@@ -20604,7 +20896,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for security impact analyses

organizational processes for privacy impact analyses

@@ -20613,7 +20905,8 @@ Separate Test Environments - + + @@ -20627,49 +20920,49 @@

A separate test environment requires an environment that is physically or logically separate and distinct from the operational environment. The separation is sufficient to ensure that activities in the test environment do not impact activities in the operational environment and that information in the operational environment is not inadvertently transmitted to the test environment. Separate environments can be achieved by physical or logical means. If physically separate test environments are not implemented, organizations determine the strength of mechanism required when implementing logical separation.

 - + - +

changes to the system are analyzed in a separate test environment before implementation in an operational environment;

 - +

changes to the system are analyzed for security impacts due to flaws;

 - +

changes to the system are analyzed for privacy impacts due to flaws;

 - +

changes to the system are analyzed for security impacts due to weaknesses;

 - +

changes to the system are analyzed for privacy impacts due to weaknesses;

 - +

changes to the system are analyzed for security impacts due to incompatibility;

 - +

changes to the system are analyzed for privacy impacts due to incompatibility;

 - +

changes to the system are analyzed for security impacts due to intentional malice;

 - +

changes to the system are analyzed for privacy impacts due to intentional malice.

 @@ -20677,7 +20970,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing security impact analyses for changes to the system

@@ -20700,7 +20993,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibility for conducting security and privacy impact analyses

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -20710,7 +21003,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for security and privacy impact analyses

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security and privacy impact analyses of changes

@@ -20720,7 +21013,8 @@ Verification of Controls - + + @@ -20735,34 +21029,34 @@

Implementation in this context refers to installing changed code in the operational system that may have an impact on security or privacy controls.

 - + - +

the impacted controls are implemented correctly with regard to meeting the security requirements for the system after system changes;

 - +

the impacted controls are implemented correctly with regard to meeting the privacy requirements for the system after system changes;

 - +

the impacted controls are operating as intended with regard to meeting the security requirements for the system after system changes;

 - +

the impacted controls are operating as intended with regard to meeting the privacy requirements for the system after system changes;

 - +

the impacted controls are producing the desired outcome with regard to meeting the security requirements for the system after system changes;

 - +

the impacted controls are producing the desired outcome with regard to meeting the privacy requirements for the system after system changes.

 @@ -20770,7 +21064,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing security impact analyses for changes to the system

@@ -20791,7 +21085,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibility for conducting security and privacy impact analyses

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -20801,7 +21095,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for security and privacy impact analyses

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security and privacy impact analyses of changes

@@ -20812,7 +21106,8 @@ Access Restrictions for Change - + + @@ -20834,34 +21129,34 @@

Changes to the hardware, software, or firmware components of systems or the operational procedures related to the system can potentially have significant effects on the security of the systems or individuals’ privacy. Therefore, organizations permit only qualified and authorized individuals to access systems for purposes of initiating changes. Access restrictions include physical and logical access controls (see AC-3 and PE-3 ), software libraries, workflow automation, media libraries, abstract layers (i.e., changes implemented into external interfaces rather than directly into systems), and change windows (i.e., changes occur only during specified times).

 - + - +

physical access restrictions associated with changes to the system are defined and documented;

 - +

physical access restrictions associated with changes to the system are approved;

 - +

physical access restrictions associated with changes to the system are enforced;

 - +

logical access restrictions associated with changes to the system are defined and documented;

 - +

logical access restrictions associated with changes to the system are approved;

 - +

logical access restrictions associated with changes to the system are enforced.

 @@ -20869,7 +21164,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing access restrictions for changes to the system

@@ -20888,7 +21183,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with logical access control responsibilities

organizational personnel with physical access control responsibilities

@@ -20898,7 +21193,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing access restrictions to change

mechanisms supporting, implementing, or enforcing access restrictions associated with changes to the system

@@ -20908,14 +21203,15 @@ Automated Access Enforcement and Audit Records - +

mechanisms used to automate the enforcement of access restrictions are defined;

 - + + @@ -20940,14 +21236,14 @@

Organizations log system accesses associated with applying configuration changes to ensure that configuration change control is implemented and to support after-the-fact actions should organizations discover any unauthorized changes.

 - + - +

access restrictions for change are enforced using ;

 - +

audit records of enforcement actions are automatically generated.

 @@ -20955,7 +21251,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing access restrictions for changes to the system

@@ -20970,7 +21266,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with logical access control responsibilities

organizational personnel with physical access control responsibilities

@@ -20980,7 +21276,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing access restrictions to change

automated mechanisms implementing the enforcement of access restrictions for changes to the system

@@ -20991,7 +21287,8 @@ Review System Changes - + + @@ -20999,7 +21296,8 @@ Signed Components - + + @@ -21012,21 +21310,22 @@ - +

system components requiring dual authorization for changes are defined;

 - +

system-level information requiring dual authorization for changes is defined;

 - + + @@ -21041,14 +21340,14 @@

Organizations employ dual authorization to help ensure that any changes to selected system components and information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals approve and implement such changes. The two individuals possess the skills and expertise to determine if the proposed changes are correct implementations of approved changes. The individuals are also accountable for the changes. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control. To reduce the risk of collusion, organizations consider rotating dual authorization duties to other individuals. System-level information includes operational procedures.

 - + - +

dual authorization for implementing changes to is enforced;

 - +

dual authorization for implementing changes to is enforced.

 @@ -21056,7 +21355,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing access restrictions for changes to the system

@@ -21074,7 +21373,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with dual authorization enforcement responsibilities for implementing system changes

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -21083,7 +21382,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing access restrictions to change

mechanisms implementing dual authorization enforcement

@@ -21098,21 +21397,22 @@ - +

frequency at which to review privileges is defined;

 - +

frequency at which to reevaluate privileges is defined;

 - + + @@ -21131,30 +21431,30 @@

In many organizations, systems support multiple mission and business functions. Limiting privileges to change system components with respect to operational systems is necessary because changes to a system component may have far-reaching effects on mission and business processes supported by the system. The relationships between systems and mission/business processes are, in some cases, unknown to developers. System-related information includes operational procedures.

 - + - + - +

privileges to change system components within a production or operational environment are limited;

 - +

privileges to change system-related information within a production or operational environment are limited;

 - + - +

privileges are reviewed ;

 - +

privileges are reevaluated .

 @@ -21164,7 +21464,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing access restrictions for changes to the system

@@ -21183,7 +21483,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -21191,7 +21491,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing access restrictions to change

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing access restrictions for change

@@ -21201,7 +21501,8 @@ Limit Library Privileges - + + @@ -21214,13 +21515,13 @@

Software libraries include privileged programs.

 - +

privileges to change software resident within software libraries are limited.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing access restrictions for changes to the system

@@ -21237,7 +21538,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -21245,7 +21546,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing access restrictions to change

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing access restrictions for change

@@ -21255,7 +21556,8 @@ Automatic Implementation of Security Safeguards - + + @@ -21265,7 +21567,7 @@ Configuration Settings - +

common secure configurations to establish and document configuration settings for components employed within the system are defined;

@@ -21273,7 +21575,7 @@ - +

system components for which approval of deviations is needed are defined;

@@ -21281,14 +21583,15 @@ - +

operational requirements necessitating approval of deviations are defined;

 - + + @@ -21350,40 +21653,40 @@

Implementation of a common secure configuration may be mandated at the organization level, mission and business process level, system level, or at a higher level, including by a regulatory agency. Common secure configurations include the United States Government Configuration Baseline USGCB and security technical implementation guides (STIGs), which affect the implementation of CM-6 and other controls such as AC-19 and CM-7 . The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) and the defined standards within the protocol provide an effective method to uniquely identify, track, and control configuration settings.

 - + - +

configuration settings that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements are established and documented for components employed within the system using ;

 - +

the configuration settings documented in CM-06a are implemented;

 - + - +

any deviations from established configuration settings for are identified and documented based on ;

 - +

any deviations from established configuration settings for are approved;

 - + - +

changes to the configuration settings are monitored in accordance with organizational policies and procedures;

 - +

changes to the configuration settings are controlled in accordance with organizational policies and procedures.

 @@ -21393,7 +21696,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing configuration settings for the system

@@ -21413,7 +21716,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with security configuration management responsibilities

organizational personnel with privacy configuration management responsibilities

@@ -21423,7 +21726,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing configuration settings

mechanisms that implement, monitor, and/or control system configuration settings

@@ -21440,35 +21743,36 @@ - +

system components for which to manage, apply, and verify configuration settings are defined;

 - +

automated mechanisms to manage configuration settings are defined;

 - +

automated mechanisms to apply configuration settings are defined;

 - +

automated mechanisms to verify configuration settings are defined;

 - + + @@ -21480,19 +21784,19 @@

Automated tools (e.g., hardening tools, baseline configuration tools) can improve the accuracy, consistency, and availability of configuration settings information. Automation can also provide data aggregation and data correlation capabilities, alerting mechanisms, and dashboards to support risk-based decision-making within the organization.

 - + - +

configuration settings for are managed using ;

 - +

configuration settings for are applied using ;

 - +

configuration settings for are verified using .

 @@ -21500,7 +21804,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing configuration settings for the system

@@ -21518,7 +21822,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with security configuration management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -21528,7 +21832,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing configuration settings

automated mechanisms implemented to manage, apply, and verify system configuration settings

@@ -21539,7 +21843,7 @@ Respond to Unauthorized Changes - +

actions to be taken upon an unauthorized change are defined;

@@ -21547,14 +21851,15 @@ - +

configuration settings requiring action upon an unauthorized change are defined;

 - + + @@ -21568,13 +21873,13 @@

Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings include alerting designated organizational personnel, restoring established configuration settings, or—in extreme cases—halting affected system processing.

 - +

are taken in response to unauthorized changes to .

 - +

System security plan

privacy plan

@@ -21593,7 +21898,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with security configuration management responsibilities

organizational personnel with security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -21602,7 +21907,7 @@ - +

Organizational process for responding to unauthorized changes to system configuration settings

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing actions in response to unauthorized changes

@@ -21612,7 +21917,8 @@ Unauthorized Change Detection - + + @@ -21620,7 +21926,8 @@ Conformance Demonstration - + + @@ -21639,49 +21946,50 @@ - +

mission-essential capabilities for the system are defined;

 - +

functions to be prohibited or restricted are defined;

 - +

ports to be prohibited or restricted are defined;

 - +

protocols to be prohibited or restricted are defined;

 - +

software to be prohibited or restricted is defined;

 - +

services to be prohibited or restricted are defined;

 - + + @@ -21721,36 +22029,36 @@

Systems provide a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services routinely provided by default may not be necessary to support essential organizational missions, functions, or operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single system component, but doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by that single component. Where feasible, organizations limit component functionality to a single function per component. Organizations consider removing unused or unnecessary software and disabling unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports and protocols to prevent unauthorized connection of components, transfer of information, and tunneling. Organizations employ network scanning tools, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and end-point protection technologies, such as firewalls and host-based intrusion detection systems, to identify and prevent the use of prohibited functions, protocols, ports, and services. Least functionality can also be achieved as part of the fundamental design and development of the system (see SA-8, SC-2 , and SC-3).

 - + - +

the system is configured to provide only ;

 - + - +

the use of is prohibited or restricted;

 - +

the use of is prohibited or restricted;

 - +

the use of is prohibited or restricted;

 - +

the use of is prohibited or restricted;

 - +

the use of is prohibited or restricted.

 @@ -21760,7 +22068,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing least functionality in the system

@@ -21775,7 +22083,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with security configuration management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -21785,7 +22093,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes prohibiting or restricting functions, ports, protocols, software, and/or services

mechanisms implementing restrictions or prohibition of functions, ports, protocols, software, and/or services

@@ -21803,49 +22111,50 @@ - +

the frequency at which to review the system to identify unnecessary and/or non-secure functions, ports, protocols, software, and/or services is defined;

 - +

functions to be disabled or removed when deemed unnecessary or non-secure are defined;

 - +

ports to be disabled or removed when deemed unnecessary or non-secure are defined;

 - +

protocols to be disabled or removed when deemed unnecessary or non-secure are defined;

 - +

software to be disabled or removed when deemed unnecessary or non-secure is defined;

 - +

services to be disabled or removed when deemed unnecessary or non-secure are defined;

 - + + @@ -21865,36 +22174,36 @@

Organizations review functions, ports, protocols, and services provided by systems or system components to determine the functions and services that are candidates for elimination. Such reviews are especially important during transition periods from older technologies to newer technologies (e.g., transition from IPv4 to IPv6). These technology transitions may require implementing the older and newer technologies simultaneously during the transition period and returning to minimum essential functions, ports, protocols, and services at the earliest opportunity. Organizations can either decide the relative security of the function, port, protocol, and/or service or base the security decision on the assessment of other entities. Unsecure protocols include Bluetooth, FTP, and peer-to-peer networking.

 - + - +

the system is reviewed to identify unnecessary and/or non-secure functions, ports, protocols, software, and services:

 - + - +

deemed to be unnecessary and/or non-secure are disabled or removed;

 - +

deemed to be unnecessary and/or non-secure are disabled or removed;

 - +

deemed to be unnecessary and/or non-secure are disabled or removed;

 - +

deemed to be unnecessary and/or non-secure is disabled or removed;

 - +

deemed to be unnecessary and/or non-secure are disabled or removed.

 @@ -21904,7 +22213,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing least functionality in the system

@@ -21921,7 +22230,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for reviewing functions, ports, protocols, and services on the system

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -21931,7 +22240,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for reviewing or disabling functions, ports, protocols, and services on the system

mechanisms implementing review and disabling of functions, ports, protocols, and/or services

@@ -21942,7 +22251,7 @@ Prevent Program Execution - + disable network access by unauthorized components isolate unauthorized components @@ -22997,14 +23317,15 @@ - +

personnel or roles to be notified when unauthorized components are detected is/are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -23032,40 +23353,40 @@

Automated unauthorized component detection is applied in addition to the monitoring for unauthorized remote connections and mobile devices. Monitoring for unauthorized system components may be accomplished on an ongoing basis or by the periodic scanning of systems for that purpose. Automated mechanisms may also be used to prevent the connection of unauthorized components (see CM-7(9) ). Automated mechanisms can be implemented in systems or in separate system components. When acquiring and implementing automated mechanisms, organizations consider whether such mechanisms depend on the ability of the system component to support an agent or supplicant in order to be detected since some types of components do not have or cannot support agents (e.g., IoT devices, sensors). Isolation can be achieved , for example, by placing unauthorized system components in separate domains or subnets or quarantining such components. This type of component isolation is commonly referred to as sandboxing.

- + - + - +

the presence of unauthorized hardware within the system is detected using ;

 - +

the presence of unauthorized software within the system is detected using ;

 - +

the presence of unauthorized firmware within the system is detected using ;

 - + - +

are taken when unauthorized hardware is detected;

 - +

are taken when unauthorized software is detected;

 - +

are taken when unauthorized firmware is detected.

 @@ -23075,7 +23396,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system component inventory

@@ -23094,7 +23415,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with component inventory management responsibilities

organizational personnel with responsibilities for managing the automated mechanisms implementing unauthorized system component detection

@@ -23105,7 +23426,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for detection of unauthorized system components

organizational processes for taking action when unauthorized system components are detected

@@ -23118,7 +23439,7 @@ Accountability Information - + - + + @@ -23139,13 +23461,13 @@

Identifying individuals who are responsible and accountable for administering system components ensures that the assigned components are properly administered and that organizations can contact those individuals if some action is required (e.g., when the component is determined to be the source of a breach, needs to be recalled or replaced, or needs to be relocated).

 - +

individuals responsible and accountable for administering system components are identified by in the system component inventory.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system component inventory

@@ -23158,7 +23480,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with component inventory management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -23167,7 +23489,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing the system component inventory

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the system component inventory

@@ -23177,7 +23499,8 @@ No Duplicate Accounting of Components - + + @@ -23185,7 +23508,8 @@ Assessed Configurations and Approved Deviations - + + @@ -23197,14 +23521,14 @@

Assessed configurations and approved deviations focus on configuration settings established by organizations for system components, the specific components that have been assessed to determine compliance with the required configuration settings, and any approved deviations from established configuration settings.

 - + - +

assessed component configurations are included in the system component inventory;

 - +

any approved deviations to current deployed configurations are included in the system component inventory.

 @@ -23212,7 +23536,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system component inventory

@@ -23228,7 +23552,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with component inventory management responsibilities

organizational personnel with assessment responsibilities

@@ -23238,7 +23562,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing the system component inventory

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system component inventory

@@ -23248,7 +23572,8 @@ Centralized Repository - + + @@ -23260,13 +23585,13 @@

Organizations may implement centralized system component inventories that include components from all organizational systems. Centralized repositories of component inventories provide opportunities for efficiencies in accounting for organizational hardware, software, and firmware assets. Such repositories may also help organizations rapidly identify the location and responsible individuals of components that have been compromised, breached, or are otherwise in need of mitigation actions. Organizations ensure that the resulting centralized inventories include system-specific information required for proper component accountability.

 - +

a centralized repository for the system component inventory is provided.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system component inventory

@@ -23282,7 +23607,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with component inventory management responsibilities

organizational personnel with security responsibilities

@@ -23291,7 +23616,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing the system component inventory

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system component inventory

@@ -23302,14 +23627,15 @@ Automated Location Tracking - +

automated mechanisms for tracking components are defined;

 - + + @@ -23321,13 +23647,13 @@

The use of automated mechanisms to track the location of system components can increase the accuracy of component inventories. Such capability may help organizations rapidly identify the location and responsible individuals of system components that have been compromised, breached, or are otherwise in need of mitigation actions. The use of tracking mechanisms can be coordinated with senior agency officials for privacy if there are implications that affect individual privacy.

 - +

are used to support the tracking of system components by geographic location.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system component inventory

@@ -23343,7 +23669,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with component inventory management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -23353,7 +23679,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing the system component inventory

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system component inventory

@@ -23365,14 +23691,15 @@ Assignment of Components to Systems - +

personnel or roles from which to receive an acknowledgement is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -23391,14 +23718,14 @@

System components that are not assigned to a system may be unmanaged, lack the required protection, and become an organizational vulnerability.

 - + - +

system components are assigned to a system;

 - +

an acknowledgement of the component assignment is received from .

 @@ -23406,7 +23733,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing system component inventory

@@ -23422,7 +23749,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with component inventory management responsibilities

system owner

@@ -23432,7 +23759,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for assigning components to systems

organizational processes for acknowledging assignment of components to systems

@@ -23446,14 +23773,15 @@ Configuration Management Plan - +

personnel or roles to review and approve the configuration management plan is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -23495,78 +23823,78 @@

Organizations can employ templates to help ensure the consistent and timely development and implementation of configuration management plans. Templates can represent a configuration management plan for the organization with subsets of the plan implemented on a system by system basis. Configuration management approval processes include the designation of key stakeholders responsible for reviewing and approving proposed changes to systems, and personnel who conduct security and privacy impact analyses prior to the implementation of changes to the systems. Configuration items are the system components, such as the hardware, software, firmware, and documentation to be configuration-managed. As systems continue through the system development life cycle, new configuration items may be identified, and some existing configuration items may no longer need to be under configuration control.

 - + - +

a configuration management plan for the system is developed and documented;

 - +

a configuration management plan for the system is implemented;

 - + - +

the configuration management plan addresses roles;

 - +

the configuration management plan addresses responsibilities;

 - +

the configuration management plan addresses configuration management processes and procedures;

 - + - +

the configuration management plan establishes a process for identifying configuration items throughout the system development life cycle;

 - +

the configuration management plan establishes a process for managing the configuration of the configuration items;

 - + - +

the configuration management plan defines the configuration items for the system;

 - +

the configuration management plan places the configuration items under configuration management;

 - +

the configuration management plan is reviewed and approved by ;

 - + - +

the configuration management plan is protected from unauthorized disclosure;

 - +

the configuration management plan is protected from unauthorized modification.

 @@ -23576,7 +23904,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing configuration management planning

@@ -23589,7 +23917,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for developing the configuration management plan

organizational personnel with responsibilities for implementing and managing processes defined in the configuration management plan

@@ -23600,7 +23928,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for developing and documenting the configuration management plan

organizational processes for identifying and managing configuration items

@@ -23613,7 +23941,8 @@ Assignment of Responsibility - + + @@ -23624,13 +23953,13 @@

In the absence of dedicated configuration management teams assigned within organizations, system developers may be tasked with developing configuration management processes using personnel who are not directly involved in system development or system integration. This separation of duties ensures that organizations establish and maintain a sufficient degree of independence between the system development and integration processes and configuration management processes to facilitate quality control and more effective oversight.

 - +

the responsibility for developing the configuration management process is assigned to organizational personnel who are not directly involved in system development.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing responsibilities for configuration management process development

@@ -23642,7 +23971,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for configuration management process development

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -23653,7 +23982,8 @@ Software Usage Restrictions - + + @@ -23680,19 +24010,19 @@

Software license tracking can be accomplished by manual or automated methods, depending on organizational needs. Examples of contract agreements include software license agreements and non-disclosure agreements.

 - + - +

software and associated documentation are used in accordance with contract agreements and copyright laws;

 - +

the use of software and associated documentation protected by quantity licenses is tracked to control copying and distribution;

 - +

the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology is controlled and documented to ensure that peer-to-peer file sharing is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of copyrighted work.

 @@ -23700,7 +24030,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

software usage restrictions

@@ -23716,7 +24046,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel operating, using, and/or maintaining the system

organizational personnel with software license management responsibilities

@@ -23726,7 +24056,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for tracking the use of software protected by quantity licenses

organizational processes for controlling/documenting the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology

@@ -23738,14 +24068,15 @@ Open-source Software - +

restrictions on the use of open-source software are defined;

 - + + @@ -23757,13 +24088,13 @@

Open-source software refers to software that is available in source code form. Certain software rights normally reserved for copyright holders are routinely provided under software license agreements that permit individuals to study, change, and improve the software. From a security perspective, the major advantage of open-source software is that it provides organizations with the ability to examine the source code. In some cases, there is an online community associated with the software that inspects, tests, updates, and reports on issues found in software on an ongoing basis. However, remediating vulnerabilities in open-source software may be problematic. There may also be licensing issues associated with open-source software, including the constraints on derivative use of such software. Open-source software that is available only in binary form may increase the level of risk in using such software.

 - +

are established for the use of open-source software.

 - +

Configuration management policy

software usage restrictions

@@ -23779,7 +24110,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel operating, using, and/or maintaining the system

organizational personnel with software license management responsibilities

@@ -23789,7 +24120,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for tracking the use of software protected by quantity licenses

organizational processes for controlling/documenting the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology

@@ -23803,7 +24134,7 @@ User-installed Software - +

policies governing the installation of software by users are defined;

@@ -23811,7 +24142,7 @@ - +

methods used to enforce software installation policies are defined;

@@ -23819,14 +24150,15 @@ - +

frequency with which to monitor compliance is defined;

 - + + @@ -23858,19 +24190,19 @@

If provided the necessary privileges, users can install software in organizational systems. To maintain control over the software installed, organizations identify permitted and prohibited actions regarding software installation. Permitted software installations include updates and security patches to existing software and downloading new applications from organization-approved app stores. Prohibited software installations include software with unknown or suspect pedigrees or software that organizations consider potentially malicious. Policies selected for governing user-installed software are organization-developed or provided by some external entity. Policy enforcement methods can include procedural methods and automated methods.

 - + - +

governing the installation of software by users are established;

 - +

software installation policies are enforced through ;

 - +

compliance with is monitored .

 @@ -23878,7 +24210,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing user-installed software

@@ -23896,7 +24228,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for governing user-installed software

organizational personnel operating, using, and/or maintaining the system

@@ -23907,7 +24239,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes governing user-installed software on the system

mechanisms enforcing policies and methods for governing the installation of software by users

@@ -23917,7 +24249,8 @@ Alerts for Unauthorized Installations - + + @@ -23925,7 +24258,8 @@ Software Installation with Privileged Status - + + @@ -23938,13 +24272,13 @@

Privileged status can be obtained, for example, by serving in the role of system administrator.

 - +

user installation of software is allowed only with explicit privileged status.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing user-installed software

@@ -23961,7 +24295,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for governing user-installed software

organizational personnel operating, using, and/or maintaining the system

@@ -23971,7 +24305,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes governing user-installed software on the system

mechanisms for prohibiting installation of software without privileged status (e.g., access controls)

@@ -23986,21 +24320,22 @@ - +

automated mechanisms used to enforce compliance are defined;

 - +

automated mechanisms used to monitor compliance are defined;

 - + + @@ -24012,14 +24347,14 @@

Organizations enforce and monitor compliance with software installation policies using automated mechanisms to more quickly detect and respond to unauthorized software installation which can be an indicator of an internal or external hostile attack.

 - + - +

compliance with software installation policies is enforced using ;

 - +

compliance with software installation policies is monitored using .

 @@ -24027,7 +24362,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing user-installed software

@@ -24045,7 +24380,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for governing user-installed software

organizational personnel operating, using, and/or maintaining the system

@@ -24056,7 +24391,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes governing user-installed software on the system

automated mechanisms enforcing policies on installation of software by users

@@ -24069,14 +24404,15 @@ Information Location - +

information for which the location is to be identified and documented is defined;

 - + + @@ -24117,49 +24453,49 @@

Information location addresses the need to understand where information is being processed and stored. Information location includes identifying where specific information types and information reside in system components and how information is being processed so that information flow can be understood and adequate protection and policy management provided for such information and system components. The security category of the information is also a factor in determining the controls necessary to protect the information and the system component where the information resides (see FIPS 199 ). The location of the information and system components is also a factor in the architecture and design of the system (see SA-4, SA-8, SA-17).

 - + - + - +

the location of is identified and documented;

 - +

the specific system components on which is processed are identified and documented;

 - +

the specific system components on which is stored are identified and documented;

 - + - +

the users who have access to the system and system components where is processed are identified and documented;

 - +

the users who have access to the system and system components where is stored are identified and documented;

 - + - +

changes to the location (i.e., system or system components) where is processed are documented;

 - +

changes to the location (i.e., system or system components) where is stored are documented.

 @@ -24169,7 +24505,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing identification and documentation of information location

@@ -24189,7 +24525,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for managing information location and user access to information

organizational personnel with responsibilities for operating, using, and/or maintaining the system

@@ -24200,7 +24536,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes governing information location

mechanisms enforcing policies and methods for governing information location

@@ -24210,7 +24546,7 @@ Automated Tools to Support Information Location - +

information to be protected is defined by information type;

@@ -24218,14 +24554,15 @@ - +

system components where the information is located are defined;

 - + + @@ -24237,13 +24574,13 @@

The use of automated tools helps to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the information location capability implemented within the system. Automation also helps organizations manage the data produced during information location activities and share such information across the organization. The output of automated information location tools can be used to guide and inform system architecture and design decisions.

 - +

automated tools are used to identify on to ensure that controls are in place to protect organizational information and individual privacy.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing identification and documentation of information location

@@ -24260,7 +24597,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for managing information location

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -24270,7 +24607,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes governing information location

automated mechanisms enforcing policies and methods for governing information location

@@ -24282,7 +24619,8 @@ Data Action Mapping - + + @@ -24301,13 +24639,13 @@

Data actions are system operations that process personally identifiable information. The processing of such information encompasses the full information life cycle, which includes collection, generation, transformation, use, disclosure, retention, and disposal. A map of system data actions includes discrete data actions, elements of personally identifiable information being processed in the data actions, system components involved in the data actions, and the owners or operators of the system components. Understanding what personally identifiable information is being processed (e.g., the sensitivity of the personally identifiable information), how personally identifiable information is being processed (e.g., if the data action is visible to the individual or is processed in another part of the system), and by whom (e.g., individuals may have different privacy perceptions based on the entity that is processing the personally identifiable information) provides a number of contextual factors that are important to assessing the degree of privacy risk created by the system. Data maps can be illustrated in different ways, and the level of detail may vary based on the mission and business needs of the organization. The data map may be an overlay of any system design artifact that the organization is using. The development of this map may necessitate coordination between the privacy and security programs regarding the covered data actions and the components that are identified as part of the system.

 - +

a map of system data actions is developed and documented.

 - +

Configuration management policy

procedures for identification and documentation of information location

@@ -24325,7 +24663,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for managing information location

organizational personnel responsible for data action mapping

@@ -24336,7 +24674,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes governing information location

mechanisms supporting or implementing data action mapping

@@ -24351,21 +24689,22 @@ - +

software components requiring verification of a digitally signed certificate before installation are defined;

 - +

firmware components requiring verification of a digitally signed certificate before installation are defined;

 - + + @@ -24382,14 +24721,14 @@

Software and firmware components prevented from installation unless signed with recognized and approved certificates include software and firmware version updates, patches, service packs, device drivers, and basic input/output system updates. Organizations can identify applicable software and firmware components by type, by specific items, or a combination of both. Digital signatures and organizational verification of such signatures is a method of code authentication.

 - + - +

the installation of is prevented unless it is verified that the software has been digitally signed using a certificate recognized and approved by the organization;

 - +

the installation of is prevented unless it is verified that the firmware has been digitally signed using a certificate recognized and approved by the organization.

 @@ -24397,7 +24736,7 @@ - +

Configuration management policy

procedures addressing digitally signed certificates for software and firmware components

@@ -24412,7 +24751,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for verifying digitally signed certificates for software and firmware component installation

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -24422,7 +24761,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes governing information location

mechanisms enforcing policies and methods for governing information location

@@ -24442,14 +24781,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the contingency planning policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the contingency planning procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -24457,7 +24796,7 @@ - + all essential @@ -25164,14 +25507,15 @@ - +

the contingency plan activation time period within which to resume mission and business functions is defined;

 - + + @@ -25182,13 +25526,13 @@

Organizations may choose to conduct contingency planning activities to resume mission and business functions as part of business continuity planning or as part of business impact analyses. Organizations prioritize the resumption of mission and business functions. The time period for resuming mission and business functions may be dependent on the severity and extent of the disruptions to the system and its supporting infrastructure.

 - +

the resumption of mission and business functions are planned for within of contingency plan activation.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency operations for the system

@@ -25203,7 +25547,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -25212,7 +25556,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for resumption of missions and business functions

 @@ -25221,7 +25565,8 @@ Resume All Mission and Business Functions - + + @@ -25230,14 +25575,15 @@ Continue Mission and Business Functions - + - + + @@ -25248,14 +25594,14 @@

Organizations may choose to conduct the contingency planning activities to continue mission and business functions as part of business continuity planning or business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with the contingency.

 - + - +

the continuance of mission and business functions with minimal or no loss of operational continuity is planned for;

 - +

continuity is sustained until full system restoration at primary processing and/or storage sites.

 @@ -25263,7 +25609,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency operations for the system

@@ -25281,7 +25627,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities

organizational personnel with knowledge of requirements for mission and business functions

@@ -25290,7 +25636,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for continuing missions and business functions

 @@ -25300,14 +25646,15 @@ Alternate Processing and Storage Sites - + - + + @@ -25318,14 +25665,14 @@

Organizations may choose to conduct contingency planning activities for alternate processing and storage sites as part of business continuity planning or business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with the contingency.

 - + - +

the transfer of mission and business functions to alternate processing and/or storage sites with minimal or no loss of operational continuity is planned for;

 - +

operational continuity is sustained until full system restoration at primary processing and/or storage sites.

 @@ -25333,7 +25680,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency operations for the system

@@ -25349,7 +25696,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities

organizational personnel with knowledge of requirements for mission and business functions

@@ -25358,7 +25705,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for transfer of essential mission and business functions to alternate processing/storage sites

 @@ -25367,7 +25714,8 @@ Coordinate with External Service Providers - + + @@ -25379,13 +25727,13 @@

When the capability of an organization to carry out its mission and business functions is dependent on external service providers, developing a comprehensive and timely contingency plan may become more challenging. When mission and business functions are dependent on external service providers, organizations coordinate contingency planning activities with the external entities to ensure that the individual plans reflect the overall contingency needs of the organization.

 - +

the contingency plan is coordinated with the contingency plans of external service providers to ensure that contingency requirements can be satisfied.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency operations for the system

@@ -25400,7 +25748,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities

external service providers

@@ -25412,14 +25760,15 @@ Identify Critical Assets - + - + + @@ -25432,13 +25781,13 @@

Organizations may choose to identify critical assets as part of criticality analysis, business continuity planning, or business impact analyses. Organizations identify critical system assets so that additional controls can be employed (beyond the controls routinely implemented) to help ensure that organizational mission and business functions can continue to be conducted during contingency operations. The identification of critical information assets also facilitates the prioritization of organizational resources. Critical system assets include technical and operational aspects. Technical aspects include system components, information technology services, information technology products, and mechanisms. Operational aspects include procedures (i.e., manually executed operations) and personnel (i.e., individuals operating technical controls and/or executing manual procedures). Organizational program protection plans can assist in identifying critical assets. If critical assets are resident within or supported by external service providers, organizations consider implementing CP-2(7) as a control enhancement.

 - +

critical system assets supporting mission and business functions are identified.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency operations for the system

@@ -25450,7 +25799,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities

organizational personnel with knowledge of requirements for mission and business functions

@@ -25463,7 +25812,7 @@ Contingency Training - +

the time period within which to provide contingency training after assuming a contingency role or responsibility is defined;

@@ -25471,7 +25820,7 @@ - +

frequency at which to provide training to system users with a contingency role or responsibility is defined;

@@ -25479,7 +25828,7 @@ - +

frequency at which to review and update contingency training content is defined;

@@ -25487,14 +25836,15 @@ - +

events necessitating review and update of contingency training are defined;

 - + + @@ -25534,35 +25884,35 @@

Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level of detail is included in such training. For example, some individuals may only need to know when and where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are affected; system administrators may require additional training on how to establish systems at alternate processing and storage sites; and organizational officials may receive more specific training on how to conduct mission-essential functions in designated off-site locations and how to establish communications with other governmental entities for purposes of coordination on contingency-related activities. Training for contingency roles or responsibilities reflects the specific continuity requirements in the contingency plan. Events that may precipitate an update to contingency training content include, but are not limited to, contingency plan testing or an actual contingency (lessons learned), assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. At the discretion of the organization, participation in a contingency plan test or exercise, including lessons learned sessions subsequent to the test or exercise, may satisfy contingency plan training requirements.

 - + - + - +

contingency training is provided to system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities within of assuming a contingency role or responsibility;

 - +

contingency training is provided to system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities when required by system changes;

 - +

contingency training is provided to system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities thereafter;

 - + - +

the contingency plan training content is reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the contingency plan training content is reviewed and updated following .

 @@ -25572,7 +25922,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency training

@@ -25586,7 +25936,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning, plan implementation, and training responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -25594,7 +25944,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for contingency training

 @@ -25602,7 +25952,8 @@ Simulated Events - + + @@ -25614,13 +25965,13 @@

The use of simulated events creates an environment for personnel to experience actual threat events, including cyber-attacks that disable websites, ransomware attacks that encrypt organizational data on servers, hurricanes that damage or destroy organizational facilities, or hardware or software failures.

 - +

simulated events are incorporated into contingency training to facilitate effective response by personnel in crisis situations.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency training

@@ -25633,7 +25984,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning, plan implementation, and training responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -25641,7 +25992,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for contingency training

mechanisms for simulating contingency events

@@ -25651,7 +26002,8 @@ Mechanisms Used in Training Environments - + + @@ -25663,13 +26015,13 @@

Operational mechanisms refer to processes that have been established to accomplish an organizational goal or a system that supports a particular organizational mission or business objective. Actual mission and business processes, systems, and/or facilities may be used to generate simulated events and enhance the realism of simulated events during contingency training.

 - +

mechanisms used in operations are employed to provide a more thorough and realistic contingency training environment.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency training

@@ -25682,7 +26034,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning, plan implementation, and training responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -25690,7 +26042,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for contingency training

mechanisms for providing contingency training environments

@@ -25707,28 +26059,29 @@ - +

frequency of testing the contingency plan for the system is defined;

 - +

tests for determining the effectiveness of the contingency plan are defined;

 - +

tests for determining readiness to execute the contingency plan are defined;

 - + + @@ -25764,33 +26117,33 @@

Methods for testing contingency plans to determine the effectiveness of the plans and identify potential weaknesses include checklists, walk-through and tabletop exercises, simulations (parallel or full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Organizations conduct testing based on the requirements in contingency plans and include a determination of the effects on organizational operations, assets, and individuals due to contingency operations. Organizations have flexibility and discretion in the breadth, depth, and timelines of corrective actions.

 - + - + - +

the contingency plan for the system is tested ;

 - +

are used to determine the effectiveness of the plan;

 - +

are used to determine the readiness to execute the plan;

 - +

the contingency plan test results are reviewed;

 - +

corrective actions are initiated, if needed.

 @@ -25798,7 +26151,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency plan testing

@@ -25811,7 +26164,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for contingency plan testing, reviewing, or responding to contingency plan tests

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -25819,7 +26172,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for contingency plan testing

mechanisms supporting the contingency plan and/or contingency plan testing

@@ -25828,7 +26181,8 @@ Coordinate with Related Plans - + + @@ -25842,13 +26196,13 @@

Plans related to contingency planning for organizational systems include Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans. Coordination of contingency plan testing does not require organizations to create organizational elements to handle related plans or to align such elements with specific plans. However, it does require that if such organizational elements are responsible for related plans, organizations coordinate with those elements.

 - +

contingency plan testing is coordinated with organizational elements responsible for related plans.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

incident response policy

@@ -25868,7 +26222,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan testing responsibilities

personnel with responsibilities for related plans

@@ -25879,7 +26233,8 @@ Alternate Processing Site - + + @@ -25900,14 +26255,14 @@

Conditions at the alternate processing site may be significantly different than the conditions at the primary site. Having the opportunity to visit the alternate site and experience the actual capabilities available at the site can provide valuable information on potential vulnerabilities that could affect essential organizational mission and business functions. The on-site visit can also provide an opportunity to refine the contingency plan to address the vulnerabilities discovered during testing.

 - + - +

the contingency plan is tested at the alternate processing site to familiarize contingency personnel with the facility and available resources;

 - +

the contingency plan is tested at the alternate processing site to evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support contingency operations.

 @@ -25915,7 +26270,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency plan testing

@@ -25930,7 +26285,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -25938,7 +26293,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for contingency plan testing

mechanisms supporting the contingency plan and/or contingency plan testing

@@ -25949,14 +26304,15 @@ Automated Testing - +

automated mechanisms for contingency plan testing are defined;

 - + + @@ -25968,13 +26324,13 @@

Automated mechanisms facilitate thorough and effective testing of contingency plans by providing more complete coverage of contingency issues, selecting more realistic test scenarios and environments, and effectively stressing the system and supported mission and business functions.

 - +

the contingency plan is tested using .

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing contingency plan testing

@@ -25988,7 +26344,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan testing responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -25996,7 +26352,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for contingency plan testing

automated mechanisms supporting contingency plan testing

@@ -26006,7 +26362,8 @@ Full Recovery and Reconstitution - + + @@ -26020,14 +26377,14 @@

Recovery is executing contingency plan activities to restore organizational mission and business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery and includes activities for returning systems to fully operational states. Organizations establish a known state for systems that includes system state information for hardware, software programs, and data. Preserving system state information facilitates system restart and return to the operational mode of organizations with less disruption of mission and business processes.

 - + - +

a full recovery of the system to a known state is included as part of contingency plan testing;

 - +

a full reconstitution of the system to a known state is included as part of contingency plan testing.

 @@ -26035,7 +26392,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system recovery and reconstitution

@@ -26048,7 +26405,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan testing responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery and reconstitution responsibilities

@@ -26057,7 +26414,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for contingency plan testing

mechanisms supporting contingency plan testing

@@ -26069,7 +26426,7 @@ Self-challenge - +

mechanisms employed to disrupt and adversely affect the system or system component are defined;

@@ -26077,14 +26434,15 @@ - +

system or system component on which to apply disruption mechanisms are defined;

 - + + @@ -26097,13 +26455,13 @@

Often, the best method of assessing system resilience is to disrupt the system in some manner. The mechanisms used by the organization could disrupt system functions or system services in many ways, including terminating or disabling critical system components, changing the configuration of system components, degrading critical functionality (e.g., restricting network bandwidth), or altering privileges. Automated, on-going, and simulated cyber-attacks and service disruptions can reveal unexpected functional dependencies and help the organization determine its ability to ensure resilience in the face of an actual cyber-attack.

 - +

are employed to disrupt and adversely affect the .

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system recovery and reconstitution

@@ -26116,7 +26474,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan testing responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery and reconstitution responsibilities

@@ -26125,7 +26483,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for contingency plan testing

mechanisms supporting contingency plan testing

@@ -26136,7 +26494,8 @@ Contingency Plan Update - + + @@ -26144,7 +26503,8 @@ Alternate Storage Site - + + @@ -26172,23 +26532,23 @@

Alternate storage sites are geographically distinct from primary storage sites and maintain duplicate copies of information and data if the primary storage site is not available. Similarly, alternate processing sites provide processing capability if the primary processing site is not available. Geographically distributed architectures that support contingency requirements may be considered alternate storage sites. Items covered by alternate storage site agreements include environmental conditions at the alternate sites, access rules for systems and facilities, physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination of delivery and retrieval of backup media. Alternate storage sites reflect the requirements in contingency plans so that organizations can maintain essential mission and business functions despite compromise, failure, or disruption in organizational systems.

 - + - + - +

an alternate storage site is established;

 - +

establishment of the alternate storage site includes necessary agreements to permit the storage and retrieval of system backup information;

 - +

the alternate storage site provides controls equivalent to that of the primary site.

 @@ -26196,7 +26556,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate storage sites

@@ -26209,7 +26569,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan alternate storage site responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26218,7 +26578,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for storing and retrieving system backup information at the alternate storage site

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the storage and retrieval of system backup information at the alternate storage site

@@ -26227,7 +26587,8 @@ Separation from Primary Site - + + @@ -26239,13 +26600,13 @@

Threats that affect alternate storage sites are defined in organizational risk assessments and include natural disasters, structural failures, hostile attacks, and errors of omission or commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate storage sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For threats such as hostile attacks, the degree of separation between sites is less relevant.

 - +

an alternate storage site that is sufficiently separated from the primary storage site is identified to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate storage sites

@@ -26259,7 +26620,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan alternate storage site responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26270,7 +26631,8 @@ Recovery Time and Recovery Point Objectives - + + @@ -26281,14 +26643,14 @@

Organizations establish recovery time and recovery point objectives as part of contingency planning. Configuration of the alternate storage site includes physical facilities and the systems supporting recovery operations that ensure accessibility and correct execution.

 - + - +

the alternate storage site is configured to facilitate recovery operations in accordance with recovery time objectives;

 - +

the alternate storage site is configured to facilitate recovery operations in accordance with recovery point objectives.

 @@ -26296,7 +26658,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate storage sites

@@ -26310,7 +26672,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan testing responsibilities

organizational personnel with responsibilities for testing related plans

@@ -26319,7 +26681,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for contingency plan testing

mechanisms supporting recovery time and point objectives

@@ -26329,7 +26691,8 @@ Accessibility - + + @@ -26341,14 +26704,14 @@

Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Explicit mitigation actions include duplicating backup information at other alternate storage sites if access problems occur at originally designated alternate sites or planning for physical access to retrieve backup information if electronic accessibility to the alternate site is disrupted.

 - + - +

potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster are identified;

 - +

explicit mitigation actions to address identified accessibility problems are outlined.

 @@ -26356,7 +26719,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate storage sites

@@ -26371,7 +26734,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan alternate storage site responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26384,7 +26747,7 @@ Alternate Processing Site - +

system operations for essential mission and business functions are defined;

@@ -26393,14 +26756,15 @@ - +

time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives is defined;

 - + + @@ -26434,28 +26798,28 @@

Alternate processing sites are geographically distinct from primary processing sites and provide processing capability if the primary processing site is not available. The alternate processing capability may be addressed using a physical processing site or other alternatives, such as failover to a cloud-based service provider or other internally or externally provided processing service. Geographically distributed architectures that support contingency requirements may also be considered alternate processing sites. Controls that are covered by alternate processing site agreements include the environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical and environmental protection requirements, and the coordination for the transfer and assignment of personnel. Requirements are allocated to alternate processing sites that reflect the requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential mission and business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational systems.

 - + - +

an alternate processing site, including necessary agreements to permit the transfer and resumption of for essential mission and business functions, is established within when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable;

 - + - +

the equipment and supplies required to transfer operations are made available at the alternate processing site or if contracts are in place to support delivery to the site within for transfer;

 - +

the equipment and supplies required to resume operations are made available at the alternate processing site or if contracts are in place to support delivery to the site within for resumption;

 - +

controls provided at the alternate processing site are equivalent to those at the primary site.

 @@ -26463,7 +26827,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate processing sites

@@ -26479,7 +26843,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for contingency planning and/or alternate site arrangements

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -26487,7 +26851,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for recovery at the alternate site

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing recovery at the alternate processing site

@@ -26496,7 +26860,8 @@ Separation from Primary Site - + + @@ -26508,13 +26873,13 @@

Threats that affect alternate processing sites are defined in organizational assessments of risk and include natural disasters, structural failures, hostile attacks, and errors of omission or commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate processing sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For threats such as hostile attacks, the degree of separation between sites is less relevant.

 - +

an alternate processing site that is sufficiently separated from the primary processing site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats is identified.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate processing sites

@@ -26528,7 +26893,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan alternate processing site responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26539,7 +26904,8 @@ Accessibility - + + @@ -26551,14 +26917,14 @@

Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk.

 - + - +

potential accessibility problems to alternate processing sites in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster are identified;

 - +

explicit mitigation actions to address identified accessibility problems are outlined.

 @@ -26566,7 +26932,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate processing sites

@@ -26580,7 +26946,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan alternate processing site responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26591,7 +26957,8 @@ Priority of Service - + + @@ -26602,13 +26969,13 @@

Priority of service agreements refer to negotiated agreements with service providers that ensure that organizations receive priority treatment consistent with their availability requirements and the availability of information resources for logical alternate processing and/or at the physical alternate processing site. Organizations establish recovery time objectives as part of contingency planning.

 - +

alternate processing site agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions in accordance with availability requirements (including recovery time objectives) are developed.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate processing sites

@@ -26621,7 +26988,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan alternate processing site responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26633,7 +27000,8 @@ Preparation for Use - + + @@ -26647,13 +27015,13 @@

Site preparation includes establishing configuration settings for systems at the alternate processing site consistent with the requirements for such settings at the primary site and ensuring that essential supplies and logistical considerations are in place.

 - +

the alternate processing site is prepared so that the site can serve as the operational site supporting essential mission and business functions.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate processing sites

@@ -26667,7 +27035,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan alternate processing site responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26676,7 +27044,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing recovery at the alternate processing site

 @@ -26685,7 +27053,8 @@ Equivalent Information Security Safeguards - + + @@ -26693,7 +27062,8 @@ Inability to Return to Primary Site - + + @@ -26704,14 +27074,14 @@

There may be situations that preclude an organization from returning to the primary processing site such as if a natural disaster (e.g., flood or a hurricane) damaged or destroyed a facility and it was determined that rebuilding in the same location was not prudent.

 - + - +

circumstances that preclude returning to the primary processing site are planned for;

 - +

circumstances that preclude returning to the primary processing site are prepared for.

 @@ -26719,7 +27089,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate processing sites

@@ -26733,7 +27103,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system reconstitution responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -26745,7 +27115,7 @@ Telecommunications Services - +

system operations to be resumed for essential mission and business functions are defined;

@@ -26753,14 +27123,15 @@ - +

time period within which to resume essential mission and business functions when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable is defined;

 - + + @@ -26776,13 +27147,13 @@

Telecommunications services (for data and voice) for primary and alternate processing and storage sites are in scope for CP-8 . Alternate telecommunications services reflect the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential mission and business functions despite the loss of primary telecommunications services. Organizations may specify different time periods for primary or alternate sites. Alternate telecommunications services include additional organizational or commercial ground-based circuits or lines, network-based approaches to telecommunications, or the use of satellites. Organizations consider factors such as availability, quality of service, and access when entering into alternate telecommunications agreements.

 - +

alternate telecommunications services, including necessary agreements to permit the resumption of , are established for essential mission and business functions within when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate telecommunications services

@@ -26794,7 +27165,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan telecommunications responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26805,7 +27176,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting telecommunications

 @@ -26813,7 +27184,8 @@ Priority of Service Provisions - + + @@ -26831,23 +27203,23 @@

Organizations consider the potential mission or business impact in situations where telecommunications service providers are servicing other organizations with similar priority of service provisions. Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) is a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) program that directs telecommunications service providers (e.g., wireline and wireless phone companies) to give preferential treatment to users enrolled in the program when they need to add new lines or have their lines restored following a disruption of service, regardless of the cause. The FCC sets the rules and policies for the TSP program, and the Department of Homeland Security manages the TSP program. The TSP program is always in effect and not contingent on a major disaster or attack taking place. Federal sponsorship is required to enroll in the TSP program.

 - + - + - +

primary telecommunications service agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions in accordance with availability requirements (including recovery time objectives) are developed;

 - +

alternate telecommunications service agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions in accordance with availability requirements (including recovery time objectives) are developed;

 - +

Telecommunications Service Priority is requested for all telecommunications services used for national security emergency preparedness if the primary and/or alternate telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier.

 @@ -26855,7 +27227,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing primary and alternate telecommunications services

@@ -26868,7 +27240,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan telecommunications responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26878,7 +27250,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting telecommunications

 @@ -26887,7 +27259,8 @@ Single Points of Failure - + + @@ -26898,13 +27271,13 @@

In certain circumstances, telecommunications service providers or services may share the same physical lines, which increases the vulnerability of a single failure point. It is important to have provider transparency for the actual physical transmission capability for telecommunication services.

 - +

alternate telecommunications services to reduce the likelihood of sharing a single point of failure with primary telecommunications services are obtained.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing primary and alternate telecommunications services

@@ -26916,7 +27289,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan telecommunications responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26928,7 +27301,8 @@ Separation of Primary and Alternate Providers - + + @@ -26939,13 +27313,13 @@

Threats that affect telecommunications services are defined in organizational assessments of risk and include natural disasters, structural failures, cyber or physical attacks, and errors of omission or commission. Organizations can reduce common susceptibilities by minimizing shared infrastructure among telecommunications service providers and achieving sufficient geographic separation between services. Organizations may consider using a single service provider in situations where the service provider can provide alternate telecommunications services that meet the separation needs addressed in the risk assessment.

 - +

alternate telecommunications services from providers that are separated from primary service providers are obtained to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing primary and alternate telecommunications services

@@ -26958,7 +27332,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency plan telecommunications responsibilities

organizational personnel with system recovery responsibilities

@@ -26975,21 +27349,22 @@ - +

frequency at which to obtain evidence of contingency testing by providers is defined;

 - +

frequency at which to obtain evidence of contingency training by providers is defined;

 - + + @@ -27013,35 +27388,35 @@

Reviews of provider contingency plans consider the proprietary nature of such plans. In some situations, a summary of provider contingency plans may be sufficient evidence for organizations to satisfy the review requirement. Telecommunications service providers may also participate in ongoing disaster recovery exercises in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and state and local governments. Organizations may use these types of activities to satisfy evidentiary requirements related to service provider contingency plan reviews, testing, and training.

 - + - + - +

primary telecommunications service providers are required to have contingency plans;

 - +

alternate telecommunications service providers are required to have contingency plans;

 - +

provider contingency plans are reviewed to ensure that the plans meet organizational contingency requirements;

 - + - +

evidence of contingency testing by providers is obtained .

 - +

evidence of contingency training by providers is obtained .

 @@ -27051,7 +27426,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing primary and alternate telecommunications services

@@ -27065,7 +27440,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning, plan implementation, and testing responsibilities

primary and alternate telecommunications service providers

@@ -27078,14 +27453,15 @@ Alternate Telecommunication Service Testing - +

frequency at which alternate telecommunications services are tested is defined;

 - + + @@ -27097,13 +27473,13 @@

Alternate telecommunications services testing is arranged through contractual agreements with service providers. The testing may occur in parallel with normal operations to ensure that there is no degradation in organizational missions or functions.

 - +

alternate telecommunications services are tested .

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate telecommunications services

@@ -27116,7 +27492,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning, plan implementation, and testing responsibilities

alternate telecommunications service providers

@@ -27125,7 +27501,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting testing alternate telecommunications services

 @@ -27136,7 +27512,7 @@ System Backup - +

system components for which to conduct backups of user-level information is defined;

@@ -27145,7 +27521,7 @@ - +

frequency at which to conduct backups of user-level information consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives is defined;

@@ -27154,7 +27530,7 @@ - +

frequency at which to conduct backups of system-level information consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives is defined;

@@ -27163,14 +27539,15 @@ - +

frequency at which to conduct backups of system documentation consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives is defined;

 - + + @@ -27210,36 +27587,36 @@

System-level information includes system state information, operating system software, middleware, application software, and licenses. User-level information includes information other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed to protect the integrity of system backups include digital signatures and cryptographic hashes. Protection of system backup information while in transit is addressed by MP-5 and SC-8 . System backups reflect the requirements in contingency plans as well as other organizational requirements for backing up information. Organizations may be subject to laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies with requirements regarding specific categories of information (e.g., personal health information). Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding such requirements.

 - + - +

backups of user-level information contained in are conducted ;

 - +

backups of system-level information contained in the system are conducted ;

 - +

backups of system documentation, including security- and privacy-related documentation are conducted ;

 - + - +

the confidentiality of backup information is protected;

 - +

the integrity of backup information is protected;

 - +

the availability of backup information is protected.

 @@ -27249,7 +27626,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system backup

@@ -27263,7 +27640,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system backup responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -27271,7 +27648,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for conducting system backups

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system backups

@@ -27285,21 +27662,22 @@ - +

frequency at which to test backup information for media reliability is defined;

 - +

frequency at which to test backup information for information integrity is defined;

 - + + @@ -27311,14 +27689,14 @@

Organizations need assurance that backup information can be reliably retrieved. Reliability pertains to the systems and system components where the backup information is stored, the operations used to retrieve the information, and the integrity of the information being retrieved. Independent and specialized tests can be used for each of the aspects of reliability. For example, decrypting and transporting (or transmitting) a random sample of backup files from the alternate storage or backup site and comparing the information to the same information at the primary processing site can provide such assurance.

 - + - +

backup information is tested to verify media reliability;

 - +

backup information is tested to verify information integrity.

 @@ -27326,7 +27704,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system backup

@@ -27340,7 +27718,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system backup responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -27348,7 +27726,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for conducting system backups

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system backups

@@ -27358,7 +27736,8 @@ Test Restoration Using Sampling - + + @@ -27370,13 +27749,13 @@

Organizations need assurance that system functions can be restored correctly and can support established organizational missions. To ensure that the selected system functions are thoroughly exercised during contingency plan testing, a sample of backup information is retrieved to determine whether the functions are operating as intended. Organizations can determine the sample size for the functions and backup information based on the level of assurance needed.

 - +

a sample of backup information in the restoration of selected system functions is used as part of contingency plan testing.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system backup

@@ -27390,7 +27769,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system backup responsibilities

organizational personnel with contingency planning/contingency plan testing responsibilities

@@ -27399,7 +27778,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for conducting system backups

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system backups

@@ -27410,14 +27789,15 @@ Separate Storage for Critical Information - +

critical system software and other security-related information backups to be stored in a separate facility are defined;

 - + + @@ -27431,13 +27811,13 @@

Separate storage for critical information applies to all critical information regardless of the type of backup storage media. Critical system software includes operating systems, middleware, cryptographic key management systems, and intrusion detection systems. Security-related information includes inventories of system hardware, software, and firmware components. Alternate storage sites, including geographically distributed architectures, serve as separate storage facilities for organizations. Organizations may provide separate storage by implementing automated backup processes at alternative storage sites (e.g., data centers). The General Services Administration (GSA) establishes standards and specifications for security and fire rated containers.

 - +

backup copies of are stored in a separate facility or in a fire rated container that is not collocated with the operational system.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system backup

@@ -27451,7 +27831,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities

organizational personnel with system backup responsibilities

@@ -27462,7 +27842,8 @@ Protection from Unauthorized Modification - + + @@ -27475,21 +27856,22 @@ - +

time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives is defined;

 - +

transfer rate consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives is defined;

 - + + @@ -27504,14 +27886,14 @@

System backup information can be transferred to alternate storage sites either electronically or by the physical shipment of storage media.

 - + - +

system backup information is transferred to the alternate storage site for ;

 - +

system backup information is transferred to the alternate storage site .

 @@ -27519,7 +27901,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system backup

@@ -27533,7 +27915,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system backup responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -27541,7 +27923,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for transferring system backups to the alternate storage site

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system backups

@@ -27552,7 +27934,8 @@ Redundant Secondary System - + + @@ -27564,14 +27947,14 @@

The effect of system backup can be achieved by maintaining a redundant secondary system that mirrors the primary system, including the replication of information. If this type of redundancy is in place and there is sufficient geographic separation between the two systems, the secondary system can also serve as the alternate processing site.

 - + - +

system backup is conducted by maintaining a redundant secondary system that is not collocated with the primary system;

 - +

system backup is conducted by maintaining a redundant secondary system that can be activated without loss of information or disruption to operations.

 @@ -27579,7 +27962,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system backup

@@ -27595,7 +27978,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system backup responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -27604,7 +27987,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for maintaining redundant secondary systems

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system backups

@@ -27616,14 +27999,15 @@ Dual Authorization for Deletion or Destruction - +

backup information for which to enforce dual authorization in order to delete or destroy is defined;

 - + + @@ -27637,13 +28021,13 @@

Dual authorization ensures that deletion or destruction of backup information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals carry out the task. Individuals deleting or destroying backup information possess the skills or expertise to determine if the proposed deletion or destruction of information reflects organizational policies and procedures. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control. To reduce the risk of collusion, organizations consider rotating dual authorization duties to other individuals.

 - +

dual authorization for the deletion or destruction of is enforced.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system backup

@@ -27658,7 +28042,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system backup responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -27666,7 +28050,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing dual authorization

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the deletion/destruction of backup information

@@ -27677,14 +28061,15 @@ Cryptographic Protection - +

backup information to protect against unauthorized disclosure and modification is defined;

 - + + @@ -27698,13 +28083,13 @@

The selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect the confidentiality and integrity of backup information. The strength of mechanisms selected is commensurate with the security category or classification of the information. Cryptographic protection applies to system backup information in storage at both primary and alternate locations. Organizations that implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest also consider cryptographic key management solutions.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms are implemented to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of .

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system backup

@@ -27717,7 +28102,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system backup responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -27725,7 +28110,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing cryptographic protection of backup information

 @@ -27740,21 +28125,22 @@ - +

time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives for the recovery of the system is determined;

 - +

time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives for the reconstitution of the system is determined;

 - + + @@ -27774,14 +28160,14 @@

Recovery is executing contingency plan activities to restore organizational mission and business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery and includes activities for returning systems to fully operational states. Recovery and reconstitution operations reflect mission and business priorities; recovery point, recovery time, and reconstitution objectives; and organizational metrics consistent with contingency plan requirements. Reconstitution includes the deactivation of interim system capabilities that may have been needed during recovery operations. Reconstitution also includes assessments of fully restored system capabilities, reestablishment of continuous monitoring activities, system reauthorization (if required), and activities to prepare the system and organization for future disruptions, breaches, compromises, or failures. Recovery and reconstitution capabilities can include automated mechanisms and manual procedures. Organizations establish recovery time and recovery point objectives as part of contingency planning.

 - + - +

the recovery of the system to a known state is provided within after a disruption, compromise, or failure;

 - +

a reconstitution of the system to a known state is provided within after a disruption, compromise, or failure.

 @@ -27789,7 +28175,7 @@ - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system backup

@@ -27805,7 +28191,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning, recovery, and/or reconstitution responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -27813,7 +28199,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes implementing system recovery and reconstitution operations

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system recovery and reconstitution operations

@@ -27822,7 +28208,8 @@ Contingency Plan Testing - + + @@ -27830,7 +28217,8 @@ Transaction Recovery - + + @@ -27841,13 +28229,13 @@

Transaction-based systems include database management systems and transaction processing systems. Mechanisms supporting transaction recovery include transaction rollback and transaction journaling.

 - +

transaction recovery is implemented for systems that are transaction-based.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system recovery and reconstitution

@@ -27864,7 +28252,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibility for transaction recovery

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -27872,7 +28260,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing transaction recovery capability

 @@ -27881,7 +28269,8 @@ Compensating Security Controls - + + @@ -27892,14 +28281,15 @@ Restore Within Time Period - +

restoration time period within which to restore system components to a known, operational state is defined;

 - + + @@ -27912,13 +28302,13 @@

Restoration of system components includes reimaging, which restores the components to known, operational states.

 - +

the capability to restore system components within from configuration-controlled and integrity-protected information representing a known, operational state for the components is provided.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system recovery and reconstitution

@@ -27934,7 +28324,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system recovery and reconstitution responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -27942,7 +28332,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the recovery/reconstitution of system information

 @@ -27951,7 +28341,8 @@ Failover Capability - + + @@ -27959,7 +28350,8 @@ Component Protection - + + @@ -27976,13 +28368,13 @@

Protection of system recovery and reconstitution components (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software) includes physical and technical controls. Backup and restoration components used for recovery and reconstitution include router tables, compilers, and other system software.

 - +

system components used for recovery and reconstitution are protected.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing system recovery and reconstitution

@@ -27999,7 +28391,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system recovery and reconstitution responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -28007,7 +28399,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for protecting backup and restoration of hardware, firmware, and software

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing protection of backups and restoration of hardware, firmware, and software

@@ -28019,14 +28411,15 @@ Alternate Communications Protocols - +

alternative communications protocols in support of maintaining continuity of operations are defined;

 - + + @@ -28039,13 +28432,13 @@

Contingency plans and the contingency training or testing associated with those plans incorporate an alternate communications protocol capability as part of establishing resilience in organizational systems. Switching communications protocols may affect software applications and operational aspects of systems. Organizations assess the potential side effects of introducing alternate communications protocols prior to implementation.

 - +

the capability to employ are provided in support of maintaining continuity of operations.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternative communications protocols

@@ -28060,7 +28453,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with contingency planning and plan implementation responsibilities

organizational personnel with continuity of operations planning and plan implementation responsibilities

@@ -28071,7 +28464,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms employing alternative communications protocols

 @@ -28082,7 +28475,7 @@ - +

restrictions for safe mode of operation are defined;

@@ -28090,14 +28483,15 @@ - +

conditions detected to enter a safe mode of operation are defined;

 - + + @@ -28113,13 +28507,13 @@

For systems that support critical mission and business functions—including military operations, civilian space operations, nuclear power plant operations, and air traffic control operations (especially real-time operational environments)—organizations can identify certain conditions under which those systems revert to a predefined safe mode of operation. The safe mode of operation, which can be activated either automatically or manually, restricts the operations that systems can execute when those conditions are encountered. Restriction includes allowing only selected functions to execute that can be carried out under limited power or with reduced communications bandwidth.

 - +

a safe mode of operation is entered with when are detected.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing safe mode of operation for the system

@@ -28138,7 +28532,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operation responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -28148,7 +28542,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing safe mode of operation

 @@ -28158,7 +28552,7 @@ Alternative Security Mechanisms - +

alternative or supplemental security mechanisms are defined;

@@ -28166,14 +28560,15 @@ - +

security functions are defined;

 - + + @@ -28187,13 +28582,13 @@

Use of alternative security mechanisms supports system resiliency, contingency planning, and continuity of operations. To ensure mission and business continuity, organizations can implement alternative or supplemental security mechanisms. The mechanisms may be less effective than the primary mechanisms. However, having the capability to readily employ alternative or supplemental mechanisms enhances mission and business continuity that might otherwise be adversely impacted if operations had to be curtailed until the primary means of implementing the functions was restored. Given the cost and level of effort required to provide such alternative capabilities, the alternative or supplemental mechanisms are only applied to critical security capabilities provided by systems, system components, or system services. For example, an organization may issue one-time pads to senior executives, officials, and system administrators if multi-factor tokens—the standard means for achieving secure authentication— are compromised.

 - +

are employed for satisfying when the primary means of implementing the security function is unavailable or compromised.

 - +

Contingency planning policy

procedures addressing alternate security mechanisms

@@ -28209,7 +28604,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operation responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -28217,7 +28612,7 @@ - +

system capability implementing alternative security mechanisms

 @@ -28234,14 +28629,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the identification and authentication policy is to be disseminated are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the identification and authentication procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -28249,7 +28644,7 @@ - + local network @@ -28773,7 +29175,7 @@ - + privileged accounts non-privileged accounts - + + @@ -28884,13 +29289,13 @@

Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve successful authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replay-resistant techniques include protocols that use nonces or challenges such as time synchronous or cryptographic authenticators.

 - +

replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for access to are implemented.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -28904,7 +29309,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities

organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

@@ -28915,7 +29320,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capabilities

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing replay-resistant authentication mechanisms

@@ -28925,7 +29330,8 @@ Network Access to Non-privileged Accounts — Replay Resistant - + + @@ -28934,14 +29340,15 @@ Single Sign-on - +

system accounts and services for which a single sign-on capability must be provided are defined;

 - + + @@ -28952,13 +29359,13 @@

Single sign-on enables users to log in once and gain access to multiple system resources. Organizations consider the operational efficiencies provided by single sign-on capabilities with the risk introduced by allowing access to multiple systems via a single authentication event. Single sign-on can present opportunities to improve system security, for example by providing the ability to add multi-factor authentication for applications and systems (existing and new) that may not be able to natively support multi-factor authentication.

 - +

a single sign-on capability is provided for .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -28973,7 +29380,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities

organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

@@ -28984,7 +29391,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capabilities

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing single sign-on capability for system accounts and services

@@ -28994,7 +29401,8 @@ Remote Access — Separate Device - + + @@ -29002,7 +29410,8 @@ Acceptance of PIV Credentials - + + @@ -29013,13 +29422,13 @@

Acceptance of Personal Identity Verification (PIV)-compliant credentials applies to organizations implementing logical access control and physical access control systems. PIV-compliant credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. The adequacy and reliability of PIV card issuers are authorized using SP 800-79-2 . Acceptance of PIV-compliant credentials includes derived PIV credentials, the use of which is addressed in SP 800-166 . The DOD Common Access Card (CAC) is an example of a PIV credential.

 - +

Personal Identity Verification-compliant credentials are accepted and electronically verified.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29035,7 +29444,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities

organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

@@ -29046,7 +29455,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing acceptance and verification of PIV credentials

 @@ -29056,7 +29465,7 @@ Out-of-band Authentication - +

out-of-band authentication mechanisms to be implemented are defined;

@@ -29064,14 +29473,15 @@ - +

conditions under which out-of-band authentication is to be implemented are defined;

 - + + @@ -29085,13 +29495,13 @@

Out-of-band authentication refers to the use of two separate communication paths to identify and authenticate users or devices to an information system. The first path (i.e., the in-band path) is used to identify and authenticate users or devices and is generally the path through which information flows. The second path (i.e., the out-of-band path) is used to independently verify the authentication and/or requested action. For example, a user authenticates via a notebook computer to a remote server to which the user desires access and requests some action of the server via that communication path. Subsequently, the server contacts the user via the user’s cell phone to verify that the requested action originated from the user. The user may confirm the intended action to an individual on the telephone or provide an authentication code via the telephone. Out-of-band authentication can be used to mitigate actual or suspected man-in the-middle attacks. The conditions or criteria for activation include suspicious activities, new threat indicators, elevated threat levels, or the impact or classification level of information in requested transactions.

 - +

mechanisms are implemented under .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29105,7 +29515,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities

organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

@@ -29116,7 +29526,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing out-of-band authentication capability

 @@ -29127,7 +29537,7 @@ Device Identification and Authentication - +

devices and/or types of devices to be uniquely identified and authenticated before establishing a connection are defined;

@@ -29135,7 +29545,7 @@ - + - + + @@ -29165,13 +29576,13 @@

Devices that require unique device-to-device identification and authentication are defined by type, device, or a combination of type and device. Organization-defined device types include devices that are not owned by the organization. Systems use shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC], Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP] addresses) for device identification or organizational authentication solutions (e.g., Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol [EAP], RADIUS server with EAP-Transport Layer Security [TLS] authentication, Kerberos) to identify and authenticate devices on local and wide area networks. Organizations determine the required strength of authentication mechanisms based on the security categories of systems and mission or business requirements. Because of the challenges of implementing device authentication on a large scale, organizations can restrict the application of the control to a limited number/type of devices based on mission or business needs.

 - +

are uniquely identified and authenticated before establishing a connection.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29185,7 +29596,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with operational responsibilities for device identification and authentication

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29195,7 +29606,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing device identification and authentication capabilities

 @@ -29204,7 +29615,7 @@ Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication - +

devices and/or types of devices requiring use of cryptographically based, bidirectional authentication to authenticate before establishing one or more connections are defined;

@@ -29212,7 +29623,7 @@ - + - + + @@ -29234,13 +29646,13 @@

A local connection is a connection with a device that communicates without the use of a network. A network connection is a connection with a device that communicates through a network. A remote connection is a connection with a device that communicates through an external network. Bidirectional authentication provides stronger protection to validate the identity of other devices for connections that are of greater risk.

 - +

are authenticated before establishing connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29254,7 +29666,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with operational responsibilities for device identification and authentication

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29264,7 +29676,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing device authentication capability

cryptographically based bidirectional authentication mechanisms

@@ -29274,7 +29686,8 @@ Cryptographic Bidirectional Network Authentication - + + @@ -29287,21 +29700,22 @@ - +

lease information to be employed to standardize dynamic address allocation for devices is defined;

 - +

lease duration to be employed to standardize dynamic address allocation for devices is defined;

 - + + @@ -29320,23 +29734,23 @@

The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is an example of a means by which clients can dynamically receive network address assignments.

 - + - + - +

dynamic address allocation lease information assigned to devices where addresses are allocated dynamically are standardized in accordance with ;

 - +

dynamic address allocation lease duration assigned to devices where addresses are allocated dynamically are standardized in accordance with ;

 - +

lease information is audited when assigned to a device.

 @@ -29344,7 +29758,7 @@ - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29359,7 +29773,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with operational responsibilities for device identification and authentication

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29369,7 +29783,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing device identification and authentication capabilities

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing dynamic address allocation

@@ -29381,14 +29795,15 @@ Device Attestation - +

configuration management process to be employed to handle device identification and authentication based on attestation is defined;

 - + + @@ -29402,13 +29817,13 @@

Device attestation refers to the identification and authentication of a device based on its configuration and known operating state. Device attestation can be determined via a cryptographic hash of the device. If device attestation is the means of identification and authentication, then it is important that patches and updates to the device are handled via a configuration management process such that the patches and updates are done securely and do not disrupt identification and authentication to other devices.

 - +

device identification and authentication are handled based on attestation by .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29424,7 +29839,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with operational responsibilities for device identification and authentication

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29433,7 +29848,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing device identification and authentication capabilities

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing configuration management

@@ -29446,7 +29861,7 @@ Identifier Management - +

personnel or roles from whom authorization must be received to assign an identifier are defined;

@@ -29454,14 +29869,15 @@ - +

a time period for preventing reuse of identifiers is defined;

 - + + @@ -29509,24 +29925,24 @@

Common device identifiers include Media Access Control (MAC) addresses, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. The management of individual identifiers is not applicable to shared system accounts. Typically, individual identifiers are the usernames of the system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the account management activities of AC-2 use account names provided by IA-4 . Identifier management also addresses individual identifiers not necessarily associated with system accounts. Preventing the reuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of previously used individual, group, role, service, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups, roles, services, or devices.

 - + - +

system identifiers are managed by receiving authorization from to assign to an individual, group, role, or device identifier;

 - +

system identifiers are managed by selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, service, or device;

 - +

system identifiers are managed by assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device;

 - +

system identifiers are managed by preventing reuse of identifiers for .

 @@ -29534,7 +29950,7 @@ - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing identifier management

@@ -29549,7 +29965,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29559,7 +29975,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management

 @@ -29567,7 +29983,8 @@ Prohibit Account Identifiers as Public Identifiers - + + @@ -29580,13 +29997,13 @@

Prohibiting account identifiers as public identifiers applies to any publicly disclosed account identifier used for communication such as, electronic mail and instant messaging. Prohibiting the use of systems account identifiers that are the same as some public identifier, such as the individual identifier section of an electronic mail address, makes it more difficult for adversaries to guess user identifiers. Prohibiting account identifiers as public identifiers without the implementation of other supporting controls only complicates guessing of identifiers. Additional protections are required for authenticators and credentials to protect the account.

 - +

the use of system account identifiers that are the same as public identifiers is prohibited for individual accounts.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29600,7 +30017,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29609,7 +30026,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management

 @@ -29618,7 +30035,8 @@ Supervisor Authorization - + + @@ -29626,7 +30044,8 @@ Multiple Forms of Certification - + + @@ -29636,14 +30055,15 @@ - +

characteristics used to identify individual status is defined;

 - + + @@ -29654,13 +30074,13 @@

Characteristics that identify the status of individuals include contractors, foreign nationals, and non-organizational users. Identifying the status of individuals by these characteristics provides additional information about the people with whom organizational personnel are communicating. For example, it might be useful for a government employee to know that one of the individuals on an email message is a contractor.

 - +

individual identifiers are managed by uniquely identifying each individual as .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29672,7 +30092,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29681,7 +30101,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management

 @@ -29691,14 +30111,15 @@ Dynamic Management - +

a dynamic identifier policy for managing individual identifiers is defined;

 - + + @@ -29710,13 +30131,13 @@

In contrast to conventional approaches to identification that presume static accounts for preregistered users, many distributed systems establish identifiers at runtime for entities that were previously unknown. When identifiers are established at runtime for previously unknown entities, organizations can anticipate and provision for the dynamic establishment of identifiers. Pre-established trust relationships and mechanisms with appropriate authorities to validate credentials and related identifiers are essential.

 - +

individual identifiers are dynamically managed in accordance with .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29730,7 +30151,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29740,7 +30161,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing dynamic identifier management

 @@ -29750,14 +30171,15 @@ Cross-organization Management - +

external organizations with whom to coordinate the cross-organization management of identifiers are defined;

 - + + @@ -29771,13 +30193,13 @@

Cross-organization identifier management provides the capability to identify individuals, groups, roles, or devices when conducting cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of information.

 - +

cross-organization management of identifiers is coordinated with .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing identifier management

@@ -29788,7 +30210,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29796,7 +30218,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management

 @@ -29805,7 +30227,8 @@ In-person Registration - + + @@ -29813,7 +30236,8 @@ Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifiers - + + @@ -29825,13 +30249,13 @@

A pairwise pseudonymous identifier is an opaque unguessable subscriber identifier generated by an identity provider for use at a specific individual relying party. Generating distinct pairwise pseudonymous identifiers with no identifying information about a subscriber discourages subscriber activity tracking and profiling beyond the operational requirements established by an organization. The pairwise pseudonymous identifiers are unique to each relying party except in situations where relying parties can show a demonstrable relationship justifying an operational need for correlation, or all parties consent to being correlated in such a manner.

 - +

pairwise pseudonymous identifiers are generated.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29845,7 +30269,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29853,7 +30277,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management

 @@ -29863,14 +30287,15 @@ Attribute Maintenance and Protection - +

protected central storage used to maintain the attributes for each uniquely identified individual, device, or service is defined;

 - + + @@ -29882,13 +30307,13 @@

For each of the entities covered in IA-2, IA-3, IA-8 , and IA-9 , it is important to maintain the attributes for each authenticated entity on an ongoing basis in a central (protected) store.

 - +

the attributes for each uniquely identified individual, device, or service are maintained in .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -29902,7 +30327,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -29910,7 +30335,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management

 @@ -29921,7 +30346,7 @@ Authenticator Management - +

a time period for changing or refreshing authenticators by authenticator type is defined;

@@ -29929,14 +30354,15 @@ - +

events that trigger the change or refreshment of authenticators are defined;

 - + + @@ -30010,58 +30436,58 @@

Systems support authenticator management by organization-defined settings and restrictions for various authenticator characteristics (e.g., minimum password length, validation time window for time synchronous one-time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during the verification stage of biometric authentication). Actions can be taken to safeguard individual authenticators, including maintaining possession of authenticators, not sharing authenticators with others, and immediately reporting lost, stolen, or compromised authenticators. Authenticator management includes issuing and revoking authenticators for temporary access when no longer needed.

 - + - +

system authenticators are managed through the verification of the identity of the individual, group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticator as part of the initial authenticator distribution;

 - +

system authenticators are managed through the establishment of initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the organization;

 - +

system authenticators are managed to ensure that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;

 - +

system authenticators are managed through the establishment and implementation of administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution; lost, compromised, or damaged authenticators; and the revocation of authenticators;

 - +

system authenticators are managed through the change of default authenticators prior to first use;

 - +

system authenticators are managed through the change or refreshment of authenticators or when occur;

 - +

system authenticators are managed through the protection of authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;

 - + - +

system authenticators are managed through the requirement for individuals to take specific controls to protect authenticators;

 - +

system authenticators are managed through the requirement for devices to implement specific controls to protect authenticators;

 - +

system authenticators are managed through the change of authenticators for group or role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.

 @@ -30069,7 +30495,7 @@ - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -30084,7 +30510,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30093,7 +30519,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authenticator management capability

 @@ -30102,7 +30528,7 @@ Password-based Authentication - +

the frequency at which to update the list of commonly used, expected, or compromised passwords is defined;

@@ -30110,14 +30536,15 @@ - +

authenticator composition and complexity rules are defined;

 - + + @@ -30162,44 +30589,44 @@

Password-based authentication applies to passwords regardless of whether they are used in single-factor or multi-factor authentication. Long passwords or passphrases are preferable over shorter passwords. Enforced composition rules provide marginal security benefits while decreasing usability. However, organizations may choose to establish certain rules for password generation (e.g., minimum character length for long passwords) under certain circumstances and can enforce this requirement in IA-5(1)(h). Account recovery can occur, for example, in situations when a password is forgotten. Cryptographically protected passwords include salted one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords. The list of commonly used, compromised, or expected passwords includes passwords obtained from previous breach corpuses, dictionary words, and repetitive or sequential characters. The list includes context-specific words, such as the name of the service, username, and derivatives thereof.

 - + - +

for password-based authentication, a list of commonly used, expected, or compromised passwords is maintained and updated and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly;

 - +

for password-based authentication when passwords are created or updated by users, the passwords are verified not to be found on the list of commonly used, expected, or compromised passwords in IA-05(01)(a);

 - +

for password-based authentication, passwords are only transmitted over cryptographically protected channels;

 - +

for password-based authentication, passwords are stored using an approved salted key derivation function, preferably using a keyed hash;

 - +

for password-based authentication, immediate selection of a new password is required upon account recovery;

 - +

for password-based authentication, user selection of long passwords and passphrases is allowed, including spaces and all printable characters;

 - +

for password-based authentication, automated tools are employed to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators;

 - +

for password-based authentication, are enforced.

 @@ -30207,7 +30634,7 @@ - +

Identification and authentication policy

password policy

@@ -30221,7 +30648,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30231,7 +30658,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing password-based authenticator management capability

 @@ -30240,7 +30667,8 @@ Public Key-based Authentication - + + @@ -30276,30 +30704,30 @@

Public key cryptography is a valid authentication mechanism for individuals, machines, and devices. For PKI solutions, status information for certification paths includes certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, certificate validation involves the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common Policy Root trust anchor, which includes certificate policy processing. Implementing a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation also supports system availability in situations where organizations are unable to access revocation information via the network.

 - + - + - +

authorized access to the corresponding private key is enforced for public key-based authentication;

 - +

the authenticated identity is mapped to the account of the individual or group for public key-based authentication;

 - + - +

when public key infrastructure (PKI) is used, certificates are validated by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor, including checking certificate status information;

 - +

when public key infrastructure (PKI) is used, a local cache of revocation data is implemented to support path discovery and validation.

 @@ -30309,7 +30737,7 @@ - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing authenticator management

@@ -30323,7 +30751,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with PKI-based, authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30333,7 +30761,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing PKI-based, authenticator management capability

 @@ -30342,7 +30770,8 @@ In-person or Trusted External Party Registration - + + @@ -30350,7 +30779,8 @@ Automated Support for Password Strength Determination - + + @@ -30358,7 +30788,8 @@ Change Authenticators Prior to Delivery - + + @@ -30369,13 +30800,13 @@

Changing authenticators prior to the delivery and installation of system components extends the requirement for organizations to change default authenticators upon system installation by requiring developers and/or installers to provide unique authenticators or change default authenticators for system components prior to delivery and/or installation. However, it typically does not apply to developers of commercial off-the-shelf information technology products. Requirements for unique authenticators can be included in acquisition documents prepared by organizations when procuring systems or system components.

 - +

developers and installers of system components are required to provide unique authenticators or change default authenticators prior to delivery and installation.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -30389,7 +30820,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security, acquisition, and contracting responsibilities

@@ -30398,7 +30829,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authenticator management capability

 @@ -30407,7 +30838,8 @@ Protection of Authenticators - + + @@ -30419,13 +30851,13 @@

For systems that contain multiple security categories of information without reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators used to grant access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security category of information on the systems. Security categories of information are determined as part of the security categorization process.

 - +

authenticators are protected commensurate with the security category of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing authenticator management

@@ -30438,7 +30870,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel implementing and/or maintaining authenticator protections

@@ -30448,7 +30880,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authenticator management capability

mechanisms protecting authenticators

@@ -30458,7 +30890,8 @@ No Embedded Unencrypted Static Authenticators - + + @@ -30469,13 +30902,13 @@

In addition to applications, other forms of static storage include access scripts and function keys. Organizations exercise caution when determining whether embedded or stored authenticators are in encrypted or unencrypted form. If authenticators are used in the manner stored, then those representations are considered unencrypted authenticators.

 - +

unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications or other forms of static storage.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

system security plan

@@ -30489,7 +30922,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30499,7 +30932,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authenticator management capability

mechanisms implementing authentication in applications

@@ -30510,14 +30943,15 @@ Multiple System Accounts - +

security controls implemented to manage the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple systems are defined;

 - + + @@ -30529,13 +30963,13 @@

When individuals have accounts on multiple systems and use the same authenticators such as passwords, there is the risk that a compromise of one account may lead to the compromise of other accounts. Alternative approaches include having different authenticators (passwords) on all systems, employing a single sign-on or federation mechanism, or using some form of one-time passwords on all systems. Organizations can also use rules of behavior (see PL-4 ) and access agreements (see PS-6 ) to mitigate the risk of multiple system accounts.

 - +

are implemented to manage the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple systems.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing authenticator management

@@ -30547,7 +30981,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30556,7 +30990,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards for authenticator management

 @@ -30566,14 +31000,15 @@ Federated Credential Management - +

external organizations to be used for federating credentials are defined;

 - + + @@ -30586,13 +31021,13 @@

Federation provides organizations with the capability to authenticate individuals and devices when conducting cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of information. Using a specific list of approved external organizations for authentication helps to ensure that those organizations are vetted and trusted.

 - +

are used to federate credentials.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing authenticator management

@@ -30604,7 +31039,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30613,7 +31048,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards for authenticator management

 @@ -30623,14 +31058,15 @@ Dynamic Credential Binding - +

rules for dynamically binding identities and authenticators are defined;

 - + + @@ -30643,13 +31079,13 @@

Authentication requires some form of binding between an identity and the authenticator that is used to confirm the identity. In conventional approaches, binding is established by pre-provisioning both the identity and the authenticator to the system. For example, the binding between a username (i.e., identity) and a password (i.e., authenticator) is accomplished by provisioning the identity and authenticator as a pair in the system. New authentication techniques allow the binding between the identity and the authenticator to be implemented external to a system. For example, with smartcard credentials, the identity and authenticator are bound together on the smartcard. Using these credentials, systems can authenticate identities that have not been pre-provisioned, dynamically provisioning the identity after authentication. In these situations, organizations can anticipate the dynamic provisioning of identities. Pre-established trust relationships and mechanisms with appropriate authorities to validate identities and related credentials are essential.

 - +

identities and authenticators are dynamically bound using .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing identifier management

@@ -30663,7 +31099,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30672,7 +31108,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms implementing identifier management capability

automated mechanisms implementing dynamic binding of identities and authenticators

@@ -30682,7 +31118,8 @@ Hardware Token-based Authentication - + + @@ -30692,14 +31129,15 @@ Biometric Authentication Performance - +

biometric quality requirements for biometric-based authentication are defined;

 - + + @@ -30711,13 +31149,13 @@

Unlike password-based authentication, which provides exact matches of user-input passwords to stored passwords, biometric authentication does not provide exact matches. Depending on the type of biometric and the type of collection mechanism, there is likely to be some divergence from the presented biometric and the stored biometric that serves as the basis for comparison. Matching performance is the rate at which a biometric algorithm correctly results in a match for a genuine user and rejects other users. Biometric performance requirements include the match rate, which reflects the accuracy of the biometric matching algorithm used by a system.

 - +

mechanisms that satisfy are employed for biometric-based authentication.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing authenticator management

@@ -30732,7 +31170,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30742,7 +31180,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing biometric-based authenticator management capability

 @@ -30752,14 +31190,15 @@ Expiration of Cached Authenticators - +

the time period after which the use of cached authenticators is prohibited is defined;

 - + + @@ -30770,13 +31209,13 @@

Cached authenticators are used to authenticate to the local machine when the network is not available. If cached authentication information is out of date, the validity of the authentication information may be questionable.

 - +

the use of cached authenticators is prohibited after .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing authenticator management

@@ -30789,7 +31228,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30799,7 +31238,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authenticator management capability

 @@ -30808,7 +31247,8 @@ Managing Content of PKI Trust Stores - + + @@ -30819,13 +31259,13 @@

An organization-wide methodology for managing the content of PKI trust stores helps improve the accuracy and currency of PKI-based authentication credentials across the organization.

 - +

an organization-wide methodology for managing the content of PKI trust stores is employed across all platforms, including networks, operating systems, browsers, and applications for PKI-based authentication.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing authenticator management

@@ -30840,7 +31280,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with authenticator management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30850,7 +31290,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing PKI-based authenticator management capability

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the PKI trust store capability

@@ -30860,7 +31300,8 @@ GSA-approved Products and Services - + + @@ -30871,13 +31312,13 @@

General Services Administration (GSA)-approved products and services are products and services that have been approved through the GSA conformance program, where applicable, and posted to the GSA Approved Products List. GSA provides guidance for teams to design and build functional and secure systems that comply with Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) policies, technologies, and implementation patterns.

 - +

only General Services Administration-approved products and services are used for identity, credential, and access management.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing identifier management

@@ -30891,7 +31332,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with identification and authentication management responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -30900,7 +31341,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing account management capability

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication management capabilities for the system

@@ -30911,7 +31352,7 @@ In-person or Trusted External Party Authenticator Issuance - +

types of and/or specific authenticators to be issued are defined;

@@ -30919,7 +31360,7 @@ - + registration code notice of proofing - + + @@ -32174,13 +32638,13 @@

To make it more difficult for adversaries to pose as legitimate users during the identity proofing process, organizations can use out-of-band methods to ensure that the individual associated with an address of record is the same individual that participated in the registration. Confirmation can take the form of a temporary enrollment code or a notice of proofing. The delivery address for these artifacts is obtained from records and not self-asserted by the user. The address can include a physical or digital address. A home address is an example of a physical address. Email addresses and telephone numbers are examples of digital addresses.

 - +

a is delivered through an out-of-band channel to verify the user’s address (physical or digital) of record.

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing identity proofing

@@ -32190,7 +32654,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -32201,7 +32665,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capabilities

 @@ -32211,14 +32675,15 @@ Accept Externally-proofed Identities - +

an identity assurance level for accepting externally proofed identities is defined;

 - + + @@ -32233,13 +32698,13 @@

To limit unnecessary re-proofing of identities, particularly of non-PIV users, organizations accept proofing conducted at a commensurate level of assurance by other agencies or organizations. Proofing is consistent with organizational security policy and the identity assurance level appropriate for the system, application, or information accessed. Accepting externally-proofed identities is a fundamental component of managing federated identities across agencies and organizations.

 - +

externally proofed identities are accepted .

 - +

Identification and authentication policy

procedures addressing identity proofing

@@ -32249,7 +32714,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -32260,7 +32725,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capabilities

 @@ -32272,7 +32737,7 @@ - +

identification and authentication policy is defined;

@@ -32280,14 +32745,15 @@ - +

mechanisms supporting authentication and authorization decisions are defined;

 - + + @@ -32304,31 +32770,31 @@

Identity providers, both internal and external to the organization, manage the user, device, and NPE authenticators and issue statements, often called identity assertions, attesting to identities of other systems or systems components. Authorization servers create and issue access tokens to identified and authenticated users and devices that can be used to gain access to system or information resources. For example, single sign-on (SSO) provides identity provider and authorization server functions. Authenticator management (to include credential management) is covered by IA-05.

 - + - +

identity providers are employed to manage user, device, and non-person entity (NPE) identities, attributes and access rights supporting authentication decisions in accordance with using ;

 - +

identity providers are employed to manage user, device, and non-person entity (NPE) identities, attributes and access rights supporting authorization decisions in accordance with using ;

 - +

authorization servers are employed to manage user, device, and non-person entity (NPE) identities, attributes and access rights supporting authentication decisions in accordance with using ;

 - +

authorization servers are employed to manage user, device, and non-person entity (NPE) identities, attributes and access rights supporting authorization decisions in accordance with using ;

 - +

Identification and authentication policy;

procedures addressing user and device identification and authentication;

@@ -32340,7 +32806,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities;

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities;

@@ -32351,7 +32817,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capabilities and access rights

 @@ -32359,7 +32825,8 @@ Protection of Cryptographic Keys - + + @@ -32373,31 +32840,31 @@

Identity assertions and access tokens are typically digitally signed. The private keys used to sign these assertions and tokens are protected commensurate with the impact of the system and information resources that can be accessed.

- + - +

cryptographic keys that protect access tokens are generated;

 - +

cryptographic keys that protect access tokens are managed;

 - +

cryptographic keys that protect access tokens are protected from disclosure; and

 - +

cryptographic keys that protect access tokens are protected from disclosure and misuse

 - +

Identification and authentication policy;

procedures addressing cryptographic key establishment and management;

@@ -32410,7 +32877,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators;

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities;

@@ -32419,7 +32886,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for cryptographic key management;

cryptographic modules generating, storing, and using cryptographic keys

@@ -32429,7 +32896,8 @@ Verification of Identity Assertions and Access Tokens - + + @@ -32441,31 +32909,31 @@

This includes verification of digital signatures protecting identity assertions and access tokens, as well as included metadata. Metadata includes information about the access request such as information unique to user, system or information resource being accessed, or the transaction itself such as time. Protected system and information resources could include connected networks, applications, and APIs.

 - + - +

the source of identity assertions is verified before granting access to system and information resources;

 - +

the source of access tokens is verified before granting access to system and information resources;

 - +

the integrity of identity assertions is verified before granting access to system and information resources;

 - +

the integrity of access tokens is verified before granting access to system and information resources

 - +

Identification and authentication policy;

system security plan; system design documentation;

@@ -32475,7 +32943,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities;

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities;

@@ -32486,7 +32954,7 @@ - +

Identity provider mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capabilities and access rights

 @@ -32495,7 +32963,8 @@ Token Management - + + @@ -32534,71 +33003,71 @@

An access token is a piece of data that represents the authorization granted to a user or NPE to access specific systems or information resources. Access tokens enable controlled access to services and resources. Properly managing the lifecycle of access tokens, including their issuance, validation, and revocation, is crucial to maintaining confidentiality of data and systems. Restricting token validity to a specific audience, e.g., an application or security domain, and restricting token validity lifetimes are important practices. Access tokens are revoked or invalidated if they are compromised, lost, or are no longer needed to mitigate the risks associated with stolen or misused tokens.

 - + - +

assertions are generated in accordance with ;

 - +

access tokens are generated in accordance with ;

 - +

assertions are issued in accordance with ;

 - +

access tokens are issued in accordance with ;

 - +

assertions are refreshed in accordance with ;

 - +

access tokens are refreshed in accordance with ;

 - +

assertions are revoked in accordance with ;

 - +

access tokens are revoked in accordance with ;

 - +

assertions are time-restricted in accordance with ;

 - +

access tokens are time-restricted in accordance with ;

 - +

assertions are audience-restricted in accordance with ;

 - +

access tokens are audience-restricted in accordance with ;

 - +

Identification and authentication policy;

access control policy;

@@ -32610,7 +33079,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system operations responsibilities;

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities;

@@ -32621,7 +33090,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms and software supporting and/or implementing token generation

 @@ -32639,14 +33108,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the incident response policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the incident response procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -32654,7 +33123,7 @@ - + organization-level mission/business process-level @@ -35892,7 +36403,7 @@ - +

an official to manage the maintenance policy and procedures is defined;

@@ -35900,7 +36411,7 @@ - +

the frequency with which the current maintenance policy is reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -35908,7 +36419,7 @@ - +

events that would require the current maintenance policy to be reviewed and updated are defined;

@@ -35916,7 +36427,7 @@ - +

the frequency with which the current maintenance procedures are reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -35924,14 +36435,15 @@ - +

events that would require the maintenance procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

 - + + @@ -35985,72 +36497,72 @@

Maintenance policy and procedures address the controls in the MA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of maintenance policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to maintenance policy and procedures assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

 - + - + - +

a maintenance policy is developed and documented;

 - +

the maintenance policy is disseminated to ;

 - +

maintenance procedures to facilitate the implementation of the maintenance policy and associated maintenance controls are developed and documented;

 - +

the maintenance procedures are disseminated to ;

 - + - + - +

the maintenance policy addresses purpose;

 - +

the maintenance policy addresses scope;

 - +

the maintenance policy addresses roles;

 - +

the maintenance policy addresses responsibilities;

 - +

the maintenance policy addresses management commitment;

 - +

the maintenance policy addresses coordination among organizational entities;

 - +

the maintenance policy addresses compliance;

 - +

the maintenance policy is consistent with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines;

 @@ -36059,35 +36571,35 @@ - +

the is designated to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures;

 - + - + - +

the current maintenance policy is reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current maintenance policy is reviewed and updated following ;

 - + - +

the current maintenance procedures are reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current maintenance procedures are reviewed and updated following .

 @@ -36099,7 +36611,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy and procedures

system security plan

@@ -36110,7 +36622,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -36121,7 +36633,7 @@ Controlled Maintenance - +

personnel or roles required to explicitly approve the removal of the system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs is/are defined;

@@ -36129,7 +36641,7 @@ - +

information to be removed from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance, repair, or replacement is defined;

@@ -36137,14 +36649,15 @@ - +

information to be included in organizational maintenance records is defined;

 - + + @@ -36191,57 +36704,57 @@

Controlling system maintenance addresses the information security aspects of the system maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to system components conducted by local or nonlocal entities. Maintenance includes peripherals such as scanners, copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes the date and time of maintenance, a description of the maintenance performed, names of the individuals or group performing the maintenance, name of the escort, and system components or equipment that are removed or replaced. Organizations consider supply chain-related risks associated with replacement components for systems.

 - + - + - +

maintenance, repair, and replacement of system components are scheduled in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements;

 - +

maintenance, repair, and replacement of system components are documented in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements;

 - +

records of maintenance, repair, and replacement of system components are reviewed in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements;

 - + - +

all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and whether the system or system components are serviced on site or removed to another location, are approved;

 - +

all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and whether the system or system components are serviced on site or removed to another location, are monitored;

 - +

is/are required to explicitly approve the removal of the system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance, repair, or replacement;

 - +

equipment is sanitized to remove from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance, repair, or replacement;

 - +

all potentially impacted controls are checked to verify that the controls are still functioning properly following maintenance, repair, or replacement actions;

 - +

is included in organizational maintenance records.

 @@ -36249,7 +36762,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing controlled system maintenance

@@ -36263,7 +36776,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36273,7 +36786,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for scheduling, performing, documenting, reviewing, approving, and monitoring maintenance and repairs for the system

organizational processes for sanitizing system components

@@ -36284,7 +36797,8 @@ Record Content - + + @@ -36298,28 +36812,29 @@ - +

automated mechanisms used to schedule maintenance, repair, and replacement actions for the system are defined;

 - +

automated mechanisms used to conduct maintenance, repair, and replacement actions for the system are defined;

 - +

automated mechanisms used to document maintenance, repair, and replacement actions for the system are defined;

 - + + @@ -36338,40 +36853,40 @@

The use of automated mechanisms to manage and control system maintenance programs and activities helps to ensure the generation of timely, accurate, complete, and consistent maintenance records.

 - + - + - +

are used to schedule maintenance, repair, and replacement actions for the system;

 - +

are used to conduct maintenance, repair, and replacement actions for the system;

 - +

are used to document maintenance, repair, and replacement actions for the system;

 - + - +

up-to date, accurate, and complete records of all maintenance actions requested, scheduled, in process, and completed are produced.

 - +

up-to date, accurate, and complete records of all repair actions requested, scheduled, in process, and completed are produced.

 - +

up-to date, accurate, and complete records of all replacement actions requested, scheduled, in process, and completed are produced.

 @@ -36381,7 +36896,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing controlled system maintenance

@@ -36394,7 +36909,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36403,7 +36918,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing controlled maintenance

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the production of records of maintenance and repair actions

@@ -36415,14 +36930,15 @@ Maintenance Tools - +

frequency at which to review previously approved system maintenance tools is defined;

 - + + @@ -36442,28 +36958,28 @@

Approving, controlling, monitoring, and reviewing maintenance tools address security-related issues associated with maintenance tools that are not within system authorization boundaries and are used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational systems. Organizations have flexibility in determining roles for the approval of maintenance tools and how that approval is documented. A periodic review of maintenance tools facilitates the withdrawal of approval for outdated, unsupported, irrelevant, or no-longer-used tools. Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items and may be pre-installed, brought in with maintenance personnel on media, cloud-based, or downloaded from a website. Such tools can be vehicles for transporting malicious code, either intentionally or unintentionally, into a facility and subsequently into systems. Maintenance tools can include hardware and software diagnostic test equipment and packet sniffers. The hardware and software components that support maintenance and are a part of the system (including the software implementing utilities such as ping, ls, ipconfig, or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch) are not addressed by maintenance tools.

 - + - + - +

the use of system maintenance tools is approved;

 - +

the use of system maintenance tools is controlled;

 - +

the use of system maintenance tools is monitored;

 - +

previously approved system maintenance tools are reviewed .

 @@ -36471,7 +36987,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance tools

@@ -36483,7 +36999,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36491,7 +37007,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for approving, controlling, and monitoring maintenance tools

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the approval, control, and/or monitoring of maintenance tools

@@ -36500,7 +37016,8 @@ Inspect Tools - + + @@ -36512,13 +37029,13 @@

Maintenance tools can be directly brought into a facility by maintenance personnel or downloaded from a vendor’s website. If, upon inspection of the maintenance tools, organizations determine that the tools have been modified in an improper manner or the tools contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedures for incident handling.

 - +

maintenance tools used by maintenance personnel are inspected for improper or unauthorized modifications.

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance tools

@@ -36531,7 +37048,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36539,7 +37056,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for inspecting maintenance tools

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the inspection of maintenance tools

@@ -36549,7 +37066,8 @@ Inspect Media - + + @@ -36561,13 +37079,13 @@

If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance, diagnostic, and test programs, organizations determine that the media contains malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures.

 - +

media containing diagnostic and test programs are checked for malicious code before the media are used in the system.

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance tools

@@ -36579,7 +37097,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36587,7 +37105,7 @@ - +

Organizational process for inspecting media for malicious code

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the inspection of media used for maintenance

@@ -36598,14 +37116,15 @@ Prevent Unauthorized Removal - +

personnel or roles who can authorize removal of equipment from the facility is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -36633,24 +37152,24 @@

Organizational information includes all information owned by organizations and any information provided to organizations for which the organizations serve as information stewards.

 - + - +

the removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information is prevented by verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment; or

 - +

the removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information is prevented by sanitizing or destroying the equipment; or

 - +

the removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information is prevented by retaining the equipment within the facility; or

 - +

the removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information is prevented by obtaining an exemption from explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.

 @@ -36658,7 +37177,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance tools

@@ -36673,7 +37192,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36682,7 +37201,7 @@ - +

Organizational process for preventing unauthorized removal of information

mechanisms supporting media sanitization or destruction of equipment

@@ -36693,7 +37212,8 @@ Restricted Tool Use - + + @@ -36708,13 +37228,13 @@

Restricting the use of maintenance tools to only authorized personnel applies to systems that are used to carry out maintenance functions.

 - +

the use of maintenance tools is restricted to authorized personnel only.

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance tools

@@ -36728,7 +37248,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36736,7 +37256,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for restricting the use of maintenance tools

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the restricted use of maintenance tools

@@ -36746,7 +37266,8 @@ Execution with Privilege - + + @@ -36760,13 +37281,13 @@

Maintenance tools that execute with increased system privilege can result in unauthorized access to organizational information and assets that would otherwise be inaccessible.

 - +

the use of maintenance tools that execute with increased privilege is monitored.

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance tools

@@ -36780,7 +37301,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36788,7 +37309,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for restricting the use of maintenance tools

organizational process for monitoring maintenance tools and maintenance tool usage

@@ -36799,7 +37320,8 @@ Software Updates and Patches - + + @@ -36813,13 +37335,13 @@

Maintenance tools using outdated and/or unpatched software can provide a threat vector for adversaries and result in a significant vulnerability for organizations.

 - +

maintenance tools are inspected to ensure that the latest software updates and patches are installed.

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance tools

@@ -36833,7 +37355,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36841,7 +37363,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for inspecting maintenance tools

organizational processes for maintenance tools updates

@@ -36854,7 +37376,8 @@ Nonlocal Maintenance - + + @@ -36903,54 +37426,54 @@

Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are conducted by individuals who communicate through either an external or internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are carried out by individuals who are physically present at the system location and not communicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques used to establish nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions reflect the network access requirements in IA-2 . Strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ multi-factor authentication. Strong authenticators include PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric. Enforcing requirements in MA-4 is accomplished, in part, by other controls. SP 800-63B provides additional guidance on strong authentication and authenticators.

 - + - + - +

nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are approved;

 - +

nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are monitored;

 - + - +

the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools are allowed only as consistent with organizational policy;

 - +

the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools are documented in the security plan for the system;

 - +

strong authentication is employed in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions;

 - +

records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are maintained;

 - + - +

session connections are terminated when nonlocal maintenance is completed;

 - +

network connections are terminated when nonlocal maintenance is completed.

 @@ -36960,7 +37483,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing nonlocal system maintenance

@@ -36977,7 +37500,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -36986,7 +37509,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing nonlocal maintenance

mechanisms implementing, supporting, and/or managing nonlocal maintenance

@@ -37002,21 +37525,22 @@ - +

audit events to be logged for nonlocal maintenance are defined;

 - +

audit events to be logged for diagnostic sessions are defined;

 - + + @@ -37036,30 +37560,30 @@

Audit logging for nonlocal maintenance is enforced by AU-2 . Audit events are defined in AU-2a.

 - + - + - +

are logged for nonlocal maintenance sessions;

 - +

are logged for nonlocal diagnostic sessions;

 - + - +

the audit records of the maintenance sessions are reviewed to detect anomalous behavior;

 - +

the audit records of the diagnostic sessions are reviewed to detect anomalous behavior.

 @@ -37069,7 +37593,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing nonlocal system maintenance

@@ -37085,7 +37609,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -37095,7 +37619,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for audit and review of nonlocal maintenance

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing audit and review of nonlocal maintenance

@@ -37105,7 +37629,8 @@ Document Nonlocal Maintenance - + + @@ -37114,7 +37639,8 @@ Comparable Security and Sanitization - + + @@ -37135,35 +37661,35 @@

Comparable security capability on systems, diagnostic tools, and equipment providing maintenance services implies that the implemented controls on those systems, tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controls on the system being serviced.

 - + - + - +

nonlocal maintenance services are required to be performed from a system that implements a security capability comparable to the capability implemented on the system being serviced;

 - +

nonlocal diagnostic services are required to be performed from a system that implements a security capability comparable to the capability implemented on the system being serviced; or

 - + - +

the component to be serviced is removed from the system prior to nonlocal maintenance or diagnostic services;

 - +

the component to be serviced is sanitized (for organizational information);

 - +

the component is inspected and sanitized (for potentially malicious software) after the service is performed and before reconnecting the component to the system.

 @@ -37173,7 +37699,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing nonlocal system maintenance

@@ -37189,7 +37715,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

system maintenance provider

@@ -37200,7 +37726,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for comparable security and sanitization for nonlocal maintenance

organizational processes for the removal, sanitization, and inspection of components serviced via nonlocal maintenance

@@ -37212,14 +37738,15 @@ Authentication and Separation of Maintenance Sessions - +

authenticators that are replay resistant are defined;

 - + + @@ -37246,21 +37773,21 @@

Communications paths can be logically separated using encryption.

 - + - +

nonlocal maintenance sessions are protected by employing ;

 - + - +

nonlocal maintenance sessions are protected by separating maintenance sessions from other network sessions with the system by physically separated communication paths; or

 - +

nonlocal maintenance sessions are protected by logically separated communication paths.

 @@ -37270,7 +37797,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing nonlocal system maintenance

@@ -37284,7 +37811,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

network engineers

@@ -37294,7 +37821,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for protecting nonlocal maintenance sessions

mechanisms implementing replay-resistant authenticators

@@ -37306,7 +37833,7 @@ Approvals and Notifications - +

personnel or roles required to approve each nonlocal maintenance session is/are defined;

@@ -37315,14 +37842,15 @@ - +

personnel and roles to be notified of the date and time of planned nonlocal maintenance is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -37340,14 +37868,14 @@

Notification may be performed by maintenance personnel. Approval of nonlocal maintenance is accomplished by personnel with sufficient information security and system knowledge to determine the appropriateness of the proposed maintenance.

 - + - +

the approval of each nonlocal maintenance session is required by ;

 - +

is/are notified of the date and time of planned nonlocal maintenance.

 @@ -37355,7 +37883,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing nonlocal system maintenance

@@ -37368,7 +37896,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with notification responsibilities

@@ -37378,7 +37906,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for approving and notifying personnel regarding nonlocal maintenance

mechanisms supporting the notification and approval of nonlocal maintenance

@@ -37389,14 +37917,15 @@ Cryptographic Protection - +

cryptographic mechanisms to be implemented to protect the integrity and confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications are defined;

 - + + @@ -37411,14 +37940,14 @@

Failure to protect nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications can result in unauthorized individuals gaining access to organizational information. Unauthorized access during remote maintenance sessions can result in a variety of hostile actions, including malicious code insertion, unauthorized changes to system parameters, and exfiltration of organizational information. Such actions can result in the loss or degradation of mission or business capabilities.

 - + - +

are implemented to protect the integrity of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications;

 - +

are implemented to protect the confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications.

 @@ -37426,7 +37955,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing nonlocal system maintenance

@@ -37442,7 +37971,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

network engineers

@@ -37452,7 +37981,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms protecting nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications

 @@ -37461,7 +37990,8 @@ Disconnect Verification - + + @@ -37473,14 +38003,14 @@

Verifying the termination of a connection once maintenance is completed ensures that connections established during nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions have been terminated and are no longer available for use.

 - + - +

session connection termination is verified after the completion of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions;

 - +

network connection termination is verified after the completion of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions.

 @@ -37488,7 +38018,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing nonlocal system maintenance

@@ -37505,7 +38035,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

network engineers

@@ -37515,7 +38045,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing remote disconnect verifications of terminated nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions

 @@ -37525,7 +38055,8 @@ Maintenance Personnel - + + @@ -37558,28 +38089,28 @@

Maintenance personnel refers to individuals who perform hardware or software maintenance on organizational systems, while PE-2 addresses physical access for individuals whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of the systems. Technical competence of supervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on the systems, while having required access authorizations refers to maintenance on and near the systems. Individuals not previously identified as authorized maintenance personnel—such as information technology manufacturers, vendors, systems integrators, and consultants—may require privileged access to organizational systems, such as when they are required to conduct maintenance activities with little or no notice. Based on organizational assessments of risk, organizations may issue temporary credentials to these individuals. Temporary credentials may be for one-time use or for very limited time periods.

 - + - + - +

a process for maintenance personnel authorization is established;

 - +

a list of authorized maintenance organizations or personnel is maintained;

 - +

non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the system possess the required access authorizations;

 - +

organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technical competence is/are designated to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess the required access authorizations.

 @@ -37587,7 +38118,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing maintenance personnel

@@ -37602,7 +38133,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -37610,7 +38141,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for authorizing and managing maintenance personnel

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authorization of maintenance personnel

@@ -37620,14 +38151,15 @@ Individuals Without Appropriate Access - +

alternate controls to be developed and implemented in the event that a system component cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from the system are defined;

 - + + @@ -37655,23 +38187,23 @@

Procedures for individuals who lack appropriate security clearances or who are not U.S. citizens are intended to deny visual and electronic access to classified or controlled unclassified information contained on organizational systems. Procedures for the use of maintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the systems.

 - + - + - +

procedures for the use of maintenance personnel who lack appropriate security clearances or are not U.S. citizens are implemented and include approved organizational personnel who are fully cleared, have appropriate access authorizations, and are technically qualified escorting and supervising maintenance personnel without the needed access authorization during the performance of maintenance and diagnostic activities;

 - +

procedures for the use of maintenance personnel who lack appropriate security clearances or are not U.S. citizens are implemented and include all volatile information storage components within the system being sanitized and all non-volatile storage media being removed or physically disconnected from the system and secured prior to initiating maintenance or diagnostic activities;

 - +

are developed and implemented in the event that a system cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from the system.

 @@ -37679,7 +38211,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing maintenance personnel

@@ -37694,7 +38226,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

@@ -37706,7 +38238,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing maintenance personnel without appropriate access

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing alternative security safeguards

@@ -37717,7 +38249,8 @@ Security Clearances for Classified Systems - + + @@ -37729,14 +38262,14 @@

Personnel who conduct maintenance on organizational systems may be exposed to classified information during the course of their maintenance activities. To mitigate the inherent risk of such exposure, organizations use maintenance personnel that are cleared (i.e., possess security clearances) to the classification level of the information stored on the system.

 - + - +

personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on a system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information possess security clearances for at least the highest classification level and for compartments of information on the system;

 - +

personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on a system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information possess formal access approvals for at least the highest classification level and for compartments of information on the system.

 @@ -37744,7 +38277,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing maintenance personnel

@@ -37759,7 +38292,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

@@ -37769,7 +38302,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing security clearances for maintenance personnel

 @@ -37778,7 +38311,8 @@ Citizenship Requirements for Classified Systems - + + @@ -37790,13 +38324,13 @@

Personnel who conduct maintenance on organizational systems may be exposed to classified information during the course of their maintenance activities. If access to classified information on organizational systems is restricted to U.S. citizens, the same restriction is applied to personnel performing maintenance on those systems.

 - +

personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on a system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are U.S. citizens.

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing maintenance personnel

@@ -37811,7 +38345,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

@@ -37822,7 +38356,8 @@ Foreign Nationals - + + @@ -37842,26 +38377,26 @@

Personnel who conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on organizational systems may be exposed to classified information. If non-U.S. citizens are permitted to perform maintenance and diagnostics activities on classified systems, then additional vetting is required to ensure agreements and restrictions are not being violated.

 - + - +

foreign nationals with appropriate security clearances are used to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified systems only when the systems are jointly owned and operated by the United States and foreign allied governments or owned and operated solely by foreign allied governments;

 - + - +

approvals regarding the use of foreign nationals to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified systems are fully documented within Memoranda of Agreements;

 - +

consents regarding the use of foreign nationals to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified systems are fully documented within Memoranda of Agreements;

 - +

detailed operational conditions regarding the use of foreign nationals to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified systems are fully documented within Memoranda of Agreements.

 @@ -37871,7 +38406,7 @@ - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing maintenance personnel

@@ -37889,7 +38424,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities, organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel managing memoranda of agreements

@@ -37898,7 +38433,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing foreign national maintenance personnel

 @@ -37907,7 +38442,8 @@ Non-system Maintenance - + + @@ -37918,13 +38454,13 @@

Personnel who perform maintenance activities in other capacities not directly related to the system include physical plant personnel and custodial personnel.

 - +

non-escorted personnel performing maintenance activities not directly associated with the system but in the physical proximity of the system have required access authorizations.

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing maintenance personnel

@@ -37940,7 +38476,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

@@ -37954,7 +38490,7 @@ Timely Maintenance - +

system components for which maintenance support and/or spare parts are obtained are defined;

@@ -37962,14 +38498,15 @@ - +

time period within which maintenance support and/or spare parts are to be obtained after a failure are defined;

 - + + @@ -37988,13 +38525,13 @@

Organizations specify the system components that result in increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation when the functionality provided by those components is not operational. Organizational actions to obtain maintenance support include having appropriate contracts in place.

 - +

maintenance support and/or spare parts are obtained for within of failure.

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance

@@ -38007,7 +38544,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

@@ -38017,7 +38554,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for ensuring timely maintenance

 @@ -38026,7 +38563,7 @@ Preventive Maintenance - +

system components on which preventive maintenance is to be performed are defined;

@@ -38034,14 +38571,15 @@ - +

time intervals within which preventive maintenance is to be performed on system components are defined;

 - + + @@ -38052,13 +38590,13 @@

Preventive maintenance includes proactive care and the servicing of system components to maintain organizational equipment and facilities in satisfactory operating condition. Such maintenance provides for the systematic inspection, tests, measurements, adjustments, parts replacement, detection, and correction of incipient failures either before they occur or before they develop into major defects. The primary goal of preventive maintenance is to avoid or mitigate the consequences of equipment failures. Preventive maintenance is designed to preserve and restore equipment reliability by replacing worn components before they fail. Methods of determining what preventive (or other) failure management policies to apply include original equipment manufacturer recommendations; statistical failure records; expert opinion; maintenance that has already been conducted on similar equipment; requirements of codes, laws, or regulations within a jurisdiction; or measured values and performance indications.

 - +

preventive maintenance is performed on at .

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance

@@ -38072,7 +38610,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -38081,7 +38619,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for preventive maintenance

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing preventive maintenance

@@ -38092,7 +38630,7 @@ Predictive Maintenance - +

system components on which predictive maintenance is to be performed are defined;

@@ -38100,14 +38638,15 @@ - +

time intervals within which predictive maintenance is to be performed are defined;

 - + + @@ -38118,13 +38657,13 @@

Predictive maintenance evaluates the condition of equipment by performing periodic or continuous (online) equipment condition monitoring. The goal of predictive maintenance is to perform maintenance at a scheduled time when the maintenance activity is most cost-effective and before the equipment loses performance within a threshold. The predictive component of predictive maintenance stems from the objective of predicting the future trend of the equipment's condition. The predictive maintenance approach employs principles of statistical process control to determine at what point in the future maintenance activities will be appropriate. Most predictive maintenance inspections are performed while equipment is in service, thus minimizing disruption of normal system operations. Predictive maintenance can result in substantial cost savings and higher system reliability.

 - +

predictive maintenance is performed on at .

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance

@@ -38138,7 +38677,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -38147,7 +38686,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for predictive maintenance

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing predictive maintenance

@@ -38158,14 +38697,15 @@ Automated Support for Predictive Maintenance - +

automated mechanisms used to transfer predictive maintenance data to a maintenance management system are defined;

 - + + @@ -38176,13 +38716,13 @@

A computerized maintenance management system maintains a database of information about the maintenance operations of organizations and automates the processing of equipment condition data to trigger maintenance planning, execution, and reporting.

 - +

predictive maintenance data is transferred to a maintenance management system using .

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing system maintenance

@@ -38196,7 +38736,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -38205,7 +38745,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms implementing the transfer of predictive maintenance data to a computerized maintenance management system

operations of the computer maintenance management system

@@ -38217,7 +38757,7 @@ Field Maintenance - +

systems or system components on which field maintenance is restricted or prohibited to trusted maintenance facilities are defined;

@@ -38225,14 +38765,15 @@ - +

trusted maintenance facilities that are not restricted or prohibited from conducting field maintenance are defined;

 - + + @@ -38245,13 +38786,13 @@

Field maintenance is the type of maintenance conducted on a system or system component after the system or component has been deployed to a specific site (i.e., operational environment). In certain instances, field maintenance (i.e., local maintenance at the site) may not be executed with the same degree of rigor or with the same quality control checks as depot maintenance. For critical systems designated as such by the organization, it may be necessary to restrict or prohibit field maintenance at the local site and require that such maintenance be conducted in trusted facilities with additional controls.

 - +

field maintenance on are restricted or prohibited to .

 - +

Maintenance policy

procedures addressing field maintenance

@@ -38265,7 +38806,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -38274,7 +38815,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing field maintenance

mechanisms implementing, supporting, and/or managing field maintenance

@@ -38294,14 +38835,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the media protection policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the media protection procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -38309,7 +38850,7 @@ - + remotely under @@ -39738,14 +40300,15 @@ - +

conditions under which information is to be purged or wiped are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -39756,13 +40319,13 @@

Remote purging or wiping of information protects information on organizational systems and system components if systems or components are obtained by unauthorized individuals. Remote purge or wipe commands require strong authentication to help mitigate the risk of unauthorized individuals purging or wiping the system, component, or device. The purge or wipe function can be implemented in a variety of ways, including by overwriting data or information multiple times or by destroying the key necessary to decrypt encrypted data.

 - +

the capability to purge or wipe information from is provided.

 - +

System media protection policy

procedures addressing media sanitization and disposal

@@ -39777,7 +40340,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system media sanitization responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -39786,7 +40349,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for purging/wiping media

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing purge/wipe capabilities

@@ -39798,7 +40361,7 @@ Media Use - +

types of system media to be restricted or prohibited from use on systems or system components are defined;

@@ -39806,7 +40369,7 @@ - + organization-level mission/business process-level @@ -40363,7 +40934,7 @@ - +

an official to manage the physical and environmental protection policy and procedures is defined;

@@ -40371,7 +40942,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which the current physical and environmental protection policy is reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -40379,7 +40950,7 @@ - +

events that would require the current physical and environmental protection policy to be reviewed and updated are defined;

@@ -40387,7 +40958,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which the current physical and environmental protection procedures are reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -40395,14 +40966,15 @@ - +

events that would require the physical and environmental protection procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

 - + + @@ -40456,72 +41028,72 @@

Physical and environmental protection policy and procedures address the controls in the PE family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of physical and environmental protection policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to physical and environmental protection policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

 - + - + - +

a physical and environmental protection policy is developed and documented;

 - +

the physical and environmental protection policy is disseminated to ;

 - +

physical and environmental protection procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental protection policy and associated physical and environmental protection controls are developed and documented;

 - +

the physical and environmental protection procedures are disseminated to ;

 - + - + - +

the physical and environmental protection policy addresses purpose;

 - +

the physical and environmental protection policy addresses scope;

 - +

the physical and environmental protection policy addresses roles;

 - +

the physical and environmental protection policy addresses responsibilities;

 - +

the physical and environmental protection policy addresses management commitment;

 - +

the physical and environmental protection policy addresses coordination among organizational entities;

 - +

the physical and environmental protection policy addresses compliance;

 - +

the physical and environmental protection policy is consistent with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines;

 @@ -40530,35 +41102,35 @@ - +

the is designated to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the physical and environmental protection policy and procedures;

 - + - + - +

the current physical and environmental protection policy is reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current physical and environmental protection policy is reviewed and updated following ;

 - + - +

the current physical and environmental protection procedures are reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current physical and environmental protection procedures are reviewed and updated following .

 @@ -40570,7 +41142,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy and procedures

system security plan

@@ -40581,7 +41153,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with physical and environmental protection responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -40592,14 +41164,15 @@ Physical Access Authorizations - +

frequency at which to review the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals is defined;

 - + + @@ -40642,38 +41215,38 @@

Physical access authorizations apply to employees and visitors. Individuals with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Authorization credentials include ID badges, identification cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine the strength of authorization credentials needed consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Physical access authorizations may not be necessary to access certain areas within facilities that are designated as publicly accessible.

 - + - + - +

a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility where the system resides has been developed;

 - +

the list of individuals with authorized access to the facility where the system resides has been approved;

 - +

the list of individuals with authorized access to the facility where the system resides has been maintained;

 - +

authorization credentials are issued for facility access;

 - +

the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals is reviewed ;

 - +

individuals are removed from the facility access list when access is no longer required.

 @@ -40681,7 +41254,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing physical access authorizations

@@ -40695,7 +41268,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with physical access authorization responsibilities

organizational personnel with physical access to system facility

@@ -40704,7 +41277,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for physical access authorizations

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access authorizations

@@ -40713,7 +41286,8 @@ Access by Position or Role - + + @@ -40727,13 +41301,13 @@

Role-based facility access includes access by authorized permanent and regular/routine maintenance personnel, duty officers, and emergency medical staff.

 - +

physical access to the facility where the system resides is authorized based on position or role.

 - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing physical access authorizations

@@ -40746,7 +41320,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with physical access authorization responsibilities

organizational personnel with physical access to system facility

@@ -40755,7 +41329,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for physical access authorizations

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access authorizations

@@ -40766,14 +41340,15 @@ Two Forms of Identification - +

a list of acceptable forms of identification for visitor access to the facility where the system resides is defined;

 - + + @@ -40787,13 +41362,13 @@

Acceptable forms of identification include passports, REAL ID-compliant drivers’ licenses, and Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards. For gaining access to facilities using automated mechanisms, organizations may use PIV cards, key cards, PINs, and biometrics.

 - +

two forms of identification are required from for visitor access to the facility where the system resides.

 - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing physical access authorizations

@@ -40807,7 +41382,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with physical access authorization responsibilities

organizational personnel with physical access to the system facility

@@ -40816,7 +41391,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for physical access authorizations

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access authorizations

@@ -40827,7 +41402,7 @@ Restrict Unescorted Access - + guards @@ -40922,7 +41498,7 @@ - +

physical access control systems or devices used to control ingress and egress to the facility are defined (if selected);

@@ -40930,7 +41506,7 @@ - +

entry or exit points for which physical access logs are maintained are defined;

@@ -40938,7 +41514,7 @@ - +

physical access controls to control access to areas within the facility designated as publicly accessible are defined;

@@ -40947,7 +41523,7 @@ - +

circumstances requiring visitor escorts and control of visitor activity are defined;

@@ -40955,7 +41531,7 @@ - +

physical access devices to be inventoried are defined;

@@ -40963,28 +41539,29 @@ - +

frequency at which to inventory physical access devices is defined;

 - +

frequency at which to change combinations is defined;

 - +

frequency at which to change keys is defined;

 - + + @@ -41057,78 +41634,78 @@

Physical access control applies to employees and visitors. Individuals with permanent physical access authorizations are not considered visitors. Physical access controls for publicly accessible areas may include physical access control logs/records, guards, or physical access devices and barriers to prevent movement from publicly accessible areas to non-public areas. Organizations determine the types of guards needed, including professional security staff, system users, or administrative staff. Physical access devices include keys, locks, combinations, biometric readers, and card readers. Physical access control systems comply with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines. Organizations have flexibility in the types of audit logs employed. Audit logs can be procedural, automated, or some combination thereof. Physical access points can include facility access points, interior access points to systems that require supplemental access controls, or both. Components of systems may be in areas designated as publicly accessible with organizations controlling access to the components.

 - + - + - +

physical access authorizations are enforced at by verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility;

 - +

physical access authorizations are enforced at by controlling ingress and egress to the facility using ;

 - +

physical access audit logs are maintained for ;

 - +

access to areas within the facility designated as publicly accessible are maintained by implementing ;

 - + - +

visitors are escorted;

 - +

visitor activity is controlled ;

 - + - +

keys are secured;

 - +

combinations are secured;

 - +

other physical access devices are secured;

 - +

are inventoried ;

 - + - +

combinations are changed , when combinations are compromised, or when individuals possessing the combinations are transferred or terminated;

 - +

keys are changed , when keys are lost, or when individuals possessing the keys are transferred or terminated.

 @@ -41138,7 +41715,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing physical access control

@@ -41155,7 +41732,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with physical access control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -41163,7 +41740,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for physical access control

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access control

@@ -41175,14 +41752,15 @@ - +

physical spaces containing one or more components of the system are defined;

 - + + @@ -41193,14 +41771,14 @@

Control of physical access to the system provides additional physical security for those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of system components.

 - + - +

physical access authorizations to the system are enforced;

 - +

physical access controls are enforced for the facility at .

 @@ -41208,7 +41786,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing physical access control

@@ -41224,7 +41802,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with physical access authorization responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -41232,7 +41810,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for physical access control to the information system/components

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access control for facility areas containing system components

@@ -41243,14 +41821,15 @@ Facility and Systems - +

the frequency at which to perform security checks at the physical perimeter of the facility or system for exfiltration of information or removal of system components is defined;

 - + + @@ -41263,13 +41842,13 @@

Organizations determine the extent, frequency, and/or randomness of security checks to adequately mitigate risk associated with exfiltration.

 - +

security checks are performed at the physical perimeter of the facility or system for exfiltration of information or removal of system components.

 - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing physical access control

@@ -41285,7 +41864,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with physical access control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -41293,7 +41872,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for physical access control to the facility and/or system

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access control for the facility or system

@@ -41305,14 +41884,15 @@ Continuous Guards - +

physical access points to the facility where the system resides are defined;

 - + + @@ -41326,13 +41906,13 @@

Employing guards at selected physical access points to the facility provides a more rapid response capability for organizations. Guards also provide the opportunity for human surveillance in areas of the facility not covered by video surveillance.

 - +

guards are employed to control to the facility where the system resides 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

 - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing physical access control

@@ -41347,7 +41927,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with physical access control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -41355,7 +41935,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for physical access control to the facility where the system resides

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access control for the facility where the system resides

@@ -41366,14 +41946,15 @@ Lockable Casings - +

system components to be protected from unauthorized physical access are defined;

 - + + @@ -41384,13 +41965,13 @@

The greatest risk from the use of portable devices—such as smart phones, tablets, and notebook computers—is theft. Organizations can employ lockable, physical casings to reduce or eliminate the risk of equipment theft. Such casings come in a variety of sizes, from units that protect a single notebook computer to full cabinets that can protect multiple servers, computers, and peripherals. Lockable physical casings can be used in conjunction with cable locks or lockdown plates to prevent the theft of the locked casing containing the computer equipment.

 - +

lockable physical casings are used to protect from unauthorized access.

 - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing physical access control

@@ -41402,7 +41983,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with physical access control responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -41410,7 +41991,7 @@ - +

Lockable physical casings

 @@ -41420,7 +42001,7 @@ Tamper Protection - +

anti-tamper technologies to be employed are defined;

@@ -41428,7 +42009,7 @@ - + an orderly shutdown of the system transition of the system to long-term alternate power - + + @@ -42764,13 +43370,13 @@

An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) is an electrical system or mechanism that provides emergency power when there is a failure of the main power source. A UPS is typically used to protect computers, data centers, telecommunication equipment, or other electrical equipment where an unexpected power disruption could cause injuries, fatalities, serious mission or business disruption, or loss of data or information. A UPS differs from an emergency power system or backup generator in that the UPS provides near-instantaneous protection from unanticipated power interruptions from the main power source by providing energy stored in batteries, supercapacitors, or flywheels. The battery duration of a UPS is relatively short but provides sufficient time to start a standby power source, such as a backup generator, or properly shut down the system.

 - +

an uninterruptible power supply is provided to facilitate in the event of a primary power source loss.

 - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing emergency power

@@ -42783,7 +43389,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for emergency power and/or planning

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -42791,7 +43397,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing an uninterruptible power supply

the uninterruptable power supply

@@ -42801,14 +43407,15 @@ Alternate Power Supply — Minimal Operational Capability - + - + + @@ -42819,14 +43426,14 @@

Provision of an alternate power supply with minimal operating capability can be satisfied by accessing a secondary commercial power supply or other external power supply.

 - + - +

an alternate power supply provided for the system is activated ;

 - +

the alternate power supply provided for the system can maintain minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.

 @@ -42834,7 +43441,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing emergency power

@@ -42847,7 +43454,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for emergency power and/or planning

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -42855,7 +43462,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing an alternate power supply

the alternate power supply

@@ -42866,7 +43473,7 @@ Alternate Power Supply — Self-contained - + minimally required operational capability full operational capability - + + @@ -42904,20 +43512,20 @@

The provision of a long-term, self-contained power supply can be satisfied by using one or more generators with sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the organization.

 - +

an alternate power supply provided for the system is activated ;

- +

the alternate power supply provided for the system is self-contained;

 - +

the alternate power supply provided for the system is not reliant on external power generation;

 - +

the alternate power supply provided for the system is capable of maintaining in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.

 @@ -42925,7 +43533,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing emergency power

@@ -42938,7 +43546,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for emergency power and/or planning

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -42946,7 +43554,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing an alternate power supply

the alternate power supply

@@ -42957,7 +43565,8 @@ Emergency Lighting - + + @@ -42969,24 +43578,24 @@

The provision of emergency lighting applies primarily to organizational facilities that contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Emergency lighting provisions for the system are described in the contingency plan for the organization. If emergency lighting for the system fails or cannot be provided, organizations consider alternate processing sites for power-related contingencies.

 - + - +

automatic emergency lighting that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption is employed for the system;

 - +

automatic emergency lighting that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption is maintained for the system;

 - +

automatic emergency lighting for the system covers emergency exits within the facility;

 - +

automatic emergency lighting for the system covers evacuation routes within the facility.

 @@ -42994,7 +43603,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing emergency lighting

@@ -43007,7 +43616,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for emergency lighting and/or planning

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -43015,7 +43624,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing an emergency lighting capability

 @@ -43023,7 +43632,8 @@ Essential Mission and Business Functions - + + @@ -43034,13 +43644,13 @@

Organizations define their essential missions and functions.

 - +

emergency lighting is provided for all areas within the facility supporting essential mission and business functions.

 - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing emergency lighting

@@ -43054,7 +43664,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for emergency lighting and/or planning

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -43062,7 +43672,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the emergency lighting capability

 @@ -43072,7 +43682,8 @@ Fire Protection - + + @@ -43083,34 +43694,34 @@

The provision of fire detection and suppression systems applies primarily to organizational facilities that contain concentrations of system resources, including data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Fire detection and suppression systems that may require an independent energy source include sprinkler systems and smoke detectors. An independent energy source is an energy source, such as a microgrid, that is separate, or can be separated, from the energy sources providing power for the other parts of the facility.

 - + - +

fire detection systems are employed;

 - +

employed fire detection systems are supported by an independent energy source;

 - +

employed fire detection systems are maintained;

 - +

fire suppression systems are employed;

 - +

employed fire suppression systems are supported by an independent energy source;

 - +

employed fire suppression systems are maintained.

 @@ -43118,7 +43729,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing fire protection

@@ -43131,7 +43742,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for fire detection and suppression devices/systems

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -43139,7 +43750,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing fire suppression/detection devices/systems

 @@ -43148,7 +43759,7 @@ Detection Systems — Automatic Activation and Notification - +

personnel or roles to be notified in the event of a fire is/are defined;

@@ -43156,14 +43767,15 @@ - +

emergency responders to be notified in the event of a fire are defined;

 - + + @@ -43174,19 +43786,19 @@

Organizations can identify personnel, roles, and emergency responders if individuals on the notification list need to have access authorizations or clearances (e.g., to enter to facilities where access is restricted due to the classification or impact level of information within the facility). Notification mechanisms may require independent energy sources to ensure that the notification capability is not adversely affected by the fire.

 - + - +

fire detection systems that activate automatically are employed in the event of a fire;

 - +

fire detection systems that notify automatically are employed in the event of a fire;

 - +

fire detection systems that notify automatically are employed in the event of a fire.

 @@ -43194,7 +43806,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing fire protection

@@ -43209,7 +43821,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for fire detection and suppression devices/systems

organizational personnel with responsibilities for notifying appropriate personnel, roles, and emergency responders of fires

@@ -43218,7 +43830,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing fire detection devices/systems

activation of fire detection devices/systems (simulated)

@@ -43230,7 +43842,7 @@ Suppression Systems — Automatic Activation and Notification - +

personnel or roles to be notified in the event of a fire is/are defined;

@@ -43238,14 +43850,15 @@ - +

emergency responders to be notified in the event of a fire are defined;

 - + + @@ -43263,28 +43876,28 @@

Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency responders if individuals on the notification list need to have appropriate access authorizations and/or clearances (e.g., to enter to facilities where access is restricted due to the impact level or classification of information within the facility). Notification mechanisms may require independent energy sources to ensure that the notification capability is not adversely affected by the fire.

 - + - + - +

fire suppression systems that activate automatically are employed;

 - +

fire suppression systems that notify automatically are employed;

 - +

fire suppression systems that notify automatically are employed;

 - +

an automatic fire suppression capability is employed when the facility is not staffed on a continuous basis.

 @@ -43292,7 +43905,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing fire protection

@@ -43306,7 +43919,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for fire detection and suppression devices/systems

organizational personnel with responsibilities for providing automatic notifications of any activation of fire suppression devices/systems to appropriate personnel, roles, and emergency responders

@@ -43315,7 +43928,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing fire suppression devices/systems

activation of fire suppression devices/systems (simulated)

@@ -43326,7 +43939,8 @@ Automatic Fire Suppression - + + @@ -43335,7 +43949,7 @@ Inspections - +

the frequency for conducting fire protection inspections on the facility is defined;

@@ -43343,14 +43957,15 @@ - +

a time period for resolving deficiencies identified by fire protection inspections is defined;

 - + + @@ -43361,14 +43976,14 @@

Authorized and qualified personnel within the jurisdiction of the organization include state, county, and city fire inspectors and fire marshals. Organizations provide escorts during inspections in situations where the systems that reside within the facilities contain sensitive information.

 - + - +

the facility undergoes fire protection inspections by authorized and qualified inspectors;

 - +

the identified deficiencies from fire protection inspections are resolved within .

 @@ -43376,7 +43991,7 @@ - +

Physical and environmental protection policy

procedures addressing fire protection

@@ -43391,7 +44006,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with responsibilities for planning, approving, and executing fire inspections

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -43403,7 +44018,7 @@ Environmental Controls - + organization-level mission/business process-level @@ -44460,7 +45090,7 @@ - +

an official to manage the planning policy and procedures is defined;

@@ -44468,7 +45098,7 @@ - +

the frequency with which the current planning policy is reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -44476,7 +45106,7 @@ - +

events that would require the current planning policy to be reviewed and updated are defined;

@@ -44484,7 +45114,7 @@ - +

the frequency with which the current planning procedures are reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -44492,14 +45122,15 @@ - +

events that would require procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

 - + + @@ -44554,72 +45185,72 @@

Planning policy and procedures for the controls in the PL family implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on their development. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission level or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission/business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to planning policy and procedures include, but are not limited to, assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

 - + - + - +

a planning policy is developed and documented.

 - +

the planning policy is disseminated to ;

 - +

planning procedures to facilitate the implementation of the planning policy and associated planning controls are developed and documented;

 - +

the planning procedures are disseminated to ;

 - + - + - +

the planning policy addresses purpose;

 - +

the planning policy addresses scope;

 - +

the planning policy addresses roles;

 - +

the planning policy addresses responsibilities;

 - +

the planning policy addresses management commitment;

 - +

the planning policy addresses coordination among organizational entities;

 - +

the planning policy addresses compliance;

 - +

the planning policy is consistent with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines;

 @@ -44628,35 +45259,35 @@ - +

the is designated to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the planning policy and procedures;

 - + - + - +

the current planning policy is reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current planning policy is reviewed and updated following ;

 - + - +

the current planning procedures are reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current planning procedures are reviewed and updated following .

 @@ -44668,7 +45299,7 @@ - +

Planning policy and procedures

system security plan

@@ -44678,7 +45309,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with planning responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -44689,7 +45320,7 @@ System Security and Privacy Plans - +

individuals or groups with whom security and privacy-related activities affecting the system that require planning and coordination is/are assigned;

@@ -44697,7 +45328,7 @@ - +

personnel or roles to receive distributed copies of the system security and privacy plans is/are assigned;

@@ -44705,14 +45336,15 @@ - +

frequency to review system security and privacy plans is defined;

 - + + @@ -44847,214 +45479,214 @@

Security- and privacy-related activities that may require coordination and planning with other individuals or groups within the organization include assessments, audits, inspections, hardware and software maintenance, acquisition and supply chain risk management, patch management, and contingency plan testing. Planning and coordination include emergency and nonemergency (i.e., planned or non-urgent unplanned) situations. The process defined by organizations to plan and coordinate security- and privacy-related activities can also be included in other documents, as appropriate.

 - + - + - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that is consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that is consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that explicitly defines the constituent system components;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that explicitly defines the constituent system components;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that describes the operational context of the system in terms of mission and business processes;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that describes the operational context of the system in terms of mission and business processes;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that identifies the individuals that fulfill system roles and responsibilities;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that identifies the individuals that fulfill system roles and responsibilities;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that identifies the information types processed, stored, and transmitted by the system;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that identifies the information types processed, stored, and transmitted by the system;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that provides the security categorization of the system, including supporting rationale;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that provides the security categorization of the system, including supporting rationale;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that describes any specific threats to the system that are of concern to the organization;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that describes any specific threats to the system that are of concern to the organization;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that provides the results of a privacy risk assessment for systems processing personally identifiable information;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that provides the results of a privacy risk assessment for systems processing personally identifiable information;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that describes the operational environment for the system and any dependencies on or connections to other systems or system components;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that describes the operational environment for the system and any dependencies on or connections to other systems or system components;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that provides an overview of the security requirements for the system;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that provides an overview of the privacy requirements for the system;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that identifies any relevant control baselines or overlays, if applicable;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that identifies any relevant control baselines or overlays, if applicable;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that describes the controls in place or planned for meeting the security requirements, including rationale for any tailoring decisions;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that describes the controls in place or planned for meeting the privacy requirements, including rationale for any tailoring decisions;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that includes risk determinations for security architecture and design decisions;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that includes risk determinations for privacy architecture and design decisions;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that includes security-related activities affecting the system that require planning and coordination with ;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that includes privacy-related activities affecting the system that require planning and coordination with ;

 - + - +

a security plan for the system is developed that is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to plan implementation;

 - +

a privacy plan for the system is developed that is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to plan implementation.

 @@ -45063,52 +45695,52 @@ - + - +

copies of the plans are distributed to ;

 - +

subsequent changes to the plans are communicated to ;

 - +

plans are reviewed ;

 - + - +

plans are updated to address changes to the system and environment of operations;

 - +

plans are updated to address problems identified during the plan implementation;

 - +

plans are updated to address problems identified during control assessments;

 - + - +

plans are protected from unauthorized disclosure;

 - +

plans are protected from unauthorized modification.

 @@ -45118,7 +45750,7 @@ - +

Security and privacy planning policy

procedures addressing system security and privacy plan development and implementation

@@ -45136,7 +45768,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system security and privacy planning and plan implementation responsibilities

system developers

@@ -45145,7 +45777,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for system security and privacy plan development, review, update, and approval

mechanisms supporting the system security and privacy plan

@@ -45154,7 +45786,8 @@ Concept of Operations - + + @@ -45162,7 +45795,8 @@ Functional Architecture - + + @@ -45170,7 +45804,8 @@ Plan and Coordinate with Other Organizational Entities - + + @@ -45179,7 +45814,8 @@ System Security Plan Update - + + @@ -45188,7 +45824,7 @@ Rules of Behavior - +

frequency for reviewing and updating the rules of behavior is defined;

@@ -45196,7 +45832,7 @@ - + organization-level mission/business process-level @@ -50253,7 +50937,7 @@ - +

an official to manage the personnel security policy and procedures is defined;

@@ -50261,7 +50945,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which the current personnel security policy is reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -50269,7 +50953,7 @@ - +

events that would require the current personnel security policy to be reviewed and updated are defined;

@@ -50277,7 +50961,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which the current personnel security procedures are reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -50285,14 +50969,15 @@ - +

events that would require the personnel security procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

 - + + @@ -50345,72 +51030,72 @@

Personnel security policy and procedures for the controls in the PS family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on their development. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission level or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission/business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to personnel security policy and procedures include, but are not limited to, assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

 - + - + - +

a personnel security policy is developed and documented;

 - +

the personnel security policy is disseminated to ;

 - +

personnel security procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy and associated personnel security controls are developed and documented;

 - +

the personnel security procedures are disseminated to ;

 - + - + - +

the personnel security policy addresses purpose;

 - +

the personnel security policy addresses scope;

 - +

the personnel security policy addresses roles;

 - +

the personnel security policy addresses responsibilities;

 - +

the personnel security policy addresses management commitment;

 - +

the personnel security policy addresses coordination among organizational entities;

 - +

the personnel security policy addresses compliance;

 - +

the personnel security policy is consistent with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines;

 @@ -50419,35 +51104,35 @@ - +

the is designated to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the personnel security policy and procedures;

 - + - + - +

the current personnel security policy is reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current personnel security policy is reviewed and updated following ;

 - + - +

the current personnel security procedures are reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current personnel security procedures are reviewed and updated following .

 @@ -50459,7 +51144,7 @@ - +

Personnel security policy

personnel security procedures

@@ -50472,7 +51157,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -50483,14 +51168,15 @@ Position Risk Designation - +

the frequency at which to review and update position risk designations is defined;

 - + + @@ -50523,19 +51209,19 @@

Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management (OPM) policy and guidance. Proper position designation is the foundation of an effective and consistent suitability and personnel security program. The Position Designation System (PDS) assesses the duties and responsibilities of a position to determine the degree of potential damage to the efficiency or integrity of the service due to misconduct of an incumbent of a position and establishes the risk level of that position. The PDS assessment also determines if the duties and responsibilities of the position present the potential for position incumbents to bring about a material adverse effect on national security and the degree of that potential effect, which establishes the sensitivity level of a position. The results of the assessment determine what level of investigation is conducted for a position. Risk designations can guide and inform the types of authorizations that individuals receive when accessing organizational information and information systems. Position screening criteria include explicit information security role appointment requirements. Parts 1400 and 731 of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, establish the requirements for organizations to evaluate relevant covered positions for a position sensitivity and position risk designation commensurate with the duties and responsibilities of those positions.

 - + - +

a risk designation is assigned to all organizational positions;

 - +

screening criteria are established for individuals filling organizational positions;

 - +

position risk designations are reviewed and updated .

 @@ -50543,7 +51229,7 @@ - +

Personnel security policy

procedures addressing position categorization

@@ -50556,7 +51242,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -50564,7 +51250,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for assigning, reviewing, and updating position risk designations

organizational processes for establishing screening criteria

@@ -50579,21 +51265,22 @@ - +

conditions requiring rescreening of individuals are defined;

 - +

the frequency of rescreening individuals where it is so indicated is defined;

 - + + @@ -50628,21 +51315,21 @@

Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines, and specific criteria established for the risk designations of assigned positions. Examples of personnel screening include background investigations and agency checks. Organizations may define different rescreening conditions and frequencies for personnel accessing systems based on types of information processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems.

 - + - +

individuals are screened prior to authorizing access to the system;

 - + - +

individuals are rescreened in accordance with ;

 - +

where rescreening is so indicated, individuals are rescreened .

 @@ -50652,7 +51339,7 @@ - +

Personnel security policy

procedures addressing personnel screening

@@ -50663,7 +51350,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -50671,7 +51358,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for personnel screening

 @@ -50679,7 +51366,8 @@ Classified Information - + + @@ -50692,14 +51380,14 @@

Classified information is the most sensitive information that the Federal Government processes, stores, or transmits. It is imperative that individuals have the requisite security clearances and system access authorizations prior to gaining access to such information. Access authorizations are enforced by system access controls (see AC-3 ) and flow controls (see AC-4).

 - + - +

individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are cleared;

 - +

individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are indoctrinated to the highest classification level of the information to which they have access on the system.

 @@ -50707,7 +51395,7 @@ - +

Personnel security policy

procedures addressing personnel screening

@@ -50718,7 +51406,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -50726,7 +51414,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for clearing and indoctrinating personnel for access to classified information

 @@ -50735,7 +51423,8 @@ Formal Indoctrination - + + @@ -50748,13 +51437,13 @@

Types of classified information that require formal indoctrination include Special Access Program (SAP), Restricted Data (RD), and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

 - +

individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting types of classified information that require formal indoctrination are formally indoctrinated for all of the relevant types of information to which they have access on the system.

 - +

Personnel security policy

procedures addressing personnel screening

@@ -50766,7 +51455,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -50774,7 +51463,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for formal indoctrination for all relevant types of information to which personnel have access

 @@ -50784,14 +51473,15 @@ Information Requiring Special Protective Measures - +

additional personnel screening criteria to be satisfied for individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting information requiring special protection are defined;

 - + + @@ -50810,14 +51500,14 @@

Organizational information that requires special protection includes controlled unclassified information. Personnel security criteria include position sensitivity background screening requirements.

 - + - +

individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting information requiring special protection have valid access authorizations that are demonstrated by assigned official government duties;

 - +

individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting information requiring special protection satisfy .

 @@ -50825,7 +51515,7 @@ - +

Personnel security policy

access control policy, procedures addressing personnel screening

@@ -50838,7 +51528,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -50846,7 +51536,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for ensuring valid access authorizations for information requiring special protection

organizational process for additional personnel screening for information requiring special protection

@@ -50857,7 +51547,7 @@ Citizenship Requirements - +

information types that are processed, stored, or transmitted by a system that require individuals accessing the system to meet are defined;

@@ -50865,14 +51555,15 @@ - +

citizenship requirements to be met by individuals to access a system processing, storing, or transmitting information are defined;

 - + + @@ -50883,13 +51574,13 @@

None.

 - +

individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting meet .

 - +

Personnel security policy

access control policy, procedures addressing personnel screening

@@ -50902,7 +51593,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -50910,7 +51601,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for ensuring valid access authorizations for information requiring citizenship

organizational process for additional personnel screening for information requiring citizenship

@@ -50922,7 +51613,7 @@ Personnel Termination - +

a time period within which to disable system access is defined;

@@ -50930,14 +51621,15 @@ - +

information security topics to be discussed when conducting exit interviews are defined;

 - + + @@ -50973,29 +51665,29 @@

System property includes hardware authentication tokens, system administration technical manuals, keys, identification cards, and building passes. Exit interviews ensure that terminated individuals understand the security constraints imposed by being former employees and that proper accountability is achieved for system-related property. Security topics at exit interviews include reminding individuals of nondisclosure agreements and potential limitations on future employment. Exit interviews may not always be possible for some individuals, including in cases related to the unavailability of supervisors, illnesses, or job abandonment. Exit interviews are important for individuals with security clearances. The timely execution of termination actions is essential for individuals who have been terminated for cause. In certain situations, organizations consider disabling the system accounts of individuals who are being terminated prior to the individuals being notified.

 - + - +

upon termination of individual employment, system access is disabled within ;

 - +

upon termination of individual employment, any authenticators and credentials are terminated or revoked;

 - +

upon termination of individual employment, exit interviews that include a discussion of are conducted;

 - +

upon termination of individual employment, all security-related organizational system-related property is retrieved;

 - +

upon termination of individual employment, access to organizational information and systems formerly controlled by the terminated individual are retained.

 @@ -51003,7 +51695,7 @@ - +

Personnel security policy

procedures addressing personnel termination

@@ -51017,7 +51709,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel with account management responsibilities

@@ -51027,7 +51719,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for personnel termination

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing personnel termination notifications

@@ -51037,7 +51729,8 @@ Post-employment Requirements - + + @@ -51055,14 +51748,14 @@

Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding matters of post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.

 - + - +

terminated individuals are notified of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements for the protection of organizational information;

 - +

terminated individuals are required to sign an acknowledgement of post-employment requirements as part of the organizational termination process.

 @@ -51070,7 +51763,7 @@ - +

Personnel security policy

procedures addressing personnel termination

@@ -51082,7 +51775,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personnel security responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -51090,7 +51783,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for post-employment requirements

 @@ -51100,7 +51793,7 @@ Automated Actions - +

automated mechanisms to notify personnel or roles of individual termination actions and/or to disable access to system resources are defined;

@@ -51108,7 +51801,7 @@ - + organization-level mission/business process-level @@ -51867,7 +52569,7 @@ - +

an official to manage the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures is defined;

@@ -51875,7 +52577,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which the current personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy is reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -51883,7 +52585,7 @@ - +

events that would require the current personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy to be reviewed and updated are defined;

@@ -51891,7 +52593,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which the current personally identifiable information processing and transparency procedures are reviewed and updated is defined;

@@ -51899,14 +52601,15 @@ - +

events that would require the personally identifiable information processing and transparency procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

 - + + @@ -51953,72 +52656,72 @@

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures address the controls in the PT family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

 - + - + - +

a personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy is developed and documented;

 - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy is disseminated to ;

 - +

personally identifiable information processing and transparency procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and associated personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls are developed and documented;

 - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency procedures are disseminated to ;

 - + - + - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy addresses purpose;

 - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy addresses scope;

 - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy addresses roles;

 - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy addresses responsibilities;

 - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy addresses management commitment;

 - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy addresses coordination among organizational entities;

 - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy addresses compliance;

 - +

the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy is consistent with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines;

 @@ -52027,35 +52730,35 @@ - +

the is designated to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures;

 - + - + - +

the current personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy is reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy is reviewed and updated following ;

 - + - +

the current personally identifiable information processing and transparency procedures are reviewed and updated ;

 - +

the current personally identifiable information processing and transparency procedures are reviewed and updated following .

 @@ -52067,7 +52770,7 @@ - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy plan

@@ -52077,7 +52780,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -52088,7 +52791,7 @@ Authority to Process Personally Identifiable Information - +

the authority to permit the processing (defined in PT-02_ODP[02]) of personally identifiable information is defined;

@@ -52096,7 +52799,7 @@ - +

the type of processing of personally identifiable information is defined;

@@ -52104,14 +52807,15 @@ - +

the type of processing of personally identifiable information to be restricted is defined;

 - + + @@ -52149,14 +52853,14 @@

Organizations take steps to ensure that personally identifiable information is only processed for authorized purposes, including training organizational personnel on the authorized processing of personally identifiable information and monitoring and auditing organizational use of personally identifiable information.

 - + - +

the that permits the of personally identifiable information is determined and documented;

 - +

the of personally identifiable information is restricted to only that which is authorized.

 @@ -52164,7 +52868,7 @@ - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy plan

@@ -52173,7 +52877,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -52181,7 +52885,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for authorizing the processing of personally identifiable information

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the restriction of personally identifiable information processing

@@ -52191,7 +52895,7 @@ Data Tagging - +

the authorized processing of personally identifiable information is defined;

@@ -52199,14 +52903,15 @@ - +

elements of personally identifiable information to be tagged are defined;

 - + + @@ -52229,13 +52934,13 @@

Data tags support the tracking and enforcement of authorized processing by conveying the types of processing that are authorized along with the relevant elements of personally identifiable information throughout the system. Data tags may also support the use of automated tools.

 - +

data tags containing are attached to .

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures including procedures addressing data tagging

data tag definitions

@@ -52247,7 +52952,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -52255,7 +52960,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for authorizing the processing of personally identifiable information

organizational processes for data tagging

@@ -52268,14 +52973,15 @@ Automation - +

automated mechanisms used to manage enforcement of the authorized processing of personally identifiable information are defined;

 - + + @@ -52297,13 +53003,13 @@

Automated mechanisms augment verification that only authorized processing is occurring.

 - +

enforcement of the authorized processing of personally identifiable information is managed using .

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy plan

@@ -52312,7 +53018,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -52320,7 +53026,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for authorizing the processing of personally identifiable information

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the management of authorized personally identifiable information processing

@@ -52332,7 +53038,7 @@ Personally Identifiable Information Processing Purposes - +

the purpose(s) for processing personally identifiable information is/are defined;

@@ -52340,7 +53046,7 @@ - +

the processing of personally identifiable information to be restricted is defined;

@@ -52348,7 +53054,7 @@ - +

mechanisms to be implemented for ensuring any changes in the processing of personally identifiable information are made in accordance with requirements are defined;

@@ -52356,14 +53062,15 @@ - +

requirements for changing the processing of personally identifiable information are defined;

 - + + @@ -52408,40 +53115,40 @@

Organizations monitor for changes in personally identifiable information processing. Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel to ensure that any new purposes that arise from changes in processing are compatible with the purpose for which the information was collected, or if the new purpose is not compatible, implement mechanisms in accordance with defined requirements to allow for the new processing, if appropriate. Mechanisms may include obtaining consent from individuals, revising privacy policies, or other measures to manage privacy risks that arise from changes in personally identifiable information processing purposes.

 - + - +

the for processing personally identifiable information is/are identified and documented;

 - + - +

the purpose(s) is/are described in the public privacy notices of the organization;

 - +

the purpose(s) is/are described in the policies of the organization;

 - +

the of personally identifiable information are restricted to only that which is compatible with the identified purpose(s);

 - + - +

changes in the processing of personally identifiable information are monitored;

 - +

are implemented to ensure that any changes are made in accordance with .

 @@ -52451,7 +53158,7 @@ - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

configuration management plan

@@ -52467,7 +53174,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -52475,7 +53182,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for authorizing the processing of personally identifiable information

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the management of authorized personally identifiable information processing

@@ -52486,7 +53193,7 @@ Data Tagging - +

processing purposes to be contained in data tags are defined;

@@ -52494,14 +53201,15 @@ - +

elements of personally identifiable information to be tagged are defined;

 - + + @@ -52522,13 +53230,13 @@

Data tags support the tracking of processing purposes by conveying the purposes along with the relevant elements of personally identifiable information throughout the system. By conveying the processing purposes in a data tag along with the personally identifiable information as the information transits a system, a system owner or operator can identify whether a change in processing would be compatible with the identified and documented purposes. Data tags may also support the use of automated tools.

 - +

data tags containing are attached to .

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

documented description of how data tags are used to identify personally identifiable information data elements and their authorized uses

@@ -52540,7 +53248,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with data tagging responsibilities

@@ -52549,7 +53257,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for authorizing the processing of personally identifiable information

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing data tagging

@@ -52560,14 +53268,15 @@ Automation - +

automated mechanisms for tracking the processing purposes of personally identifiable information are defined;

 - + + @@ -52588,13 +53297,13 @@

Automated mechanisms augment tracking of the processing purposes.

 - +

the processing purposes of personally identifiable information are tracked using .

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

data extracts with corresponding data tags

@@ -52604,7 +53313,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -52612,7 +53321,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing the enforcement of authorized processing of personally identifiable information

automated tracking mechanisms

@@ -52624,14 +53333,15 @@ Consent - +

the tools or mechanisms to be implemented for individuals to consent to the processing of their personally identifiable information are defined;

 - + + @@ -52647,13 +53357,13 @@

Consent allows individuals to participate in making decisions about the processing of their information and transfers some of the risk that arises from the processing of personally identifiable information from the organization to an individual. Consent may be required by applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or guidelines. Otherwise, when selecting consent as a control, organizations consider whether individuals can be reasonably expected to understand and accept the privacy risks that arise from their authorization. Organizations consider whether other controls may more effectively mitigate privacy risk either alone or in conjunction with consent. Organizations also consider any demographic or contextual factors that may influence the understanding or behavior of individuals with respect to the processing carried out by the system or organization. When soliciting consent from individuals, organizations consider the appropriate mechanism for obtaining consent, including the type of consent (e.g., opt-in, opt-out), how to properly authenticate and identity proof individuals and how to obtain consent through electronic means. In addition, organizations consider providing a mechanism for individuals to revoke consent once it has been provided, as appropriate. Finally, organizations consider usability factors to help individuals understand the risks being accepted when providing consent, including the use of plain language and avoiding technical jargon.

 - +

the are implemented for individuals to consent to the processing of their personally identifiable information prior to its collection that facilitate individuals’ informed decision-making.

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

consent policies and procedures

@@ -52666,7 +53376,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -52674,7 +53384,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the collection of personally identifiable information

consent tools or mechanisms for users to authorize the processing of their personally identifiable information

@@ -52685,14 +53395,15 @@ Tailored Consent - +

tailoring mechanisms for processing selected elements of personally identifiable information permissions are defined;

 - + + @@ -52704,13 +53415,13 @@

While some processing may be necessary for the basic functionality of the product or service, other processing may not. In these circumstances, organizations allow individuals to select how specific personally identifiable information elements may be processed. More tailored consent may help reduce privacy risk, increase individual satisfaction, and avoid adverse behaviors, such as abandonment of the product or service.

 - +

are provided to allow individuals to tailor processing permissions to selected elements of personally identifiable information.

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

consent policies and procedures

@@ -52722,7 +53433,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with user interface or user experience responsibilities

@@ -52731,7 +53442,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for consenting to the processing of personally identifiable information

consent tools or mechanisms

@@ -52743,7 +53454,7 @@ Just-in-time Consent - +

consent mechanisms to be presented to individuals are defined;

@@ -52751,7 +53462,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which to present consent mechanisms to individuals is defined;

@@ -52759,14 +53470,15 @@ - +

personally identifiable information processing to be presented in conjunction with organization-defined consent mechanisms is defined;

 - + + @@ -52778,13 +53490,13 @@

Just-in-time consent enables individuals to participate in how their personally identifiable information is being processed at the time or in conjunction with specific types of data processing when such participation may be most useful to the individual. Individual assumptions about how personally identifiable information is being processed might not be accurate or reliable if time has passed since the individual last gave consent or the type of processing creates significant privacy risk. Organizations use discretion to determine when to use just-in-time consent and may use supporting information on demographics, focus groups, or surveys to learn more about individuals’ privacy interests and concerns.

 - +

are presented to individuals and in conjunction with .

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

consent policies and procedures

@@ -52794,7 +53506,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with user interface or user experience responsibilities

@@ -52803,7 +53515,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the collection of personally identifiable information

mechanisms for obtaining just-in-time consent from users for the processing of their personally identifiable information

@@ -52815,14 +53527,15 @@ Revocation - +

the tools or mechanisms to be implemented for revoking consent to the processing of personally identifiable information are defined;

 - + + @@ -52834,13 +53547,13 @@

Revocation of consent enables individuals to exercise control over their initial consent decision when circumstances change. Organizations consider usability factors in enabling easy-to-use revocation capabilities.

 - +

the are implemented for individuals to revoke consent to the processing of their personally identifiable information.

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

consent revocation policies and procedures

@@ -52851,7 +53564,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with user interface or user experience responsibilities

@@ -52860,7 +53573,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for consenting to the processing of personally identifiable information

tools or mechanisms for implementing consent revocation

@@ -52872,7 +53585,7 @@ Privacy Notice - +

the frequency at which a notice is provided to individuals after initial interaction with an organization is defined;

@@ -52880,14 +53593,15 @@ - +

information to be included with the notice about the processing of personally identifiable information is defined;

 - + + @@ -52930,38 +53644,38 @@

Privacy risk assessments identify the privacy risks associated with the processing of personally identifiable information and may help organizations determine appropriate elements to include in a privacy notice to manage such risks. To help individuals understand how their information is being processed, organizations write materials in plain language and avoid technical jargon.

 - + - + - +

a notice to individuals about the processing of personally identifiable information is provided such that the notice is available to individuals upon first interacting with an organization;

 - +

a notice to individuals about the processing of personally identifiable information is provided such that the notice is subsequently available to individuals ;

 - +

a notice to individuals about the processing of personally identifiable information is provided that is clear, easy-to-understand, and expresses information about personally identifiable information processing in plain language;

 - +

a notice to individuals about the processing of personally identifiable information that identifies the authority that authorizes the processing of personally identifiable information is provided;

 - +

a notice to individuals about the processing of personally identifiable information that identifies the purpose for which personally identifiable information is to be processed is provided;

 - +

a notice to individuals about the processing of personally identifiable information which includes is provided.

 @@ -52969,7 +53683,7 @@ - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -52980,7 +53694,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with user interface or user experience responsibilities

@@ -52989,7 +53703,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes and implementation support or mechanisms for providing notice to individuals regarding the processing of their personally identifiable information

 @@ -52998,14 +53712,15 @@ Just-in-time Notice - +

the frequency at which to present a notice of personally identifiable information processing is defined;

 - + + @@ -53017,13 +53732,13 @@

Just-in-time notices inform individuals of how organizations process their personally identifiable information at a time when such notices may be most useful to the individuals. Individual assumptions about how personally identifiable information will be processed might not be accurate or reliable if time has passed since the organization last presented notice or the circumstances under which the individual was last provided notice have changed. A just-in-time notice can explain data actions that organizations have identified as potentially giving rise to greater privacy risk for individuals. Organizations can use a just-in-time notice to update or remind individuals about specific data actions as they occur or highlight specific changes that occurred since last presenting notice. A just-in-time notice can be used in conjunction with just-in-time consent to explain what will occur if consent is declined. Organizations use discretion to determine when to use a just-in-time notice and may use supporting information on user demographics, focus groups, or surveys to learn about users’ privacy interests and concerns.

 - +

a notice of personally identifiable information processing is presented to individuals at a time and location where the individual provides personally identifiable information, in conjunction with a data action, or .

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -53033,7 +53748,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with user interface or user experience responsibilities

@@ -53042,7 +53757,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes and implementation support or mechanisms for providing notice to individuals regarding the processing of their personally identifiable information

 @@ -53051,7 +53766,8 @@ Privacy Act Statements - + + @@ -53064,13 +53780,13 @@

PRIVACT statements provide formal notice to individuals of the authority that authorizes the solicitation of the information; whether providing the information is mandatory or voluntary; the principal purpose(s) for which the information is to be used; the published routine uses to which the information is subject; the effects on the individual, if any, of not providing all or any part of the information requested; and an appropriate citation and link to the relevant system of records notice. Federal agency personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding the notice provisions of the PRIVACT.

 - +

Privacy Act statements are included on forms that collect information that will be maintained in a Privacy Act system of records, or Privacy Act statements are provided on separate forms that can be retained by individuals.

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -53082,7 +53798,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -53090,7 +53806,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for including Privacy Act statements on forms that collect information or on separate forms that can be retained by individuals

 @@ -53100,7 +53816,8 @@ System of Records Notice - + + @@ -53129,28 +53846,28 @@

The PRIVACT requires that federal agencies publish a system of records notice in the Federal Register upon the establishment and/or modification of a PRIVACT system of records. As a general matter, a system of records notice is required when an agency maintains a group of any records under the control of the agency from which information is retrieved by the name of an individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifier. The notice describes the existence and character of the system and identifies the system of records, the purpose(s) of the system, the authority for maintenance of the records, the categories of records maintained in the system, the categories of individuals about whom records are maintained, the routine uses to which the records are subject, and additional details about the system as described in OMB A-108.

 - + - + - +

system of records notices are drafted in accordance with OMB guidance for systems that process information that will be maintained in a Privacy Act system of records;

 - +

new and significantly modified system of records notices are submitted to the OMB and appropriate congressional committees for advance review for systems that process information that will be maintained in a Privacy Act system of records;

 - +

system of records notices are published in the Federal Register for systems that process information that will be maintained in a Privacy Act system of records;

 - +

system of records notices are kept accurate, up-to-date, and scoped in accordance with policy for systems that process information that will be maintained in a Privacy Act system of records.

 @@ -53158,7 +53875,7 @@ - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -53170,7 +53887,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -53178,7 +53895,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for Privacy Act system of records maintenance

 @@ -53187,14 +53904,15 @@ Routine Uses - +

the frequency at which to review all routine uses published in the system of records notice is defined;

 - + + @@ -53205,13 +53923,13 @@

A PRIVACT routine use is a particular kind of disclosure of a record outside of the federal agency maintaining the system of records. A routine use is an exception to the PRIVACT prohibition on the disclosure of a record in a system of records without the prior written consent of the individual to whom the record pertains. To qualify as a routine use, the disclosure must be for a purpose that is compatible with the purpose for which the information was originally collected. The PRIVACT requires agencies to describe each routine use of the records maintained in the system of records, including the categories of users of the records and the purpose of the use. Agencies may only establish routine uses by explicitly publishing them in the relevant system of records notice.

 - +

all routine uses published in the system of records notice are reviewed to ensure continued accuracy, and to ensure that routine uses continue to be compatible with the purpose for which the information was collected.

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -53222,7 +53940,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -53230,7 +53948,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for reviewing system of records notices

 @@ -53240,14 +53958,15 @@ Exemption Rules - +

the frequency at which to review all Privacy Act exemptions claimed for the system of records is defined;

 - + + @@ -53258,19 +53977,19 @@

The PRIVACT includes two sets of provisions that allow federal agencies to claim exemptions from certain requirements in the statute. In certain circumstances, these provisions allow agencies to promulgate regulations to exempt a system of records from select provisions of the PRIVACT . At a minimum, organizations’ PRIVACT exemption regulations include the specific name(s) of any system(s) of records that will be exempt, the specific provisions of the PRIVACT from which the system(s) of records is to be exempted, the reasons for the exemption, and an explanation for why the exemption is both necessary and appropriate.

 - + - +

all Privacy Act exemptions claimed for the system of records are reviewed to ensure that they remain appropriate and necessary in accordance with law;

 - +

all Privacy Act exemptions claimed for the system of records are reviewed to ensure that they have been promulgated as regulations;

 - +

all Privacy Act exemptions claimed for the system of records are reviewed to ensure that they are accurately described in the system of records notice.

 @@ -53278,7 +53997,7 @@ - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -53290,7 +54009,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -53298,7 +54017,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for Privacy Act system of records maintenance

 @@ -53309,14 +54028,15 @@ Specific Categories of Personally Identifiable Information - +

processing conditions to be applied for specific categories of personally identifiable information are defined;

 - + + @@ -53334,13 +54054,13 @@

Organizations apply any conditions or protections that may be necessary for specific categories of personally identifiable information. These conditions may be required by laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or guidelines. The requirements may also come from the results of privacy risk assessments that factor in contextual changes that may result in an organizational determination that a particular category of personally identifiable information is particularly sensitive or raises particular privacy risks. Organizations consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding any protections that may be necessary.

 - +

are applied for specific categories of personally identifiable information.

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -53356,7 +54076,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -53364,7 +54084,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for supporting and/or implementing personally identifiable information processing

 @@ -53372,7 +54092,8 @@ Social Security Numbers - + + @@ -53396,40 +54117,40 @@

Federal law and policy establish specific requirements for organizations’ processing of Social Security numbers. Organizations take steps to eliminate unnecessary uses of Social Security numbers and other sensitive information and observe any particular requirements that apply.

 - + - + - +

when a system processes Social Security numbers, the unnecessary collection, maintenance, and use of Social Security numbers are eliminated;

 - +

when a system processes Social Security numbers, alternatives to the use of Social Security Numbers as a personal identifier are explored;

 - +

when a system processes Social Security numbers, individual rights, benefits, or privileges provided by law are not denied because of an individual’s refusal to disclose their Social Security number;

 - + - +

when a system processes Social Security numbers, any individual who is asked to disclose their Social Security number is informed whether that disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or other authority such number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it;

 - +

when a system processes Social Security numbers, any individual who is asked to disclose their Social Security number is informed by what statutory or other authority the number is solicited;

 - +

when a system processes Social Security numbers, any individual who is asked to disclose their Social Security number is informed what uses will be made of it.

 @@ -53439,7 +54160,7 @@ - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -53452,7 +54173,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -53460,7 +54181,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for identifying, reviewing, and taking action to control the unnecessary use of Social Security numbers

implementation of an alternative to Social Security numbers as identifiers

@@ -53470,7 +54191,8 @@ First Amendment Information - + + @@ -53481,13 +54203,13 @@

The PRIVACT limits agencies’ ability to process information that describes how individuals exercise rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Organizations consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding these requirements.

 - +

the processing of information describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment is prohibited unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

 - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -53498,7 +54220,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -53506,7 +54228,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for supporting and/or implementing personally identifiable information processing

 @@ -53516,7 +54238,8 @@ Computer Matching Requirements - + + @@ -53551,45 +54274,45 @@

The PRIVACT establishes requirements for federal and non-federal agencies if they engage in a matching program. In general, a matching program is a computerized comparison of records from two or more automated PRIVACT systems of records or an automated system of records and automated records maintained by a non-federal agency (or agent thereof). A matching program either pertains to federal benefit programs or federal personnel or payroll records. A federal benefit match is performed to determine or verify eligibility for payments under federal benefit programs or to recoup payments or delinquent debts under federal benefit programs. A matching program involves not just the matching activity itself but also the investigative follow-up and ultimate action, if any.

 - + - +

approval to conduct the matching program is obtained from the Data Integrity Board when a system or organization processes information for the purpose of conducting a matching program;

 - + - +

a computer matching agreement is developed when a system or organization processes information for the purpose of conducting a matching program;

 - +

a computer matching agreement is entered into when a system or organization processes information for the purpose of conducting a matching program;

 - +

a matching notice is published in the Federal Register when a system or organization processes information for the purpose of conducting a matching program;

 - +

the information produced by the matching program is independently verified before taking adverse action against an individual, if required, when a system or organization processes information for the purpose of conducting a matching program;

 - + - +

individuals are provided with notice when a system or organization processes information for the purpose of conducting a matching program;

 - +

individuals are provided with an opportunity to contest the findings before adverse action is taken against them when a system or organization processes information for the purpose of conducting a matching program.

 @@ -53599,7 +54322,7 @@ - +

Personally identifiable information processing and transparency policy and procedures

privacy notice

@@ -53616,7 +54339,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with personally identifiable information processing and transparency responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -53624,7 +54347,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for supporting and/or implementing personally identifiable information processing

matching program

@@ -53642,14 +54365,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the risk assessment policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the risk assessment procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -53657,7 +54380,7 @@ - + security and privacy plans risk assessment report @@ -54047,7 +54773,7 @@ - +

a document in which risk assessment results are to be documented (if not documented in the security and privacy plans or risk assessment report) is defined (if selected);

@@ -54055,7 +54781,7 @@ - +

the frequency to review risk assessment results is defined;

@@ -54063,7 +54789,7 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom risk assessment results are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -54071,14 +54797,15 @@ - +

the frequency to update the risk assessment is defined;

 - + + @@ -54159,48 +54886,48 @@

Risk assessments can also address information related to the system, including system design, the intended use of the system, testing results, and supply chain-related information or artifacts. Risk assessments can play an important role in control selection processes, particularly during the application of tailoring guidance and in the earliest phases of capability determination.

 - + - + - +

a risk assessment is conducted to identify threats to and vulnerabilities in the system;

 - +

a risk assessment is conducted to determine the likelihood and magnitude of harm from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the system; the information it processes, stores, or transmits; and any related information;

 - +

a risk assessment is conducted to determine the likelihood and impact of adverse effects on individuals arising from the processing of personally identifiable information;

 - +

risk assessment results and risk management decisions from the organization and mission or business process perspectives are integrated with system-level risk assessments;

 - +

risk assessment results are documented in ;

 - +

risk assessment results are reviewed ;

 - +

risk assessment results are disseminated to ;

 - +

the risk assessment is updated or when there are significant changes to the system, its environment of operation, or other conditions that may impact the security or privacy state of the system.

 @@ -54208,7 +54935,7 @@ - +

Risk assessment policy

risk assessment procedures

@@ -54225,7 +54952,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with risk assessment responsibilities

organizational personnel with security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -54233,7 +54960,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for risk assessment

mechanisms supporting and/or conducting, documenting, reviewing, disseminating, and updating the risk assessment

@@ -54243,7 +54970,7 @@ Supply Chain Risk Assessment - +

systems, system components, and system services to assess supply chain risks are defined;

@@ -54251,14 +54978,15 @@ - +

the frequency at which to update the supply chain risk assessment is defined;

 - + + @@ -54282,14 +55010,14 @@

Supply chain-related events include disruption, use of defective components, insertion of counterfeits, theft, malicious development practices, improper delivery practices, and insertion of malicious code. These events can have a significant impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system and its information and, therefore, can also adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The supply chain-related events may be unintentional or malicious and can occur at any point during the system life cycle. An analysis of supply chain risk can help an organization identify systems or components for which additional supply chain risk mitigations are required.

 - + - +

supply chain risks associated with are assessed;

 - +

the supply chain risk assessment is updated , when there are significant changes to the relevant supply chain, or when changes to the system, environments of operation, or other conditions may necessitate a change in the supply chain.

 @@ -54297,7 +55025,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy

inventory of critical systems, system components, and system services

@@ -54316,7 +55044,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with risk assessment responsibilities

organizational personnel with security responsibilities

@@ -54325,7 +55053,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for risk assessment

mechanisms supporting and/or conducting, documenting, reviewing, disseminating, and updating the supply chain risk assessment

@@ -54335,7 +55063,8 @@ Use of All-source Intelligence - + + @@ -54347,13 +55076,13 @@

Organizations employ all-source intelligence to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions. All-source intelligence consists of information derived from all available sources, including publicly available or open-source information, measurement and signature intelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. All-source intelligence is used to analyze the risk of vulnerabilities (both intentional and unintentional) from development, manufacturing, and delivery processes, people, and the environment. The risk analysis may be performed on suppliers at multiple tiers in the supply chain sufficient to manage risks. Organizations may develop agreements to share all-source intelligence information or resulting decisions with other organizations, as appropriate.

 - +

all-source intelligence is used to assist in the analysis of risk.

 - +

Risk assessment policy

security planning policy and procedures

@@ -54369,7 +55098,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with risk assessment responsibilities

organizational personnel with security responsibilities

@@ -54377,7 +55106,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for risk assessment

mechanisms supporting and/or conducting, documenting, reviewing, disseminating, and updating the risk assessment

@@ -54388,14 +55117,15 @@ Dynamic Threat Awareness - +

means to determine the current cyber threat environment on an ongoing basis;

 - + + @@ -54408,13 +55138,13 @@

The threat awareness information that is gathered feeds into the organization’s information security operations to ensure that procedures are updated in response to the changing threat environment. For example, at higher threat levels, organizations may change the privilege or authentication thresholds required to perform certain operations.

 - +

the current cyber threat environment is determined on an ongoing basis using .

 - +

Risk assessment policy

security planning policy and procedures

@@ -54430,7 +55160,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with risk assessment responsibilities

organizational personnel with security responsibilities

@@ -54438,7 +55168,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for risk assessment

mechanisms supporting and/or conducting, documenting, reviewing, disseminating, and updating the risk assessment

@@ -54453,7 +55183,7 @@ - +

advanced automation capabilities to predict and identify risks are defined;

@@ -54461,21 +55191,22 @@ - +

systems or system components where advanced automation and analytics capabilities are to be employed are defined;

 - +

advanced analytics capabilities to predict and identify risks are defined;

 - + + @@ -54487,14 +55218,14 @@

A properly resourced Security Operations Center (SOC) or Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) may be overwhelmed by the volume of information generated by the proliferation of security tools and appliances unless it employs advanced automation and analytics to analyze the data. Advanced automation and analytics capabilities are typically supported by artificial intelligence concepts, including machine learning. Examples include Automated Threat Discovery and Response (which includes broad-based collection, context-based analysis, and adaptive response capabilities), automated workflow operations, and machine assisted decision tools. Note, however, that sophisticated adversaries may be able to extract information related to analytic parameters and retrain the machine learning to classify malicious activity as benign. Accordingly, machine learning is augmented by human monitoring to ensure that sophisticated adversaries are not able to conceal their activities.

 - + - +

are employed to predict and identify risks to ;

 - +

are employed to predict and identify risks to .

 @@ -54502,7 +55233,7 @@ - +

Risk assessment policy

security planning policy and procedures

@@ -54518,7 +55249,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with risk assessment responsibilities

organizational personnel with security responsibilities

@@ -54526,7 +55257,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for risk assessment

mechanisms supporting and/or conducting, documenting, reviewing, disseminating, and updating the risk assessment

@@ -54537,7 +55268,8 @@ Risk Assessment Update - + + @@ -54550,14 +55282,14 @@ - +

frequency for monitoring systems and hosted applications for vulnerabilities is defined;

 - +

frequency for scanning systems and hosted applications for vulnerabilities is defined;

@@ -54565,7 +55297,7 @@ - +

response times to remediate legitimate vulnerabilities in accordance with an organizational assessment of risk are defined;

@@ -54573,14 +55305,15 @@ - +

personnel or roles with whom information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and control assessments is to be shared;

 - + + @@ -54655,58 +55388,58 @@

Organizations may also employ the use of financial incentives (also known as bug bounties ) to further encourage external security researchers to report discovered vulnerabilities. Bug bounty programs can be tailored to the organization’s needs. Bounties can be operated indefinitely or over a defined period of time and can be offered to the general public or to a curated group. Organizations may run public and private bounties simultaneously and could choose to offer partially credentialed access to certain participants in order to evaluate security vulnerabilities from privileged vantage points.

 - + - + - +

systems and hosted applications are monitored for vulnerabilities and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system are identified and reported;

 - +

systems and hosted applications are scanned for vulnerabilities and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system are identified and reported;

 - +

vulnerability monitoring tools and techniques are employed to facilitate interoperability among tools;

- +

vulnerability monitoring tools and techniques are employed to automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;

 - +

vulnerability monitoring tools and techniques are employed to facilitate interoperability among tools and to automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for formatting checklists and test procedures;

 - +

vulnerability monitoring tools and techniques are employed to facilitate interoperability among tools and to automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for measuring vulnerability impact;

 - +

vulnerability scan reports and results from vulnerability monitoring are analyzed;

 - +

legitimate vulnerabilities are remediated in accordance with an organizational assessment of risk;

 - +

information obtained from the vulnerability monitoring process and control assessments is shared with to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other systems;

 - +

vulnerability monitoring tools that include the capability to readily update the vulnerabilities to be scanned are employed.

 @@ -54714,7 +55447,7 @@ - +

Risk assessment policy

procedures addressing vulnerability scanning

@@ -54729,7 +55462,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with risk assessment, control assessment, and vulnerability scanning responsibilities

organizational personnel with vulnerability scan analysis responsibilities

@@ -54740,7 +55473,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for vulnerability scanning, analysis, remediation, and information sharing

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing vulnerability scanning, analysis, remediation, and information sharing

@@ -54749,7 +55482,8 @@ Update Tool Capability - + + @@ -54758,7 +55492,7 @@ Update Vulnerabilities to Be Scanned - + when @@ -55302,7 +56046,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which to employ technical surveillance countermeasure surveys is defined (if selected);

@@ -55310,14 +56054,15 @@ - +

events or indicators which, if they occur, trigger a technical surveillance countermeasures survey are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -55328,13 +56073,13 @@

A technical surveillance countermeasures survey is a service provided by qualified personnel to detect the presence of technical surveillance devices and hazards and to identify technical security weaknesses that could be used in the conduct of a technical penetration of the surveyed facility. Technical surveillance countermeasures surveys also provide evaluations of the technical security posture of organizations and facilities and include visual, electronic, and physical examinations of surveyed facilities, internally and externally. The surveys also provide useful input for risk assessments and information regarding organizational exposure to potential adversaries.

 - +

a technical surveillance countermeasures survey is employed at .

 - +

Risk assessment policy

procedures addressing technical surveillance countermeasures surveys

@@ -55345,7 +56090,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with technical surveillance countermeasures surveys responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -55354,7 +56099,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for technical surveillance countermeasures surveys

mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing technical surveillance countermeasure surveys

@@ -55364,7 +56109,8 @@ Risk Response - + + @@ -55388,24 +56134,24 @@

Organizations have many options for responding to risk including mitigating risk by implementing new controls or strengthening existing controls, accepting risk with appropriate justification or rationale, sharing or transferring risk, or avoiding risk. The risk tolerance of the organization influences risk response decisions and actions. Risk response addresses the need to determine an appropriate response to risk before generating a plan of action and milestones entry. For example, the response may be to accept risk or reject risk, or it may be possible to mitigate the risk immediately so that a plan of action and milestones entry is not needed. However, if the risk response is to mitigate the risk, and the mitigation cannot be completed immediately, a plan of action and milestones entry is generated.

 - + - +

findings from security assessments are responded to in accordance with organizational risk tolerance;

 - +

findings from privacy assessments are responded to in accordance with organizational risk tolerance;

 - +

findings from monitoring are responded to in accordance with organizational risk tolerance;

 - +

findings from audits are responded to in accordance with organizational risk tolerance.

 @@ -55413,7 +56159,7 @@ - +

Risk assessment policy

assessment reports

@@ -55425,7 +56171,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with assessment and auditing responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -55434,7 +56180,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for assessments and audits

mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing assessments and auditing

@@ -55444,7 +56190,8 @@ Privacy Impact Assessments - + + @@ -55486,21 +56233,21 @@

To conduct the privacy impact assessment, organizations can use security and privacy risk assessments. Organizations may also use other related processes that may have different names, including privacy threshold analyses. A privacy impact assessment can also serve as notice to the public regarding the organization’s practices with respect to privacy. Although conducting and publishing privacy impact assessments may be required by law, organizations may develop such policies in the absence of applicable laws. For federal agencies, privacy impact assessments may be required by EGOV ; agencies should consult with their senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel on this requirement and be aware of the statutory exceptions and OMB guidance relating to the provision.

 - + - +

privacy impact assessments are conducted for systems, programs, or other activities before developing or procuring information technology that processes personally identifiable information;

 - + - +

privacy impact assessments are conducted for systems, programs, or other activities before initiating a collection of personally identifiable information that will be processed using information technology;

 - +

privacy impact assessments are conducted for systems, programs, or other activities before initiating a collection of personally identifiable information that includes personally identifiable information permitting the physical or virtual (online) contacting of a specific individual, if identical questions have been posed to, or identical reporting requirements imposed on, ten or more individuals, other than agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the federal government.

 @@ -55510,7 +56257,7 @@ - +

Risk assessment policy

security and privacy risk assessment reports

@@ -55522,7 +56269,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with assessment and auditing responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -55534,7 +56281,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for assessments and audits

mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing assessments and auditing

@@ -55545,7 +56292,7 @@ Criticality Analysis - +

systems, system components, or system services to be analyzed for criticality are defined;

@@ -55553,14 +56300,15 @@ - +

decision points in the system development life cycle when a criticality analysis is to be performed are defined;

 - + + @@ -55584,13 +56332,13 @@

Criticality analysis is performed when an architecture or design is being developed, modified, or upgraded. If such analysis is performed early in the system development life cycle, organizations may be able to modify the system design to reduce the critical nature of these components and functions, such as by adding redundancy or alternate paths into the system design. Criticality analysis can also influence the protection measures required by development contractors. In addition to criticality analysis for systems, system components, and system services, criticality analysis of information is an important consideration. Such analysis is conducted as part of security categorization in RA-2.

 - +

critical system components and functions are identified by performing a criticality analysis for at .

 - +

Risk assessment policy

assessment reports

@@ -55603,7 +56351,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with assessment and auditing responsibilities

organizational personnel with criticality analysis responsibilities

@@ -55613,7 +56361,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for assessments and audits

mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing assessments and auditing

@@ -55624,14 +56372,15 @@ Threat Hunting - +

the frequency at which to employ the threat hunting capability is defined;

 - + + @@ -55666,23 +56415,23 @@

Threat hunting is an active means of cyber defense in contrast to traditional protection measures, such as firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, quarantining malicious code in sandboxes, and Security Information and Event Management technologies and systems. Cyber threat hunting involves proactively searching organizational systems, networks, and infrastructure for advanced threats. The objective is to track and disrupt cyber adversaries as early as possible in the attack sequence and to measurably improve the speed and accuracy of organizational responses. Indications of compromise include unusual network traffic, unusual file changes, and the presence of malicious code. Threat hunting teams leverage existing threat intelligence and may create new threat intelligence, which is shared with peer organizations, Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO), Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), and relevant government departments and agencies.

 - + - + - +

a cyber threat capability is established and maintained to search for indicators of compromise in organizational systems;

 - +

a cyber threat capability is established and maintained to detect, track, and disrupt threats that evade existing controls;

 - +

the threat hunting capability is employed .

 @@ -55690,7 +56439,7 @@ - +

Risk assessment policy

assessment reports

@@ -55702,7 +56451,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with threat hunting responsibilities

system/network administrators

@@ -55711,7 +56460,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for assessments and audits

mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing threat hunting capabilities

@@ -55729,14 +56478,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the system and services acquisition policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the system and services acquisition procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -55744,7 +56493,7 @@ - + standardized contract language @@ -56478,14 +57233,15 @@ - +

contract language is defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -56569,108 +57325,108 @@

Security and privacy documentation requirements address all stages of the system development life cycle. Documentation provides user and administrator guidance for the implementation and operation of controls. The level of detail required in such documentation is based on the security categorization or classification level of the system and the degree to which organizations depend on the capabilities, functions, or mechanisms to meet risk response expectations. Requirements can include mandated configuration settings that specify allowed functions, ports, protocols, and services. Acceptance criteria for systems, system components, and system services are defined in the same manner as the criteria for any organizational acquisition or procurement.

 - + - + - +

security functional requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - +

privacy functional requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - +

strength of mechanism requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - + - +

security assurance requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - +

privacy assurance requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - + - +

controls needed to satisfy the security requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - +

controls needed to satisfy the privacy requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - + - +

security documentation requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - +

privacy documentation requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - + - +

requirements for protecting security documentation, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - +

requirements for protecting privacy documentation, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - +

the description of the system development environment and environment in which the system is intended to operate, requirements, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - + - +

the allocation of responsibility or identification of parties responsible for information security requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service;

 - +

the allocation of responsibility or identification of parties responsible for privacy requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using ;

 - +

the allocation of responsibility or identification of parties responsible for supply chain risk management requirements, descriptions, and criteria are included explicitly or by reference using ;

 - +

acceptance criteria requirements and descriptions are included explicitly or by reference using in the acquisition contract for the system, system component, or system service.

 @@ -56678,7 +57434,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -56694,7 +57450,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -56704,7 +57460,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for determining system security and privacy functional, strength, and assurance requirements

organizational processes for developing acquisition contracts

@@ -56714,7 +57470,8 @@ Functional Properties of Controls - + + @@ -56726,13 +57483,13 @@

Functional properties of security and privacy controls describe the functionality (i.e., security or privacy capability, functions, or mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls and specifically exclude functionality and data structures internal to the operation of the controls.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to provide a description of the functional properties of the controls to be implemented.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -56747,7 +57504,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -56756,7 +57513,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for determining system security functional requirements

organizational processes for developing acquisition contracts

@@ -56768,7 +57525,7 @@ Design and Implementation Information for Controls - + - +

system security engineering methods are defined (if selected);

 - +

privacy engineering methods are defined (if selected);

@@ -56881,7 +57639,7 @@ - + - +

software development methods are defined (if selected);

 - +

testing, evaluation, assessment, verification, and validation methods are defined (if selected);

 - +

quality control processes are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -56934,19 +57693,19 @@

Following a system development life cycle that includes state-of-the-practice software development methods, systems engineering methods, systems security and privacy engineering methods, and quality control processes helps to reduce the number and severity of latent errors within systems, system components, and system services. Reducing the number and severity of such errors reduces the number of vulnerabilities in those systems, components, and services. Transparency in the methods and techniques that developers select and implement for systems engineering, systems security and privacy engineering, software development, component and system assessments, and quality control processes provides an increased level of assurance in the trustworthiness of the system, system component, or system service being acquired.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle process that includes ;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle process that includes ;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle process that includes .

 @@ -56954,7 +57713,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -56973,7 +57732,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -56983,7 +57742,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for development methods, techniques, and processes

 @@ -56992,7 +57751,8 @@ Assignment of Components to Systems - + + @@ -57001,14 +57761,15 @@ System, Component, and Service Configurations - +

security configurations for the system, component, or service are defined;

 - + + @@ -57028,14 +57789,14 @@

Examples of security configurations include the U.S. Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB), Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), and any limitations on functions, ports, protocols, and services. Security characteristics can include requiring that default passwords have been changed.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to deliver the system, component, or service with implemented;

 - +

the configurations are used as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service reinstallation or upgrade.

 @@ -57043,7 +57804,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the integration of security requirements, descriptions, and criteria into the acquisition process

@@ -57058,7 +57819,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with the responsibility to determine system security requirements

@@ -57068,7 +57829,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms used to verify that the configuration of the system, component, or service is delivered as specified

 @@ -57077,7 +57838,8 @@ Use of Information Assurance Products - + + @@ -57099,14 +57861,14 @@

Commercial off-the-shelf IA or IA-enabled information technology products used to protect classified information by cryptographic means may be required to use NSA-approved key management. See NSA CSFC.

 - + - +

only government off-the-shelf or commercial off-the-shelf information assurance and information assurance-enabled information technology products that compose an NSA-approved solution to protect classified information when the networks used to transmit the information are at a lower classification level than the information being transmitted are employed;

 - +

these products have been evaluated and/or validated by NSA or in accordance with NSA-approved procedures.

 @@ -57114,7 +57876,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management plan

system and services acquisition policy

@@ -57132,7 +57894,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with the responsibility to determine system security requirements

@@ -57142,7 +57904,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for selecting and employing evaluated and/or validated information assurance products and services that compose an NSA-approved solution to protect classified information

 @@ -57151,7 +57913,8 @@ NIAP-approved Protection Profiles - + + @@ -57173,14 +57936,14 @@

See NIAP CCEVS for additional information on NIAP. See NIST CMVP for additional information on FIPS-validated cryptographic modules.

 - + - +

the use of commercially provided information assurance and information assurance-enabled information technology products is limited to those products that have been successfully evaluated against a National Information Assurance partnership (NIAP)-approved Protection Profile for a specific technology type, if such a profile exists;

 - +

if no NIAP-approved Protection Profile exists for a specific technology type but a commercially provided information technology product relies on cryptographic functionality to enforce its security policy, that cryptographic module is required to be FIPS-validated or NSA-approved.

 @@ -57188,7 +57951,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management plan

system and services acquisition policy

@@ -57205,7 +57968,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security requirements

@@ -57215,7 +57978,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for selecting and employing products/services evaluated against a NIAP-approved protection profile or FIPS-validated products

 @@ -57224,7 +57987,8 @@ Continuous Monitoring Plan for Controls - + + @@ -57237,13 +58001,13 @@

The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if the planned, required, and deployed controls within the system, system component, or system service continue to be effective over time based on the inevitable changes that occur. Developer continuous monitoring plans include a sufficient level of detail such that the information can be incorporated into continuous monitoring programs implemented by organizations. Continuous monitoring plans can include the types of control assessment and monitoring activities planned, frequency of control monitoring, and actions to be taken when controls fail or become ineffective.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of control effectiveness that is consistent with the continuous monitoring program of the organization.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing developer continuous monitoring plans

@@ -57260,7 +58024,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security requirements

@@ -57270,7 +58034,7 @@ - +

Vendor processes for continuous monitoring

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing developer continuous monitoring

@@ -57280,7 +58044,8 @@ Functions, Ports, Protocols, and Services in Use - + + @@ -57294,24 +58059,24 @@

The identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services early in the system development life cycle (e.g., during the initial requirements definition and design stages) allows organizations to influence the design of the system, system component, or system service. This early involvement in the system development life cycle helps organizations avoid or minimize the use of functions, ports, protocols, or services that pose unnecessarily high risks and understand the trade-offs involved in blocking specific ports, protocols, or services or requiring system service providers to do so. Early identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services avoids costly retrofitting of controls after the system, component, or system service has been implemented. SA-9 describes the requirements for external system services. Organizations identify which functions, ports, protocols, and services are provided from external sources.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to identify the functions intended for organizational use;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to identify the ports intended for organizational use;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to identify the protocols intended for organizational use;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to identify the services intended for organizational use.

 @@ -57319,7 +58084,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the integration of security requirements, descriptions, and criteria into the acquisition process

@@ -57336,7 +58101,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security requirements

@@ -57350,7 +58115,8 @@ Use of Approved PIV Products - + + @@ -57365,13 +58131,13 @@

Products on the FIPS 201-approved products list meet NIST requirements for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors. PIV cards are used for multi-factor authentication in systems and organizations.

 - +

only information technology products on the FIPS 201-approved products list for the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented within organizational systems are employed.

 - +

Supply chain risk management plan

system and services acquisition policy

@@ -57387,7 +58153,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security requirements

@@ -57397,7 +58163,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for selecting and employing FIPS 201-approved products

 @@ -57407,14 +58173,15 @@ System of Records - +

Privacy Act requirements for the operation of a system of records are defined;

 - + + @@ -57427,13 +58194,13 @@

When, by contract, an organization provides for the operation of a system of records to accomplish an organizational mission or function, the organization, consistent with its authority, causes the requirements of the PRIVACT to be applied to the system of records.

 - +

are defined in the acquisition contract for the operation of a system of records on behalf of an organization to accomplish an organizational mission or function.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -57453,7 +58220,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -57461,7 +58228,7 @@ - +

Contract management processes to verify Privacy Act requirements are defined for the operation of a system of records

vendor processes for demonstrating incorporation of Privacy Act requirements in its operation of a system of records

@@ -57472,14 +58239,15 @@ Data Ownership - +

time frame to remove data from a contractor system and return it to the organization is defined;

 - + + @@ -57498,14 +58266,14 @@

Contractors who operate a system that contains data owned by an organization initiating the contract have policies and procedures in place to remove the data from their systems and/or return the data in a time frame defined by the contract.

 - + - +

organizational data ownership requirements are included in the acquisition contract;

 - +

all data to be removed from the contractor’s system and returned to the organization is required within .

 @@ -57513,7 +58281,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -57535,7 +58303,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with the responsibility for data management and processing requirements

@@ -57544,7 +58312,7 @@ - +

Contract management processes to verify that data is removed as required

vendor processes for removing data in required timeframe

@@ -57557,7 +58325,7 @@ System Documentation - +

actions to take when system, system component, or system service documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent are defined;

@@ -57565,14 +58333,15 @@ - +

personnel or roles to distribute system documentation to is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -57642,61 +58411,61 @@

System documentation helps personnel understand the implementation and operation of controls. Organizations consider establishing specific measures to determine the quality and completeness of the content provided. System documentation may be used to support the management of supply chain risk, incident response, and other functions. Personnel or roles that require documentation include system owners, system security officers, and system administrators. Attempts to obtain documentation include contacting manufacturers or suppliers and conducting web-based searches. The inability to obtain documentation may occur due to the age of the system or component or the lack of support from developers and contractors. When documentation cannot be obtained, organizations may need to recreate the documentation if it is essential to the implementation or operation of the controls. The protection provided for the documentation is commensurate with the security category or classification of the system. Documentation that addresses system vulnerabilities may require an increased level of protection. Secure operation of the system includes initially starting the system and resuming secure system operation after a lapse in system operation.

 - + - + - + - +

administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the secure configuration of the system, component, or service is obtained or developed;

 - +

administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the secure installation of the system, component, or service is obtained or developed;

 - +

administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the secure operation of the system, component, or service is obtained or developed;

 - + - +

administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the effective use of security functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;

 - +

administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the effective maintenance of security functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;

 - +

administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the effective use of privacy functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;

 - +

administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes the effective maintenance of privacy functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;

 - + - +

administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes known vulnerabilities regarding the configuration of administrative or privileged functions is obtained or developed;

 - +

administrator documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes known vulnerabilities regarding the use of administrative or privileged functions is obtained or developed;

 @@ -57705,54 +58474,54 @@ - + - + - +

user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes user-accessible security functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;

 - +

user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes how to effectively use those (user-accessible security) functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;

 - +

user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes user-accessible privacy functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;

 - +

user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes how to effectively use those (user-accessible privacy) functions and mechanisms is obtained or developed;

 - + - +

user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes methods for user interaction, which enable individuals to use the system, component, or service in a more secure manner is obtained or developed;

 - +

user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes methods for user interaction, which enable individuals to use the system, component, or service to protect individual privacy is obtained or developed;

 - + - +

user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes user responsibilities for maintaining the security of the system, component, or service is obtained or developed;

 - +

user documentation for the system, system component, or system service that describes user responsibilities for maintaining the privacy of individuals is obtained or developed;

 @@ -57761,21 +58530,21 @@ - + - +

attempts to obtain system, system component, or system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent is documented;

 - +

after attempts to obtain system, system component, or system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent, are taken in response;

 - +

documentation is distributed to .

 @@ -57783,7 +58552,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -57802,7 +58571,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -57813,7 +58582,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for obtaining, protecting, and distributing system administrator and user documentation

 @@ -57821,7 +58590,8 @@ Functional Properties of Security Controls - + + @@ -57829,7 +58599,8 @@ Security-relevant External System Interfaces - + + @@ -57837,7 +58608,8 @@ High-level Design - + + @@ -57845,7 +58617,8 @@ Low-level Design - + + @@ -57853,7 +58626,8 @@ Source Code - + + @@ -57862,7 +58636,8 @@ Software Usage Restrictions - + + @@ -57871,7 +58646,8 @@ User-installed Software - + + @@ -57885,21 +58661,22 @@ - +

systems security engineering principles are defined;

 - +

privacy engineering principles are defined;

 - + + @@ -57940,54 +58717,54 @@

Organizations that apply systems security and privacy engineering concepts and principles can facilitate the development of trustworthy, secure systems, system components, and system services; reduce risk to acceptable levels; and make informed risk management decisions. System security engineering principles can also be used to protect against certain supply chain risks, including incorporating tamper-resistant hardware into a design.

 - + - +

are applied in the specification of the system and system components;

 - +

are applied in the design of the system and system components;

 - +

are applied in the development of the system and system components;

 - +

are applied in the implementation of the system and system components;

 - +

are applied in the modification of the system and system components;

 - +

are applied in the specification of the system and system components;

 - +

are applied in the design of the system and system components;

 - +

are applied in the development of the system and system components;

 - +

are applied in the implementation of the system and system components;

 - +

are applied in the modification of the system and system components.

 @@ -57995,7 +58772,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -58012,7 +58789,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -58022,7 +58799,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying security and privacy engineering principles in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of security and privacy engineering principles in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58031,7 +58808,8 @@ Clear Abstractions - + + @@ -58044,13 +58822,13 @@

The principle of clear abstractions states that a system has simple, well-defined interfaces and functions that provide a consistent and intuitive view of the data and how the data is managed. The clarity, simplicity, necessity, and sufficiency of the system interfaces— combined with a precise definition of their functional behavior—promotes ease of analysis, inspection, and testing as well as the correct and secure use of the system. The clarity of an abstraction is subjective. Examples that reflect the application of this principle include avoidance of redundant, unused interfaces; information hiding; and avoidance of semantic overloading of interfaces or their parameters. Information hiding (i.e., representation-independent programming), is a design discipline used to ensure that the internal representation of information in one system component is not visible to another system component invoking or calling the first component, such that the published abstraction is not influenced by how the data may be managed internally.

 - +

the security design principle of clear abstractions is implemented.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of clear abstractions used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58063,7 +58841,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58073,7 +58851,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of clear abstractions to system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of clear abstractions to system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58084,14 +58862,15 @@ Least Common Mechanism - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of least common mechanism are defined;

 - + + @@ -58104,13 +58883,13 @@

The principle of least common mechanism states that the amount of mechanism common to more than one user and depended on by all users is minimized POPEK74 . Mechanism minimization implies that different components of a system refrain from using the same mechanism to access a system resource. Every shared mechanism (especially a mechanism involving shared variables) represents a potential information path between users and is designed with care to ensure that it does not unintentionally compromise security SALTZER75 . Implementing the principle of least common mechanism helps to reduce the adverse consequences of sharing the system state among different programs. A single program that corrupts a shared state (including shared variables) has the potential to corrupt other programs that are dependent on the state. The principle of least common mechanism also supports the principle of simplicity of design and addresses the issue of covert storage channels LAMPSON73.

 - +

implement the security design principle of least common mechanism.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of least common mechanism used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58123,7 +58902,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58133,7 +58912,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of least common mechanism in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of least common mechanism in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58148,21 +58927,22 @@ - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of modularity are defined;

 - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of layering are defined;

 - + + @@ -58177,14 +58957,14 @@

The principles of modularity and layering are fundamental across system engineering disciplines. Modularity and layering derived from functional decomposition are effective in managing system complexity by making it possible to comprehend the structure of the system. Modular decomposition, or refinement in system design, is challenging and resists general statements of principle. Modularity serves to isolate functions and related data structures into well-defined logical units. Layering allows the relationships of these units to be better understood so that dependencies are clear and undesired complexity can be avoided. The security design principle of modularity extends functional modularity to include considerations based on trust, trustworthiness, privilege, and security policy. Security-informed modular decomposition includes the allocation of policies to systems in a network, separation of system applications into processes with distinct address spaces, allocation of system policies to layers, and separation of processes into subjects with distinct privileges based on hardware-supported privilege domains.

 - + - +

implement the security design principle of modularity;

 - +

implement the security design principle of layering.

 @@ -58192,7 +58972,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principles of modularity and layering used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58205,7 +58985,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58215,7 +58995,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principles of modularity and layering in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principles of modularity and layering in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58227,14 +59007,15 @@ Partially Ordered Dependencies - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of partially ordered dependencies are defined;

 - + + @@ -58247,13 +59028,13 @@

The principle of partially ordered dependencies states that the synchronization, calling, and other dependencies in the system are partially ordered. A fundamental concept in system design is layering, whereby the system is organized into well-defined, functionally related modules or components. The layers are linearly ordered with respect to inter-layer dependencies, such that higher layers are dependent on lower layers. While providing functionality to higher layers, some layers can be self-contained and not dependent on lower layers. While a partial ordering of all functions in a given system may not be possible, if circular dependencies are constrained to occur within layers, the inherent problems of circularity can be more easily managed. Partially ordered dependencies and system layering contribute significantly to the simplicity and coherency of the system design. Partially ordered dependencies also facilitate system testing and analysis.

 - +

implement the security design principle of partially ordered dependencies.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of partially ordered dependencies used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58266,7 +59047,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58276,7 +59057,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of partially ordered dependencies in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of partially ordered dependencies in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58287,14 +59068,15 @@ Efficiently Mediated Access - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of efficiently mediated access are defined;

 - + + @@ -58308,13 +59090,13 @@

The principle of efficiently mediated access states that policy enforcement mechanisms utilize the least common mechanism available while satisfying stakeholder requirements within expressed constraints. The mediation of access to system resources (i.e., CPU, memory, devices, communication ports, services, infrastructure, data, and information) is often the predominant security function of secure systems. It also enables the realization of protections for the capability provided to stakeholders by the system. Mediation of resource access can result in performance bottlenecks if the system is not designed correctly. For example, by using hardware mechanisms, efficiently mediated access can be achieved. Once access to a low-level resource such as memory has been obtained, hardware protection mechanisms can ensure that out-of-bounds access does not occur.

 - +

implement the security design principle of efficiently mediated access.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of efficiently mediated access used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58327,7 +59109,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition/contracting responsibilities

organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

@@ -58338,7 +59120,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of efficiently mediated access in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of efficiently mediated access in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58349,14 +59131,15 @@ Minimized Sharing - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of minimized sharing are defined;

 - + + @@ -58370,13 +59153,13 @@

The principle of minimized sharing states that no computer resource is shared between system components (e.g., subjects, processes, functions) unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Minimized sharing helps to simplify system design and implementation. In order to protect user-domain resources from arbitrary active entities, no resource is shared unless that sharing has been explicitly requested and granted. The need for resource sharing can be motivated by the design principle of least common mechanism in the case of internal entities or driven by stakeholder requirements. However, internal sharing is carefully designed to avoid performance and covert storage and timing channel problems. Sharing via common mechanism can increase the susceptibility of data and information to unauthorized access, disclosure, use, or modification and can adversely affect the inherent capability provided by the system. To minimize sharing induced by common mechanisms, such mechanisms can be designed to be reentrant or virtualized to preserve separation. Moreover, the use of global data to share information is carefully scrutinized. The lack of encapsulation may obfuscate relationships among the sharing entities.

 - +

implement the security design principle of minimized sharing.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of minimized sharing used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58389,7 +59172,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58399,7 +59182,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of minimized sharing in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of minimized sharing in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58410,14 +59193,15 @@ Reduced Complexity - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of reduced complexity are defined;

 - + + @@ -58430,13 +59214,13 @@

The principle of reduced complexity states that the system design is as simple and small as possible. A small and simple design is more understandable, more analyzable, and less prone to error. The reduced complexity principle applies to any aspect of a system, but it has particular importance for security due to the various analyses performed to obtain evidence about the emergent security property of the system. For such analyses to be successful, a small and simple design is essential. Application of the principle of reduced complexity contributes to the ability of system developers to understand the correctness and completeness of system security functions. It also facilitates the identification of potential vulnerabilities. The corollary of reduced complexity states that the simplicity of the system is directly related to the number of vulnerabilities it will contain; that is, simpler systems contain fewer vulnerabilities. An benefit of reduced complexity is that it is easier to understand whether the intended security policy has been captured in the system design and that fewer vulnerabilities are likely to be introduced during engineering development. An additional benefit is that any such conclusion about correctness, completeness, and the existence of vulnerabilities can be reached with a higher degree of assurance in contrast to conclusions reached in situations where the system design is inherently more complex. Transitioning from older technologies to newer technologies (e.g., transitioning from IPv4 to IPv6) may require implementing the older and newer technologies simultaneously during the transition period. This may result in a temporary increase in system complexity during the transition.

 - +

implement the security design principle of reduced complexity.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of reduced complexity used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58449,7 +59233,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58459,7 +59243,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of reduced complexity in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of reduced complexity in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58470,14 +59254,15 @@ Secure Evolvability - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure evolvability are defined;

 - + + @@ -58491,13 +59276,13 @@

The principle of secure evolvability states that a system is developed to facilitate the maintenance of its security properties when there are changes to the system’s structure, interfaces, interconnections (i.e., system architecture), functionality, or configuration (i.e., security policy enforcement). Changes include a new, enhanced, or upgraded system capability; maintenance and sustainment activities; and reconfiguration. Although it is not possible to plan for every aspect of system evolution, system upgrades and changes can be anticipated by analyses of mission or business strategic direction, anticipated changes in the threat environment, and anticipated maintenance and sustainment needs. It is unrealistic to expect that complex systems remain secure in contexts not envisioned during development, whether such contexts are related to the operational environment or to usage. A system may be secure in some new contexts, but there is no guarantee that its emergent behavior will always be secure. It is easier to build trustworthiness into a system from the outset, and it follows that the sustainment of system trustworthiness requires planning for change as opposed to adapting in an ad hoc or non-methodical manner. The benefits of this principle include reduced vendor life cycle costs, reduced cost of ownership, improved system security, more effective management of security risk, and less risk uncertainty.

 - +

implement the security design principle of secure evolvability.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of secure evolvability used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58510,7 +59295,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58520,7 +59305,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of secure evolvability in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of secure evolvability in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58531,14 +59316,15 @@ Trusted Components - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of trusted components are defined;

 - + + @@ -58552,13 +59338,13 @@

The principle of trusted components also applies to a compound component that consists of subcomponents (e.g., a subsystem), which may have varying levels of trustworthiness. The conservative assumption is that the trustworthiness of a compound component is that of its least trustworthy subcomponent. It may be possible to provide a security engineering rationale that the trustworthiness of a particular compound component is greater than the conservative assumption. However, any such rationale reflects logical reasoning based on a clear statement of the trustworthiness objectives as well as relevant and credible evidence. The trustworthiness of a compound component is not the same as increased application of defense-in-depth layering within the component or a replication of components. Defense-in-depth techniques do not increase the trustworthiness of the whole above that of the least trustworthy component.

 - +

implement the security design principle of trusted components.

 - +

Supply chain risk management plan

system and services acquisition policy

@@ -58573,7 +59359,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58584,7 +59370,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of trusted components in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of trusted components in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58595,14 +59381,15 @@ Hierarchical Trust - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of hierarchical trust are defined;

 - + + @@ -58615,13 +59402,13 @@

The principle of hierarchical trust for components builds on the principle of trusted components and states that the security dependencies in a system will form a partial ordering if they preserve the principle of trusted components. The partial ordering provides the basis for trustworthiness reasoning or an assurance case (assurance argument) when composing a secure system from heterogeneously trustworthy components. To analyze a system composed of heterogeneously trustworthy components for its trustworthiness, it is essential to eliminate circular dependencies with regard to the trustworthiness. If a more trustworthy component located in a lower layer of the system were to depend on a less trustworthy component in a higher layer, this would, in effect, put the components in the same less trustworthy equivalence class per the principle of trusted components. Trust relationships, or chains of trust, can have various manifestations. For example, the root certificate of a certificate hierarchy is the most trusted node in the hierarchy, whereas the leaves in the hierarchy may be the least trustworthy nodes. Another example occurs in a layered high-assurance system where the security kernel (including the hardware base), which is located at the lowest layer of the system, is the most trustworthy component. The principle of hierarchical trust, however, does not prohibit the use of overly trustworthy components. There may be cases in a system of low trustworthiness where it is reasonable to employ a highly trustworthy component rather than one that is less trustworthy (e.g., due to availability or other cost-benefit driver). For such a case, any dependency of the highly trustworthy component upon a less trustworthy component does not degrade the trustworthiness of the resulting low-trust system.

 - +

implement the security design principle of hierarchical trust.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of hierarchical trust used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58634,7 +59421,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58644,7 +59431,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of hierarchical trust in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of hierarchical trust in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58655,14 +59442,15 @@ Inverse Modification Threshold - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of inverse modification threshold are defined;

 - + + @@ -58675,13 +59463,13 @@

The principle of inverse modification threshold builds on the principle of trusted components and the principle of hierarchical trust and states that the degree of protection provided to a component is commensurate with its trustworthiness. As the trust placed in a component increases, the protection against unauthorized modification of the component also increases to the same degree. Protection from unauthorized modification can come in the form of the component’s own self-protection and innate trustworthiness, or it can come from the protections afforded to the component from other elements or attributes of the security architecture (to include protections in the environment of operation).

 - +

implement the security design principle of inverse modification threshold.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of inverse modification threshold used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58694,7 +59482,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58704,7 +59492,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of inverse modification threshold in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of inverse modification threshold in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58715,14 +59503,15 @@ Hierarchical Protection - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of hierarchical protection are defined;

 - + + @@ -58735,13 +59524,13 @@

The principle of hierarchical protection states that a component need not be protected from more trustworthy components. In the degenerate case of the most trusted component, it protects itself from all other components. For example, if an operating system kernel is deemed the most trustworthy component in a system, then it protects itself from all untrusted applications it supports, but the applications, conversely, do not need to protect themselves from the kernel. The trustworthiness of users is a consideration for applying the principle of hierarchical protection. A trusted system need not protect itself from an equally trustworthy user, reflecting use of untrusted systems in system high environments where users are highly trustworthy and where other protections are put in place to bound and protect the system high execution environment.

 - +

implement the security design principle of hierarchical protection.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of hierarchical protection used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58754,7 +59543,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58764,7 +59553,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of hierarchical protection in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of hierarchical protection in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58775,14 +59564,15 @@ Minimized Security Elements - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of minimized security elements are defined;

 - + + @@ -58795,13 +59585,13 @@

The principle of minimized security elements states that the system does not have extraneous trusted components. The principle of minimized security elements has two aspects: the overall cost of security analysis and the complexity of security analysis. Trusted components are generally costlier to construct and implement, owing to the increased rigor of development processes. Trusted components require greater security analysis to qualify their trustworthiness. Thus, to reduce the cost and decrease the complexity of the security analysis, a system contains as few trustworthy components as possible. The analysis of the interaction of trusted components with other components of the system is one of the most important aspects of system security verification. If the interactions between components are unnecessarily complex, the security of the system will also be more difficult to ascertain than one whose internal trust relationships are simple and elegantly constructed. In general, fewer trusted components result in fewer internal trust relationships and a simpler system.

 - +

implement the security design principle of minimized security elements.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of minimized security elements used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58814,7 +59604,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58824,7 +59614,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of minimized security elements in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of minimized security elements in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58835,14 +59625,15 @@ Least Privilege - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of least privilege are defined;

 - + + @@ -58858,13 +59649,13 @@

In addition to its manifestations at the system interface, least privilege can be used as a guiding principle for the internal structure of the system itself. One aspect of internal least privilege is to construct modules so that only the elements encapsulated by the module are directly operated on by the functions within the module. Elements external to a module that may be affected by the module’s operation are indirectly accessed through interaction (e.g., via a function call) with the module that contains those elements. Another aspect of internal least privilege is that the scope of a given module or component includes only those system elements that are necessary for its functionality and that the access modes for the elements (e.g., read, write) are minimal.

 - +

implement the security design principle of least privilege.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of least privilege used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58877,7 +59668,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58887,7 +59678,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of least privilege in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of least privilege in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58898,14 +59689,15 @@ Predicate Permission - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of predicate permission are defined;

 - + + @@ -58919,13 +59711,13 @@

The principle of predicate permission states that system designers consider requiring multiple authorized entities to provide consent before a highly critical operation or access to highly sensitive data, information, or resources is allowed to proceed. SALTZER75 originally named predicate permission the separation of privilege. It is also equivalent to separation of duty. The division of privilege among multiple parties decreases the likelihood of abuse and provides the safeguard that no single accident, deception, or breach of trust is sufficient to enable an unrecoverable action that can lead to significantly damaging effects. The design options for such a mechanism may require simultaneous action (e.g., the firing of a nuclear weapon requires two different authorized individuals to give the correct command within a small time window) or a sequence of operations where each successive action is enabled by some prior action, but no single individual is able to enable more than one action.

 - +

implement the security design principle of predicate permission.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of predicate permission used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58938,7 +59730,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -58948,7 +59740,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of predicate permission in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of predicate permission in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -58959,14 +59751,15 @@ Self-reliant Trustworthiness - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of self-reliant trustworthiness are defined;

 - + + @@ -58979,13 +59772,13 @@

The principle of self-reliant trustworthiness states that systems minimize their reliance on other systems for their own trustworthiness. A system is trustworthy by default, and any connection to an external entity is used to supplement its function. If a system were required to maintain a connection with another external entity in order to maintain its trustworthiness, then that system would be vulnerable to malicious and non-malicious threats that could result in the loss or degradation of that connection. The benefit of the principle of self-reliant trustworthiness is that the isolation of a system will make it less vulnerable to attack. A corollary to this principle relates to the ability of the system (or system component) to operate in isolation and then resynchronize with other components when it is rejoined with them.

 - +

implement the security design principle of self-reliant trustworthiness.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of self-reliant trustworthiness used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -58998,7 +59791,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59008,7 +59801,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of self-reliant trustworthiness in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of self-reliant trustworthiness in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59019,14 +59812,15 @@ Secure Distributed Composition - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure distributed composition are defined;

 - + + @@ -59039,13 +59833,13 @@

The principle of secure distributed composition states that the composition of distributed components that enforce the same system security policy result in a system that enforces that policy at least as well as the individual components do. Many of the design principles for secure systems deal with how components can or should interact. The need to create or enable a capability from the composition of distributed components can magnify the relevancy of these principles. In particular, the translation of security policy from a stand-alone to a distributed system or a system-of-systems can have unexpected or emergent results. Communication protocols and distributed data consistency mechanisms help to ensure consistent policy enforcement across a distributed system. To ensure a system-wide level of assurance of correct policy enforcement, the security architecture of a distributed composite system is thoroughly analyzed.

 - +

implement the security design principle of secure distributed composition.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of secure distributed composition used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -59058,7 +59852,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59068,7 +59862,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of secure distributed composition in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of secure distributed composition in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59079,14 +59873,15 @@ Trusted Communications Channels - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of trusted communications channels are defined;

 - + + @@ -59102,13 +59897,13 @@

The principle of trusted communication channels states that when composing a system where there is a potential threat to communications between components (i.e., the interconnections between components), each communication channel is trustworthy to a level commensurate with the security dependencies it supports (i.e., how much it is trusted by other components to perform its security functions). Trusted communication channels are achieved by a combination of restricting access to the communication channel (to ensure an acceptable match in the trustworthiness of the endpoints involved in the communication) and employing end-to-end protections for the data transmitted over the communication channel (to protect against interception and modification and to further increase the assurance of proper end-to-end communication).

 - +

implement the security design principle of trusted communications channels.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of trusted communications channels used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -59121,7 +59916,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59131,7 +59926,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of trusted communications channels in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of trusted communications channels in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59142,14 +59937,15 @@ Continuous Protection - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of continuous protection are defined;

 - + + @@ -59164,13 +59960,13 @@

Continuous protection also applies to systems designed to operate in varying configurations, including those that deliver full operational capability and degraded-mode configurations that deliver partial operational capability. The continuous protection principle requires that changes to the system security policies be traceable to the operational need that drives the configuration and be verifiable (i.e., it is possible to verify that the proposed changes will not put the system into an insecure state). Insufficient traceability and verification may lead to inconsistent states or protection discontinuities due to the complex or undecidable nature of the problem. The use of pre-verified configuration definitions that reflect the new security policy enables analysis to determine that a transition from old to new policies is essentially atomic and that any residual effects from the old policy are guaranteed to not conflict with the new policy. The ability to demonstrate continuous protection is rooted in the clear articulation of life cycle protection needs as stakeholder security requirements.

 - +

implement the security design principle of continuous protection.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

access control policy

@@ -59187,7 +59983,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59200,7 +59996,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of continuous protection in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions

@@ -59213,14 +60009,15 @@ Secure Metadata Management - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure metadata management are defined;

 - + + @@ -59234,13 +60031,13 @@

The apparent secondary nature of metadata can lead to neglect of its legitimate need for protection, resulting in a violation of the security policy that includes the exfiltration of information. A particular concern associated with insufficient protections for metadata is associated with multilevel secure (MLS) systems. MLS systems mediate access by a subject to an object based on relative sensitivity levels. It follows that all subjects and objects in the scope of control of the MLS system are either directly labeled or indirectly attributed with sensitivity levels. The corollary of labeled metadata for MLS systems states that objects containing metadata are labeled. As with protection needs assessments for data, attention is given to ensure that the confidentiality and integrity protections are individually assessed, specified, and allocated to metadata, as would be done for mission, business, and system data.

 - +

implement the security design principle of secure metadata management.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of metadata management used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -59253,7 +60050,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59263,7 +60060,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of metadata management in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of metadata management in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59274,14 +60071,15 @@ Self-analysis - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of self-analysis are defined;

 - + + @@ -59295,13 +60093,13 @@

The principle of self-analysis states that a system component is able to assess its internal state and functionality to a limited extent at various stages of execution, and that this self-analysis capability is commensurate with the level of trustworthiness invested in the system. At the system level, self-analysis can be achieved through hierarchical assessments of trustworthiness established in a bottom-up fashion. In this approach, the lower-level components check for data integrity and correct functionality (to a limited extent) of higher-level components. For example, trusted boot sequences involve a trusted lower-level component that attests to the trustworthiness of the next higher-level components so that a transitive chain of trust can be established. At the root, a component attests to itself, which usually involves an axiomatic or environmentally enforced assumption about its integrity. Results of the self-analyses can be used to guard against externally induced errors, internal malfunction, or transient errors. By following this principle, some simple malfunctions or errors can be detected without allowing the effects of the error or malfunction to propagate outside of the component. Further, the self-test can be used to attest to the configuration of the component, detecting any potential conflicts in configuration with respect to the expected configuration.

 - +

implement the security design principle of self-analysis.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of self-analysis used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -59314,7 +60112,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59324,7 +60122,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of self-analysis in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of self-analysis in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59339,21 +60137,22 @@ - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of accountability are defined;

 - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of traceability are defined;

 - + + @@ -59375,14 +60174,14 @@

The principle of accountability and traceability states that it is possible to trace security-relevant actions (i.e., subject-object interactions) to the entity on whose behalf the action is being taken. The principle of accountability and traceability requires a trustworthy infrastructure that can record details about actions that affect system security (e.g., an audit subsystem). To record the details about actions, the system is able to uniquely identify the entity on whose behalf the action is being carried out and also record the relevant sequence of actions that are carried out. The accountability policy also requires that audit trail itself be protected from unauthorized access and modification. The principle of least privilege assists in tracing the actions to particular entities, as it increases the granularity of accountability. Associating specific actions with system entities, and ultimately with users, and making the audit trail secure against unauthorized access and modifications provide non-repudiation because once an action is recorded, it is not possible to change the audit trail. Another important function that accountability and traceability serves is in the routine and forensic analysis of events associated with the violation of security policy. Analysis of audit logs may provide additional information that may be helpful in determining the path or component that allowed the violation of the security policy and the actions of individuals associated with the violation of the security policy.

 - + - +

implement the security design principle of accountability;

 - +

implement the security design principle of traceability.

 @@ -59390,7 +60189,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

audit and accountability policy

@@ -59412,7 +60211,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with audit and accountability responsibilities

@@ -59423,7 +60222,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of accountability and traceability in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of accountability and traceability in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59436,14 +60235,15 @@ Secure Defaults - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure defaults are defined;

 - + + @@ -59461,13 +60261,13 @@

The security engineering approach to this principle states that security mechanisms deny requests unless the request is found to be well-formed and consistent with the security policy. The insecure alternative is to allow a request unless it is shown to be inconsistent with the policy. In a large system, the conditions that are satisfied to grant a request that is denied by default are often far more compact and complete than those that would need to be checked in order to deny a request that is granted by default.

 - +

implement the security design principle of secure defaults.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

configuration management policy

@@ -59487,7 +60287,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59497,7 +60297,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of secure defaults in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of secure defaults in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59514,21 +60314,22 @@ - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure failure are defined;

 - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure recovery are defined;

 - + + @@ -59550,14 +60351,14 @@

Failure protection strategies that employ replication of policy enforcement mechanisms, sometimes called defense in depth, can allow the system to continue in a secure state even when one mechanism has failed to protect the system. If the mechanisms are similar, however, the additional protection may be illusory, as the adversary can simply attack in series. Similarly, in a networked system, breaking the security on one system or service may enable an attacker to do the same on other similar replicated systems and services. By employing multiple protection mechanisms whose features are significantly different, the possibility of attack replication or repetition can be reduced. Analyses are conducted to weigh the costs and benefits of such redundancy techniques against increased resource usage and adverse effects on the overall system performance. Additional analyses are conducted as the complexity of these mechanisms increases, as could be the case for dynamic behaviors. Increased complexity generally reduces trustworthiness. When a resource cannot be continuously protected, it is critical to detect and repair any security breaches before the resource is once again used in a secure context.

 - + - +

implement the security design principle of secure failure;

 - +

implement the security design principle of secure recovery.

 @@ -59565,7 +60366,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and communications protection policy

@@ -59585,7 +60386,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59598,7 +60399,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of secure failure and recovery in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of secure failure and recovery in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59615,14 +60416,15 @@ Economic Security - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of economic security are defined;

 - + + @@ -59636,13 +60438,13 @@

The principle of economic security states that security mechanisms are not costlier than the potential damage that could occur from a security breach. This is the security-relevant form of the cost-benefit analyses used in risk management. The cost assumptions of cost-benefit analysis prevent the system designer from incorporating security mechanisms of greater strength than necessary, where strength of mechanism is proportional to cost. The principle of economic security also requires analysis of the benefits of assurance relative to the cost of that assurance in terms of the effort expended to obtain relevant and credible evidence as well as the necessary analyses to assess and draw trustworthiness and risk conclusions from the evidence.

 - +

implement the security design principle of economic security.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of economic security used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -59656,7 +60458,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59666,7 +60468,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of economic security in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of economic security in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59677,14 +60479,15 @@ Performance Security - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of performance security are defined;

 - + + @@ -59702,13 +60505,13 @@

The principle of performance security leads to the incorporation of features that help in the enforcement of security policy but incur minimum overhead, such as low-level hardware mechanisms upon which higher-level services can be built. Such low-level mechanisms are usually very specific, have very limited functionality, and are optimized for performance. For example, once access rights to a portion of memory is granted, many systems use hardware mechanisms to ensure that all further accesses involve the correct memory address and access mode. Application of this principle reinforces the need to design security into the system from the ground up and to incorporate simple mechanisms at the lower layers that can be used as building blocks for higher-level mechanisms.

 - +

implement the security design principle of performance security.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of performance security used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -59722,7 +60525,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59732,7 +60535,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of performance security in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of performance security in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59743,14 +60546,15 @@ Human Factored Security - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of human factored security are defined;

 - + + @@ -59763,13 +60567,13 @@

The principle of human factored security states that the user interface for security functions and supporting services is intuitive, user-friendly, and provides feedback for user actions that affect such policy and its enforcement. The mechanisms that enforce security policy are not intrusive to the user and are designed not to degrade user efficiency. Security policy enforcement mechanisms also provide the user with meaningful, clear, and relevant feedback and warnings when insecure choices are being made. Particular attention is given to interfaces through which personnel responsible for system administration and operation configure and set up the security policies. Ideally, these personnel are able to understand the impact of their choices. Personnel with system administrative and operational responsibilities are able to configure systems before start-up and administer them during runtime with confidence that their intent is correctly mapped to the system’s mechanisms. Security services, functions, and mechanisms do not impede or unnecessarily complicate the intended use of the system. There is a trade-off between system usability and the strictness necessary for security policy enforcement. If security mechanisms are frustrating or difficult to use, then users may disable them, avoid them, or use them in ways inconsistent with the security requirements and protection needs that the mechanisms were designed to satisfy.

 - +

implement the security design principle of human factored security.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of human factored security used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -59783,7 +60587,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with human factored security responsibilities

@@ -59794,7 +60598,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of human factored security in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of human factored security in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59806,14 +60610,15 @@ Acceptable Security - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of acceptable security are defined;

 - + + @@ -59826,13 +60631,13 @@

The principle of acceptable security requires that the level of privacy and performance that the system provides is consistent with the users’ expectations. The perception of personal privacy may affect user behavior, morale, and effectiveness. Based on the organizational privacy policy and the system design, users should be able to restrict their actions to protect their privacy. When systems fail to provide intuitive interfaces or meet privacy and performance expectations, users may either choose to completely avoid the system or use it in ways that may be inefficient or even insecure.

 - +

implement the security design principle of acceptable security.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -59851,7 +60656,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59860,7 +60665,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of acceptable security in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of acceptable security in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59872,14 +60677,15 @@ Repeatable and Documented Procedures - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of repeatable and documented procedures are defined;

 - + + @@ -59900,13 +60706,13 @@

The principle of repeatable and documented procedures states that the techniques and methods employed to construct a system component permit the same component to be completely and correctly reconstructed at a later time. Repeatable and documented procedures support the development of a component that is identical to the component created earlier, which may be in widespread use. In the case of other system artifacts (e.g., documentation and testing results), repeatability supports consistency and the ability to inspect the artifacts. Repeatable and documented procedures can be introduced at various stages within the system development life cycle and contribute to the ability to evaluate assurance claims for the system. Examples include systematic procedures for code development and review, procedures for the configuration management of development tools and system artifacts, and procedures for system delivery.

 - +

implement the security design principle of repeatable and documented procedures.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of repeatable and documented procedures used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -59919,7 +60725,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59929,7 +60735,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of repeatable and documented procedures in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of repeatable and documented procedures in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -59941,14 +60747,15 @@ Procedural Rigor - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of procedural rigor are defined;

 - + + @@ -59963,13 +60770,13 @@

Finally, modifications to an existing system component are easier when there are detailed specifications that describe its current design instead of studying source code or schematics to try to understand how it works. Procedural rigor helps ensure that security functional and assurance requirements have been satisfied, and it contributes to a better-informed basis for the determination of trustworthiness and risk posture. Procedural rigor is commensurate with the degree of assurance desired for the system. If the required trustworthiness of the system is low, a high level of procedural rigor may add unnecessary cost, whereas when high trustworthiness is critical, the cost of high procedural rigor is merited.

 - +

implement the security design principle of procedural rigor.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of procedural rigor used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -59982,7 +60789,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -59992,7 +60799,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of procedural rigor in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of procedural rigor in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -60004,14 +60811,15 @@ Secure System Modification - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure system modification are defined;

 - + + @@ -60026,13 +60834,13 @@

The principle of secure system modification states that system modification maintains system security with respect to the security requirements and risk tolerance of stakeholders. Upgrades or modifications to systems can transform secure systems into systems that are not secure. The procedures for system modification ensure that if the system is to maintain its trustworthiness, the same rigor that was applied to its initial development is applied to any system changes. Because modifications can affect the ability of the system to maintain its secure state, a careful security analysis of the modification is needed prior to its implementation and deployment. This principle parallels the principle of secure evolvability.

 - +

implement the security design principle of secure system modification.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

configuration management policy and procedures

@@ -60048,7 +60856,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -60058,7 +60866,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of secure system modification in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of secure system modification in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -60072,14 +60880,15 @@ Sufficient Documentation - +

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of sufficient documentation are defined;

 - + + @@ -60095,13 +60904,13 @@

The principle of sufficient documentation states that organizational personnel with responsibilities to interact with the system are provided with adequate documentation and other information such that the personnel contribute to rather than detract from system security. Despite attempts to comply with principles such as human factored security and acceptable security, systems are inherently complex, and the design intent for the use of security mechanisms and the ramifications of the misuse or misconfiguration of security mechanisms are not always intuitively obvious. Uninformed and insufficiently trained users can introduce vulnerabilities due to errors of omission and commission. The availability of documentation and training can help to ensure a knowledgeable cadre of personnel, all of whom have a critical role in the achievement of principles such as continuous protection. Documentation is written clearly and supported by training that provides security awareness and understanding of security-relevant responsibilities.

 - +

implement the security design principle of sufficient documentation.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing the security design principle of sufficient documentation used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system

@@ -60117,7 +60926,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with the responsibility for determining system security and privacy requirements

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -60127,7 +60936,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of sufficient documentation in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of sufficient documentation in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -60141,14 +60950,15 @@ Minimization - +

processes that implement the privacy principle of minimization are defined;

 - + + @@ -60165,13 +60975,13 @@

The principle of minimization states that organizations should only process personally identifiable information that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish an authorized purpose and should only maintain personally identifiable information for as long as is necessary to accomplish the purpose. Organizations have processes in place, consistent with applicable laws and policies, to implement the principle of minimization.

 - +

the privacy principle of minimization is implemented using .

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -60191,7 +61001,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

organizational personnel with system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification responsibilities

@@ -60200,7 +61010,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for applying the privacy design principle of minimization in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of sufficient documentation in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification

@@ -60215,7 +61025,7 @@ External System Services - +

controls to be employed by external system service providers are defined;

@@ -60223,14 +61033,15 @@ - +

processes, methods, and techniques employed to monitor control compliance by external service providers are defined;

 - + + @@ -60269,42 +61080,42 @@

External system services are provided by an external provider, and the organization has no direct control over the implementation of the required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness. Organizations establish relationships with external service providers in a variety of ways, including through business partnerships, contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, joint ventures, and supply chain exchanges. The responsibility for managing risks from the use of external system services remains with authorizing officials. For services external to organizations, a chain of trust requires that organizations establish and retain a certain level of confidence that each provider in the consumer-provider relationship provides adequate protection for the services rendered. The extent and nature of this chain of trust vary based on relationships between organizations and the external providers. Organizations document the basis for the trust relationships so that the relationships can be monitored. External system services documentation includes government, service providers, end user security roles and responsibilities, and service-level agreements. Service-level agreements define the expectations of performance for implemented controls, describe measurable outcomes, and identify remedies and response requirements for identified instances of noncompliance.

 - + - + - +

providers of external system services comply with organizational security requirements;

 - +

providers of external system services comply with organizational privacy requirements;

 - +

providers of external system services employ ;

 - + - +

organizational oversight with regard to external system services are defined and documented;

 - +

user roles and responsibilities with regard to external system services are defined and documented;

 - +

are employed to monitor control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.

 @@ -60312,7 +61123,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -60332,7 +61143,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

external providers of system services

@@ -60342,7 +61153,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for monitoring security and privacy control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis

mechanisms for monitoring security and privacy control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis

@@ -60352,14 +61163,15 @@ Risk Assessments and Organizational Approvals - +

personnel or roles that approve the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -60381,14 +61193,14 @@

Information security services include the operation of security devices, such as firewalls or key management services as well as incident monitoring, analysis, and response. Risks assessed can include system, mission or business, security, privacy, or supply chain risks.

 - + - +

an organizational assessment of risk is conducted prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of information security services;

 - +

approve the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services.

 @@ -60396,7 +61208,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

supply chain risk management policy and procedures

@@ -60412,7 +61224,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with system security responsibilities

@@ -60423,7 +61235,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for conducting a risk assessment prior to acquiring or outsourcing dedicated security services

organizational processes for approving the outsourcing of dedicated security services

@@ -60436,14 +61248,15 @@ Identification of Functions, Ports, Protocols, and Services - +

external system services that require the identification of functions, ports, protocols, and other services are defined;

 - + + @@ -60457,13 +61270,13 @@

Information from external service providers regarding the specific functions, ports, protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can be useful when the need arises to understand the trade-offs involved in restricting certain functions and services or blocking certain ports and protocols.

 - +

providers of are required to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use of such services.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

supply chain risk management policy and procedures

@@ -60480,7 +61293,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -60497,21 +61310,22 @@ - +

security requirements, properties, factors, or conditions defining acceptable trust relationships on which a trust relationship is maintained are defined;

 - +

privacy requirements, properties, factors, or conditions defining acceptable trust relationships on which a trust relationship is maintained are defined;

 - + + @@ -60524,24 +61338,24 @@

Trust relationships between organizations and external service providers reflect the degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is at an acceptable level. Trust relationships can help organizations gain increased levels of confidence that service providers are providing adequate protection for the services rendered and can also be useful when conducting incident response or when planning for upgrades or obsolescence. Trust relationships can be complicated due to the potentially large number of entities participating in the consumer-provider interactions, subordinate relationships and levels of trust, and types of interactions between the parties. In some cases, the degree of trust is based on the level of control that organizations can exert on external service providers regarding the controls necessary for the protection of the service, information, or individual privacy and the evidence brought forth as to the effectiveness of the implemented controls. The level of control is established by the terms and conditions of the contracts or service-level agreements.

 - + - +

trust relationships with external service provides based on are established and documented;

 - +

trust relationships with external service provides based on are maintained;

 - +

trust relationships with external service provides based on are established and documented;

 - +

trust relationships with external service provides based on are maintained.

 @@ -60549,7 +61363,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -60569,7 +61383,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -60582,7 +61396,7 @@ Consistent Interests of Consumers and Providers - +

external service providers are defined;

@@ -60590,14 +61404,15 @@ - +

actions to be taken to verify that the interests of external service providers are consistent with and reflect organizational interests are defined;

 - + + @@ -60609,13 +61424,13 @@

As organizations increasingly use external service providers, it is possible that the interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational interests. In such situations, simply having the required technical, management, or operational controls in place may not be sufficient if the providers that implement and manage those controls are not operating in a manner consistent with the interests of the consuming organizations. Actions that organizations take to address such concerns include requiring background checks for selected service provider personnel; examining ownership records; employing only trustworthy service providers, such as providers with which organizations have had successful trust relationships; and conducting routine, periodic, unscheduled visits to service provider facilities.

 - +

are taken to verify that the interests of are consistent with and reflect organizational interests.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing external system services

@@ -60633,7 +61448,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -60643,7 +61458,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for defining and employing safeguards to ensure consistent interests with external service providers

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards to ensure consistent interests with external service providers

@@ -60654,7 +61469,7 @@ Processing, Storage, and Service Location - + design development @@ -60927,7 +61746,7 @@ - +

configuration items under configuration management are defined;

@@ -60935,14 +61754,15 @@ - +

personnel to whom security flaws and flaw resolutions within the system, component, or service are reported is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -60993,69 +61813,69 @@

The configuration items that are placed under configuration management include the formal model; the functional, high-level, and low-level design specifications; other design data; implementation documentation; source code and hardware schematics; the current running version of the object code; tools for comparing new versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions and source code with previous versions; and test fixtures and documentation. Depending on the mission and business needs of organizations and the nature of the contractual relationships in place, developers may provide configuration management support during the operations and maintenance stage of the system development life cycle.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform configuration management during system, component, or service ;

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to document the integrity of changes to ;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to manage the integrity of changes to ;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to control the integrity of changes to ;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component, or service;

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to document approved changes to the system, component, or service;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to document the potential security impacts of approved changes;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to document the potential privacy impacts of approved changes;

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to track security flaws within the system, component, or service;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to track security flaw resolutions within the system, component, or service;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to report findings to .

 @@ -61065,7 +61885,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing system developer configuration management

@@ -61084,7 +61904,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -61094,7 +61914,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for monitoring developer configuration management

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management

@@ -61103,7 +61923,8 @@ Software and Firmware Integrity Verification - + + @@ -61117,13 +61938,13 @@

Software and firmware integrity verification allows organizations to detect unauthorized changes to software and firmware components using developer-provided tools, techniques, and mechanisms. The integrity checking mechanisms can also address counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the integrity of software and firmware components, for example, through secure one-way hashes provided by developers. Delivered software and firmware components also include any updates to such components.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing system developer configuration management

@@ -61143,7 +61964,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -61154,7 +61975,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for monitoring developer configuration management

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management

@@ -61164,7 +61985,8 @@ Alternative Configuration Management Processes - + + @@ -61176,13 +61998,13 @@

Alternate configuration management processes may be required when organizations use commercial off-the-shelf information technology products. Alternate configuration management processes include organizational personnel who review and approve proposed changes to systems, system components, and system services and conduct security and privacy impact analyses prior to the implementation of changes to systems, components, or services.

 - +

an alternate configuration management process has been provided using organizational personnel in the absence of a dedicated developer configuration management team.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -61204,7 +62026,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -61214,7 +62036,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for monitoring developer configuration management

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management

@@ -61224,7 +62046,8 @@ Hardware Integrity Verification - + + @@ -61237,13 +62060,13 @@

Hardware integrity verification allows organizations to detect unauthorized changes to hardware components using developer-provided tools, techniques, methods, and mechanisms. Organizations may verify the integrity of hardware components with hard-to-copy labels, verifiable serial numbers provided by developers, and by requiring the use of anti-tamper technologies. Delivered hardware components also include hardware and firmware updates to such components.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to enable integrity verification of hardware components.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing system developer configuration management

@@ -61260,7 +62083,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -61271,7 +62094,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for monitoring developer configuration management

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management

@@ -61281,7 +62104,8 @@ Trusted Generation - + + @@ -61293,19 +62117,19 @@

The trusted generation of descriptions, source code, and object code addresses authorized changes to hardware, software, and firmware components between versions during development. The focus is on the efficacy of the configuration management process by the developer to ensure that newly generated versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions, source code, and object code continue to enforce the security policy for the system, system component, or system service. In contrast, SA-10(1) and SA-10(3) allow organizations to detect unauthorized changes to hardware, software, and firmware components using tools, techniques, or mechanisms provided by developers.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to employ tools for comparing newly generated versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions with previous versions;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to employ tools for comparing newly generated versions of source code with previous versions;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to employ tools for comparing newly generated versions of object code with previous versions.

 @@ -61313,7 +62137,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing system developer configuration management

@@ -61331,7 +62155,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for monitoring developer configuration management

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management

@@ -61341,7 +62165,8 @@ Mapping Integrity for Version Control - + + @@ -61353,13 +62178,13 @@

Mapping integrity for version control addresses changes to hardware, software, and firmware components during both initial development and system development life cycle updates. Maintaining the integrity between the master copies of security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware (including designs, hardware drawings, source code) and the equivalent data in master copies in operational environments is essential to ensuring the availability of organizational systems that support critical mission and business functions.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to maintain the integrity of the mapping between the master build data describing the current version of security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware and the on-site master copy of the data for the current version.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing system developer configuration management

@@ -61378,7 +62203,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -61388,7 +62213,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for monitoring developer configuration management

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management

@@ -61398,7 +62223,8 @@ Trusted Distribution - + + @@ -61410,13 +62236,13 @@

The trusted distribution of security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates help to ensure that the updates are correct representations of the master copies maintained by the developer and have not been tampered with during distribution.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to execute procedures for ensuring that security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates distributed to the organization are exactly as specified by the master copies.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing system developer configuration management

@@ -61433,7 +62259,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -61443,7 +62269,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for monitoring developer configuration management

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management

@@ -61463,35 +62289,36 @@ - +

security representatives to be included in the configuration change management and control process are defined;

 - +

privacy representatives to be included in the configuration change management and control process are defined;

 - +

configuration change management and control processes in which security representatives are required to be included are defined;

 - +

configuration change management and control processes in which privacy representatives are required to be included are defined;

 - + + @@ -61503,14 +62330,14 @@

Information security and privacy representatives can include system security officers, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, and system privacy officers. Representation by personnel with information security and privacy expertise is important because changes to system configurations can have unintended side effects, some of which may be security- or privacy-relevant. Detecting such changes early in the process can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security and privacy posture of systems. The configuration change management and control process in this control enhancement refers to the change management and control process defined by organizations in SA-10b.

 - + - +

are required to be included in the ;

 - +

are required to be included in the .

 @@ -61518,7 +62345,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -61537,7 +62364,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -61551,7 +62378,7 @@ Developer Testing and Evaluation - + @@ -62924,7 +63781,7 @@ - +

frequency at which to provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics is defined (if selected);

@@ -62933,14 +63790,15 @@ - +

program review milestones are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -62960,14 +63818,14 @@

Organizations use quality metrics to establish acceptable levels of system quality. Metrics can include quality gates, which are collections of completion criteria or sufficiency standards that represent the satisfactory execution of specific phases of the system development project. For example, a quality gate may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or a determination that such warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security or privacy capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. Metrics can include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities in accordance with organizational risk tolerance, such as requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity of medium or high.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics .

 @@ -62975,7 +63833,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing development process, standards, and tools

@@ -62992,7 +63850,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -63003,7 +63861,8 @@ Security and Privacy Tracking Tools - + + @@ -63016,14 +63875,14 @@

System development teams select and deploy security and privacy tracking tools, including vulnerability or work item tracking systems that facilitate assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with development processes.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to select and employ security tracking tools for use during the development process;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to select and employ privacy tracking tools for use during the development process.

 @@ -63031,7 +63890,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -63052,7 +63911,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -63071,28 +63930,29 @@ - +

decision points in the system development life cycle are defined;

 - +

the breadth of criticality analysis is defined;

 - +

the depth of criticality analysis is defined;

 - + + @@ -63113,21 +63973,21 @@

Criticality analysis performed by the developer provides input to the criticality analysis performed by organizations. Developer input is essential to organizational criticality analysis because organizations may not have access to detailed design documentation for system components that are developed as commercial off-the-shelf products. Such design documentation includes functional specifications, high-level designs, low-level designs, source code, and hardware schematics. Criticality analysis is important for organizational systems that are designated as high value assets. High value assets can be moderate- or high-impact systems due to heightened adversarial interest or potential adverse effects on the federal enterprise. Developer input is especially important when organizations conduct supply chain criticality analyses.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform a criticality analysis at in the system development life cycle;

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform a criticality analysis at the following rigor level: ;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform a criticality analysis at the following rigor level: .

 @@ -63137,7 +63997,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management plan

system and services acquisition policy

@@ -63156,7 +64016,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -63167,7 +64027,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for performing criticality analysis

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing criticality analysis

@@ -63177,7 +64037,8 @@ Threat Modeling and Vulnerability Analysis - + + @@ -63186,14 +64047,15 @@ Attack Surface Reduction - +

thresholds to which attack surfaces are to be reduced are defined;

 - + + @@ -63209,13 +64071,13 @@

Attack surface reduction is closely aligned with threat and vulnerability analyses and system architecture and design. Attack surface reduction is a means of reducing risk to organizations by giving attackers less opportunity to exploit weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e., potential vulnerabilities) within systems, system components, and system services. Attack surface reduction includes implementing the concept of layered defenses, applying the principles of least privilege and least functionality, applying secure software development practices, deprecating unsafe functions, reducing entry points available to unauthorized users, reducing the amount of code that executes, and eliminating application programming interfaces (APIs) that are vulnerable to attacks.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to reduce attack surfaces to .

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing development process, standards, and tools

@@ -63234,7 +64096,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -63244,7 +64106,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for defining attack surface reduction thresholds

 @@ -63253,7 +64115,8 @@ Continuous Improvement - + + @@ -63265,13 +64128,13 @@

Developers of systems, system components, and system services consider the effectiveness and efficiency of their development processes for meeting quality objectives and addressing the security and privacy capabilities in current threat environments.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to implement an explicit process to continuously improve the development process.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -63293,7 +64156,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -63305,7 +64168,7 @@ Automated Vulnerability Analysis - +

frequency at which to conduct vulnerability analysis is defined;

@@ -63313,7 +64176,7 @@ - +

tools used to perform automated vulnerability analysis are defined;

@@ -63321,14 +64184,15 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the outputs of tools and results of the analysis are to be delivered is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -63358,24 +64222,24 @@

Automated tools can be more effective at analyzing exploitable weaknesses or deficiencies in large and complex systems, prioritizing vulnerabilities by severity, and providing recommendations for risk mitigations.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform automated vulnerability analysis using ;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to determine the exploitation potential for discovered vulnerabilities ;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to determine potential risk mitigations for delivered vulnerabilities;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to deliver the outputs of the tools and results of the analysis to .

 @@ -63383,7 +64247,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing development process, standards, and tools

@@ -63402,7 +64266,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -63412,7 +64276,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for vulnerability analysis of systems, system components, or system services under development

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing vulnerability analysis of systems, system components, or system services under development

@@ -63422,7 +64286,8 @@ Reuse of Threat and Vulnerability Information - + + @@ -63434,14 +64299,14 @@

Analysis of vulnerabilities found in similar software applications can inform potential design and implementation issues for systems under development. Similar systems or system components may exist within developer organizations. Vulnerability information is available from a variety of public and private sector sources, including the NIST National Vulnerability Database.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to use threat modeling from similar systems, components, or services to inform the current development process;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to use vulnerability analyses from similar systems, components, or services to inform the current development process.

 @@ -63449,7 +64314,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -63465,7 +64330,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -63477,7 +64342,8 @@ Use of Live Data - + + @@ -63485,7 +64351,8 @@ Incident Response Plan - + + @@ -63498,19 +64365,19 @@

The incident response plan provided by developers may provide information not readily available to organizations and be incorporated into organizational incident response plans. Developer information may also be extremely helpful, such as when organizations respond to vulnerabilities in commercial off-the-shelf products.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to provide an incident response plan;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to implement an incident response plan;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to test an incident response plan.

 @@ -63518,7 +64385,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing incident response, standards, and tools

@@ -63538,7 +64405,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -63550,7 +64417,8 @@ Archive System or Component - + + @@ -63563,13 +64431,13 @@

Archiving system or system components requires the developer to retain key development artifacts, including hardware specifications, source code, object code, and relevant documentation from the development process that can provide a readily available configuration baseline for system and component upgrades or modifications.

 - +

the developer of the system or system component is required to archive the system or component to be released or delivered together with the corresponding evidence supporting the final security and privacy review.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing development process, standards, and tools

@@ -63585,7 +64453,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -63597,7 +64465,8 @@ Minimize Personally Identifiable Information - + + @@ -63612,13 +64481,13 @@

Organizations can minimize the risk to an individual’s privacy by using techniques such as de-identification or synthetic data. Limiting the use of personally identifiable information in development and test environments helps reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system.

 - +

the developer of the system or system component is required to minimize the use of personally identifiable information in development and test environments.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -63637,7 +64506,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -63646,7 +64515,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the minimization of personally identifiable information in development and test environments

mechanisms to facilitate the minimization of personally identifiable information in development and test environments

@@ -63658,14 +64527,15 @@ Developer-provided Training - +

training on the correct use and operation of the implemented security and privacy functions, controls, and/or mechanisms provided by the developer of the system, system component, or system service is defined;

 - + + @@ -63681,13 +64551,13 @@

Developer-provided training applies to external and internal (in-house) developers. Training personnel is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the controls implemented within organizational systems. Types of training include web-based and computer-based training, classroom-style training, and hands-on training (including micro-training). Organizations can also request training materials from developers to conduct in-house training or offer self-training to organizational personnel. Organizations determine the type of training necessary and may require different types of training for different security and privacy functions, controls, and mechanisms.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to provide on the correct use and operation of the implemented security and privacy functions, controls, and/or mechanisms.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -63708,7 +64578,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -63720,7 +64590,8 @@ Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and Design - + + @@ -63753,44 +64624,44 @@

Developer security and privacy architecture and design are directed at external developers, although they could also be applied to internal (in-house) development. In contrast, PL-8 is directed at internal developers to ensure that organizations develop a security and privacy architecture that is integrated with the enterprise architecture. The distinction between SA-17 and PL-8 is especially important when organizations outsource the development of systems, system components, or system services and when there is a requirement to demonstrate consistency with the enterprise architecture and security and privacy architecture of the organization. ISO 15408-2, ISO 15408-3 , and SP 800-160-1 provide information on security architecture and design, including formal policy models, security-relevant components, formal and informal correspondence, conceptually simple design, and structuring for least privilege and testing.

 - + - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a design specification and security architecture that are consistent with the organization’s security architecture, which is an integral part the organization’s enterprise architecture;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a design specification and privacy architecture that are consistent with the organization’s privacy architecture, which is an integral part the organization’s enterprise architecture;

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a design specification and security architecture that accurately and completely describe the required security functionality and the allocation of controls among physical and logical components;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a design specification and privacy architecture that accurately and completely describe the required privacy functionality and the allocation of controls among physical and logical components;

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a design specification and security architecture that express how individual security functions, mechanisms, and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a design specification and privacy architecture that express how individual privacy functions, mechanisms, and services work together to provide required privacy capabilities and a unified approach to protection.

 @@ -63800,7 +64671,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -63820,7 +64691,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -63835,21 +64706,22 @@ - +

organizational security policy to be enforced is defined;

 - +

organizational privacy policy to be enforced is defined;

 - + + @@ -63872,30 +64744,30 @@

Formal models describe specific behaviors or security and privacy policies using formal languages, thus enabling the correctness of those behaviors and policies to be formally proven. Not all components of systems can be modeled. Generally, formal specifications are scoped to the behaviors or policies of interest, such as nondiscretionary access control policies. Organizations choose the formal modeling language and approach based on the nature of the behaviors and policies to be described and the available tools.

 - + - + - +

as an integral part of the development process, the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a formal policy model describing the to be enforced;

 - +

as an integral part of the development process, the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a formal policy model describing the to be enforced;

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to prove that the formal policy model is internally consistent and sufficient to enforce the defined elements of the organizational security policy when implemented;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to prove that the formal policy model is internally consistent and sufficient to enforce the defined elements of the organizational privacy policy when implemented.

 @@ -63905,7 +64777,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

system and services acquisition procedures

@@ -63925,7 +64797,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -63936,7 +64808,8 @@ Security-relevant Components - + + @@ -63958,28 +64831,28 @@

The security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware represent the portion of the system, component, or service that is trusted to perform correctly to maintain required security properties.

 - + - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to define security-relevant hardware;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to define security-relevant software;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to define security-relevant firmware;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to provide a rationale that the definition for security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware is complete.

 @@ -63987,7 +64860,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

enterprise architecture policy

@@ -64004,7 +64877,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -64016,7 +64889,8 @@ Formal Correspondence - + + @@ -64053,43 +64927,43 @@

Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, and that any additional code or implementation details that are present have no impact on the behaviors or policies being modeled. Formal methods can be used to show that the high-level security properties are satisfied by the formal system description, and that the formal system description is correctly implemented by a description of some lower level, including a hardware description. Consistency between the formal top-level specification and the formal policy models is generally not amenable to being fully proven. Therefore, a combination of formal and informal methods may be needed to demonstrate such consistency. Consistency between the formal top-level specification and the actual implementation may require the use of an informal demonstration due to limitations on the applicability of formal methods to prove that the specification accurately reflects the implementation. Hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms internal to security-relevant components include mapping registers and direct memory input and output.

 - + - + - +

as an integral part of the development process, the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a formal top-level specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of exceptions;

 - +

as an integral part of the development process, the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a formal top-level specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of error messages;

 - +

as an integral part of the development process, the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce a formal top-level specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of effects;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to show proof that the formal top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model to the extent feasible with additional informal demonstration as necessary;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to show via informal demonstration that the formal top-level specification completely covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to show that the formal top-level specification is an accurate description of the implemented security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms that are not addressed in the formal top-level specification but are strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware.

 @@ -64097,7 +64971,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

enterprise architecture policy

@@ -64118,7 +64992,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -64131,13 +65005,14 @@ Informal Correspondence - + - + + @@ -64174,43 +65049,43 @@

Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, and that additional code or implementation detail has no impact on the behaviors or policies being modeled. Consistency between the descriptive top-level specification (i.e., high-level/low-level design) and the formal policy model is generally not amenable to being fully proven. Therefore, a combination of formal and informal methods may be needed to show such consistency. Hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms strictly internal to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware include mapping registers and direct memory input and output.

 - + - + - +

as an integral part of the development process, the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce an informal, descriptive top-level specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of exceptions;

 - +

as an integral part of the development process, the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce an informal, descriptive top-level specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of error messages;

 - +

as an integral part of the development process, the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to produce an informal, descriptive top-level specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of effects;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to show via that the descriptive top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to show via informal demonstration that the descriptive top-level specification completely covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to show that the descriptive top-level specification is an accurate description of the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms that are not addressed in the descriptive top-level specification but are strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware.

 @@ -64218,7 +65093,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

enterprise architecture policy

@@ -64239,7 +65114,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -64251,7 +65126,8 @@ Conceptually Simple Design - + + @@ -64274,14 +65150,14 @@

The principle of reduced complexity states that the system design is as simple and small as possible (see SA-8(7) ). A small and simple design is easier to understand and analyze and is also less prone to error (see AC-25, SA-8(13) ). The principle of reduced complexity applies to any aspect of a system, but it has particular importance for security due to the various analyses performed to obtain evidence about the emergent security property of the system. For such analyses to be successful, a small and simple design is essential. Application of the principle of reduced complexity contributes to the ability of system developers to understand the correctness and completeness of system security functions and facilitates the identification of potential vulnerabilities. The corollary of reduced complexity states that the simplicity of the system is directly related to the number of vulnerabilities it will contain. That is, simpler systems contain fewer vulnerabilities. An important benefit of reduced complexity is that it is easier to understand whether the security policy has been captured in the system design and that fewer vulnerabilities are likely to be introduced during engineering development. An additional benefit is that any such conclusion about correctness, completeness, and existence of vulnerabilities can be reached with a higher degree of assurance in contrast to conclusions reached in situations where the system design is inherently more complex.

 - + - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to design and structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to use a complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism with precisely defined semantics;

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to internally structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware with specific regard for this mechanism.

 @@ -64289,7 +65165,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

enterprise architecture policy

@@ -64308,7 +65184,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -64320,7 +65196,8 @@ Structure for Testing - + + @@ -64334,13 +65211,13 @@

Applying the security design principles in SP 800-160-1 promotes complete, consistent, and comprehensive testing and evaluation of systems, system components, and services. The thoroughness of such testing contributes to the evidence produced to generate an effective assurance case or argument as to the trustworthiness of the system, system component, or service.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to facilitate testing.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

enterprise architecture policy

@@ -64361,7 +65238,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -64373,7 +65250,8 @@ Structure for Least Privilege - + + @@ -64389,13 +65267,13 @@

In addition to its manifestations at the system interface, least privilege can be used as a guiding principle for the internal structure of the system itself. One aspect of internal least privilege is to construct modules so that only the elements encapsulated by the module are directly operated upon by the functions within the module. Elements external to a module that may be affected by the module’s operation are indirectly accessed through interaction (e.g., via a function call) with the module that contains those elements. Another aspect of internal least privilege is that the scope of a given module or component includes only those system elements that are necessary for its functionality, and the access modes to the elements (e.g., read, write) are minimal.

 - +

the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to facilitate controlling access with least privilege.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

enterprise architecture policy

@@ -64414,7 +65292,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -64428,7 +65306,7 @@ - +

critical systems or system components are defined;

@@ -64437,14 +65315,15 @@ - +

capabilities to be implemented by systems or components are defined;

 - + + @@ -64456,13 +65335,13 @@

Security resources that are distributed, located at different layers or in different system elements, or are implemented to support different aspects of trustworthiness can interact in unforeseen or incorrect ways. Adverse consequences can include cascading failures, interference, or coverage gaps. Coordination of the behavior of security resources (e.g., by ensuring that one patch is installed across all resources before making a configuration change that assumes that the patch is propagated) can avert such negative interactions.

 - +

are designed with coordinated behavior to implement .

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

enterprise architecture policy

@@ -64483,7 +65362,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -64497,14 +65376,15 @@ - +

critical systems or system components to be designed differently are defined;

 - + + @@ -64516,13 +65396,13 @@

Design diversity is achieved by supplying the same requirements specification to multiple developers, each of whom is responsible for developing a variant of the system or system component that meets the requirements. Variants can be in software design, in hardware design, or in both hardware and a software design. Differences in the designs of the variants can result from developer experience (e.g., prior use of a design pattern), design style (e.g., when decomposing a required function into smaller tasks, determining what constitutes a separate task and how far to decompose tasks into sub-tasks), selection of libraries to incorporate into the variant, and the development environment (e.g., different design tools make some design patterns easier to visualize). Hardware design diversity includes making different decisions about what information to keep in analog form and what information to convert to digital form, transmitting the same information at different times, and introducing delays in sampling (temporal diversity). Design diversity is commonly used to support fault tolerance.

 - +

different designs are used for to satisfy a common set of requirements or to provide equivalent functionality.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

enterprise architecture policy

@@ -64541,7 +65421,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -64554,14 +65434,16 @@ Tamper Resistance and Detection - + + Multiple Phases of System Development Life Cycle - + + @@ -64569,6 +65451,7 @@ Inspection of Systems or Components + @@ -64577,14 +65460,16 @@ Component Authenticity - + + Anti-counterfeit Training - + + @@ -64592,7 +65477,8 @@ Configuration Control for Component Service and Repair - + + @@ -64600,7 +65486,8 @@ Component Disposal - + + @@ -64608,7 +65495,8 @@ Anti-counterfeit Scanning - + + @@ -64619,14 +65507,15 @@ - +

critical system components to be reimplemented or custom-developed are defined;

 - + + @@ -64641,13 +65530,13 @@

Organizations determine that certain system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate risk. Reimplementation or custom development of such components may satisfy requirements for higher assurance and is carried out by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to reimplement or custom develop critical system components, additional controls can be employed. Controls include enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files.

 - +

are reimplemented or custom-developed.

 - +

Supply chain risk management plan

system and services acquisition policy

@@ -64663,7 +65552,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -64672,7 +65561,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the reimplementation or customized development of critical system components

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the reimplementation or customized development of critical system components

@@ -64684,7 +65573,7 @@ - +

the system, systems component, or system service that the developer has access to is/are defined;

@@ -64692,7 +65581,7 @@ - +

official government duties assigned to the developer are defined;

@@ -64700,14 +65589,15 @@ - +

additional personnel screening criteria for the developer are defined;

 - + + @@ -64732,14 +65622,14 @@

Developer screening is directed at external developers. Internal developer screening is addressed by PS-3 . Because the system, system component, or system service may be used in critical activities essential to the national or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that developers are trustworthy. The degree of trust required of developers may need to be consistent with that of the individuals who access the systems, system components, or system services once deployed. Authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearances, background checks, citizenship, and nationality. Developer trustworthiness may also include a review and analysis of company ownership and relationships that the company has with entities that may potentially affect the quality and reliability of the systems, components, or services being developed. Satisfying the required access authorizations and personnel screening criteria includes providing a list of all individuals who are authorized to perform development activities on the selected system, system component, or system service so that organizations can validate that the developer has satisfied the authorization and screening requirements.

 - + - +

the developer of is required to have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned ;

 - +

the developer of is required to satisfy .

 @@ -64747,7 +65637,7 @@ - +

System and services acquisition policy

personnel security policy and procedures

@@ -64766,7 +65656,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -64775,7 +65665,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for developer screening

mechanisms supporting developer screening

@@ -64784,7 +65674,8 @@ Validation of Screening - + + @@ -64794,7 +65685,7 @@ Unsupported System Components - + design modification augmentation @@ -64896,14 +65789,15 @@ - +

systems or system components supporting mission-essential services or functions are defined;

 - + + @@ -64918,13 +65812,13 @@

It is often necessary for a system or system component that supports mission-essential services or functions to be enhanced to maximize the trustworthiness of the resource. Sometimes this enhancement is done at the design level. In other instances, it is done post-design, either through modifications of the system in question or by augmenting the system with additional components. For example, supplemental authentication or non-repudiation functions may be added to the system to enhance the identity of critical resources to other resources that depend on the organization-defined resources.

 - +

is employed on supporting essential services or functions to increase the trustworthiness in those systems or components.

 - +

System and services acquisition policy

procedures addressing design modification, augmentation, or reconfiguration of systems or system components

@@ -64936,7 +65830,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -64946,7 +65840,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the modification of design, augmentation, or reconfiguration of systems or system components

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing design modification, augmentation, or reconfiguration of systems or system components

@@ -64964,14 +65858,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the system and communications protection policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the system and communications protection procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -64979,7 +65873,7 @@ - + protect against limit @@ -65854,14 +66761,15 @@ - +

controls to achieve the denial-of-service objective by type of denial-of-service event are defined;

 - + + @@ -65884,14 +66792,14 @@

Denial-of-service events may occur due to a variety of internal and external causes, such as an attack by an adversary or a lack of planning to support organizational needs with respect to capacity and bandwidth. Such attacks can occur across a wide range of network protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). A variety of technologies are available to limit or eliminate the origination and effects of denial-of-service events. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain types of packets to protect system components on internal networks from being directly affected by or the source of denial-of-service attacks. Employing increased network capacity and bandwidth combined with service redundancy also reduces the susceptibility to denial-of-service events.

 - + - +

the effects of are ;

 - +

are employed to achieve the denial-of-service protection objective.

 @@ -65899,7 +66807,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing denial-of-service protection

@@ -65914,7 +66822,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -65924,7 +66832,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms protecting against or limiting the effects of denial-of-service attacks

 @@ -65933,14 +66841,15 @@ Restrict Ability to Attack Other Systems - +

denial-of-service attacks for which to restrict the ability of individuals to launch are defined;

 - + + @@ -65951,13 +66860,13 @@

Restricting the ability of individuals to launch denial-of-service attacks requires the mechanisms commonly used for such attacks to be unavailable. Individuals of concern include hostile insiders or external adversaries who have breached or compromised the system and are using it to launch a denial-of-service attack. Organizations can restrict the ability of individuals to connect and transmit arbitrary information on the transport medium (i.e., wired networks, wireless networks, spoofed Internet protocol packets). Organizations can also limit the ability of individuals to use excessive system resources. Protection against individuals having the ability to launch denial-of-service attacks may be implemented on specific systems or boundary devices that prohibit egress to potential target systems.

 - +

the ability of individuals to launch against other systems is restricted.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing denial-of-service protection

@@ -65971,7 +66880,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -65981,7 +66890,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms restricting the ability to launch denial-of-service attacks against other systems

 @@ -65990,7 +66899,8 @@ Capacity, Bandwidth, and Redundancy - + + @@ -66001,13 +66911,13 @@

Managing capacity ensures that sufficient capacity is available to counter flooding attacks. Managing capacity includes establishing selected usage priorities, quotas, partitioning, or load balancing.

 - +

capacity, bandwidth, or other redundancies to limit the effects of information flooding denial-of-service attacks are managed.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing denial-of-service protection

@@ -66020,7 +66930,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -66030,7 +66940,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing the management of system bandwidth, capacity, and redundancy to limit the effects of information flooding denial-of-service attacks

 @@ -66040,7 +66950,7 @@ Detection and Monitoring - +

monitoring tools for detecting indicators of denial-of-service attacks are defined;

@@ -66048,14 +66958,15 @@ - +

system resources to be monitored to determine if sufficient resources exist to prevent effective denial-of-service attacks are defined;

 - + + @@ -66075,14 +66986,14 @@

Organizations consider the utilization and capacity of system resources when managing risk associated with a denial of service due to malicious attacks. Denial-of-service attacks can originate from external or internal sources. System resources that are sensitive to denial of service include physical disk storage, memory, and CPU cycles. Techniques used to prevent denial-of-service attacks related to storage utilization and capacity include instituting disk quotas, configuring systems to automatically alert administrators when specific storage capacity thresholds are reached, using file compression technologies to maximize available storage space, and imposing separate partitions for system and user data.

 - + - +

are employed to detect indicators of denial-of-service attacks against or launched from the system;

 - +

are monitored to determine if sufficient resources exist to prevent effective denial-of-service attacks.

 @@ -66090,7 +67001,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing denial-of-service protection

@@ -66104,7 +67015,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -66113,7 +67024,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms/tools implementing system monitoring for denial-of-service attacks

 @@ -66124,7 +67035,7 @@ Resource Availability - +

resources to be allocated to protect the availability of resources are defined;

@@ -66132,7 +67043,7 @@ - + physically logically - + + @@ -66260,38 +67173,38 @@

Managed interfaces include gateways, routers, firewalls, guards, network-based malicious code analysis, virtualization systems, or encrypted tunnels implemented within a security architecture. Subnetworks that are physically or logically separated from internal networks are referred to as demilitarized zones or DMZs. Restricting or prohibiting interfaces within organizational systems includes restricting external web traffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces, prohibiting external traffic that appears to be spoofing internal addresses, and prohibiting internal traffic that appears to be spoofing external addresses. SP 800-189 provides additional information on source address validation techniques to prevent ingress and egress of traffic with spoofed addresses. Commercial telecommunications services are provided by network components and consolidated management systems shared by customers. These services may also include third party-provided access lines and other service elements. Such services may represent sources of increased risk despite contract security provisions. Boundary protection may be implemented as a common control for all or part of an organizational network such that the boundary to be protected is greater than a system-specific boundary (i.e., an authorization boundary).

 - + - + - +

communications at external managed interfaces to the system are monitored;

 - +

communications at external managed interfaces to the system are controlled;

 - +

communications at key internal managed interfaces within the system are monitored;

 - +

communications at key internal managed interfaces within the system are controlled;

 - +

subnetworks for publicly accessible system components are separated from internal organizational networks;

 - +

external networks or systems are only connected to through managed interfaces consisting of boundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational security and privacy architecture.

 @@ -66299,7 +67212,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing boundary protection

@@ -66315,7 +67228,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -66325,7 +67238,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing boundary protection capabilities

 @@ -66333,7 +67246,8 @@ Physically Separated Subnetworks - + + @@ -66341,7 +67255,8 @@ Public Access - + + @@ -66349,7 +67264,8 @@ Access Points - + + @@ -66360,13 +67276,13 @@

Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates monitoring of inbound and outbound communications traffic. The Trusted Internet Connection DHS TIC initiative is an example of a federal guideline that requires limits on the number of external network connections. Limiting the number of external network connections to the system is important during transition periods from older to newer technologies (e.g., transitioning from IPv4 to IPv6 network protocols). Such transitions may require implementing the older and newer technologies simultaneously during the transition period and thus increase the number of access points to the system.

 - +

the number of external network connections to the system is limited.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing boundary protection

@@ -66382,7 +67298,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -66391,7 +67307,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing boundary protection capabilities

mechanisms limiting the number of external network connections to the system

@@ -66402,14 +67318,15 @@ External Telecommunications Services - +

the frequency at which to review exceptions to traffic flow policy is defined;

 - + + @@ -66456,62 +67373,62 @@

External telecommunications services can provide data and/or voice communications services. Examples of control plane traffic include Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing, Domain Name System (DNS), and management protocols. See SP 800-189 for additional information on the use of the resource public key infrastructure (RPKI) to protect BGP routes and detect unauthorized BGP announcements.

 - + - +

a managed interface is implemented for each external telecommunication service;

 - +

a traffic flow policy is established for each managed interface;

 - + - +

the confidentiality of the information being transmitted across each interface is protected;

 - +

the integrity of the information being transmitted across each interface is protected;

 - +

each exception to the traffic flow policy is documented with a supporting mission or business need and duration of that need;

 - + - +

exceptions to the traffic flow policy are reviewed ;

 - +

exceptions to the traffic flow policy that are no longer supported by an explicit mission or business need are removed;

 - +

unauthorized exchanges of control plan traffic with external networks are prevented;

 - +

information is published to enable remote networks to detect unauthorized control plane traffic from internal networks;

 - +

unauthorized control plane traffic is filtered from external networks.

 @@ -66519,7 +67436,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

traffic flow policy

@@ -66538,7 +67455,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -66547,7 +67464,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for documenting and reviewing exceptions to the traffic flow policy

organizational processes for removing exceptions to the traffic flow policy

@@ -66560,7 +67477,7 @@ Deny by Default — Allow by Exception - + physically logically @@ -68083,14 +69024,15 @@ - +

critical system components and functions to be isolated are defined;

 - + + @@ -68101,13 +69043,13 @@

Separating critical system components and functions from other noncritical system components and functions through separate subnetworks may be necessary to reduce susceptibility to a catastrophic or debilitating breach or compromise that results in system failure. For example, physically separating the command and control function from the in-flight entertainment function through separate subnetworks in a commercial aircraft provides an increased level of assurance in the trustworthiness of critical system functions.

 - +

subnetworks are separated to isolate .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing boundary protection

@@ -68123,7 +69065,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -68133,7 +69075,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms separating critical system components and functions

 @@ -68144,14 +69086,15 @@ Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity - + - + + @@ -68185,13 +69128,13 @@

Organizations that rely on commercial providers who offer transmission services as commodity services rather than as fully dedicated services may find it difficult to obtain the necessary assurances regarding the implementation of needed controls for transmission confidentiality and integrity. In such situations, organizations determine what types of confidentiality or integrity services are available in standard, commercial telecommunications service packages. If it is not feasible to obtain the necessary controls and assurances of control effectiveness through appropriate contracting vehicles, organizations can implement appropriate compensating controls.

 - +

the of transmitted information is/are protected.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing transmission confidentiality and integrity

@@ -68204,7 +69147,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -68213,7 +69156,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing transmission confidentiality and/or integrity

 @@ -68222,14 +69165,15 @@ Cryptographic Protection - + - + + @@ -68242,13 +69186,13 @@

Encryption protects information from unauthorized disclosure and modification during transmission. Cryptographic mechanisms that protect the confidentiality and integrity of information during transmission include TLS and IPSec. Cryptographic mechanisms used to protect information integrity include cryptographic hash functions that have applications in digital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms are implemented to during transmission.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing transmission confidentiality and integrity

@@ -68261,7 +69205,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -68270,7 +69214,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms supporting and/or implementing transmission confidentiality and/or integrity

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing alternative physical safeguards

@@ -68282,14 +69226,15 @@ Pre- and Post-transmission Handling - + - + + @@ -68300,14 +69245,14 @@

Information can be unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during preparation for transmission or during reception, including during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing and unpacking. Such unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information.

 - + - +

information is/are maintained during preparation for transmission;

 - +

information is/are maintained during reception.

 @@ -68315,7 +69260,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing transmission confidentiality and integrity

@@ -68328,7 +69273,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -68337,7 +69282,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing transmission confidentiality and/or integrity

 @@ -68347,14 +69292,15 @@ Cryptographic Protection for Message Externals - +

alternative physical controls to protect message externals are defined;

 - + + @@ -68367,13 +69313,13 @@

Cryptographic protection for message externals addresses protection from the unauthorized disclosure of information. Message externals include message headers and routing information. Cryptographic protection prevents the exploitation of message externals and applies to internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized users. Header and routing information is sometimes transmitted in clear text (i.e., unencrypted) because the information is not identified by organizations as having significant value or because encrypting the information can result in lower network performance or higher costs. Alternative physical controls include protected distribution systems.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms are implemented to protect message externals unless otherwise protected by .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing transmission confidentiality and integrity

@@ -68386,7 +69332,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -68395,7 +69341,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms supporting and/or implementing transmission confidentiality and/or integrity for message externals

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing alternative physical safeguards

@@ -68407,14 +69353,15 @@ Conceal or Randomize Communications - +

alternative physical controls to protect against unauthorized disclosure of communication patterns are defined;

 - + + @@ -68427,13 +69374,13 @@

Concealing or randomizing communication patterns addresses protection from unauthorized disclosure of information. Communication patterns include frequency, periods, predictability, and amount. Changes to communications patterns can reveal information with intelligence value, especially when combined with other available information related to the mission and business functions of the organization. Concealing or randomizing communications prevents the derivation of intelligence based on communications patterns and applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized users. Encrypting the links and transmitting in continuous, fixed, or random patterns prevents the derivation of intelligence from the system communications patterns. Alternative physical controls include protected distribution systems.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms are implemented to conceal or randomize communication patterns unless otherwise protected by .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing transmission confidentiality and integrity

@@ -68446,7 +69393,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -68455,7 +69402,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms supporting and/or implementing concealment or randomization of communication patterns

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing alternative physical safeguards

@@ -68467,7 +69414,7 @@ Protected Distribution System - +

the protected distribution system is defined;

@@ -68475,14 +69422,15 @@ - + - + + @@ -68493,13 +69441,13 @@

The purpose of a protected distribution system is to deter, detect, and/or make difficult physical access to the communication lines that carry national security information.

 - +

the is implemented to during transmission.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing transmission confidentiality and integrity

@@ -68512,7 +69460,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -68521,7 +69469,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms supporting and/or implementing concealment or randomization of communication patterns

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing protected distribution systems

@@ -68532,7 +69480,8 @@ Transmission Confidentiality - + + @@ -68541,14 +69490,15 @@ Network Disconnect - +

a time period of inactivity after which the system terminates a network connection associated with a communication session is defined;

 - + + @@ -68560,13 +69510,13 @@

Network disconnect applies to internal and external networks. Terminating network connections associated with specific communications sessions includes de-allocating TCP/IP address or port pairs at the operating system level and de-allocating the networking assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single operating system-level network connection. Periods of inactivity may be established by organizations and include time periods by type of network access or for specific network accesses.

 - +

the network connection associated with a communication session is terminated at the end of the session or after of inactivity.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing network disconnect

@@ -68580,7 +69530,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -68589,7 +69539,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing a network disconnect capability

 @@ -68599,7 +69549,7 @@ Trusted Path - + NIST FIPS-validated NSA-approved - + + @@ -68925,19 +69880,19 @@

SP 800-56A, SP 800-56B , and SP 800-56C provide guidance on cryptographic key establishment schemes and key derivation methods. SP 800-57-1, SP 800-57-2 , and SP 800-57-3 provide guidance on cryptographic key management.

 - + - +

symmetric cryptographic keys are produced using key management technology and processes;

 - +

symmetric cryptographic keys are controlled using key management technology and processes;

 - +

symmetric cryptographic keys are distributed using key management technology and processes.

 @@ -68945,7 +69900,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing cryptographic key establishment and management

@@ -68960,7 +69915,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -68970,7 +69925,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing symmetric cryptographic key establishment and management

 @@ -68980,7 +69935,7 @@ Asymmetric Keys - + - + + @@ -69002,19 +69958,19 @@

SP 800-56A, SP 800-56B , and SP 800-56C provide guidance on cryptographic key establishment schemes and key derivation methods. SP 800-57-1, SP 800-57-2 , and SP 800-57-3 provide guidance on cryptographic key management.

 - + - +

asymmetric cryptographic keys are produced using ;

 - +

asymmetric cryptographic keys are controlled using ;

 - +

asymmetric cryptographic keys are distributed using .

 @@ -69022,7 +69978,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing cryptographic key establishment and management

@@ -69037,7 +69993,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69048,7 +70004,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing asymmetric cryptographic key establishment and management

 @@ -69057,7 +70013,8 @@ PKI Certificates - + + @@ -69065,7 +70022,8 @@ PKI Certificates / Hardware Tokens - + + @@ -69073,7 +70031,8 @@ Physical Control of Keys - + + @@ -69085,13 +70044,13 @@

For organizations that use external service providers (e.g., cloud service or data center providers), physical control of cryptographic keys provides additional assurance that information stored by such external providers is not subject to unauthorized disclosure or modification.

 - +

physical control of cryptographic keys is maintained when stored information is encrypted by external service providers.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing cryptographic key establishment, management, and recovery

@@ -69104,7 +70063,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69113,7 +70072,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing cryptographic key establishment and management

 @@ -69124,7 +70083,7 @@ Cryptographic Protection - +

cryptographic uses are defined;

@@ -69133,14 +70092,15 @@ - +

types of cryptography for each specified cryptographic use are defined;

 - + + @@ -69187,14 +70147,14 @@

Cryptography can be employed to support a variety of security solutions, including the protection of classified information and controlled unclassified information, the provision and implementation of digital signatures, and the enforcement of information separation when authorized individuals have the necessary clearances but lack the necessary formal access approvals. Cryptography can also be used to support random number and hash generation. Generally applicable cryptographic standards include FIPS-validated cryptography and NSA-approved cryptography. For example, organizations that need to protect classified information may specify the use of NSA-approved cryptography. Organizations that need to provision and implement digital signatures may specify the use of FIPS-validated cryptography. Cryptography is implemented in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.

 - + - +

are identified;

 - +

for each specified cryptographic use (defined in SC-13_ODP[01]) are implemented.

 @@ -69202,7 +70162,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing cryptographic protection

@@ -69217,7 +70177,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69227,7 +70187,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing cryptographic protection

 @@ -69235,7 +70195,8 @@ FIPS-validated Cryptography - + + @@ -69243,7 +70204,8 @@ NSA-approved Cryptography - + + @@ -69251,7 +70213,8 @@ Individuals Without Formal Access Approvals - + + @@ -69259,7 +70222,8 @@ Digital Signatures - + + @@ -69268,7 +70232,8 @@ Public Access Protections - + + @@ -69285,14 +70250,15 @@ Collaborative Computing Devices and Applications - +

exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed are defined;

 - + + @@ -69311,14 +70277,14 @@

Collaborative computing devices and applications include remote meeting devices and applications, networked white boards, cameras, and microphones. The explicit indication of use includes signals to users when collaborative computing devices and applications are activated.

 - + - +

remote activation of collaborative computing devices and applications is prohibited except ;

 - +

an explicit indication of use is provided to users physically present at the devices.

 @@ -69326,7 +70292,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing collaborative computing

@@ -69340,7 +70306,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69350,7 +70316,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the management of remote activation of collaborative computing devices

mechanisms providing an indication of use of collaborative computing devices

@@ -69360,14 +70326,15 @@ Physical or Logical Disconnect - + - + + @@ -69378,13 +70345,13 @@

Failing to disconnect from collaborative computing devices can result in subsequent compromises of organizational information. Providing easy methods to disconnect from such devices after a collaborative computing session ensures that participants carry out the disconnect activity without having to go through complex and tedious procedures. Disconnect from collaborative computing devices can be manual or automatic.

 - +

the disconnect of collaborative computing devices is/are provided in a manner that supports ease of use.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing collaborative computing

@@ -69398,7 +70365,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69408,7 +70375,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the physical disconnect of collaborative computing devices

 @@ -69417,7 +70384,8 @@ Blocking Inbound and Outbound Communications Traffic - + + @@ -69426,7 +70394,7 @@ Disabling and Removal in Secure Work Areas - +

systems or system components from which collaborative computing devices are to be disabled or removed are defined;

@@ -69434,14 +70402,15 @@ - +

secure work areas where collaborative computing devices are to be disabled or removed from systems or system components are defined;

 - + + @@ -69452,13 +70421,13 @@

Failing to disable or remove collaborative computing devices and applications from systems or system components can result in compromises of information, including eavesdropping on conversations. A Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) is an example of a secure work area.

 - +

collaborative computing devices and applications are disabled or removed from in .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing collaborative computing

@@ -69474,7 +70443,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69483,7 +70452,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to disable collaborative computing devices

 @@ -69493,14 +70462,15 @@ Explicitly Indicate Current Participants - +

online meetings and teleconferences for which an explicit indication of current participants is to be provided are defined;

 - + + @@ -69511,13 +70481,13 @@

Explicitly indicating current participants prevents unauthorized individuals from participating in collaborative computing sessions without the explicit knowledge of other participants.

 - +

an explicit indication of current participants in is provided.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing collaborative computing

@@ -69532,7 +70502,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69541,7 +70511,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to indicate participants on collaborative computing devices

 @@ -69556,21 +70526,22 @@ - +

security attributes to be associated with information exchanged are defined;

 - +

privacy attributes to be associated with information exchanged are defined;

 - + + @@ -69584,24 +70555,24 @@

Security and privacy attributes can be explicitly or implicitly associated with the information contained in organizational systems or system components. Attributes are abstractions that represent the basic properties or characteristics of an entity with respect to protecting information or the management of personally identifiable information. Attributes are typically associated with internal data structures, including records, buffers, and files within the system. Security and privacy attributes are used to implement access control and information flow control policies; reflect special dissemination, management, or distribution instructions, including permitted uses of personally identifiable information; or support other aspects of the information security and privacy policies. Privacy attributes may be used independently or in conjunction with security attributes.

 - + - +

are associated with information exchanged between systems;

 - +

are associated with information exchanged between system components;

 - +

are associated with information exchanged between systems;

 - +

are associated with information exchanged between system components.

 @@ -69609,7 +70580,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing the transmission of security and privacy attributes

@@ -69625,7 +70596,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -69633,7 +70604,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the transmission of security and privacy attributes between systems

 @@ -69641,7 +70612,8 @@ Integrity Verification - + + @@ -69654,14 +70626,14 @@

Part of verifying the integrity of transmitted information is ensuring that security and privacy attributes that are associated with such information have not been modified in an unauthorized manner. Unauthorized modification of security or privacy attributes can result in a loss of integrity for transmitted information.

 - + - +

the integrity of transmitted security attributes is verified;

 - +

the integrity of transmitted privacy attributes is verified.

 @@ -69669,7 +70641,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing the transmission of security and privacy attributes

@@ -69684,7 +70656,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -69692,7 +70664,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing verification of the integrity of transmitted security and privacy attributes

 @@ -69701,7 +70673,8 @@ Anti-spoofing Mechanisms - + + @@ -69715,13 +70688,13 @@

Some attack vectors operate by altering the security attributes of an information system to intentionally and maliciously implement an insufficient level of security within the system. The alteration of attributes leads organizations to believe that a greater number of security functions are in place and operational than have actually been implemented.

 - +

anti-spoofing mechanisms are implemented to prevent adversaries from falsifying the security attributes indicating the successful application of the security process.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing the transmission of security and privacy attributes

@@ -69735,7 +70708,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69743,7 +70716,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing anti-spoofing mechanisms

 @@ -69753,14 +70726,15 @@ Cryptographic Binding - +

mechanisms or techniques to bind security and privacy attributes to transmitted information are defined;

 - + + @@ -69774,13 +70748,13 @@

Cryptographic mechanisms and techniques can provide strong security and privacy attribute binding to transmitted information to help ensure the integrity of such information.

 - +

are implemented to bind security and privacy attributes to transmitted information.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing the transmission of security and privacy attributes

@@ -69794,7 +70768,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69802,7 +70776,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing anti-spoofing mechanisms

 @@ -69813,14 +70787,15 @@ Public Key Infrastructure Certificates - +

a certificate policy for issuing public key certificates is defined;

 - + + @@ -69846,14 +70821,14 @@

Public key infrastructure (PKI) certificates are certificates with visibility external to organizational systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems, such as application-specific time services. In cryptographic systems with a hierarchical structure, a trust anchor is an authoritative source (i.e., a certificate authority) for which trust is assumed and not derived. A root certificate for a PKI system is an example of a trust anchor. A trust store or certificate store maintains a list of trusted root certificates.

 - + - +

public key certificates are issued under , or public key certificates are obtained from an approved service provider;

 - +

only approved trust anchors are included in trust stores or certificate stores managed by the organization.

 @@ -69861,7 +70836,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing public key infrastructure certificates

@@ -69873,7 +70848,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69883,7 +70858,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the management of public key infrastructure certificates

 @@ -69892,7 +70867,8 @@ Mobile Code - + + @@ -69915,45 +70891,45 @@

Mobile code includes any program, application, or content that can be transmitted across a network (e.g., embedded in an email, document, or website) and executed on a remote system. Decisions regarding the use of mobile code within organizational systems are based on the potential for the code to cause damage to the systems if used maliciously. Mobile code technologies include Java applets, JavaScript, HTML5, WebGL, and VBScript. Usage restrictions and implementation guidelines apply to both the selection and use of mobile code installed on servers and mobile code downloaded and executed on individual workstations and devices, including notebook computers and smart phones. Mobile code policy and procedures address specific actions taken to prevent the development, acquisition, and introduction of unacceptable mobile code within organizational systems, including requiring mobile code to be digitally signed by a trusted source.

 - + - + - +

acceptable mobile code is defined;

 - +

unacceptable mobile code is defined;

 - +

acceptable mobile code technologies are defined;

 - +

unacceptable mobile code technologies are defined;

 - + - +

the use of mobile code is authorized within the system;

 - +

the use of mobile code is monitored within the system;

 - +

the use of mobile code is controlled within the system.

 @@ -69963,7 +70939,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing mobile code

@@ -69979,7 +70955,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -69988,7 +70964,7 @@ - +

Organizational process for authorizing, monitoring, and controlling mobile code

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the management of mobile code

@@ -69999,7 +70975,7 @@ Identify Unacceptable Code and Take Corrective Actions - +

unacceptable mobile code to be identified is defined;

@@ -70007,14 +70983,15 @@ - +

corrective actions to be taken when unacceptable mobile code is identified are defined;

 - + + @@ -70025,14 +71002,14 @@

Corrective actions when unacceptable mobile code is detected include blocking, quarantine, or alerting administrators. Blocking includes preventing the transmission of word processing files with embedded macros when such macros have been determined to be unacceptable mobile code.

 - + - +

is identified;

 - +

are taken if unacceptable mobile code is identified.

 @@ -70040,7 +71017,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing mobile code

@@ -70058,7 +71035,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70068,7 +71045,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing mobile code detection, inspection, and corrective capabilities

 @@ -70078,14 +71055,15 @@ Acquisition, Development, and Use - +

mobile code requirements for the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code to be deployed in the system are defined;

 - + + @@ -70096,19 +71074,19 @@

None.

 - + - +

the acquisition of mobile code to be deployed in the system meets ;

 - +

the development of mobile code to be deployed in the system meets ;

 - +

the use of mobile code to be deployed in the system meets .

 @@ -70116,7 +71094,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing mobile code

@@ -70132,7 +71110,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70142,7 +71120,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code

 @@ -70152,14 +71130,15 @@ Prevent Downloading and Execution - +

unacceptable mobile code to be prevented from downloading and executing is defined;

 - + + @@ -70170,14 +71149,14 @@

None.

 - + - +

the download of is prevented;

 - +

the execution of is prevented.

 @@ -70185,7 +71164,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing mobile code

@@ -70200,7 +71179,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70210,7 +71189,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms preventing the download and execution of unacceptable mobile code

 @@ -70220,7 +71199,7 @@ Prevent Automatic Execution - +

software applications in which the automatic execution of mobile code is to be prevented are defined;

@@ -70228,14 +71207,15 @@ - +

actions to be enforced by the system prior to executing mobile code are defined;

 - + + @@ -70246,14 +71226,14 @@

Actions enforced before executing mobile code include prompting users prior to opening email attachments or clicking on web links. Preventing the automatic execution of mobile code includes disabling auto-execute features on system components that employ portable storage devices, such as compact discs, digital versatile discs, and universal serial bus devices.

 - + - +

the automatic execution of mobile code in is prevented;

 - +

are enforced prior to executing mobile code.

 @@ -70261,7 +71241,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing mobile code

@@ -70277,7 +71257,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70287,7 +71267,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms preventing the automatic execution of unacceptable mobile code

mechanisms enforcing actions to be taken prior to the execution of the mobile code

@@ -70297,7 +71277,8 @@ Allow Execution Only in Confined Environments - + + @@ -70310,13 +71291,13 @@

Permitting the execution of mobile code only in confined virtual machine environments helps prevent the introduction of malicious code into other systems and system components.

 - +

execution of permitted mobile code is allowed only in confined virtual machine environments.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing mobile code

@@ -70332,7 +71313,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70342,7 +71323,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms allowing for the execution of permitted mobile code in confined virtual machine environments

 @@ -70352,7 +71333,8 @@ Voice Over Internet Protocol - + + @@ -70362,7 +71344,8 @@ Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) - + + @@ -70388,30 +71371,30 @@

Providing authoritative source information enables external clients, including remote Internet clients, to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Systems that provide name and address resolution services include domain name system (DNS) servers. Additional artifacts include DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) digital signatures and cryptographic keys. Authoritative data includes DNS resource records. The means for indicating the security status of child zones include the use of delegation signer resource records in the DNS. Systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host and service names and network addresses provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data.

 - + - + - +

additional data origin authentication is provided along with the authoritative name resolution data that the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries;

 - +

integrity verification artifacts are provided along with the authoritative name resolution data that the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries;

 - + - +

the means to indicate the security status of child zones (and if the child supports secure resolution services) is provided when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace;

 - +

the means to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and child domains when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace is provided.

 @@ -70421,7 +71404,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing secure name/address resolution services (authoritative source)

@@ -70433,7 +71416,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70442,7 +71425,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing secure name/address resolution services

 @@ -70450,7 +71433,8 @@ Child Subspaces - + + @@ -70458,7 +71442,8 @@ Data Origin and Integrity - + + @@ -70469,14 +71454,14 @@

None.

 - + - +

data origin artifacts are provided for internal name/address resolution queries;

 - +

integrity protection artifacts are provided for internal name/address resolution queries.

 @@ -70484,7 +71469,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing secure name/address resolution services (authoritative source)

@@ -70497,7 +71482,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70506,7 +71491,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing data origin and integrity protection for internal name/address resolution service queries

 @@ -70516,7 +71501,8 @@ Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver) - + + @@ -70529,24 +71515,24 @@

Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on its own or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host and service names and network addresses provide some other means to enable clients to verify the authenticity and integrity of response data.

 - + - +

data origin authentication is requested for the name/address resolution responses that the system receives from authoritative sources;

 - +

data origin authentication is performed on the name/address resolution responses that the system receives from authoritative sources;

 - +

data integrity verification is requested for the name/address resolution responses that the system receives from authoritative sources;

 - +

data integrity verification is performed on the name/address resolution responses that the system receives from authoritative sources.

 @@ -70554,7 +71540,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing secure name/address resolution services (recursive or caching resolver)

@@ -70567,7 +71553,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70576,7 +71562,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing data origin authentication and data integrity verification for name/address resolution services

 @@ -70584,7 +71570,8 @@ Data Origin and Integrity - + + @@ -70593,7 +71580,8 @@ Architecture and Provisioning for Name/Address Resolution Service - + + @@ -70608,19 +71596,19 @@

Systems that provide name and address resolution services include domain name system (DNS) servers. To eliminate single points of failure in systems and enhance redundancy, organizations employ at least two authoritative domain name system servers—one configured as the primary server and the other configured as the secondary server. Additionally, organizations typically deploy the servers in two geographically separated network subnetworks (i.e., not located in the same physical facility). For role separation, DNS servers with internal roles only process name and address resolution requests from within organizations (i.e., from internal clients). DNS servers with external roles only process name and address resolution information requests from clients external to organizations (i.e., on external networks, including the Internet). Organizations specify clients that can access authoritative DNS servers in certain roles (e.g., by address ranges and explicit lists).

 - + - +

the systems that collectively provide name/address resolution services for an organization are fault-tolerant;

 - +

the systems that collectively provide name/address resolution services for an organization implement internal role separation;

 - +

the systems that collectively provide name/address resolution services for an organization implement external role separation.

 @@ -70628,7 +71616,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing architecture and provisioning for name/address resolution services

@@ -70643,7 +71631,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70652,7 +71640,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing name/address resolution services for fault tolerance and role separation

 @@ -70661,7 +71649,8 @@ Session Authenticity - + + @@ -70679,13 +71668,13 @@

Protecting session authenticity addresses communications protection at the session level, not at the packet level. Such protection establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in the ongoing identities of other parties and the validity of transmitted information. Authenticity protection includes protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks, session hijacking, and the insertion of false information into sessions.

 - +

the authenticity of communication sessions is protected.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing session authenticity

@@ -70698,7 +71687,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70706,7 +71695,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing session authenticity

 @@ -70714,7 +71703,8 @@ Invalidate Session Identifiers at Logout - + + @@ -70725,13 +71715,13 @@

Invalidating session identifiers at logout curtails the ability of adversaries to capture and continue to employ previously valid session IDs.

 - +

session identifiers are invalidated upon user logout or other session termination.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing session authenticity

@@ -70744,7 +71734,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70752,7 +71742,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing session identifier invalidation upon session termination

 @@ -70761,7 +71751,8 @@ User-initiated Logouts and Message Displays - + + @@ -70770,14 +71761,15 @@ Unique System-generated Session Identifiers - +

randomness requirements for generating a unique session identifier for each session are defined;

 - + + @@ -70791,14 +71783,14 @@

Generating unique session identifiers curtails the ability of adversaries to reuse previously valid session IDs. Employing the concept of randomness in the generation of unique session identifiers protects against brute-force attacks to determine future session identifiers.

 - + - +

a unique session identifier is generated for each session with ;

 - +

only system-generated session identifiers are recognized.

 @@ -70806,7 +71798,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing session authenticity

@@ -70819,7 +71811,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70827,7 +71819,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting, implementing, generating, and monitoring unique session identifiers

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing randomness requirements

@@ -70837,7 +71829,8 @@ Unique Session Identifiers with Randomization - + + @@ -70847,14 +71840,15 @@ - +

certificate authorities to be allowed for verification of the establishment of protected sessions are defined;

 - + + @@ -70867,13 +71861,13 @@

Reliance on certificate authorities for the establishment of secure sessions includes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates. These certificates, after verification by their respective certificate authorities, facilitate the establishment of protected sessions between web clients and web servers.

 - +

only the use of for verification of the establishment of protected sessions is allowed.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing session authenticity

@@ -70887,7 +71881,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70895,7 +71889,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the management of certificate authorities

 @@ -70907,7 +71901,7 @@ - +

types of system failures for which the system components fail to a known state are defined;

@@ -70915,7 +71909,7 @@ - +

known system state to which system components fail in the event of a system failure is defined;

@@ -70923,14 +71917,15 @@ - +

system state information to be preserved in the event of a system failure is defined;

 - + + @@ -70949,13 +71944,13 @@

Failure in a known state addresses security concerns in accordance with the mission and business needs of organizations. Failure in a known state prevents the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information in the event of failures of organizational systems or system components. Failure in a known safe state helps to prevent systems from failing to a state that may cause injury to individuals or destruction to property. Preserving system state information facilitates system restart and return to the operational mode with less disruption of mission and business processes.

 - +

fail to a while preserving in failure.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing system failure to known state

@@ -70970,7 +71965,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -70979,7 +71974,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the fail in known state capability

mechanisms preserving system state information in the event of a system failure

@@ -70990,14 +71985,15 @@ Thin Nodes - +

system components to be employed with minimal functionality and information storage are defined;

 - + + @@ -71009,14 +72005,14 @@

The deployment of system components with minimal functionality reduces the need to secure every endpoint and may reduce the exposure of information, systems, and services to attacks. Reduced or minimal functionality includes diskless nodes and thin client technologies.

 - + - +

minimal functionality for is employed;

 - +

minimal information storage on is allocated.

 @@ -71024,7 +72020,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing use of thin nodes

@@ -71037,7 +72033,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -71045,7 +72041,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing thin nodes

 @@ -71054,7 +72050,8 @@ Decoys - + + @@ -71071,19 +72068,19 @@

Decoys (i.e., honeypots, honeynets, or deception nets) are established to attract adversaries and deflect attacks away from the operational systems that support organizational mission and business functions. Use of decoys requires some supporting isolation measures to ensure that any deflected malicious code does not infect organizational systems. Depending on the specific usage of the decoy, consultation with the Office of the General Counsel before deployment may be needed.

 - + - +

components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks are included to detect such attacks;

 - +

components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks are included to deflect such attacks;

 - +

components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks are included to analyze such attacks.

 @@ -71091,7 +72088,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing the use of decoys

@@ -71104,7 +72101,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -71113,7 +72110,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing decoys

 @@ -71121,7 +72118,8 @@ Detection of Malicious Code - + + @@ -71131,14 +72129,15 @@ Platform-independent Applications - +

platform-independent applications to be included within organizational systems are defined;

 - + + @@ -71149,13 +72148,13 @@

Platforms are combinations of hardware, firmware, and software components used to execute software applications. Platforms include operating systems, the underlying computer architectures, or both. Platform-independent applications are applications with the capability to execute on multiple platforms. Such applications promote portability and reconstitution on different platforms. Application portability and the ability to reconstitute on different platforms increase the availability of mission-essential functions within organizations in situations where systems with specific operating systems are under attack.

 - +

are included within organizational systems.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing platform-independent applications

@@ -71169,7 +72168,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -71178,7 +72177,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing platform-independent applications

 @@ -71188,7 +72187,7 @@ Protection of Information at Rest - + hardware-protected key store @@ -71431,14 +72433,15 @@ - +

safeguards for protecting the storage of cryptographic keys are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -71452,13 +72455,13 @@

A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an example of a hardware-protected data store that can be used to protect cryptographic keys.

 - +

protected storage for cryptographic keys is provided using .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing the protection of information at rest

@@ -71472,7 +72475,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -71480,7 +72483,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing hardware-based key store protection

 @@ -71491,14 +72494,15 @@ Heterogeneity - +

system components requiring a diverse set of information technologies to be employed in the implementation of the system are defined;

 - + + @@ -71514,13 +72518,13 @@

Increasing the diversity of information technologies within organizational systems reduces the impact of potential exploitations or compromises of specific technologies. Such diversity protects against common mode failures, including those failures induced by supply chain attacks. Diversity in information technologies also reduces the likelihood that the means adversaries use to compromise one system component will be effective against other system components, thus further increasing the adversary work factor to successfully complete planned attacks. An increase in diversity may add complexity and management overhead that could ultimately lead to mistakes and unauthorized configurations.

 - +

a diverse set of information technologies is employed for in the implementation of the system.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

system design documentation

@@ -71534,7 +72538,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -71543,7 +72547,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the employment of a diverse set of information technologies

 @@ -71552,14 +72556,15 @@ Virtualization Techniques - +

the frequency at which to change the diversity of operating systems and applications deployed using virtualization techniques is defined;

 - + + @@ -71571,13 +72576,13 @@

While frequent changes to operating systems and applications can pose significant configuration management challenges, the changes can result in an increased work factor for adversaries to conduct successful attacks. Changing virtual operating systems or applications, as opposed to changing actual operating systems or applications, provides virtual changes that impede attacker success while reducing configuration management efforts. Virtualization techniques can assist in isolating untrustworthy software or software of dubious provenance into confined execution environments.

 - +

virtualization techniques are employed to support the deployment of a diverse range of operating systems and applications that are changed .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

configuration management policy and procedures

@@ -71594,7 +72599,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -71603,7 +72608,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the employment of a diverse set of information technologies

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing virtualization techniques

@@ -71615,7 +72620,7 @@ Concealment and Misdirection - +

concealment and misdirection techniques to be employed to confuse and mislead adversaries potentially targeting systems are defined;

@@ -71623,7 +72628,7 @@ - +

systems for which concealment and misdirection techniques are to be employed are defined;

@@ -71631,14 +72636,15 @@ - +

time periods to employ concealment and misdirection techniques for systems are defined;

 - + + @@ -71655,13 +72661,13 @@

Concealment and misdirection techniques can significantly reduce the targeting capabilities of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initiate and complete attacks. For example, virtualization techniques provide organizations with the ability to disguise systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful attacks without the cost of having multiple platforms. The increased use of concealment and misdirection techniques and methods—including randomness, uncertainty, and virtualization—may sufficiently confuse and mislead adversaries and subsequently increase the risk of discovery and/or exposing tradecraft. Concealment and misdirection techniques may provide additional time to perform core mission and business functions. The implementation of concealment and misdirection techniques may add to the complexity and management overhead required for the system.

 - +

are employed for for to confuse and mislead adversaries.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing concealment and misdirection techniques for the system

@@ -71676,7 +72682,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -71685,7 +72691,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing concealment and misdirection techniques

 @@ -71693,7 +72699,8 @@ Virtualization Techniques - + + @@ -71702,14 +72709,15 @@ Randomness - +

techniques employed to introduce randomness into organizational operations and assets are defined;

 - + + @@ -71721,13 +72729,13 @@

Randomness introduces increased levels of uncertainty for adversaries regarding the actions that organizations take to defend their systems against attacks. Such actions may impede the ability of adversaries to correctly target information resources of organizations that support critical missions or business functions. Uncertainty may also cause adversaries to hesitate before initiating or continuing attacks. Misdirection techniques that involve randomness include performing certain routine actions at different times of day, employing different information technologies, using different suppliers, and rotating roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel.

 - +

are employed to introduce randomness into organizational operations and assets.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing concealment and misdirection techniques for the system

@@ -71742,7 +72750,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -71751,7 +72759,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing randomness as a concealment and misdirection technique

 @@ -71761,7 +72769,7 @@ Change Processing and Storage Locations - +

processing and/or storage locations to be changed are defined;

@@ -71769,7 +72777,7 @@ - + storage timing - + + @@ -71991,14 +73003,14 @@

Developers are in the best position to identify potential areas within systems that might lead to covert channels. Covert channel analysis is a meaningful activity when there is the potential for unauthorized information flows across security domains, such as in the case of systems that contain export-controlled information and have connections to external networks (i.e., networks that are not controlled by organizations). Covert channel analysis is also useful for multilevel secure systems, multiple security level systems, and cross-domain systems.

 - + - +

a covert channel analysis is performed to identify those aspects of communications within the system that are potential avenues for covert channels;

 - +

the maximum bandwidth of those channels is estimated.

 @@ -72006,7 +73018,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing covert channel analysis

@@ -72020,7 +73032,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72030,7 +73042,7 @@ - +

Organizational process for conducting covert channel analysis

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing covert channel analysis

@@ -72040,7 +73052,8 @@ Test Covert Channels for Exploitability - + + @@ -72052,13 +73065,13 @@

None.

 - +

a subset of the identified covert channels is tested to determine the channels that are exploitable.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing covert channel analysis

@@ -72073,7 +73086,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72082,7 +73095,7 @@ - +

Organizational process for testing covert channels

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the testing of covert channel analysis

@@ -72093,7 +73106,7 @@ Maximum Bandwidth - + physical logical @@ -72243,14 +73258,15 @@ - +

circumstances for the physical or logical separation of components are defined;

 - + + @@ -72271,13 +73287,13 @@

System partitioning is part of a defense-in-depth protection strategy. Organizations determine the degree of physical separation of system components. Physical separation options include physically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, critical components in separate rooms, and geographical separation of critical components. Security categorization can guide the selection of candidates for domain partitioning. Managed interfaces restrict or prohibit network access and information flow among partitioned system components.

 - +

the system is partitioned into residing in separate domains or environments based on .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing system partitioning

@@ -72293,7 +73309,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72303,7 +73319,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the physical separation of system components

 @@ -72311,7 +73327,8 @@ Separate Physical Domains for Privileged Functions - + + @@ -72324,13 +73341,13 @@

Privileged functions that operate in a single physical domain may represent a single point of failure if that domain becomes compromised or experiences a denial of service.

 - +

privileged functions are partitioned into separate physical domains.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing system partitioning

@@ -72346,7 +73363,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72356,7 +73373,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the physical separation of system components

 @@ -72366,7 +73383,8 @@ Transmission Preparation Integrity - + + @@ -72375,7 +73393,7 @@ Non-modifiable Executable Programs - +

system components for which the operating environment and applications are to be loaded and executed from hardware-enforced, read-only media are defined;

@@ -72383,14 +73401,15 @@ - +

applications to be loaded and executed from hardware-enforced, read-only media are defined;

 - + + @@ -72412,14 +73431,14 @@

The operating environment for a system contains the code that hosts applications, including operating systems, executives, or virtual machine monitors (i.e., hypervisors). It can also include certain applications that run directly on hardware platforms. Hardware-enforced, read-only media include Compact Disc-Recordable (CD-R) and Digital Versatile Disc-Recordable (DVD-R) disk drives as well as one-time, programmable, read-only memory. The use of non-modifiable storage ensures the integrity of software from the point of creation of the read-only image. The use of reprogrammable, read-only memory can be accepted as read-only media provided that integrity can be adequately protected from the point of initial writing to the insertion of the memory into the system, and there are reliable hardware protections against reprogramming the memory while installed in organizational systems.

 - + - +

the operating environment for is loaded and executed from hardware-enforced, read-only media;

 - +

for are loaded and executed from hardware-enforced, read-only media.

 @@ -72427,7 +73446,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing non-modifiable executable programs

@@ -72445,7 +73464,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72456,7 +73475,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing, loading, and executing the operating environment from hardware-enforced, read-only media

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing, loading, and executing applications from hardware-enforced, read-only media

@@ -72466,14 +73485,15 @@ No Writable Storage - +

system components to be employed with no writeable storage are defined;

 - + + @@ -72487,13 +73507,13 @@

Disallowing writeable storage eliminates the possibility of malicious code insertion via persistent, writeable storage within the designated system components. The restriction applies to fixed and removable storage, with the latter being addressed either directly or as specific restrictions imposed through access controls for mobile devices.

 - +

are employed with no writeable storage that is persistent across component restart or power on/off.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing non-modifiable executable programs

@@ -72508,7 +73528,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72518,7 +73538,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the employment of components with no writeable storage

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing persistent non-writeable storage across component restart and power on/off

@@ -72528,7 +73548,8 @@ Integrity Protection on Read-only Media - + + @@ -72548,14 +73569,14 @@

Controls prevent the substitution of media into systems or the reprogramming of programmable read-only media prior to installation into the systems. Integrity protection controls include a combination of prevention, detection, and response.

 - + - +

the integrity of information is protected prior to storage on read-only media;

 - +

the media is controlled after such information has been recorded onto the media;

 @@ -72563,7 +73584,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing non-modifiable executable programs

@@ -72577,7 +73598,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72587,7 +73608,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to protect information integrity on read-only media prior to storage and after information has been recorded onto the media

 @@ -72596,7 +73617,8 @@ Hardware-based Protection - + + @@ -72605,7 +73627,8 @@ External Malicious Code Identification - + + @@ -72620,13 +73643,13 @@

External malicious code identification differs from decoys in SC-26 in that the components actively probe networks, including the Internet, in search of malicious code contained on external websites. Like decoys, the use of external malicious code identification techniques requires some supporting isolation measures to ensure that any malicious code discovered during the search and subsequently executed does not infect organizational systems. Virtualization is a common technique for achieving such isolation.

 - +

system components that proactively seek to identify network-based malicious code or malicious websites are included.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing external malicious code identification

@@ -72640,7 +73663,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72650,7 +73673,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing external malicious code identification

 @@ -72672,35 +73695,36 @@ - +

processing components to be distributed across multiple locations/domains are defined;

 - + - +

storage components to be distributed across multiple locations/domains are defined;

 - + - + + @@ -72716,14 +73740,14 @@

Distributing processing and storage across multiple physical locations or logical domains provides a degree of redundancy or overlap for organizations. The redundancy and overlap increase the work factor of adversaries to adversely impact organizational operations, assets, and individuals. The use of distributed processing and storage does not assume a single primary processing or storage location. Therefore, it allows for parallel processing and storage.

 - + - +

are distributed across ;

 - +

are distributed across .

 @@ -72731,7 +73755,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

contingency planning policy and procedures

@@ -72749,7 +73773,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72760,7 +73784,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for distributed processing and storage across multiple physical locations

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to distribute processing and storage across multiple physical locations

@@ -72770,7 +73794,7 @@ Polling Techniques - +

distributed processing and storage components for which polling techniques are to be employed to identify potential faults, errors, or compromises are defined;

@@ -72778,14 +73802,15 @@ - +

actions to be taken in response to identified faults, errors, or compromise are defined;

 - + + @@ -72805,14 +73830,14 @@

Distributed processing and/or storage may be used to reduce opportunities for adversaries to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of organizational information and systems. However, the distribution of processing and storage components does not prevent adversaries from compromising one or more of the components. Polling compares the processing results and/or storage content from the distributed components and subsequently votes on the outcomes. Polling identifies potential faults, compromises, or errors in the distributed processing and storage components.

 - + - +

polling techniques are employed to identify potential faults, errors, or compromises to ;

 - +

are taken in response to identified faults, errors, or compromise.

 @@ -72820,7 +73845,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

system design documentation

@@ -72835,7 +73860,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72845,7 +73870,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing polling techniques

 @@ -72855,14 +73880,15 @@ Synchronization - +

duplicate systems or system components to be synchronized are defined;

 - + + @@ -72875,13 +73901,13 @@

SC-36 and CP-9(6) require the duplication of systems or system components in distributed locations. The synchronization of duplicated and redundant services and data helps to ensure that information contained in the distributed locations can be used in the mission or business functions of organizations, as needed.

 - +

are synchronized.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

system design documentation

@@ -72896,7 +73922,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -72906,7 +73932,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing duplicate system or system component synchronization

 @@ -72917,7 +73943,7 @@ Out-of-band Channels - +

out-of-band channels to be employed for the physical delivery or electronic transmission of information, system components, or devices to individuals or the system are defined;

@@ -72925,7 +73951,7 @@ - +

information, system components, or devices to employ out-of-band-channels for physical delivery or electronic transmission are defined;

@@ -72933,14 +73959,15 @@ - +

individuals or systems to which physical delivery or electronic transmission of information, system components, or devices is to be achieved via the employment of out-of-band channels are defined;

 - + + @@ -72966,13 +73993,13 @@

Out-of-band channels include local, non-network accesses to systems; network paths physically separate from network paths used for operational traffic; or non-electronic paths, such as the U.S. Postal Service. The use of out-of-band channels is contrasted with the use of in-band channels (i.e., the same channels) that carry routine operational traffic. Out-of-band channels do not have the same vulnerability or exposure as in-band channels. Therefore, the confidentiality, integrity, or availability compromises of in-band channels will not compromise or adversely affect the out-of-band channels. Organizations may employ out-of-band channels in the delivery or transmission of organizational items, including authenticators and credentials; cryptographic key management information; system and data backups; configuration management changes for hardware, firmware, or software; security updates; maintenance information; and malicious code protection updates. For example, cryptographic keys for encrypted files are delivered using a different channel than the file.

 - +

are employed for the physical delivery or electronic transmission of to .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing the use of out-of-band channels

@@ -72992,7 +74019,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73003,7 +74030,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the use of out-of-band channels

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the use of out-of-band channels

@@ -73013,7 +74040,7 @@ Ensure Delivery and Transmission - +

controls to be employed to ensure that only designated individuals or systems receive specific information, system components, or devices are defined;

@@ -73021,7 +74048,7 @@ - +

individuals or systems designated to receive specific information, system components, or devices are defined;

@@ -73029,14 +74056,15 @@ - +

information, system components, or devices that only individuals or systems are designated to receive are defined;

 - + + @@ -73048,13 +74076,13 @@

Techniques employed by organizations to ensure that only designated systems or individuals receive certain information, system components, or devices include sending authenticators via an approved courier service but requiring recipients to show some form of government-issued photographic identification as a condition of receipt.

 - +

are employed to ensure that only receive .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing the use of out-of-band channels

@@ -73073,7 +74101,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73084,7 +74112,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the use of out-of-band channels

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the use of out-of-band channels

@@ -73097,14 +74125,15 @@ Operations Security - +

operations security controls to be employed to protect key organizational information throughout the system development life cycle are defined;

 - + + @@ -73126,13 +74155,13 @@

Operations security (OPSEC) is a systematic process by which potential adversaries can be denied information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations by identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified information that specifically relates to the planning and execution of sensitive organizational activities. The OPSEC process involves five steps: identification of critical information, analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities, assessment of risks, and the application of appropriate countermeasures. OPSEC controls are applied to organizational systems and the environments in which those systems operate. OPSEC controls protect the confidentiality of information, including limiting the sharing of information with suppliers, potential suppliers, and other non-organizational elements and individuals. Information critical to organizational mission and business functions includes user identities, element uses, suppliers, supply chain processes, functional requirements, security requirements, system design specifications, testing and evaluation protocols, and security control implementation details.

 - +

are employed to protect key organizational information throughout the system development life cycle.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing operations security

@@ -73149,7 +74178,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73159,7 +74188,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for protecting organizational information throughout the system development life cycle

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards to protect organizational information throughout the system development life cycle

@@ -73169,7 +74198,8 @@ Process Isolation - + + @@ -73189,13 +74219,13 @@

Systems can maintain separate execution domains for each executing process by assigning each process a separate address space. Each system process has a distinct address space so that communication between processes is performed in a manner controlled through the security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing code of another process. Maintaining separate execution domains for executing processes can be achieved, for example, by implementing separate address spaces. Process isolation technologies, including sandboxing or virtualization, logically separate software and firmware from other software, firmware, and data. Process isolation helps limit the access of potentially untrusted software to other system resources. The capability to maintain separate execution domains is available in commercial operating systems that employ multi-state processor technologies.

 - +

a separate execution domain is maintained for each executing system process.

 - +

System design documentation

system architecture

@@ -73206,7 +74236,7 @@ - +

System developers/integrators

system security architect

@@ -73214,7 +74244,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing separate execution domains for each executing process

 @@ -73222,7 +74252,8 @@ Hardware Separation - + + @@ -73234,13 +74265,13 @@

Hardware-based separation of system processes is generally less susceptible to compromise than software-based separation, thus providing greater assurance that the separation will be enforced. Hardware separation mechanisms include hardware memory management.

 - +

hardware separation is implemented to facilitate process isolation.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

system design documentation

@@ -73255,7 +74286,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73265,7 +74296,7 @@ - +

System capability implementing underlying hardware separation mechanisms for process separation

 @@ -73275,14 +74306,15 @@ Separate Execution Domain Per Thread - +

multi-thread processing for which a separate execution domain is to be maintained for each thread is defined;

 - + + @@ -73294,13 +74326,13 @@

None.

 - +

a separate execution domain is maintained for each thread in .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

system design documentation

@@ -73316,7 +74348,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73327,7 +74359,7 @@ - +

System capability implementing a separate execution domain for each thread in multi-threaded processing

 @@ -73347,35 +74379,36 @@ - +

external wireless links to be protected from particular types of signal parameter attacks are defined;

 - +

types of signal parameter attacks or references to sources for such attacks from which to protect external wireless links are defined;

 - +

internal wireless links to be protected from particular types of signal parameter attacks are defined;

 - +

types of signal parameter attacks or references to sources for such attacks from which to protect internal wireless links are defined;

 - + + @@ -73387,14 +74420,14 @@

Wireless link protection applies to internal and external wireless communication links that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized system users. Adversaries can exploit the signal parameters of wireless links if such links are not adequately protected. There are many ways to exploit the signal parameters of wireless links to gain intelligence, deny service, or spoof system users. Protection of wireless links reduces the impact of attacks that are unique to wireless systems. If organizations rely on commercial service providers for transmission services as commodity items rather than as fully dedicated services, it may not be possible to implement wireless link protections to the extent necessary to meet organizational security requirements.

 - + - +

external are protected from .

 - +

internal are protected from .

 @@ -73402,7 +74435,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

access control policy and procedures

@@ -73420,7 +74453,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73431,7 +74464,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the protection of wireless links

 @@ -73440,14 +74473,15 @@ Electromagnetic Interference - +

level of protection to be employed against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference is defined;

 - + + @@ -73461,13 +74495,13 @@

The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms for electromagnetic interference protects systems against intentional jamming that might deny or impair communications by ensuring that wireless spread spectrum waveforms used to provide anti-jam protection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms may also coincidentally mitigate the effects of unintentional jamming due to interference from legitimate transmitters that share the same spectrum. Mission requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, and standards determine levels of wireless link availability, cryptography needed, and performance.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms that achieve against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference are implemented.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

access control policy and procedures

@@ -73485,7 +74519,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73496,7 +74530,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms enforcing protections against effects of intentional electromagnetic interference

 @@ -73506,14 +74540,15 @@ Reduce Detection Potential - +

the level of reduction to be achieved to reduce the detection potential of wireless links is defined;

 - + + @@ -73526,13 +74561,13 @@

The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms to reduce detection potential is used for covert communications and to protect wireless transmitters from geo-location. It also ensures that the spread spectrum waveforms used to achieve a low probability of detection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Mission requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, and standards determine the levels to which wireless links are undetectable.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms to reduce the detection potential of wireless links to are implemented.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

access control policy and procedures

@@ -73550,7 +74585,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73561,7 +74596,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms enforcing protections to reduce the detection of wireless links

 @@ -73570,7 +74605,8 @@ Imitative or Manipulative Communications Deception - + + @@ -73584,13 +74620,13 @@

The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject imitative or manipulative communications ensures that the signal parameters of wireless transmissions are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Such unpredictability reduces the probability of imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters alone.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms are implemented to identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

access control policy and procedures

@@ -73606,7 +74642,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73617,7 +74653,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms enforcing wireless link protections against imitative or manipulative communications deception

 @@ -73627,14 +74663,15 @@ Signal Parameter Identification - +

wireless transmitters for which cryptographic mechanisms are to be implemented are defined;

 - + + @@ -73647,13 +74684,13 @@

The implementation of cryptographic mechanisms to prevent the identification of wireless transmitters protects against the unique identification of wireless transmitters for the purposes of intelligence exploitation by ensuring that anti-fingerprinting alterations to signal parameters are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. It also provides anonymity when required. Radio fingerprinting techniques identify the unique signal parameters of transmitters to fingerprint such transmitters for purposes of tracking and mission or user identification.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms are implemented to prevent the identification of by using the transmitter signal parameters.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

access control policy and procedures

@@ -73669,7 +74706,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -73680,7 +74717,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms preventing the identification of wireless transmitters

 @@ -73691,7 +74728,7 @@ Port and I/O Device Access - +

connection ports or input/output devices to be disabled or removed are defined;

@@ -73699,7 +74736,7 @@ - + the use of devices possessing in the remote activation of environmental sensing capabilities on organizational systems or system components with the following exceptions: @@ -73776,7 +74814,7 @@ - +

environmental sensing capabilities in devices are defined (if selected);

@@ -73784,7 +74822,7 @@ - +

facilities, areas, or systems where the use of devices possessing environmental sensing capabilities is prohibited are defined (if selected);

@@ -73792,7 +74830,7 @@ - +

exceptions where remote activation of sensors is allowed are defined (if selected);

@@ -73800,14 +74838,15 @@ - +

group of users to whom an explicit indication of sensor use is to be provided is defined;

 - + + @@ -73827,14 +74866,14 @@

Sensor capability and data applies to types of systems or system components characterized as mobile devices, such as cellular telephones, smart phones, and tablets. Mobile devices often include sensors that can collect and record data regarding the environment where the system is in use. Sensors that are embedded within mobile devices include microphones, cameras, Global Positioning System (GPS) mechanisms, and accelerometers. While the sensors on mobiles devices provide an important function, if activated covertly, such devices can potentially provide a means for adversaries to learn valuable information about individuals and organizations. For example, remotely activating the GPS function on a mobile device could provide an adversary with the ability to track the movements of an individual. Organizations may prohibit individuals from bringing cellular telephones or digital cameras into certain designated facilities or controlled areas within facilities where classified information is stored or sensitive conversations are taking place.

 - + - +

is/are prohibited;

 - +

an explicit indication of sensor use is provided to .

 @@ -73842,7 +74881,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing sensor capabilities and data collection

@@ -73857,7 +74896,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -73868,7 +74907,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms implementing access controls for the remote activation of system sensor capabilities

mechanisms implementing the capability to indicate sensor use

@@ -73879,14 +74918,15 @@ - +

sensors to be used to collect data or information are defined;

 - + + @@ -73897,13 +74937,13 @@

In situations where sensors are activated by authorized individuals, it is still possible that the data or information collected by the sensors will be sent to unauthorized entities.

 - +

the system is configured so that data or information collected by the is only reported to authorized individuals or roles.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

access control policy and procedures

@@ -73920,7 +74960,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -73931,7 +74971,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms restricting the reporting of sensor information to those authorized

sensor data collection and reporting capabilities for the system

@@ -73942,14 +74982,15 @@ Authorized Use - +

measures to be employed so that data or information collected by sensors is only used for authorized purposes are defined;

 - + + @@ -73962,13 +75003,13 @@

Information collected by sensors for a specific authorized purpose could be misused for some unauthorized purpose. For example, GPS sensors that are used to support traffic navigation could be misused to track the movements of individuals. Measures to mitigate such activities include additional training to help ensure that authorized individuals do not abuse their authority and, in the case where sensor data is maintained by external parties, contractual restrictions on the use of such data.

 - +

are employed so that data or information collected by is only used for authorized purposes.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

access control policy and procedures

@@ -73986,7 +75027,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -73996,7 +75037,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing measures to ensure that sensor information is only used for authorized purposes

sensor information collection capability for the system

@@ -74006,7 +75047,8 @@ Prohibit Use of Devices - + + @@ -74015,7 +75057,7 @@ Notice of Collection - +

measures to facilitate an individual’s awareness that personally identifiable information is being collected are defined;

@@ -74023,14 +75065,15 @@ - +

sensors that collect personally identifiable information are defined;

 - + + @@ -74044,13 +75087,13 @@

Awareness that organizational sensors are collecting data enables individuals to more effectively engage in managing their privacy. Measures can include conventional written notices and sensor configurations that make individuals directly or indirectly aware through other devices that the sensor is collecting information. The usability and efficacy of the notice are important considerations.

 - +

are employed to facilitate an individual’s awareness that personally identifiable information is being collected by

- +

System and communications protection policy

access control policy and procedures

@@ -74071,7 +75114,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -74081,7 +75124,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing measures to facilitate an individual’s awareness that personally identifiable information is being collected by sensors

sensor information collection capabilities for the system

@@ -74092,14 +75135,15 @@ Collection Minimization - +

the sensors that are configured to minimize the collection of unneeded information about individuals are defined;

 - + + @@ -74112,13 +75156,13 @@

Although policies to control for authorized use can be applied to information once it is collected, minimizing the collection of information that is not needed mitigates privacy risk at the system entry point and mitigates the risk of policy control failures. Sensor configurations include the obscuring of human features, such as blurring or pixelating flesh tones.

 - +

the configured to minimize the collection of information about individuals that is not needed are employed.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

access control policy and procedures

@@ -74139,7 +75183,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -74149,7 +75193,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing measures to facilitate the review of information that is being collected by sensors

sensor information collection capabilities for the system

@@ -74162,14 +75206,15 @@ - +

the components for which usage restrictions and implementation guidance are to be established are defined;

 - + + @@ -74194,26 +75239,26 @@

Usage restrictions apply to all system components including but not limited to mobile code, mobile devices, wireless access, and wired and wireless peripheral components (e.g., copiers, printers, scanners, optical devices, and other similar technologies). The usage restrictions and implementation guidelines are based on the potential for system components to cause damage to the system and help to ensure that only authorized system use occurs.

 - + - +

usage restrictions and implementation guidelines are established for ;

 - + - +

the use of is authorized within the system;

 - +

the use of is monitored within the system;

 - +

the use of is controlled within the system.

 @@ -74223,7 +75268,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

usage restrictions

@@ -74238,7 +75283,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74247,7 +75292,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for authorizing, monitoring, and controlling the use of components with usage restrictions

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing, authorizing, monitoring, and controlling the use of components with usage restrictions

@@ -74258,14 +75303,15 @@ Detonation Chambers - +

the system, system component, or location where a detonation chamber capability is to be employed is defined;

 - + + @@ -74285,13 +75331,13 @@

Detonation chambers, also known as dynamic execution environments, allow organizations to open email attachments, execute untrusted or suspicious applications, and execute Universal Resource Locator requests in the safety of an isolated environment or a virtualized sandbox. Protected and isolated execution environments provide a means of determining whether the associated attachments or applications contain malicious code. While related to the concept of deception nets, the employment of detonation chambers is not intended to maintain a long-term environment in which adversaries can operate and their actions can be observed. Rather, detonation chambers are intended to quickly identify malicious code and either reduce the likelihood that the code is propagated to user environments of operation or prevent such propagation completely.

 - +

a detonation chamber capability is employed within the .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing detonation chambers

@@ -74304,7 +75350,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74313,7 +75359,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the detonation chamber capability

 @@ -74322,7 +75368,8 @@ System Time Synchronization - + + @@ -74337,13 +75384,13 @@

Time synchronization of system clocks is essential for the correct execution of many system services, including identification and authentication processes that involve certificates and time-of-day restrictions as part of access control. Denial of service or failure to deny expired credentials may result without properly synchronized clocks within and between systems and system components. Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. The granularity of time measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between system clocks and reference clocks, such as clocks synchronizing within hundreds of milliseconds or tens of milliseconds. Organizations may define different time granularities for system components. Time service can be critical to other security capabilities—such as access control and identification and authentication—depending on the nature of the mechanisms used to support the capabilities.

 - +

system clocks are synchronized within and between systems and system components.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing time synchronization

@@ -74356,7 +75403,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74365,7 +75412,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system time synchronization

 @@ -74374,7 +75421,7 @@ Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source - +

the frequency at which to compare the internal system clocks with the authoritative time source is defined;

@@ -74382,7 +75429,7 @@ - +

the authoritative time source to which internal system clocks are to be compared is defined;

@@ -74390,14 +75437,15 @@ - +

the time period to compare the internal system clocks with the authoritative time source is defined;

 - + + @@ -74415,14 +75463,14 @@

Synchronization of internal system clocks with an authoritative source provides uniformity of time stamps for systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network.

 - + - +

the internal system clocks are compared with ;

 - +

the internal system clocks are synchronized with the authoritative time source when the time difference is greater than .

 @@ -74430,7 +75478,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing time synchronization

@@ -74443,7 +75491,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74452,7 +75500,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system time synchronization

 @@ -74461,7 +75509,8 @@ Secondary Authoritative Time Source - + + @@ -74479,14 +75528,14 @@

It may be necessary to employ geolocation information to determine that the secondary authoritative time source is in a different geographic region.

 - + - +

a secondary authoritative time source is identified that is in a different geographic region than the primary authoritative time source;

 - +

the internal system clocks are synchronized to the secondary authoritative time source if the primary authoritative time source is unavailable.

 @@ -74494,7 +75543,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing time synchronization

@@ -74507,7 +75556,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74516,7 +75565,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system time synchronization with secondary authoritative time sources

 @@ -74527,14 +75576,15 @@ Cross Domain Policy Enforcement - + - + + @@ -74547,13 +75597,13 @@

For logical policy enforcement mechanisms, organizations avoid creating a logical path between interfaces to prevent the ability to bypass the policy enforcement mechanism. For physical policy enforcement mechanisms, the robustness of physical isolation afforded by the physical implementation of policy enforcement to preclude the presence of logical covert channels penetrating the security domain may be needed. Contact ncdsmo@nsa.gov for more information.

 - +

a policy enforcement mechanism is implemented between the physical and/or network interfaces for the connecting security domains.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing cross-domain policy enforcement

@@ -74566,7 +75616,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74575,7 +75625,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing cross-domain policy enforcement

 @@ -74586,14 +75636,15 @@ - +

alternate communication paths for system operations and operational command and control are defined;

 - + + @@ -74609,13 +75660,13 @@

An incident, whether adversarial- or nonadversarial-based, can disrupt established communications paths used for system operations and organizational command and control. Alternate communications paths reduce the risk of all communications paths being affected by the same incident. To compound the problem, the inability of organizational officials to obtain timely information about disruptions or to provide timely direction to operational elements after a communications path incident, can impact the ability of the organization to respond to such incidents in a timely manner. Establishing alternate communications paths for command and control purposes, including designating alternative decision makers if primary decision makers are unavailable and establishing the extent and limitations of their actions, can greatly facilitate the organization’s ability to continue to operate and take appropriate actions during an incident.

 - +

are established for system operations and operational command and control.

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing communication paths

@@ -74628,7 +75679,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74637,7 +75688,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing alternate communication paths for system operations

 @@ -74647,7 +75698,7 @@ Sensor Relocation - +

sensors and monitoring capabilities to be relocated are defined;

@@ -74655,7 +75706,7 @@ - +

locations to where sensors and monitoring capabilities are to be relocated are defined;

@@ -74663,14 +75714,15 @@ - +

conditions or circumstances for relocating sensors and monitoring capabilities are defined;

 - + + @@ -74685,13 +75737,13 @@

Adversaries may take various paths and use different approaches as they move laterally through an organization (including its systems) to reach their target or as they attempt to exfiltrate information from the organization. The organization often only has a limited set of monitoring and detection capabilities, and they may be focused on the critical or likely infiltration or exfiltration paths. By using communications paths that the organization typically does not monitor, the adversary can increase its chances of achieving its desired goals. By relocating its sensors or monitoring capabilities to new locations, the organization can impede the adversary’s ability to achieve its goals. The relocation of the sensors or monitoring capabilities might be done based on threat information that the organization has acquired or randomly to confuse the adversary and make its lateral transition through the system or organization more challenging.

 - +

are relocated to under .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing sensor and monitoring capability relocation

@@ -74707,7 +75759,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74716,7 +75768,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing sensor relocation

 @@ -74725,7 +75777,7 @@ Dynamic Relocation of Sensors or Monitoring Capabilities - +

sensors and monitoring capabilities to be dynamically relocated are defined;

@@ -74733,7 +75785,7 @@ - +

locations to where sensors and monitoring capabilities are to be dynamically relocated are defined;

@@ -74741,14 +75793,15 @@ - +

conditions or circumstances for dynamically relocating sensors and monitoring capabilities are defined;

 - + + @@ -74760,13 +75813,13 @@

None.

 - +

are dynamically relocated to under .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing sensor and monitoring capability relocation

@@ -74782,7 +75835,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74791,7 +75844,7 @@ - +

SELECT FROM: Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing sensor relocation

 @@ -74802,14 +75855,15 @@ Hardware-enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement - +

security domains requiring hardware-enforced separation and policy enforcement mechanisms are defined;

 - + + @@ -74825,13 +75879,13 @@

System owners may require additional strength of mechanism and robustness to ensure domain separation and policy enforcement for specific types of threats and environments of operation. Hardware-enforced separation and policy enforcement provide greater strength of mechanism than software-enforced separation and policy enforcement.

 - +

hardware-enforced separation and policy enforcement mechanisms are implemented between .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing cross-domain policy enforcement

@@ -74844,7 +75898,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74853,7 +75907,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing hardware-enforced security domain separation and policy enforcement

 @@ -74863,14 +75917,15 @@ Software-enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement - +

security domains requiring software-enforced separation and policy enforcement mechanisms are defined;

 - + + @@ -74889,13 +75944,13 @@

System owners may require additional strength of mechanism to ensure domain separation and policy enforcement for specific types of threats and environments of operation.

 - +

software-enforced separation and policy enforcement mechanisms are implemented between .

 - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing cross-domain policy enforcement

@@ -74908,7 +75963,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -74917,7 +75972,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing software-enforced separation and policy enforcement

 @@ -74927,7 +75982,7 @@ Hardware-based Protection - +

system firmware components requiring hardware-based write-protect are defined;

@@ -74935,14 +75990,15 @@ - +

authorized individuals requiring procedures for disabling and re-enabling hardware write-protect are defined;

 - + + @@ -74961,21 +76017,21 @@

None.

 - + - +

hardware-based write-protect for is employed;

 - + - +

specific procedures are implemented for to manually disable hardware write-protect for firmware modifications;

 - +

specific procedures are implemented for to re-enable the write-protect prior to returning to operational mode.

 @@ -74985,7 +76041,7 @@ - +

System and communications protection policy

procedures addressing firmware modifications

@@ -74999,7 +76055,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -75009,7 +76065,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for modifying system firmware

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing hardware-based write-protection for system firmware

@@ -75027,14 +76083,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom the system and information integrity policy is to be disseminated is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom the system and information integrity procedures are to be disseminated is/are defined;

@@ -75042,7 +76098,7 @@ - + signature-based non-signature-based @@ -75798,7 +76862,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which malicious code protection mechanisms perform scans is defined;

@@ -75806,7 +76870,7 @@ - + block malicious code quarantine malicious code @@ -75823,7 +76887,7 @@ - +

action to be taken in response to malicious code detection are defined (if selected);

@@ -75831,14 +76895,15 @@ - +

personnel or roles to be alerted when malicious code is detected is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -75896,51 +76961,51 @@

In situations where malicious code cannot be detected by detection methods or technologies, organizations rely on other types of controls, including secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to ensure that software does not perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that, in response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, organizations can define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, the detection of malicious downloads, or the detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files.

 - + - + - +

malicious code protection mechanisms are implemented at system entry and exit points to detect malicious code;

 - +

malicious code protection mechanisms are implemented at system entry and exit points to eradicate malicious code;

 - +

malicious code protection mechanisms are updated automatically as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;

 - + - + - +

malicious code protection mechanisms are configured to perform periodic scans of the system ;

 - +

malicious code protection mechanisms are configured to perform real-time scans of files from external sources at as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy;

 - + - +

malicious code protection mechanisms are configured to in response to malicious code detection;

 - +

malicious code protection mechanisms are configured to send alerts to in response to malicious code detection;

 @@ -75949,7 +77014,7 @@ - +

the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting potential impact on the availability of the system are addressed.

 @@ -75957,7 +77022,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -75976,7 +77041,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -75987,7 +77052,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for employing, updating, and configuring malicious code protection mechanisms

organizational processes for addressing false positives and resulting potential impacts

@@ -75998,7 +77063,8 @@ Central Management - + + @@ -76006,7 +77072,8 @@ Automatic Updates - + + @@ -76014,7 +77081,8 @@ Non-privileged Users - + + @@ -76022,7 +77090,8 @@ Updates Only by Privileged Users - + + @@ -76035,13 +77104,13 @@

Protection mechanisms for malicious code are typically categorized as security-related software and, as such, are only updated by organizational personnel with appropriate access privileges.

 - +

malicious code protection mechanisms are updated only when directed by a privileged user.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -76058,7 +77127,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -76069,7 +77138,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing malicious code protection capabilities

 @@ -76078,7 +77147,8 @@ Portable Storage Devices - + + @@ -76087,14 +77157,15 @@ Testing and Verification - +

the frequency at which to test malicious code protection mechanisms is defined;

 - + + @@ -76115,21 +77186,21 @@

None.

 - + - +

malicious code protection mechanisms are tested by introducing known benign code into the system;

 - + - +

the detection of (benign test) code occurs;

 - +

the associated incident reporting occurs.

 @@ -76139,7 +77210,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -76155,7 +77226,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -76165,7 +77236,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the testing and verification of malicious code protection capabilities

 @@ -76174,7 +77245,8 @@ Nonsignature-based Detection - + + @@ -76183,7 +77255,7 @@ Detect Unauthorized Commands - +

system hardware components for which unauthorized operating system commands are to be detected through the kernel application programming interface are defined;

@@ -76191,7 +77263,7 @@ - +

unauthorized operating system commands to be detected are defined;

@@ -76199,7 +77271,7 @@ - + - + + @@ -76228,14 +77301,14 @@

Detecting unauthorized commands can be applied to critical interfaces other than kernel-based interfaces, including interfaces with virtual machines and privileged applications. Unauthorized operating system commands include commands for kernel functions from system processes that are not trusted to initiate such commands as well as commands for kernel functions that are suspicious even though commands of that type are reasonable for processes to initiate. Organizations can define the malicious commands to be detected by a combination of command types, command classes, or specific instances of commands. Organizations can also define hardware components by component type, component, component location in the network, or a combination thereof. Organizations may select different actions for different types, classes, or instances of malicious commands.

 - + - +

are detected through the kernel application programming interface on ;

 - +

is/are performed.

 @@ -76243,7 +77316,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -76259,7 +77332,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -76270,7 +77343,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing malicious code protection capabilities

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the detection of unauthorized operating system commands through the kernel application programming interface

@@ -76279,8 +77352,8 @@ Authenticate Remote Commands - - + + @@ -76289,14 +77362,15 @@ Malicious Code Analysis - +

tools and techniques to be employed to analyze the characteristics and behavior of malicious code are defined;

 - + + @@ -76314,21 +77388,21 @@

The use of malicious code analysis tools provides organizations with a more in-depth understanding of adversary tradecraft (i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) and the functionality and purpose of specific instances of malicious code. Understanding the characteristics of malicious code facilitates effective organizational responses to current and future threats. Organizations can conduct malicious code analyses by employing reverse engineering techniques or by monitoring the behavior of executing code.

 - + - +

are employed to analyze the characteristics and behavior of malicious code;

 - + - +

the results from malicious code analysis are incorporated into organizational incident response processes;

 - +

the results from malicious code analysis are incorporated into organizational flaw remediation processes.

 @@ -76338,7 +77412,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -76357,7 +77431,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -76369,7 +77443,7 @@ - +

Organizational process for incident response

organizational process for flaw remediation

@@ -76383,7 +77457,7 @@ System Monitoring - +

monitoring objectives to detect attacks and indicators of potential attacks on the system are defined;

@@ -76391,7 +77465,7 @@ - +

techniques and methods used to identify unauthorized use of the system are defined;

@@ -76399,7 +77473,7 @@ - +

system monitoring information to be provided to personnel or roles is defined;

@@ -76407,7 +77481,7 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom system monitoring information is to be provided is/are defined;

@@ -76415,7 +77489,7 @@ - + audit alert @@ -78109,14 +79205,15 @@ - +

personnel or roles to be alerted upon the detection of network services that have not been authorized or approved by authorization or approval processes is/are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -78136,14 +79233,14 @@

Unauthorized or unapproved network services include services in service-oriented architectures that lack organizational verification or validation and may therefore be unreliable or serve as malicious rogues for valid services.

 - + - +

network services that have not been authorized or approved by are detected;

 - +

is/are initiated when network services that have not been authorized or approved by authorization or approval processes are detected.

 @@ -78151,7 +79248,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -78169,7 +79266,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -78180,7 +79277,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for system monitoring

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing a system monitoring capability

@@ -78193,7 +79290,7 @@ Host-based Devices - +

host-based monitoring mechanisms to be implemented on system components are defined;

@@ -78201,14 +79298,15 @@ - +

system components where host-based monitoring is to be implemented are defined;

 - + + @@ -78222,13 +79320,13 @@

Host-based monitoring collects information about the host (or system in which it resides). System components in which host-based monitoring can be implemented include servers, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Organizations may consider employing host-based monitoring mechanisms from multiple product developers or vendors.

 - +

are implemented on .

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -78246,7 +79344,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -78256,7 +79354,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for system monitoring

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing a host-based monitoring capability

@@ -78267,7 +79365,7 @@ Indicators of Compromise - +

sources that provide indicators of compromise are defined;

@@ -78275,14 +79373,15 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom indicators of compromise are to be distributed is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -78295,19 +79394,19 @@

Indicators of compromise (IOC) are forensic artifacts from intrusions that are identified on organizational systems at the host or network level. IOCs provide valuable information on systems that have been compromised. IOCs can include the creation of registry key values. IOCs for network traffic include Universal Resource Locator or protocol elements that indicate malicious code command and control servers. The rapid distribution and adoption of IOCs can improve information security by reducing the time that systems and organizations are vulnerable to the same exploit or attack. Threat indicators, signatures, tactics, techniques, procedures, and other indicators of compromise may be available via government and non-government cooperatives, including the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, the Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Information Sharing Program, and the CERT Coordination Center.

 - + - +

indicators of compromise provided by are discovered;

 - +

indicators of compromise provided by are collected;

 - +

indicators of compromise provided by are distributed to .

 @@ -78315,7 +79414,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -78331,7 +79430,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -78342,7 +79441,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for system monitoring

organizational processes for the discovery, collection, distribution, and use of indicators of compromise

@@ -78354,7 +79453,8 @@ Optimize Network Traffic Analysis - + + @@ -78366,14 +79466,14 @@

Encrypted traffic, asymmetric routing architectures, capacity and latency limitations, and transitioning from older to newer technologies (e.g., IPv4 to IPv6 network protocol transition) may result in blind spots for organizations when analyzing network traffic. Collecting, decrypting, pre-processing, and distributing only relevant traffic to monitoring devices can streamline the efficiency and use of devices and optimize traffic analysis.

 - + - +

visibility into network traffic at external system interfaces is provided to optimize the effectiveness of monitoring devices;

 - +

visibility into network traffic at key internal system interfaces is provided to optimize the effectiveness of monitoring devices.

 @@ -78381,7 +79481,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -78399,7 +79499,7 @@ - +

System/network administrators

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -78410,7 +79510,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for system monitoring

organizational processes for the discovery, collection, distribution, and use of indicators of compromise

@@ -78424,7 +79524,7 @@ Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives - +

external organizations from whom system security alerts, advisories, and directives are to be received on an ongoing basis are defined;

@@ -78432,7 +79532,7 @@ - + upon command by user with appropriate privilege @@ -78646,7 +79748,7 @@ - +

system transitional states requiring the verification of security and privacy functions are defined; (if selected)

@@ -78654,7 +79756,7 @@ - +

frequency at which to verify the correct operation of security and privacy functions is defined; (if selected)

@@ -78662,7 +79764,7 @@ - +

personnel or roles to be alerted of failed security and privacy verification tests is/are defined;

@@ -78670,7 +79772,7 @@ - + at startup at @@ -79173,28 +80280,28 @@ - +

transitional states or security-relevant events requiring integrity checks (on software) are defined (if selected);

 - +

frequency with which to perform an integrity check (on software) is defined (if selected);

 - +

firmware on which an integrity check is to be performed is defined;

 - + - +

transitional states or security-relevant events requiring integrity checks (on firmware) are defined (if selected);

 - +

frequency with which to perform an integrity check (on firmware) is defined (if selected);

 - +

information on which an integrity check is to be performed is defined;

 - + - +

transitional states or security-relevant events requiring integrity checks (of information) are defined (if selected);

 - +

frequency with which to perform an integrity check (of information) is defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -79257,19 +80365,19 @@

Security-relevant events include the identification of new threats to which organizational systems are susceptible and the installation of new hardware, software, or firmware. Transitional states include system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort.

 - + - +

an integrity check of is performed ;

 - +

an integrity check of is performed ;

 - +

an integrity check of is performed .

 @@ -79277,7 +80385,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -79292,7 +80400,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -79302,7 +80410,7 @@ - +

Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools

 @@ -79312,14 +80420,15 @@ Automated Notifications of Integrity Violations - +

personnel or roles to whom notification is to be provided upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -79331,13 +80440,13 @@

The employment of automated tools to report system and information integrity violations and to notify organizational personnel in a timely matter is essential to effective risk response. Personnel with an interest in system and information integrity violations include mission and business owners, system owners, senior agency information security official, senior agency official for privacy, system administrators, software developers, systems integrators, information security officers, and privacy officers.

 - +

automated tools that provide notification to upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification are employed.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -79357,7 +80466,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -79367,7 +80476,7 @@ - +

Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools

mechanisms providing integrity discrepancy notifications

@@ -79377,7 +80486,8 @@ Centrally Managed Integrity Tools - + + @@ -79392,13 +80502,13 @@

Centrally managed integrity verification tools provides greater consistency in the application of such tools and can facilitate more comprehensive coverage of integrity verification actions.

 - +

centrally managed integrity verification tools are employed.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -79413,7 +80523,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for the central management of integrity verification tools

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -79421,7 +80531,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the central management of integrity verification tools

 @@ -79430,7 +80540,8 @@ Tamper-evident Packaging - + + @@ -79439,7 +80550,7 @@ Automated Response to Integrity Violations - + generate an audit record alert current user @@ -79660,7 +80774,7 @@ - +

personnel or roles to be alerted upon the detection of a potential integrity violation is/are defined (if selected);

@@ -79668,14 +80782,15 @@ - +

other actions to be taken upon the detection of a potential integrity violation are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -79690,14 +80805,14 @@

Organizations select response actions based on types of software, specific software, or information for which there are potential integrity violations.

 - + - +

the capability to audit an event upon the detection of a potential integrity violation is provided;

 - +

is/are initiated upon the detection of a potential integrity violation.

 @@ -79705,7 +80820,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -79724,7 +80839,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -79734,7 +80849,7 @@ - +

Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to audit potential integrity violations

@@ -79746,14 +80861,15 @@ Verify Boot Process - +

system components requiring integrity verification of the boot process are defined;

 - + + @@ -79766,13 +80882,13 @@

Ensuring the integrity of boot processes is critical to starting system components in known, trustworthy states. Integrity verification mechanisms provide a level of assurance that only trusted code is executed during boot processes.

 - +

the integrity of the boot process of is verified.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -79789,7 +80905,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -79798,7 +80914,7 @@ - +

Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing integrity verification of the boot process

@@ -79809,7 +80925,7 @@ Protection of Boot Firmware - +

mechanisms to be implemented to protect the integrity of boot firmware in system components are defined;

@@ -79817,14 +80933,15 @@ - +

system components requiring mechanisms to protect the integrity of boot firmware are defined;

 - + + @@ -79837,13 +80954,13 @@

Unauthorized modifications to boot firmware may indicate a sophisticated, targeted attack. These types of targeted attacks can result in a permanent denial of service or a persistent malicious code presence. These situations can occur if the firmware is corrupted or if the malicious code is embedded within the firmware. System components can protect the integrity of boot firmware in organizational systems by verifying the integrity and authenticity of all updates to the firmware prior to applying changes to the system component and preventing unauthorized processes from modifying the boot firmware.

 - +

are implemented to protect the integrity of boot firmware in .

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -79859,7 +80976,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -79869,7 +80986,7 @@ - +

Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing protection of the integrity of boot firmware

@@ -79880,7 +80997,8 @@ Confined Environments with Limited Privileges - + + @@ -79889,14 +81007,15 @@ Integrity Verification - +

user-installed software requiring integrity verification prior to execution is defined;

 - + + @@ -79910,13 +81029,13 @@

Organizations verify the integrity of user-installed software prior to execution to reduce the likelihood of executing malicious code or programs that contains errors from unauthorized modifications. Organizations consider the practicality of approaches to verifying software integrity, including the availability of trustworthy checksums from software developers and vendors.

 - +

the integrity of is verified prior to execution.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -79931,7 +81050,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -79939,7 +81058,7 @@ - +

Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing verification of the integrity of user-installed software prior to execution

@@ -79949,7 +81068,8 @@ Code Execution in Protected Environments - + + @@ -79957,7 +81077,8 @@ Binary or Machine Executable Code - + + @@ -79966,14 +81087,15 @@ Code Authentication - +

software or firmware components to be authenticated by cryptographic mechanisms prior to installation are defined;

 - + + @@ -79988,13 +81110,13 @@

Cryptographic authentication includes verifying that software or firmware components have been digitally signed using certificates recognized and approved by organizations. Code signing is an effective method to protect against malicious code. Organizations that employ cryptographic mechanisms also consider cryptographic key management solutions.

 - +

cryptographic mechanisms are implemented to authenticate prior to installation.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80009,7 +81131,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80019,7 +81141,7 @@ - +

Cryptographic mechanisms authenticating software and firmware prior to installation

 @@ -80029,14 +81151,15 @@ Time Limit on Process Execution Without Supervision - +

the maximum time period permitted for processes to execute without supervision is defined;

 - + + @@ -80048,13 +81171,13 @@

Placing a time limit on process execution without supervision is intended to apply to processes for which typical or normal execution periods can be determined and situations in which organizations exceed such periods. Supervision includes timers on operating systems, automated responses, and manual oversight and response when system process anomalies occur.

 - +

processes are prohibited from executing without supervision for more than .

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80068,7 +81191,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80078,7 +81201,7 @@ - +

Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing time limits on process execution without supervision

@@ -80089,14 +81212,15 @@ Runtime Application Self-protection - +

controls to be implemented for application self-protection at runtime are defined;

 - + + @@ -80110,13 +81234,13 @@

Runtime application self-protection employs runtime instrumentation to detect and block the exploitation of software vulnerabilities by taking advantage of information from the software in execution. Runtime exploit prevention differs from traditional perimeter-based protections such as guards and firewalls which can only detect and block attacks by using network information without contextual awareness. Runtime application self-protection technology can reduce the susceptibility of software to attacks by monitoring its inputs and blocking those inputs that could allow attacks. It can also help protect the runtime environment from unwanted changes and tampering. When a threat is detected, runtime application self-protection technology can prevent exploitation and take other actions (e.g., sending a warning message to the user, terminating the user's session, terminating the application, or sending an alert to organizational personnel). Runtime application self-protection solutions can be deployed in either a monitor or protection mode.

 - +

are implemented for application self-protection at runtime.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80130,7 +81254,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80140,7 +81264,7 @@ - +

Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing runtime application self-protection

@@ -80151,7 +81275,8 @@ Spam Protection - + + @@ -80176,33 +81301,33 @@

System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote-access servers, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Spam can be transported by different means, including email, email attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection mechanisms include signature definitions.

 - + - + - +

spam protection mechanisms are employed at system entry points to detect unsolicited messages;

 - +

spam protection mechanisms are employed at system exit points to detect unsolicited messages;

 - +

spam protection mechanisms are employed at system entry points to act on unsolicited messages;

 - +

spam protection mechanisms are employed at system exit points to act on unsolicited messages;

 - +

spam protection mechanisms are updated when new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policies and procedures.

 @@ -80210,7 +81335,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80227,7 +81352,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for spam protection

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80237,7 +81362,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for implementing spam protection

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing spam protection

@@ -80246,7 +81371,8 @@ Central Management - + + @@ -80255,14 +81381,15 @@ Automatic Updates - +

the frequency at which to automatically update spam protection mechanisms is defined;

 - + + @@ -80273,13 +81400,13 @@

Using automated mechanisms to update spam protection mechanisms helps to ensure that updates occur on a regular basis and provide the latest content and protection capabilities.

 - +

spam protection mechanisms are automatically updated .

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80295,7 +81422,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for spam protection

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80305,7 +81432,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for spam protection

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing automatic updates to spam protection mechanisms

@@ -80315,7 +81442,8 @@ Continuous Learning Capability - + + @@ -80326,13 +81454,13 @@

Learning mechanisms include Bayesian filters that respond to user inputs that identify specific traffic as spam or legitimate by updating algorithm parameters and thereby more accurately separating types of traffic.

 - +

spam protection mechanisms with a learning capability are implemented to more effectively identify legitimate communications traffic.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80347,7 +81475,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for spam protection

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80357,7 +81485,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for spam protection

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing spam protection mechanisms with a learning capability

@@ -80368,7 +81496,8 @@ Information Input Restrictions - + + @@ -80382,14 +81511,15 @@ - +

information inputs to the system requiring validity checks are defined;

 - + + @@ -80401,13 +81531,13 @@

Checking the valid syntax and semantics of system inputs—including character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values—verifies that inputs match specified definitions for format and content. For example, if the organization specifies that numerical values between 1-100 are the only acceptable inputs for a field in a given application, inputs of 387, abc, or %K% are invalid inputs and are not accepted as input to the system. Valid inputs are likely to vary from field to field within a software application. Applications typically follow well-defined protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attacker-supplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages, then the attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data to be interpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component that receives the corrupted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret the data incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to passing them to interpreters prevents the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation ensures accurate and correct inputs and prevents attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks.

 - +

the validity of the is checked.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80425,7 +81555,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for information input validation

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80435,7 +81565,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing validity checks on information inputs

 @@ -80444,14 +81574,15 @@ Manual Override Capability - +

authorized individuals who can use the manual override capability are defined;

 - + + @@ -80478,19 +81609,19 @@

In certain situations, such as during events that are defined in contingency plans, a manual override capability for input validation may be needed. Manual overrides are used only in limited circumstances and with the inputs defined by the organization.

 - + - +

a manual override capability for the validation of is provided;

 - +

the use of the manual override capability is restricted to only ;

 - +

the use of the manual override capability is audited.

 @@ -80498,7 +81629,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80514,7 +81645,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for information input validation

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80524,7 +81655,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the use of a manual override capability

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing a manual override capability for input validation

@@ -80540,21 +81671,22 @@ - +

the time period within which input validation errors are to be reviewed is defined;

 - +

the time period within which input validation errors are to be resolved is defined;

 - + + @@ -80566,14 +81698,14 @@

Resolution of input validation errors includes correcting systemic causes of errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input. Input validation errors are those related to the information inputs defined by the organization in the base control ( SI-10).

 - + - +

input validation errors are reviewed within ;

 - +

input validation errors are resolved within .

 @@ -80581,7 +81713,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80597,7 +81729,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for information input validation

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80606,7 +81738,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the review and resolution of input validation errors

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the review and resolution of input validation errors

@@ -80616,7 +81748,8 @@ Predictable Behavior - + + @@ -80629,14 +81762,14 @@

A common vulnerability in organizational systems is unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. Verification of system predictability helps ensure that the system behaves as expected when invalid inputs are received. This occurs by specifying system responses that allow the system to transition to known states without adverse, unintended side effects. The invalid inputs are those related to the information inputs defined by the organization in the base control ( SI-10).

 - + - +

the system behaves in a predictable manner when invalid inputs are received;

 - +

the system behaves in a documented manner when invalid inputs are received.

 @@ -80644,7 +81777,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80658,7 +81791,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for information input validation

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80668,7 +81801,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing predictable behavior when invalid inputs are received

 @@ -80677,7 +81810,8 @@ Timing Interactions - + + @@ -80689,13 +81823,13 @@

In addressing invalid system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error response on other protocols in the protocol stack. For example, 802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to invalid packet input). TCP assumes packet losses are due to congestion, while packets lost over 802.11 links are typically dropped due to noise or collisions on the link. If TCP makes a congestion response, it takes the wrong action in response to a collision event. Adversaries may be able to use what appear to be acceptable individual behaviors of the protocols in concert to achieve adverse effects through suitable construction of invalid input. The invalid inputs are those related to the information inputs defined by the organization in the base control ( SI-10).

 - +

timing interactions among system components are accounted for in determining appropriate responses for invalid inputs.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80709,7 +81843,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for information input validation

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80719,7 +81853,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for determining appropriate responses to invalid inputs

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing responses to invalid inputs

@@ -80730,7 +81864,7 @@ Restrict Inputs to Trusted Sources and Approved Formats - +

trusted sources to which the use of information inputs is to be restricted are defined;

@@ -80738,14 +81872,15 @@ - +

formats to which the use of information inputs is to be restricted are defined;

 - + + @@ -80759,13 +81894,13 @@

Restricting the use of inputs to trusted sources and in trusted formats applies the concept of authorized or permitted software to information inputs. Specifying known trusted sources for information inputs and acceptable formats for such inputs can reduce the probability of malicious activity. The information inputs are those defined by the organization in the base control ( SI-10).

 - +

the use of information inputs is restricted to and/or .

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80781,7 +81916,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for information input validation

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80791,7 +81926,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for restricting information inputs

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing restriction of information inputs

@@ -80801,7 +81936,8 @@ Injection Prevention - + + @@ -80815,13 +81951,13 @@

Untrusted data injections may be prevented using a parameterized interface or output escaping (output encoding). Parameterized interfaces separate data from code so that injections of malicious or unintended data cannot change the semantics of commands being sent. Output escaping uses specified characters to inform the interpreter’s parser whether data is trusted. Prevention of untrusted data injections are with respect to the information inputs defined by the organization in the base control ( SI-10).

 - +

untrusted data injections are prevented.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80837,7 +81973,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for information input validation

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80847,7 +81983,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for preventing untrusted data injections

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing injection prevention

@@ -80859,14 +81995,15 @@ Error Handling - +

personnel or roles to whom error messages are to be revealed is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -80888,14 +82025,14 @@

Organizations consider the structure and content of error messages. The extent to which systems can handle error conditions is guided and informed by organizational policy and operational requirements. Exploitable information includes stack traces and implementation details; erroneous logon attempts with passwords mistakenly entered as the username; mission or business information that can be derived from, if not stated explicitly by, the information recorded; and personally identifiable information, such as account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card numbers. Error messages may also provide a covert channel for transmitting information.

 - + - +

error messages that provide the information necessary for corrective actions are generated without revealing information that could be exploited;

 - +

error messages are revealed only to .

 @@ -80903,7 +82040,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -80918,7 +82055,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for information input validation

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -80928,7 +82065,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for error handling

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing error handling

@@ -80939,7 +82076,8 @@ Information Management and Retention - + + @@ -80982,24 +82120,24 @@

Information management and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond system disposal. Information to be retained may also include policies, procedures, plans, reports, data output from control implementation, and other types of administrative information. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provides federal policy and guidance on records retention and schedules. If organizations have a records management office, consider coordinating with records management personnel. Records produced from the output of implemented controls that may require management and retention include, but are not limited to: All XX-1, AC-6(9), AT-4, AU-12, CA-2, CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA-8, CA-9, CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-6, CM-8, CM-9, CM-12, CM-13, CP-2, IR-6, IR-8, MA-2, MA-4, PE-2, PE-8, PE-16, PE-17, PL-2, PL-4, PL-7, PL-8, PM-5, PM-8, PM-9, PM-18, PM-21, PM-27, PM-28, PM-30, PM-31, PS-2, PS-6, PS-7, PT-2, PT-3, PT-7, RA-2, RA-3, RA-5, RA-8, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-10, SI-4, SR-2, SR-4, SR-8.

 - + - +

information within the system is managed in accordance with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines, and operational requirements;

 - +

information within the system is retained in accordance with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines, and operational requirements;

 - +

information output from the system is managed in accordance with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines, and operational requirements;

 - +

information output from the system is retained in accordance with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines, and operational requirements.

 @@ -81007,7 +82145,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -81029,7 +82167,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information and records management, retention, and disposition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -81038,7 +82176,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for information management, retention, and disposition

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information management, retention, and disposition

@@ -81048,14 +82186,15 @@ Limit Personally Identifiable Information Elements - +

elements of personally identifiable information being processed in the information life cycle are defined;

 - + + @@ -81067,13 +82206,13 @@

Limiting the use of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle when the information is not needed for operational purposes helps to reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system. The information life cycle includes information creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposition. Risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, and policies can provide useful inputs to determining which elements of personally identifiable information may create risk.

 - +

personally identifiable information being processed in the information life cycle is limited to .

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -81096,7 +82235,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information and records management, retention, and disposition responsibilities

organizational personnel with security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -81105,7 +82244,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for information management and retention (including limiting personally identifiable information processing)

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing limits to personally identifiable information processing

@@ -81121,28 +82260,29 @@ - +

techniques used to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for research are defined;

 - +

techniques used to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for testing are defined;

 - +

techniques used to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for training are defined;

 - + + @@ -81156,19 +82296,19 @@

Organizations can minimize the risk to an individual’s privacy by employing techniques such as de-identification or synthetic data. Limiting the use of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle when the information is not needed for research, testing, or training helps reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system. Risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, and policies can provide useful inputs to determining the techniques to use and when to use them.

 - + - +

are used to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for research;

 - +

are used to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for testing;

 - +

are used to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for training.

 @@ -81176,7 +82316,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -81196,7 +82336,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information and records management, retention, and disposition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -81207,7 +82347,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the minimization of personally identifiable information used in testing, training, and research

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the minimization of personally identifiable information used in testing, training, and research

@@ -81223,28 +82363,29 @@ - +

techniques used to dispose of information following the retention period are defined;

 - +

techniques used to destroy information following the retention period are defined;

 - +

techniques used to erase information following the retention period are defined;

 - + + @@ -81255,19 +82396,19 @@

Organizations can minimize both security and privacy risks by disposing of information when it is no longer needed. The disposal or destruction of information applies to originals as well as copies and archived records, including system logs that may contain personally identifiable information.

 - + - +

are used to dispose of information following the retention period;

 - +

are used to destroy information following the retention period;

 - +

are used to erase information following the retention period.

 @@ -81275,7 +82416,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -81298,7 +82439,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information and records management, retention, and disposition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -81307,7 +82448,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for information disposition

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information disposition

@@ -81319,7 +82460,7 @@ Predictable Failure Prevention - +

system components for which mean time to failure (MTTF) should be determined are defined;

@@ -81328,14 +82469,15 @@ - +

mean time to failure (MTTF) substitution criteria to be used as a means to exchange active and standby components are defined;

 - + + @@ -81360,14 +82502,14 @@

While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, predictable failure prevention is intended to address potential failures of system components that provide security capabilities. Failure rates reflect installation-specific consideration rather than the industry-average. Organizations define the criteria for the substitution of system components based on the MTTF value with consideration for the potential harm from component failures. The transfer of responsibilities between active and standby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or security capabilities. The preservation of system state variables is also critical to help ensure a successful transfer process. Standby components remain available at all times except for maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress.

 - + - +

mean time to failure (MTTF) is determined for in specific environments of operation;

 - +

substitute system components and a means to exchange active and standby components are provided in accordance with .

 @@ -81375,7 +82517,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -81390,7 +82532,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for MTTF determinations and activities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -81400,7 +82542,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing MTTF

 @@ -81409,14 +82551,15 @@ Transferring Component Responsibilities - +

the fraction or percentage of mean time to failure within which to transfer the responsibilities of a system component to a substitute component is defined;

 - + + @@ -81428,13 +82571,13 @@

Transferring primary system component responsibilities to other substitute components prior to primary component failure is important to reduce the risk of degraded or debilitated mission or business functions. Making such transfers based on a percentage of mean time to failure allows organizations to be proactive based on their risk tolerance. However, the premature replacement of system components can result in the increased cost of system operations.

 - +

system components are taken out of service by transferring component responsibilities to substitute components no later than of mean time to failure.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -81448,7 +82591,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for MTTF activities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -81458,7 +82601,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing MTTF

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the transfer of component responsibilities to substitute components

@@ -81468,7 +82611,8 @@ Time Limit on Process Execution Without Supervision - + + @@ -81477,14 +82621,15 @@ Manual Transfer Between Components - +

the percentage of the mean time to failure for transfers to be manually initiated is defined;

 - + + @@ -81496,13 +82641,13 @@

For example, if the MTTF for a system component is 100 days and the MTTF percentage defined by the organization is 90 percent, the manual transfer would occur after 90 days.

 - +

transfers are initiated manually between active and standby system components when the use of the active component reaches of the mean time to failure.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -81516,7 +82661,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for MTTF activities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -81526,7 +82671,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing MTTF and conducting the manual transfer between active and standby components

 @@ -81536,7 +82681,7 @@ Standby Component Installation and Notification - +

time period for standby components to be installed is defined;

@@ -81544,7 +82689,7 @@ - + real-time near real-time @@ -81649,14 +82795,15 @@ - +

a failover capability for the system has been defined;

 - + + @@ -81671,13 +82818,13 @@

Failover refers to the automatic switchover to an alternate system upon the failure of the primary system. Failover capability includes incorporating mirrored system operations at alternate processing sites or periodic data mirroring at regular intervals defined by the recovery time periods of organizations.

 - +

is provided for the system.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -81692,7 +82839,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for the failover capability

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -81702,7 +82849,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for managing the failover capability

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the failover capability

@@ -81714,7 +82861,7 @@ Non-persistence - +

non-persistent system components and services to be implemented are defined;

@@ -81722,7 +82869,7 @@ - + refresh generate on demand @@ -81866,7 +83015,7 @@ - +

the information to be refreshed is defined (if selected);

@@ -81874,7 +83023,7 @@ - +

the frequency at which to refresh information is defined (if selected);

@@ -81882,14 +83031,15 @@ - +

the information to be generated is defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -81908,14 +83058,14 @@

Retaining information longer than is needed makes the information a potential target for advanced adversaries searching for high value assets to compromise through unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized modification, or exfiltration. For system-related information, unnecessary retention provides advanced adversaries information that can assist in their reconnaissance and lateral movement through the system.

 - + - +

is performed;

 - +

information is deleted when no longer needed.

 @@ -81923,7 +83073,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -81937,7 +83087,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for ensuring that information is and remains non-persistent

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -81945,7 +83095,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for ensuring that information is and remains non-persistent

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing component and service refreshes

@@ -81956,14 +83106,15 @@ Non-persistent Connectivity - + - + + @@ -81976,14 +83127,14 @@

Persistent connections to systems can provide advanced adversaries with paths to move laterally through systems and potentially position themselves closer to high value assets. Limiting the availability of such connections impedes the adversary’s ability to move freely through organizational systems.

 - + - +

connections to the system are established on demand;

 - +

connections to the system are terminated after .

 @@ -81991,7 +83142,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82005,7 +83156,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for limiting persistent connections

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -82013,7 +83164,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for limiting persistent connections

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing non-persistent connectivity

@@ -82025,14 +83176,15 @@ Information Output Filtering - +

software programs and/or applications whose information output requires validation are defined;

 - + + @@ -82046,13 +83198,13 @@

Certain types of attacks, including SQL injections, produce output results that are unexpected or inconsistent with the output results that would be expected from software programs or applications. Information output filtering focuses on detecting extraneous content, preventing such extraneous content from being displayed, and then alerting monitoring tools that anomalous behavior has been discovered.

 - +

information output from is validated to ensure that the information is consistent with the expected content.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82066,7 +83218,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for validating information output

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -82076,7 +83228,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for validating information output

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information output validation

@@ -82087,14 +83239,15 @@ Memory Protection - +

controls to be implemented to protect the system memory from unauthorized code execution are defined;

 - + + @@ -82108,13 +83261,13 @@

Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in non-executable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Controls employed to protect memory include data execution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data execution prevention controls can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced with hardware enforcement providing the greater strength of mechanism.

 - +

are implemented to protect the system memory from unauthorized code execution.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82129,7 +83282,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for memory protection

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -82139,7 +83292,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards to protect the system memory from unauthorized code execution

 @@ -82153,21 +83306,22 @@ - +

fail-safe procedures associated with failure conditions are defined;

 - +

a list of failure conditions requiring fail-safe procedures is defined;

 - + + @@ -82182,13 +83336,13 @@

Failure conditions include the loss of communications among critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe procedures include alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on subsequent steps to take. Subsequent steps may include doing nothing, reestablishing system settings, shutting down processes, restarting the system, or contacting designated organizational personnel.

 - +

are implemented when occur.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82203,7 +83357,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for fail-safe procedures

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -82213,7 +83367,7 @@ - +

Organizational fail-safe procedures

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing fail-safe procedures

@@ -82230,35 +83384,36 @@ - +

the frequency at which to check the accuracy of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle is defined;

 - +

the frequency at which to check the relevance of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle is defined;

 - +

the frequency at which to check the timeliness of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle is defined;

 - +

the frequency at which to check the completeness of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle is defined;

 - + + @@ -82283,33 +83438,33 @@

Personally identifiable information quality operations include the steps that organizations take to confirm the accuracy and relevance of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle. The information life cycle includes the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal of personally identifiable information. Personally identifiable information quality operations include editing and validating addresses as they are collected or entered into systems using automated address verification look-up application programming interfaces. Checking personally identifiable information quality includes the tracking of updates or changes to data over time, which enables organizations to know how and what personally identifiable information was changed should erroneous information be identified. The measures taken to protect personally identifiable information quality are based on the nature and context of the personally identifiable information, how it is to be used, how it was obtained, and the potential de-identification methods employed. The measures taken to validate the accuracy of personally identifiable information used to make determinations about the rights, benefits, or privileges of individuals covered under federal programs may be more comprehensive than the measures used to validate personally identifiable information used for less sensitive purposes.

 - + - + - +

the accuracy of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle is checked ;

 - +

the relevance of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle is checked ;

 - +

the timeliness of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle is checked ;

 - +

the completeness of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle is checked ;

 - +

inaccurate or outdated personally identifiable information is corrected or deleted.

 @@ -82317,7 +83472,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82336,7 +83491,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for performing personally identifiable information quality inspections

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -82345,7 +83500,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for personally identifiable information quality inspection

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing personally identifiable information quality operations

@@ -82355,14 +83510,15 @@ Automation Support - +

automated mechanisms used to correct or delete personally identifiable information that is inaccurate, outdated, incorrectly determined regarding impact, or incorrectly de-identified are defined;

 - + + @@ -82377,13 +83533,13 @@

As data is obtained and used across the information life cycle, it is important to confirm the accuracy and relevance of personally identifiable information. Automated mechanisms can augment existing data quality processes and procedures and enable an organization to better identify and manage personally identifiable information in large-scale systems. For example, automated tools can greatly improve efforts to consistently normalize data or identify malformed data. Automated tools can also be used to improve the auditing of data and detect errors that may incorrectly alter personally identifiable information or incorrectly associate such information with the wrong individual. Automated capabilities backstop processes and procedures at-scale and enable more fine-grained detection and correction of data quality errors.

 - +

are used to correct or delete personally identifiable information that is inaccurate, outdated, incorrectly determined regarding impact, or incorrectly de-identified.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82402,7 +83558,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for performing personally identifiable information quality inspections

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -82410,7 +83566,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for personally identifiable information quality inspection

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing personally identifiable information quality operations

@@ -82420,7 +83576,8 @@ Data Tags - + + @@ -82435,13 +83592,13 @@

Data tagging personally identifiable information includes tags that note processing permissions, authority to process, de-identification, impact level, information life cycle stage, and retention or last updated dates. Employing data tags for personally identifiable information can support the use of automation tools to correct or delete relevant personally identifiable information.

 - +

data tags are employed to automate the correction or deletion of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle within organizational systems.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82459,7 +83616,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for tagging data

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -82467,7 +83624,7 @@ - +

Data tagging mechanisms

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing data tagging

@@ -82477,7 +83634,8 @@ Collection - + + @@ -82489,13 +83647,13 @@

Individuals or their designated representatives can be sources of correct personally identifiable information. Organizations consider contextual factors that may incentivize individuals to provide correct data versus false data. Additional steps may be necessary to validate collected information based on the nature and context of the personally identifiable information, how it is to be used, and how it was obtained. The measures taken to validate the accuracy of personally identifiable information used to make determinations about the rights, benefits, or privileges of individuals under federal programs may be more comprehensive than the measures taken to validate less sensitive personally identifiable information.

 - +

personally identifiable information is collected directly from the individual.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82512,7 +83670,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for data collection

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -82520,7 +83678,7 @@ - +

Data collection mechanisms

automated mechanisms supporting and/or validating collection directly from the individual

@@ -82530,7 +83688,8 @@ Individual Requests - + + @@ -82542,13 +83701,13 @@

Inaccurate personally identifiable information maintained by organizations may cause problems for individuals, especially in those business functions where inaccurate information may result in inappropriate decisions or the denial of benefits and services to individuals. Even correct information, in certain circumstances, can cause problems for individuals that outweigh the benefits of an organization maintaining the information. Organizations use discretion when determining if personally identifiable information is to be corrected or deleted based on the scope of requests, the changes sought, the impact of the changes, and laws, regulations, and policies. Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding appropriate instances of correction or deletion.

 - +

personally identifiable information is corrected or deleted upon request by individuals or their designated representatives.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82566,7 +83725,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for responding to individual requests for personally identifiable information correction or deletion

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -82574,7 +83733,7 @@ - +

Request mechanisms

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing individual requests for correction or deletion

@@ -82586,14 +83745,15 @@ - +

recipients of personally identifiable information to be notified when the personally identifiable information has been corrected or deleted are defined;

 - + + @@ -82605,13 +83765,13 @@

When personally identifiable information is corrected or deleted, organizations take steps to ensure that all authorized recipients of such information, and the individual with whom the information is associated or their designated representatives, are informed of the corrected or deleted information.

 - +

and individuals are notified when the personally identifiable information has been corrected or deleted.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82629,7 +83789,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for sending correction or deletion notices

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -82637,7 +83797,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for notifications of correction or deletion

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing notifications of correction or deletion

@@ -82650,7 +83810,7 @@ - +

elements of personally identifiable information to be removed from datasets are defined;

@@ -82658,14 +83818,15 @@ - +

the frequency at which to evaluate the effectiveness of de-identification is defined;

 - + + @@ -82691,14 +83852,14 @@

De-identification is the general term for the process of removing the association between a set of identifying data and the data subject. Many datasets contain information about individuals that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records. Datasets may also contain other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information. Personally identifiable information is removed from datasets by trained individuals when such information is not (or no longer) necessary to satisfy the requirements envisioned for the data. For example, if the dataset is only used to produce aggregate statistics, the identifiers that are not needed for producing those statistics are removed. Removing identifiers improves privacy protection since information that is removed cannot be inadvertently disclosed or improperly used. Organizations may be subject to specific de-identification definitions or methods under applicable laws, regulations, or policies. Re-identification is a residual risk with de-identified data. Re-identification attacks can vary, including combining new datasets or other improvements in data analytics. Maintaining awareness of potential attacks and evaluating for the effectiveness of the de-identification over time support the management of this residual risk.

 - + - +

are removed from datasets;

 - +

the effectiveness of de-identification is evaluated .

 @@ -82706,7 +83867,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82723,7 +83884,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for identifying unnecessary identifiers

organizational personnel responsible for removing personally identifiable information from datasets

@@ -82732,7 +83893,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the removal of personally identifiable information elements

 @@ -82740,7 +83901,8 @@ Collection - + + @@ -82752,13 +83914,13 @@

If a data source contains personally identifiable information but the information will not be used, the dataset can be de-identified when it is created by not collecting the data elements that contain the personally identifiable information. For example, if an organization does not intend to use the social security number of an applicant, then application forms do not ask for a social security number.

 - +

the dataset is de-identified upon collection by not collecting personally identifiable information.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82776,7 +83938,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for de-identifying the dataset

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -82784,7 +83946,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms preventing the collection of personally identifiable information

 @@ -82793,7 +83955,8 @@ Archiving - + + @@ -82805,13 +83968,13 @@

Datasets can be archived for many reasons. The envisioned purposes for the archived dataset are specified, and if personally identifiable information elements are not required, the elements are not archived. For example, social security numbers may have been collected for record linkage, but the archived dataset may include the required elements from the linked records. In this case, it is not necessary to archive the social security numbers.

 - +

the archiving of personally identifiable information elements is prohibited if those elements in a dataset will not be needed after the dataset is archived.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82828,7 +83991,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for de-identifying the dataset

organizational personnel with dataset archival responsibilities

@@ -82837,7 +84000,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms prohibiting the archival of personally identifiable information elements

 @@ -82846,7 +84009,8 @@ Release - + + @@ -82858,13 +84022,13 @@

Prior to releasing a dataset, a data custodian considers the intended uses of the dataset and determines if it is necessary to release personally identifiable information. If the personally identifiable information is not necessary, the information can be removed using de-identification techniques.

 - +

personally identifiable information elements are removed from a dataset prior to its release if those elements in the dataset do not need to be part of the data release.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82882,7 +84046,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for de-identifying the dataset

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -82890,7 +84054,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the removal of personally identifiable information elements from a dataset

 @@ -82899,7 +84063,8 @@ Removal, Masking, Encryption, Hashing, or Replacement of Direct Identifiers - + + @@ -82912,13 +84077,13 @@

There are many possible processes for removing direct identifiers from a dataset. Columns in a dataset that contain a direct identifier can be removed. In masking, the direct identifier is transformed into a repeating character, such as XXXXXX or 999999. Identifiers can be encrypted or hashed so that the linked records remain linked. In the case of encryption or hashing, algorithms are employed that require the use of a key, including the Advanced Encryption Standard or a Hash-based Message Authentication Code. Implementations may use the same key for all identifiers or use a different key for each identifier. Using a different key for each identifier provides a higher degree of security and privacy. Identifiers can alternatively be replaced with a keyword, including transforming George Washington to PATIENT or replacing it with a surrogate value, such as transforming George Washington to Abraham Polk.

- +

direct identifiers in a dataset are removed, masked, encrypted, hashed, or replaced.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -82936,7 +84101,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for de-identifying the dataset

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -82944,7 +84109,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the removal, masking, encryption, hashing or replacement of direct identifiers

 @@ -82953,7 +84118,8 @@ Statistical Disclosure Control - + + @@ -82965,19 +84131,19 @@

Many types of statistical analyses can result in the disclosure of information about individuals even if only summary information is provided. For example, if a school that publishes a monthly table with the number of minority students enrolled, reports that it has 10-19 such students in January, and subsequently reports that it has 20-29 such students in March, then it can be inferred that the student who enrolled in February was a minority.

 - + - +

numerical data is manipulated so that no individual or organization is identifiable in the results of the analysis;

 - +

contingency tables are manipulated so that no individual or organization is identifiable in the results of the analysis;

 - +

statistical findings are manipulated so that no individual or organization is identifiable in the results of the analysis.

 @@ -82985,7 +84151,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -83004,7 +84170,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for de-identifying the dataset

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -83012,7 +84178,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the control of statistical disclosure

 @@ -83021,7 +84187,8 @@ Differential Privacy - + + @@ -83035,13 +84202,13 @@

The mathematical definition for differential privacy holds that the result of a dataset analysis should be approximately the same before and after the addition or removal of a single data record (which is assumed to be the data from a single individual). In its most basic form, differential privacy applies only to online query systems. However, it can also be used to produce machine-learning statistical classifiers and synthetic data. Differential privacy comes at the cost of decreased accuracy of results, forcing organizations to quantify the trade-off between privacy protection and the overall accuracy, usefulness, and utility of the de-identified dataset. Non-deterministic noise can include adding small, random values to the results of mathematical operations in dataset analysis.

 - +

the disclosure of personally identifiable information is prevented by adding non-deterministic noise to the results of mathematical operations before the results are reported.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -83059,7 +84226,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for de-identifying the dataset

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -83067,7 +84234,7 @@ - +

Online query systems

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing differential privacy

@@ -83077,7 +84244,8 @@ Validated Algorithms and Software - + + @@ -83088,14 +84256,14 @@

Algorithms that appear to remove personally identifiable information from a dataset may in fact leave information that is personally identifiable or data that is re-identifiable. Software that is claimed to implement a validated algorithm may contain bugs or implement a different algorithm. Software may de-identify one type of data, such as integers, but not de-identify another type of data, such as floating point numbers. For these reasons, de-identification is performed using algorithms and software that are validated.

 - + - +

de-identification is performed using validated algorithms;

 - +

de-identification is performed using software that is validated to implement the algorithms.

 @@ -83103,7 +84271,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -83121,7 +84289,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for de-identifying the dataset

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -83129,7 +84297,7 @@ - +

Validated algorithms and software

 @@ -83138,7 +84306,8 @@ Motivated Intruder - + + @@ -83150,13 +84319,13 @@

A motivated intruder test is a test in which an individual or group takes a data release and specified resources and attempts to re-identify one or more individuals in the de-identified dataset. Such tests specify the amount of inside knowledge, computational resources, financial resources, data, and skills that intruders possess to conduct the tests. A motivated intruder test can determine if the de-identification is insufficient. It can also be a useful diagnostic tool to assess if de-identification is likely to be sufficient. However, the test alone cannot prove that de-identification is sufficient.

 - +

a motivated intruder test is performed on the de-identified dataset to determine if the identified data remains or if the de-identified data can be re-identified.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -83174,7 +84343,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for de-identifying the dataset

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -83182,7 +84351,7 @@ - +

Motivated intruder test

 @@ -83193,14 +84362,15 @@ Tainting - +

the systems or system components with data or capabilities to be embedded are defined;

 - + + @@ -83215,13 +84385,13 @@

Many cyber-attacks target organizational information, or information that the organization holds on behalf of other entities (e.g., personally identifiable information), and exfiltrate that data. In addition, insider attacks and erroneous user procedures can remove information from the system that is in violation of the organizational policies. Tainting approaches can range from passive to active. A passive tainting approach can be as simple as adding false email names and addresses to an internal database. If the organization receives email at one of the false email addresses, it knows that the database has been compromised. Moreover, the organization knows that the email was sent by an unauthorized entity, so any packets it includes potentially contain malicious code, and that the unauthorized entity may have potentially obtained a copy of the database. Another tainting approach can include embedding false data or steganographic data in files to enable the data to be found via open-source analysis. Finally, an active tainting approach can include embedding software in the data that is able to call home, thereby alerting the organization to its capture, and possibly its location, and the path by which it was exfiltrated or removed.

 - +

data or capabilities are embedded in to determine if organizational data has been exfiltrated or improperly removed from the organization.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -83237,7 +84407,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for detecting tainted data

organizational personnel with systems security engineering responsibilities

@@ -83246,7 +84416,7 @@ - +

Automated mechanisms for post-breach detection

decoys, traps, lures, and methods for deceiving adversaries

@@ -83258,7 +84428,7 @@ Information Refresh - +

the information to be refreshed is defined;

@@ -83266,14 +84436,15 @@ - +

the frequencies at which to refresh information are defined;

 - + + @@ -83288,13 +84459,13 @@

Retaining information for longer than it is needed makes it an increasingly valuable and enticing target for adversaries. Keeping information available for the minimum period of time needed to support organizational missions or business functions reduces the opportunity for adversaries to compromise, capture, and exfiltrate that information.

 - +

the is refreshed or is generated on demand and deleted when no longer needed.

 - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -83311,7 +84482,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel responsible for refreshing information

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -83321,7 +84492,7 @@ - +

Mechanisms for information refresh

organizational processes for information refresh

@@ -83332,7 +84503,7 @@ Information Diversity - +

alternative information sources for essential functions and services are defined;

@@ -83340,7 +84511,7 @@ - +

essential functions and services that require alternative sources of information are defined;

@@ -83348,14 +84519,15 @@ - +

systems or system components that require an alternative information source for the execution of essential functions or services are defined;

 - + + @@ -83375,14 +84547,14 @@

Actions taken by a system service or a function are often driven by the information it receives. Corruption, fabrication, modification, or deletion of that information could impact the ability of the service function to properly carry out its intended actions. By having multiple sources of input, the service or function can continue operation if one source is corrupted or no longer available. It is possible that the alternative sources of information may be less precise or less accurate than the primary source of information. But having such sub-optimal information sources may still provide a sufficient level of quality that the essential service or function can be carried out, even in a degraded or debilitated manner.

 - + - +

for are identified;

 - +

an alternative information source is used for the execution of essential functions or services on when the primary source of information is corrupted or unavailable.

 @@ -83390,7 +84562,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -83405,7 +84577,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

organizational personnel with systems security engineering responsibilities

@@ -83414,7 +84586,7 @@ - +

Automated methods and mechanisms to convert information from an analog to digital medium

 @@ -83424,7 +84596,7 @@ Information Fragmentation - +

circumstances that require information fragmentation are defined;

@@ -83432,7 +84604,7 @@ - +

the information to be fragmented is defined;

@@ -83440,14 +84612,15 @@ - +

systems or system components across which the fragmented information is to be distributed are defined;

 - + + @@ -83468,14 +84641,14 @@

One objective of the advanced persistent threat is to exfiltrate valuable information. Once exfiltrated, there is generally no way for the organization to recover the lost information. Therefore, organizations may consider dividing the information into disparate elements and distributing those elements across multiple systems or system components and locations. Such actions will increase the adversary’s work factor to capture and exfiltrate the desired information and, in so doing, increase the probability of detection. The fragmentation of information impacts the organization’s ability to access the information in a timely manner. The extent of the fragmentation is dictated by the impact or classification level (and value) of the information, threat intelligence information received, and whether data tainting is used (i.e., data tainting-derived information about the exfiltration of some information could result in the fragmentation of the remaining information).

 - + - +

under , is fragmented;

 - +

under , the fragmented information is distributed across .

 @@ -83483,7 +84656,7 @@ - +

System and information integrity policy

system and information integrity procedures

@@ -83503,7 +84676,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

organizational personnel with systems security engineering responsibilities

@@ -83513,7 +84686,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes to identify information for fragmentation and distribution across systems/system components

automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information fragmentation and distribution across systems/system components

@@ -83531,14 +84704,14 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom supply chain risk management policy is to be disseminated to is/are defined;

 - +

personnel or roles to whom supply chain risk management procedures are disseminated to is/are defined;

@@ -83546,7 +84719,7 @@ - + security and privacy plans supply chain risk management plan @@ -84071,14 +85247,15 @@ - +

the document identifying the selected and implemented supply chain processes and controls is defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -84131,28 +85308,28 @@

Supply chain elements include organizations, entities, or tools employed for the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal of systems and system components. Supply chain processes include hardware, software, and firmware development processes; shipping and handling procedures; personnel security and physical security programs; configuration management tools, techniques, and measures to maintain provenance; or other programs, processes, or procedures associated with the development, acquisition, maintenance and disposal of systems and system components. Supply chain elements and processes may be provided by organizations, system integrators, or external providers. Weaknesses or deficiencies in supply chain elements or processes represent potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries to cause harm to the organization and affect its ability to carry out its core missions or business functions. Supply chain personnel are individuals with roles and responsibilities in the supply chain.

 - + - + - +

a process or processes is/are established to identify and address weaknesses or deficiencies in the supply chain elements and processes of ;

 - +

the process or processes to identify and address weaknesses or deficiencies in the supply chain elements and processes of is/are coordinated with ;

 - +

are employed to protect against supply chain risks to the system, system component, or system service and to limit the harm or consequences from supply chain-related events;

 - +

the selected and implemented supply chain processes and controls are documented in .

 @@ -84160,7 +85337,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy

supply chain risk management procedures

@@ -84182,7 +85359,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -84191,7 +85368,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for identifying and addressing supply chain element and process deficiencies

 @@ -84204,21 +85381,22 @@ - +

system components with a diverse set of sources are defined;

 - +

services with a diverse set of sources are defined;

 - + + @@ -84230,14 +85408,14 @@

Diversifying the supply of systems, system components, and services can reduce the probability that adversaries will successfully identify and target the supply chain and can reduce the impact of a supply chain event or compromise. Identifying multiple suppliers for replacement components can reduce the probability that the replacement component will become unavailable. Employing a diverse set of developers or logistics service providers can reduce the impact of a natural disaster or other supply chain event. Organizations consider designing the system to include diverse materials and components.

 - + - +

a diverse set of sources is employed for ;

 - +

a diverse set of sources is employed for .

 @@ -84245,7 +85423,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

system and services acquisition policy

@@ -84261,7 +85439,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -84270,7 +85448,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for defining and employing security safeguards to ensure an adequate supply of critical system components

processes to identify critical suppliers

@@ -84282,14 +85460,15 @@ Limitation of Harm - +

controls to limit harm from potential supply chain adversaries are defined;

 - + + @@ -84301,13 +85480,13 @@

Controls that can be implemented to reduce the probability of adversaries successfully identifying and targeting the supply chain include avoiding the purchase of custom or non-standardized configurations, employing approved vendor lists with standing reputations in industry, following pre-agreed maintenance schedules and update and patch delivery mechanisms, maintaining a contingency plan in case of a supply chain event, using procurement carve-outs that provide exclusions to commitments or obligations, using diverse delivery routes, and minimizing the time between purchase decisions and delivery.

 - +

are employed to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the organizational supply chain.

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -84331,7 +85510,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -84340,7 +85519,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for defining and employing safeguards to limit harm from adversaries of the organizational supply chain

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of safeguards to protect the organizational supply chain

@@ -84350,7 +85529,8 @@ Sub-tier Flow Down - + + @@ -84364,13 +85544,13 @@

To manage supply chain risk effectively and holistically, it is important that organizations ensure that supply chain risk management controls are included at all tiers in the supply chain. This includes ensuring that Tier 1 (prime) contractors have implemented processes to facilitate the flow down of supply chain risk management controls to sub-tier contractors. The controls subject to flow down are identified in SR-3b.

 - +

the controls included in the contracts of prime contractors are also included in the contracts of subcontractors.

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -84386,7 +85566,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -84395,7 +85575,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for establishing inter-organizational agreements and procedures with supply chain entities

 @@ -84406,14 +85586,15 @@ Provenance - +

systems, system components, and associated data that require valid provenance are defined;

 - + + @@ -84441,19 +85622,19 @@

Every system and system component has a point of origin and may be changed throughout its existence. Provenance is the chronology of the origin, development, ownership, location, and changes to a system or system component and associated data. It may also include personnel and processes used to interact with or make modifications to the system, component, or associated data. Organizations consider developing procedures (see SR-1 ) for allocating responsibilities for the creation, maintenance, and monitoring of provenance for systems and system components; transferring provenance documentation and responsibility between organizations; and preventing and monitoring for unauthorized changes to the provenance records. Organizations have methods to document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance baselines for systems, system components, and related data. These actions help track, assess, and document any changes to the provenance, including changes in supply chain elements or configuration, and help ensure non-repudiation of provenance information and the provenance change records. Provenance considerations are addressed throughout the system development life cycle and incorporated into contracts and other arrangements, as appropriate.

 - + - +

valid provenance is documented for ;

 - +

valid provenance is monitored for ;

 - +

valid provenance is maintained for .

 @@ -84461,7 +85642,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy

supply chain risk management procedures

@@ -84479,7 +85660,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -84488,7 +85669,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for identifying the provenance of critical systems and critical system components

mechanisms used to document, monitor, or maintain provenance

@@ -84499,14 +85680,15 @@ - +

supply chain elements, processes, and personnel associated with systems and critical system components that require unique identification are defined;

 - + + @@ -84521,14 +85703,14 @@

Knowing who and what is in the supply chains of organizations is critical to gaining visibility into supply chain activities. Visibility into supply chain activities is also important for monitoring and identifying high-risk events and activities. Without reasonable visibility into supply chains elements, processes, and personnel, it is very difficult for organizations to understand and manage risk and reduce their susceptibility to adverse events. Supply chain elements include organizations, entities, or tools used for the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations, maintenance, and disposal of systems and system components. Supply chain processes include development processes for hardware, software, and firmware; shipping and handling procedures; configuration management tools, techniques, and measures to maintain provenance; personnel and physical security programs; or other programs, processes, or procedures associated with the production and distribution of supply chain elements. Supply chain personnel are individuals with specific roles and responsibilities related to the secure the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal of a system or system component. Identification methods are sufficient to support an investigation in case of a supply chain change (e.g. if a supply company is purchased), compromise, or event.

 - + - +

unique identification of is established;

 - +

unique identification of is maintained.

 @@ -84536,7 +85718,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -84550,7 +85732,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -84560,7 +85742,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for defining, establishing, and retaining unique identification for supply chain elements, processes, and actors

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition, establishment, and retention of unique identification for supply chain elements, processes, and actors

@@ -84571,14 +85753,15 @@ Track and Trace - +

systems and critical system components that require unique identification for tracking through the supply chain are defined;

 - + + @@ -84594,14 +85777,14 @@

Tracking the unique identification of systems and system components during development and transport activities provides a foundational identity structure for the establishment and maintenance of provenance. For example, system components may be labeled using serial numbers or tagged using radio-frequency identification tags. Labels and tags can help provide better visibility into the provenance of a system or system component. A system or system component may have more than one unique identifier. Identification methods are sufficient to support a forensic investigation after a supply chain compromise or event.

 - + - +

the unique identification of is established for tracking through the supply chain;

 - +

the unique identification of is maintained for tracking through the supply chain.

 @@ -84609,7 +85792,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

system and services acquisition policy

@@ -84623,7 +85806,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -84633,7 +85816,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for defining, establishing, and retaining unique identification for supply chain elements, processes, and actors

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition, establishment, and retention of unique identification for supply chain elements, processes, and actors

@@ -84648,21 +85831,22 @@ - +

controls to validate that the system or system component received is genuine are defined;

 - +

controls to validate that the system or system component received has not been altered are defined;

 - + + @@ -84678,14 +85862,14 @@

For many systems and system components, especially hardware, there are technical means to determine if the items are genuine or have been altered, including optical and nanotechnology tagging, physically unclonable functions, side-channel analysis, cryptographic hash verifications or digital signatures, and visible anti-tamper labels or stickers. Controls can also include monitoring for out of specification performance, which can be an indicator of tampering or counterfeits. Organizations may leverage supplier and contractor processes for validating that a system or component is genuine and has not been altered and for replacing a suspect system or component. Some indications of tampering may be visible and addressable before accepting delivery, such as inconsistent packaging, broken seals, and incorrect labels. When a system or system component is suspected of being altered or counterfeit, the supplier, contractor, or original equipment manufacturer may be able to replace the item or provide a forensic capability to determine the origin of the counterfeit or altered item. Organizations can provide training to personnel on how to identify suspicious system or component deliveries.

 - + - +

are employed to validate that the system or system component received is genuine;

 - +

are employed to validate that the system or system component received has not been altered.

 @@ -84693,7 +85877,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -84713,7 +85897,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -84722,7 +85906,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for defining and employing validation safeguards

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of validation safeguards

@@ -84734,7 +85918,7 @@ Supply Chain Integrity — Pedigree - +

controls employed to ensure that the integrity of the system and system component are defined;

@@ -84743,14 +85927,15 @@ - +

an analysis method to be conducted to validate the internal composition and provenance of critical or mission-essential technologies, products, and services to ensure the integrity of the system and system component is defined;

 - + + @@ -84763,14 +85948,14 @@

Authoritative information regarding the internal composition of system components and the provenance of technology, products, and services provides a strong basis for trust. The validation of the internal composition and provenance of technologies, products, and services is referred to as the pedigree. For microelectronics, this includes material composition of components. For software this includes the composition of open-source and proprietary code, including the version of the component at a given point in time. Pedigrees increase the assurance that the claims suppliers assert about the internal composition and provenance of the products, services, and technologies they provide are valid. The validation of the internal composition and provenance can be achieved by various evidentiary artifacts or records that manufacturers and suppliers produce during the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal of technology, products, and services. Evidentiary artifacts include, but are not limited to, software identification (SWID) tags, software component inventory, the manufacturers’ declarations of platform attributes (e.g., serial numbers, hardware component inventory), and measurements (e.g., firmware hashes) that are tightly bound to the hardware itself.

 - + - +

are employed to ensure the integrity of the system and system components;

 - +

is conducted to ensure the integrity of the system and system components.

 @@ -84778,7 +85963,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -84794,7 +85979,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -84803,7 +85988,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for identifying pedigree information

organizational processes to determine and validate the integrity of the internal composition of critical systems and critical system components

@@ -84817,14 +86002,15 @@ - +

acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods to protect against, identify, and mitigate supply chain risks are defined;

 - + + @@ -84857,19 +86043,19 @@

The use of the acquisition process provides an important vehicle to protect the supply chain. There are many useful tools and techniques available, including obscuring the end use of a system or system component, using blind or filtered buys, requiring tamper-evident packaging, or using trusted or controlled distribution. The results from a supply chain risk assessment can guide and inform the strategies, tools, and methods that are most applicable to the situation. Tools and techniques may provide protections against unauthorized production, theft, tampering, insertion of counterfeits, insertion of malicious software or backdoors, and poor development practices throughout the system development life cycle. Organizations also consider providing incentives for suppliers who implement controls, promote transparency into their processes and security and privacy practices, provide contract language that addresses the prohibition of tainted or counterfeit components, and restrict purchases from untrustworthy suppliers. Organizations consider providing training, education, and awareness programs for personnel regarding supply chain risk, available mitigation strategies, and when the programs should be employed. Methods for reviewing and protecting development plans, documentation, and evidence are commensurate with the security and privacy requirements of the organization. Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements.

 - + - +

are employed to protect against supply chain risks;

 - +

are employed to identify supply chain risks;

 - +

are employed to mitigate supply chain risks.

 @@ -84877,7 +86063,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy

supply chain risk management procedures

@@ -84898,7 +86084,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities

@@ -84907,7 +86093,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for defining and employing tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods

@@ -84917,7 +86103,7 @@ Adequate Supply - +

controls to ensure an adequate supply of critical system components are defined;

@@ -84925,14 +86111,15 @@ - +

critical system components of which an adequate supply is required are defined;

 - + + @@ -84945,13 +86132,13 @@

Adversaries can attempt to impede organizational operations by disrupting the supply of critical system components or corrupting supplier operations. Organizations may track systems and component mean time to failure to mitigate the loss of temporary or permanent system function. Controls to ensure that adequate supplies of critical system components include the use of multiple suppliers throughout the supply chain for the identified critical components, stockpiling spare components to ensure operation during mission-critical times, and the identification of functionally identical or similar components that may be used, if necessary.

 - +

are employed to ensure an adequate supply of .

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management strategy

@@ -84974,7 +86161,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -84983,7 +86170,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for defining and employing tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods

@@ -84993,7 +86180,8 @@ Assessments Prior to Selection, Acceptance, Modification, or Update - + + @@ -85009,24 +86197,24 @@

Organizational personnel or independent, external entities conduct assessments of systems, components, products, tools, and services to uncover evidence of tampering, unintentional and intentional vulnerabilities, or evidence of non-compliance with supply chain controls. These include malicious code, malicious processes, defective software, backdoors, and counterfeits. Assessments can include evaluations; design proposal reviews; visual or physical inspection; static and dynamic analyses; visual, x-ray, or magnetic particle inspections; simulations; white, gray, or black box testing; fuzz testing; stress testing; and penetration testing (see SR-6(1) ). Evidence generated during assessments is documented for follow-on actions by organizations. The evidence generated during the organizational or independent assessments of supply chain elements may be used to improve supply chain processes and inform the supply chain risk management process. The evidence can be leveraged in follow-on assessments. Evidence and other documentation may be shared in accordance with organizational agreements.

 - + - +

the system, system component, or system service is assessed prior to selection;

 - +

the system, system component, or system service is assessed prior to acceptance;

 - +

the system, system component, or system service is assessed prior to modification;

 - +

the system, system component, or system service is assessed prior to update.

 @@ -85034,7 +86222,7 @@ - +

System security plan

system and services acquisition policy

@@ -85050,7 +86238,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -85059,7 +86247,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for conducting assessments prior to selection, acceptance, or update

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the conducting of assessments prior to selection, acceptance, or update

@@ -85071,14 +86259,15 @@ Supplier Assessments and Reviews - +

the frequency at which to assess and review the supply chain-related risks associated with suppliers or contractors and the systems, system components, or system services they provide is defined;

 - + + @@ -85104,13 +86293,13 @@

An assessment and review of supplier risk includes security and supply chain risk management processes, foreign ownership, control or influence (FOCI), and the ability of the supplier to effectively assess subordinate second-tier and third-tier suppliers and contractors. The reviews may be conducted by the organization or by an independent third party. The reviews consider documented processes, documented controls, all-source intelligence, and publicly available information related to the supplier or contractor. Organizations can use open-source information to monitor for indications of stolen information, poor development and quality control practices, information spillage, or counterfeits. In some cases, it may be appropriate or required to share assessment and review results with other organizations in accordance with any applicable rules, policies, or inter-organizational agreements or contracts.

 - +

the supply chain-related risks associated with suppliers or contractors and the systems, system components, or system services they provide are assessed and reviewed .

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management strategy

@@ -85125,7 +86314,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -85134,7 +86323,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for conducting supplier reviews

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing supplier reviews

@@ -85144,7 +86333,7 @@ Testing and Analysis - + notification of supply chain compromises @@ -85297,14 +86488,15 @@ - +

information for which agreements and procedures are to be established are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -85325,13 +86517,13 @@

The establishment of agreements and procedures facilitates communications among supply chain entities. Early notification of compromises and potential compromises in the supply chain that can potentially adversely affect or have adversely affected organizational systems or system components is essential for organizations to effectively respond to such incidents. The results of assessments or audits may include open-source information that contributed to a decision or result and could be used to help the supply chain entity resolve a concern or improve its processes.

 - +

agreements and procedures are established with entities involved in the supply chain for the system, system components, or system service for .

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -85347,7 +86539,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -85356,7 +86548,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for establishing inter-organizational agreements and procedures with supply chain entities

 @@ -85365,7 +86557,8 @@ Tamper Resistance and Detection - + + @@ -85387,13 +86580,13 @@

Anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques provide a level of protection for systems, system components, and services against many threats, including reverse engineering, modification, and substitution. Strong identification combined with tamper resistance and/or tamper detection is essential to protecting systems and components during distribution and when in use.

 - +

a tamper protection program is implemented for the system, system component, or system service.

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -85412,7 +86605,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with tamper protection program responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -85421,7 +86614,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for the implementation of the tamper protection program

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the tamper protection program

@@ -85430,7 +86623,8 @@ Multiple Stages of System Development Life Cycle - + + @@ -85443,13 +86637,13 @@

The system development life cycle includes research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal. Organizations use a combination of hardware and software techniques for tamper resistance and detection. Organizations use obfuscation and self-checking to make reverse engineering and modifications more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive for adversaries. The customization of systems and system components can make substitutions easier to detect and therefore limit damage.

 - +

anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques are employed throughout the system development life cycle.

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -85471,7 +86665,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -85481,7 +86675,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for employing anti-tamper technologies

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing anti-tamper technologies

@@ -85493,7 +86687,7 @@ Inspection of Systems or Components - +

systems or system components that require inspection are defined;

@@ -85501,7 +86695,7 @@ - + source of counterfeit component @@ -85599,7 +86794,7 @@ - +

external reporting organizations to whom counterfeit system components are to be reported is/are defined (if selected);

@@ -85607,14 +86802,15 @@ - +

personnel or roles to whom counterfeit system components are to be reported is/are defined (if selected);

 - + + @@ -85638,33 +86834,33 @@

Sources of counterfeit components include manufacturers, developers, vendors, and contractors. Anti-counterfeiting policies and procedures support tamper resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code. External reporting organizations include CISA.

 - + - + - +

an anti-counterfeit policy is developed and implemented;

 - +

anti-counterfeit procedures are developed and implemented;

 - +

the anti-counterfeit procedures include the means to detect counterfeit components entering the system;

 - +

the anti-counterfeit procedures include the means to prevent counterfeit components from entering the system;

 - +

counterfeit system components are reported to .

 @@ -85672,7 +86868,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -85694,7 +86890,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and service acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -85704,7 +86900,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for counterfeit prevention, detection, and reporting

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing anti-counterfeit detection, prevention, and reporting

@@ -85714,14 +86910,15 @@ Anti-counterfeit Training - +

personnel or roles requiring training to detect counterfeit system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) is/are defined;

 - + + @@ -85734,13 +86931,13 @@

None.

 - +

are trained to detect counterfeit system components (including hardware, software, and firmware).

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -85758,7 +86955,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

organizational personnel with supply chain risk management responsibilities

@@ -85767,7 +86964,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for anti-counterfeit training

 @@ -85777,14 +86974,15 @@ Configuration Control for Component Service and Repair - +

system components requiring configuration control are defined;

 - + + @@ -85800,14 +86998,14 @@

None.

 - + - +

configuration control over awaiting service or repair is maintained;

 - +

configuration control over serviced or repaired awaiting return to service is maintained.

 @@ -85815,7 +87013,7 @@ - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -85830,7 +87028,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -85839,7 +87037,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for establishing inter-organizational agreements and procedures with supply chain entities

organizational configuration control processes

@@ -85850,14 +87048,15 @@ Anti-counterfeit Scanning - +

the frequency at which to scan for counterfeit system components is defined;

 - + + @@ -85870,13 +87069,13 @@

The type of component determines the type of scanning to be conducted (e.g., web application scanning if the component is a web application).

 - +

scanning for counterfeit system components is conducted .

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -85894,7 +87093,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system and services acquisition responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -85905,7 +87104,7 @@ - +

Organizational processes for scanning for counterfeit system components

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing anti-counterfeit scanning

@@ -85917,7 +87116,7 @@ Component Disposal - +

data, documentation, tools, or system components to be disposed of are defined;

@@ -85925,14 +87124,15 @@ - +

techniques and methods for disposing of data, documentation, tools, or system components are defined;

 - + + @@ -85944,13 +87144,13 @@

Data, documentation, tools, or system components can be disposed of at any time during the system development life cycle (not only in the disposal or retirement phase of the life cycle). For example, disposal can occur during research and development, design, prototyping, or operations/maintenance and include methods such as disk cleaning, removal of cryptographic keys, partial reuse of components. Opportunities for compromise during disposal affect physical and logical data, including system documentation in paper-based or digital files; shipping and delivery documentation; memory sticks with software code; or complete routers or servers that include permanent media, which contain sensitive or proprietary information. Additionally, proper disposal of system components helps to prevent such components from entering the gray market.

 - +

are disposed of using .

 - +

Supply chain risk management policy and procedures

supply chain risk management plan

@@ -85966,7 +87166,7 @@ - +

Organizational personnel with system component disposal responsibilities

organizational personnel with information security responsibilities

@@ -85975,7 +87175,7 @@ - +

Organizational techniques and methods for system component disposal

mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system component disposal

@@ -87345,8 +88545,12 @@ - NIST SP 800-53 content and other OSCAL content examples + NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.1.1 content and other OSCAL content examples + + NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.1.1 content and other OSCAL content examples + + - + \ No newline at end of file From 3d33fa03f66a903b29b5a2c9bcf375c2ff1fad1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Iorga Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 23:43:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 02/20] Addressing SC-12 error - issue 72 --- src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml index 7e25adce..892134bb 100644 --- a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml +++ b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml @@ -69748,7 +69748,6 @@ - From 20e711794959b3f445ea456c69755bfa3a987cf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michaela Iorga Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 00:04:08 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 03/20] corrected oscal version --- src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml index 892134bb..c476f9b5 100644 --- a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml +++ b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Electronic Version of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.1.1 Controls and SP 800-53A Rev 5.1.1 Assessment Procedures 2024-01-18T22:10:00.000000-00:00 5.1.1+u4 - 1.1.2 + 1.1.1 Electronic Version of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Controls and SP 800-53A Rev 5 Assessment Procedures From e21cd77aa985e6c9e41b7b27395aa1625038d8cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michaela Iorga Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 13:41:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 04/20] Replacing the alt-idenfier props with zero-padded labels. --- .../rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml | 2390 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 1195 insertions(+), 1195 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml index c476f9b5..4e5d0089 100644 --- a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml +++ b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ - + Electronic Version of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.1.1 Controls and SP 800-53A Rev 5.1.1 Assessment Procedures 2024-01-18T22:10:00.000000-00:00 @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ 1.1.1 -

This OSCAL version of the SP 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 catalog restores the props/@name="labels". The SP 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 catalog includes one new control (IA-13) and three control enhancements, minor grammatical edits/clarifications that do not impact the implementation or outcome of the controls and introduces “leading 0s” to the control identifiers. A list of updates in Release 5.1.1 is available under [Supplemental Material](includes one new control (IA-13) and three control enhancements, minor grammatical edits/clarifications that do not impact the implementation or outcome of the controls and introduces “leading 0s” to the control identifiers.

+

This OSCAL version of the SP 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 catalog restores the non-padded prop/@name="label" for all controls, for backwards compatibility and adds prop/@name="label" with class="zero-padded" to support and encourage users' transission to zero-padded control IDs. This SP 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 catalog preserves all content changes of the previous 5.1.1+u3 release: one new control (IA-13), three control enhancements, minor grammatical edits/clarifications that do not impact the implementation or outcome of the controls and introduces “leading 0s” to the control identifiers.

 @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@

events that would require procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -420,7 +420,7 @@

the frequency of account review is defined;

- + @@ -763,7 +763,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to support the management of system accounts are defined;

- + @@ -830,7 +830,7 @@

the time period after which to automatically remove or disable temporary or emergency accounts is defined;

- + @@ -898,7 +898,7 @@

time period for account inactivity before disabling is defined;

- + @@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ Automated Audit Actions - + @@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@

the time period of expected inactivity or description of when to log out is defined;

- + @@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@

dynamic privilege management capabilities are defined;

- + @@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ an attribute-based access scheme - + @@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@

system accounts that are dynamically created, activated, managed, and deactivated are defined;

- + @@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@

conditions for establishing shared and group accounts are defined;

- + @@ -1410,7 +1410,7 @@ Shared and Group Account Credential Change - + @@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@

system accounts subject to enforcement of circumstances and/or usage conditions are defined;

- + @@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@

personnel or roles to report atypical usage is/are defined;

- + @@ -1593,7 +1593,7 @@

significant risks leading to disabling accounts are defined;

- + @@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@ Access Enforcement - + @@ -1749,7 +1749,7 @@ Restricted Access to Privileged Functions - + @@ -1767,7 +1767,7 @@

privileged commands and/or other actions requiring dual authorization are defined;

- + @@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@

privileges to be explicitly granted to subjects are defined;

- + @@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@

discretionary access control policy enforced over the set of covered objects is defined;

- + @@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@

security-relevant information to which access is prevented except during secure, non-operable system states is defined;

- + @@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ Protection of User and System Information - + @@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@

users authorized to assume roles (defined in AC-03(07)_ODP[01]) are defined;

- + @@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@

rules governing the timing of revocations of access authorizations are defined;

- + @@ -2374,7 +2374,7 @@

controls used to validate appropriateness of information to be released are defined;

- + @@ -2473,7 +2473,7 @@

roles allowed to employ an audited override of automated access control mechanisms are defined;

- + @@ -2536,7 +2536,7 @@

information types requiring restricted access to data repositories are defined;

- + @@ -2598,7 +2598,7 @@

system applications and functions requiring access assertion are defined;

- + @@ -2682,7 +2682,7 @@

attributes to assume access permissions are defined;

- + @@ -2762,7 +2762,7 @@

elements of personally identifiable information to which individuals have access are defined;

- + @@ -2861,7 +2861,7 @@

a discretionary access control policy enforced over the set of covered objects specified in the policy is defined;

- + @@ -2959,7 +2959,7 @@

information flow control policies within the system and between connected systems are defined;

- + @@ -3113,7 +3113,7 @@

information flow control policies as a basis for enforcement of flow control decisions are defined;

- + @@ -3183,7 +3183,7 @@

information flow control policies to be enforced by use of protected processing domains are defined;

- + @@ -3242,7 +3242,7 @@

information flow control policies to be enforced are defined;

- + @@ -3321,7 +3321,7 @@

the organization-defined procedure or method used to prevent encrypted information from bypassing information flow control mechanisms is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -3380,7 +3380,7 @@

limitations on embedding data types within other data types are defined;

- + @@ -3438,7 +3438,7 @@

metadata on which to base enforcement of information flow control is defined;

- + @@ -3491,7 +3491,7 @@ One-way Flow Mechanisms - + @@ -3609,7 +3609,7 @@

privacy policy identifying actions to be taken after a filter processing failure are defined;

- + @@ -3705,7 +3705,7 @@

conditions under which the use of human reviews for information flows are to be enforced are defined;

- + @@ -3799,7 +3799,7 @@

conditions under which privileged administrators have the capability to enable and disable privacy policy filters are defined;

- + @@ -3883,7 +3883,7 @@

privacy policy filters that privileged administrators have the capability to configure to support different security and privacy policies are defined;

- + @@ -3955,7 +3955,7 @@

data type identifiers to be used to validate data essential for information flow decisions are defined;

- + @@ -4014,7 +4014,7 @@

policy-relevant subcomponents into which to decompose information for submission to policy enforcement mechanisms are defined;

- + @@ -4083,7 +4083,7 @@

privacy policy filters to be implemented that require fully enumerated formats restricting data structure and content are defined;

- + @@ -4174,7 +4174,7 @@

privacy policy that requires the transfer of organization-defined unsanctioned information between different security domains to be prohibited is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -4241,7 +4241,7 @@ Information Transfers on Interconnected Systems - + @@ -4257,7 +4257,7 @@ organization, system, application, service, individual - + @@ -4313,7 +4313,7 @@ Security Attribute Binding - + @@ -4341,7 +4341,7 @@

privacy policy filters to be implemented on metadata are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -4421,7 +4421,7 @@

information to be controlled when it flows across security domains is defined;

- + @@ -4501,7 +4501,7 @@

required separations by types of information are defined;

- + @@ -4565,7 +4565,7 @@ Access Only - + @@ -4622,7 +4622,7 @@

modification action implemented on non-releasable information is defined;

- + @@ -4672,7 +4672,7 @@ Internal Normalized Format - + @@ -4746,7 +4746,7 @@

policy for sanitizing data is defined;

- + @@ -4796,7 +4796,7 @@ Audit Filtering Actions - + @@ -4860,7 +4860,7 @@ Redundant/Independent Filtering Mechanisms - + @@ -4909,7 +4909,7 @@ Linear Filter Pipelines - + @@ -4967,7 +4967,7 @@

policy for content-filtering actions is defined;

- + @@ -5044,7 +5044,7 @@ Filter Mechanisms Using Multiple Processes - + @@ -5094,7 +5094,7 @@ Failed Content Transfer Prevention - + @@ -5143,7 +5143,7 @@ Process Requirements for Information Transfer - + @@ -5238,7 +5238,7 @@

duties of individuals requiring separation are defined;

- + @@ -5319,7 +5319,7 @@ Least Privilege - + @@ -5422,7 +5422,7 @@

security-relevant information for authorized access is defined;

- + @@ -5515,7 +5515,7 @@

security functions or security-relevant information, the access to which requires users to use non-privileged accounts to access non-security functions, are defined;

- + @@ -5584,7 +5584,7 @@

compelling operational needs necessitating network access to privileged commands are defined;

- + @@ -5644,7 +5644,7 @@ Separate Processing Domains - + @@ -5708,7 +5708,7 @@

personnel or roles to which privileged accounts on the system are to be restricted is/are defined;

- + @@ -5761,7 +5761,7 @@ Privileged Access by Non-organizational Users - + @@ -5832,7 +5832,7 @@

roles or classes of users to which privileges are assigned are defined;

- + @@ -5909,7 +5909,7 @@

software to be prevented from executing at higher privilege levels than users executing the software is defined;

- + @@ -5960,7 +5960,7 @@ Log Use of Privileged Functions - + @@ -6015,7 +6015,7 @@ Prohibit Non-privileged Users from Executing Privileged Functions - + @@ -6117,7 +6117,7 @@

other action to be taken when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -6187,7 +6187,7 @@ Automatic Account Lock - + @@ -6221,7 +6221,7 @@

the number of consecutive, unsuccessful logon attempts before the information is purged or wiped from mobile devices is defined;

- + @@ -6282,7 +6282,7 @@

the number of unsuccessful biometric logon attempts is defined;

- + @@ -6355,7 +6355,7 @@

time period during which a user can attempt logons through alternative factors is defined;

- + @@ -6439,7 +6439,7 @@

conditions for system use to be displayed by the system before granting further access are defined;

- + @@ -6585,7 +6585,7 @@ Previous Logon Notification - + @@ -6634,7 +6634,7 @@ Unsuccessful Logons - + @@ -6700,7 +6700,7 @@

the time period for which the system notifies the user of the number of successful logons, unsuccessful logon attempts, or both is defined;

- + @@ -6766,7 +6766,7 @@

the time period for which the system notifies the user of changes to security-related characteristics or parameters of the user’s account is defined;

- + @@ -6823,7 +6823,7 @@

additional information about which to notify the user is defined;

- + @@ -6890,7 +6890,7 @@

the number of concurrent sessions to be allowed for each account and/or account type is defined;

- + @@ -6955,7 +6955,7 @@

time period of inactivity after which a device lock is initiated is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -7023,7 +7023,7 @@ Pattern-hiding Displays - + @@ -7082,7 +7082,7 @@

conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect are defined;

- + @@ -7141,7 +7141,7 @@

information resources for which a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions is required are defined;

- + @@ -7193,7 +7193,7 @@ Termination Message - + @@ -7253,7 +7253,7 @@

time until the end of session for display to users is defined;

- + @@ -7305,7 +7305,7 @@ Supervision and Review — Access Control - + @@ -7323,7 +7323,7 @@

user actions that can be performed on the system without identification or authentication are defined;

- + @@ -7391,7 +7391,7 @@ Necessary Uses - + @@ -7401,7 +7401,7 @@ Automated Marking - + @@ -7519,7 +7519,7 @@

the frequency at which to review privacy attributes for applicability is defined;

- + @@ -7732,7 +7732,7 @@

privacy policies requiring dynamic association of privacy attributes with subjects and objects are defined;

- + @@ -7801,7 +7801,7 @@ Attribute Value Changes by Authorized Individuals - + @@ -7915,7 +7915,7 @@

objects requiring the association and integrity of privacy attributes to such objects to be maintained are defined;

- + @@ -8053,7 +8053,7 @@

objects requiring the association of privacy attributes by authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of individuals) are defined;

- + @@ -8142,7 +8142,7 @@

human-readable, standard naming conventions for the security and privacy attributes to be displayed in human-readable form on each object that the system transmits to output devices are defined;

- + @@ -8291,7 +8291,7 @@

privacy policies that require personnel to associate and maintain the association of security and privacy attributes with subjects and objects;

- + @@ -8357,7 +8357,7 @@ Consistent Attribute Interpretation - + @@ -8437,7 +8437,7 @@

techniques and technologies to be implemented in associating privacy attributes to information are defined;

- + @@ -8517,7 +8517,7 @@

techniques or procedures used to validate regrading mechanisms for privacy attributes are defined;

- + @@ -8576,7 +8576,7 @@ Attribute Configuration by Authorized Individuals - + @@ -8636,7 +8636,7 @@ Remote Access - + @@ -8739,7 +8739,7 @@ Monitoring and Control - + @@ -8803,7 +8803,7 @@ Protection of Confidentiality and Integrity Using Encryption - + @@ -8856,7 +8856,7 @@ Managed Access Control Points - + @@ -8925,7 +8925,7 @@

needs requiring access to security-relevant information via remote access are defined;

- + @@ -9011,7 +9011,7 @@ Monitoring for Unauthorized Connections - + @@ -9020,7 +9020,7 @@ Protection of Mechanism Information - + @@ -9062,7 +9062,7 @@ Additional Protection for Security Function Access - + @@ -9071,7 +9071,7 @@ Disable Nonsecure Network Protocols - + @@ -9088,7 +9088,7 @@

the time period within which to disconnect or disable remote access to the system is defined;

- + @@ -9153,7 +9153,7 @@

remote commands to be authenticated by mechanisms are defined;

- + @@ -9206,7 +9206,7 @@ Wireless Access - + @@ -9307,7 +9307,7 @@ devices - + @@ -9368,7 +9368,7 @@ Monitoring Unauthorized Connections - + @@ -9377,7 +9377,7 @@ Disable Wireless Networking - + @@ -9426,7 +9426,7 @@ Restrict Configurations by Users - + @@ -9485,7 +9485,7 @@ Antennas and Transmission Power Levels - + @@ -9546,7 +9546,7 @@ Access Control for Mobile Devices - + @@ -9652,7 +9652,7 @@ Use of Writable and Portable Storage Devices - + @@ -9661,7 +9661,7 @@ Use of Personally Owned Portable Storage Devices - + @@ -9670,7 +9670,7 @@ Use of Portable Storage Devices with No Identifiable Owner - + @@ -9695,7 +9695,7 @@

security policies restricting the connection of classified mobile devices to classified systems are defined;

- + @@ -9835,7 +9835,7 @@

mobile devices on which to employ encryption are defined;

- + @@ -9923,7 +9923,7 @@

types of external systems prohibited from use are defined;

- + @@ -10018,7 +10018,7 @@ Limits on Authorized Use - + @@ -10091,7 +10091,7 @@

restrictions on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external systems are defined;

- + @@ -10150,7 +10150,7 @@

restrictions on the use of non-organizationally owned systems or system components to process, store, or transmit organizational information are defined;

- + @@ -10208,7 +10208,7 @@

network-accessible storage devices prohibited from use in external systems are defined;

- + @@ -10259,7 +10259,7 @@ Portable Storage Devices — Prohibited Use - + @@ -10325,7 +10325,7 @@

automated mechanisms or manual processes that assist users in making information-sharing and collaboration decisions are defined;

- + @@ -10413,7 +10413,7 @@

automated mechanisms employed to enforce information-sharing decisions by authorized users are defined;

- + @@ -10473,7 +10473,7 @@

information-sharing restrictions to be enforced by information search and retrieval services are defined;

- + @@ -10534,7 +10534,7 @@

the frequency at which to review the content on the publicly accessible system for non-public information is defined;

- + @@ -10649,7 +10649,7 @@

data storage objects to be protected against unauthorized data mining are defined;

- + @@ -10726,7 +10726,7 @@

access control decisions applied to each access request prior to access enforcement are defined;

- + @@ -10800,7 +10800,7 @@

systems that enforce access control decisions are defined;

- + @@ -10870,7 +10870,7 @@

privacy attributes that do not include the identity of the user or process acting on behalf of the user are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -10939,7 +10939,7 @@

access control policies for which a reference monitor is implemented are defined;

- + @@ -11068,7 +11068,7 @@

events that would require procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -11320,7 +11320,7 @@

events that would require literacy training and awareness content to be updated are defined;

- + @@ -11481,7 +11481,7 @@ Practical Exercises - + @@ -11535,7 +11535,7 @@ Insider Threat - + @@ -11588,7 +11588,7 @@ Social Engineering and Mining - + @@ -11658,7 +11658,7 @@

indicators of malicious code are defined;

- + @@ -11701,7 +11701,7 @@ Advanced Persistent Threat - + @@ -11744,7 +11744,7 @@ Cyber Threat Environment - + @@ -11848,7 +11848,7 @@

events that require role-based training content to be updated are defined;

- + @@ -12018,7 +12018,7 @@

the frequency at which to provide refresher training in the employment and operation of environmental controls is defined;

- + @@ -12082,7 +12082,7 @@

the frequency at which to provide refresher training in the employment and operation of physical security controls is defined;

- + @@ -12128,7 +12128,7 @@ Practical Exercises - + @@ -12180,7 +12180,7 @@ Suspicious Communications and Anomalous System Behavior - + @@ -12205,7 +12205,7 @@

the frequency at which to provide refresher training in the employment and operation of personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls is defined;

- + @@ -12267,7 +12267,7 @@

time period for retaining individual training records is defined;

- + @@ -12345,7 +12345,7 @@ Contacts with Security Groups and Associations - + @@ -12370,7 +12370,7 @@

personnel to whom feedback on organizational training results will be provided is/are assigned;

- + @@ -12486,7 +12486,7 @@

events that would require audit and accountability procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -12710,7 +12710,7 @@

the frequency of event types selected for logging are reviewed and updated;

- + @@ -12849,7 +12849,7 @@ Compilation of Audit Records from Multiple Sources - + @@ -12858,7 +12858,7 @@ Selection of Audit Events by Component - + @@ -12867,7 +12867,7 @@ Reviews and Updates - + @@ -12876,7 +12876,7 @@ Privileged Functions - + @@ -12886,7 +12886,7 @@ Content of Audit Records - + @@ -13008,7 +13008,7 @@

additional information to be included in audit records is defined;

- + @@ -13060,7 +13060,7 @@ Centralized Management of Planned Audit Record Content - + @@ -13077,7 +13077,7 @@

elements identified in the privacy risk assessment are defined;

- + @@ -13142,7 +13142,7 @@

audit log retention requirements are defined;

- + @@ -13211,7 +13211,7 @@

the frequency of audit logs transferred to a different system, system component, or media other than the system or system component conducting the logging is defined;

- + @@ -13289,7 +13289,7 @@

additional actions to be taken in the event of an audit logging process failure are defined;

- + @@ -13388,7 +13388,7 @@

percentage of repository maximum audit log storage capacity is defined;

- + @@ -13462,7 +13462,7 @@

audit logging failure events requiring real-time alerts are defined;

- + @@ -13514,7 +13514,7 @@ delay - + @@ -13584,7 +13584,7 @@

audit logging failures that trigger a change in operational mode are defined;

- + @@ -13644,7 +13644,7 @@

an alternate audit logging functionality in the event of a failure in primary audit logging capability is defined;

- + @@ -13721,7 +13721,7 @@

personnel or roles to receive findings from reviews and analyses of system records is/are defined;

- + @@ -13826,7 +13826,7 @@

automated mechanisms used for integrating audit record review, analysis, and reporting processes are defined;

- + @@ -13878,7 +13878,7 @@ Automated Security Alerts - + @@ -13887,7 +13887,7 @@ Correlate Audit Record Repositories - + @@ -13939,7 +13939,7 @@ Central Review and Analysis - + @@ -14019,7 +14019,7 @@

data/information collected from other sources to be analyzed is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -14071,7 +14071,7 @@ Correlation with Physical Monitoring - + @@ -14132,7 +14132,7 @@ user - + @@ -14179,7 +14179,7 @@ Full Text Analysis of Privileged Commands - + @@ -14234,7 +14234,7 @@ Correlation with Information from Nontechnical Sources - + @@ -14286,7 +14286,7 @@ Audit Level Adjustment - + @@ -14296,7 +14296,7 @@ Audit Record Reduction and Report Generation - + @@ -14401,7 +14401,7 @@

fields within audit records that can be processed, sorted, or searched are defined;

- + @@ -14463,7 +14463,7 @@ Automatic Sort and Search - + @@ -14481,7 +14481,7 @@

granularity of time measurement for audit record timestamps is defined;

- + @@ -14549,7 +14549,7 @@ Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source - + @@ -14558,7 +14558,7 @@ Secondary Authoritative Time Source - + @@ -14576,7 +14576,7 @@

personnel or roles to be alerted upon detection of unauthorized access, modification, or deletion of audit information is/are defined;

- + @@ -14660,7 +14660,7 @@ Hardware Write-once Media - + @@ -14724,7 +14724,7 @@

the frequency of storing audit records in a repository is defined;

- + @@ -14778,7 +14778,7 @@ Cryptographic Protection - + @@ -14842,7 +14842,7 @@

a subset of privileged users or roles authorized to access management of audit logging functionality is defined;

- + @@ -14913,7 +14913,7 @@

audit information for which dual authorization is to be enforced is defined;

- + @@ -14975,7 +14975,7 @@

a subset of privileged users or roles with authorized read-only access to audit information is defined;

- + @@ -15030,7 +15030,7 @@ Store on Component with Different Operating System - + @@ -15096,7 +15096,7 @@

actions to be covered by non-repudiation are defined;

- + @@ -15167,7 +15167,7 @@

the strength of binding between the identity of the information producer and the information is defined;

- + @@ -15252,7 +15252,7 @@

the actions to be performed in the event of a validation error are defined;

- + @@ -15323,7 +15323,7 @@ Chain of Custody - + @@ -15394,7 +15394,7 @@

actions to be performed in the event of a validation error are defined;

- + @@ -15464,7 +15464,7 @@ Digital Signatures - + @@ -15483,7 +15483,7 @@

a time period to retain audit records that is consistent with the records retention policy is defined;

- + @@ -15544,7 +15544,7 @@

measures to be employed to ensure that long-term audit records generated by the system can be retrieved are defined;

- + @@ -15614,7 +15614,7 @@

personnel or roles allowed to select the event types that are to be logged by specific components of the system is/are defined;

- + @@ -15725,7 +15725,7 @@

level of tolerance for the relationship between timestamps of individual records in the audit trail is defined;

- + @@ -15779,7 +15779,7 @@ Standardized Formats - + @@ -15863,7 +15863,7 @@

time thresholds in which logging actions are to change is defined;

- + @@ -15925,7 +15925,7 @@ Query Parameter Audits of Personally Identifiable Information - + @@ -16020,7 +16020,7 @@

additional actions to be taken if an information disclosure is discovered are defined;

- + @@ -16116,7 +16116,7 @@

automated mechanisms for monitoring open-source information and information sites are defined;

- + @@ -16176,7 +16176,7 @@

the frequency at which to review the open-source information sites being monitored is defined;

- + @@ -16227,7 +16227,7 @@ Unauthorized Replication of Information - + @@ -16307,7 +16307,7 @@

circumstances under which the content of a user session can be audited are defined;

- + @@ -16407,7 +16407,7 @@ System Start-up - + @@ -16458,7 +16458,7 @@ Capture and Record Content - + @@ -16467,7 +16467,7 @@ Remote Viewing and Listening - + @@ -16531,7 +16531,7 @@ Alternate Audit Logging Capability - + @@ -16556,7 +16556,7 @@

audit information to be coordinated among external organizations when audit information is transmitted across organizational boundaries is defined;

- + @@ -16608,7 +16608,7 @@ Identity Preservation - + @@ -16677,7 +16677,7 @@

cross-organizational sharing agreements to be used when providing cross-organizational audit information to organizations are defined;

- + @@ -16727,7 +16727,7 @@

measures to disassociate individuals from audit information transmitted across organizational boundaries are defined;

- + @@ -16849,7 +16849,7 @@

events that would require assessment, authorization, and monitoring procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -17060,7 +17060,7 @@

individuals or roles to whom control assessment results are to be provided are defined;

- + @@ -17236,7 +17236,7 @@ Independent Assessors - + @@ -17322,7 +17322,7 @@

other forms of assessment are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -17399,7 +17399,7 @@

requirements to be met by the control assessment performed by an external organization on the system are defined;

- + @@ -17476,7 +17476,7 @@

the frequency at which to review and update agreements is defined;

- + @@ -17595,7 +17595,7 @@ Unclassified National Security System Connections - + @@ -17604,7 +17604,7 @@ Classified National Security System Connections - + @@ -17613,7 +17613,7 @@ Unclassified Non-national Security System Connections - + @@ -17622,7 +17622,7 @@ Connections to Public Networks - + @@ -17631,7 +17631,7 @@ Restrictions on External System Connections - + @@ -17640,7 +17640,7 @@ Transfer Authorizations - + @@ -17702,7 +17702,7 @@ Transitive Information Exchanges - + @@ -17779,7 +17779,7 @@ Security Certification - + @@ -17796,7 +17796,7 @@

the frequency at which to update an existing plan of action and milestones based on the findings from control assessments, independent audits or reviews, and continuous monitoring activities is defined;

- + @@ -17878,7 +17878,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of the plan of action and milestones for the system are defined;

- + @@ -17938,7 +17938,7 @@

frequency at which to update the authorizations is defined;

- + @@ -18055,7 +18055,7 @@ Joint Authorization — Intra-organization - + @@ -18115,7 +18115,7 @@ Joint Authorization — Inter-organization - + @@ -18238,7 +18238,7 @@

frequency at which the privacy status of the system is reported is defined;

- + @@ -18445,7 +18445,7 @@ Independent Assessment - + @@ -18492,7 +18492,7 @@ Types of Assessments - + @@ -18501,7 +18501,7 @@ Trend Analyses - + @@ -18570,7 +18570,7 @@ Risk Monitoring - + @@ -18671,7 +18671,7 @@

actions to validate that implemented controls are operating in a consistent manner are defined;

- + @@ -18741,7 +18741,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of monitoring results for the system are defined;

- + @@ -18814,7 +18814,7 @@

systems or system components on which penetration testing is to be conducted are defined;

- + @@ -18870,7 +18870,7 @@ Independent Penetration Testing Agent or Team - + @@ -18923,7 +18923,7 @@

red team exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise organizational systems are defined;

- + @@ -18994,7 +18994,7 @@ unannounced - + @@ -19077,7 +19077,7 @@

frequency at which to review the continued need for each internal connection is defined;

- + @@ -19192,7 +19192,7 @@ Compliance Checks - + @@ -19329,7 +19329,7 @@

events that would require configuration management procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -19539,7 +19539,7 @@

the circumstances requiring baseline configuration review and update are defined;

- + @@ -19665,7 +19665,7 @@ Reviews and Updates - + @@ -19682,7 +19682,7 @@

automated mechanisms for maintaining baseline configuration of the system are defined;

- + @@ -19766,7 +19766,7 @@

the number of previous baseline configuration versions to be retained is defined;

- + @@ -19817,7 +19817,7 @@ Unauthorized Software - + @@ -19826,7 +19826,7 @@ Authorized Software - + @@ -19835,7 +19835,7 @@ Development and Test Environments - + @@ -19923,7 +19923,7 @@

the controls to be applied when the individuals return from travel are defined;

- + @@ -20037,7 +20037,7 @@

configuration change conditions that prompt the configuration control element to convene are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -20239,7 +20239,7 @@

personnel to be notified when approved changes are complete is/are defined;

- + @@ -20351,7 +20351,7 @@ Testing, Validation, and Documentation of Changes - + @@ -20431,7 +20431,7 @@

mechanisms used to automate the implementation of changes and deployment of the updated baseline across the installed base are defined;

- + @@ -20523,7 +20523,7 @@

the configuration change control element of which the security and privacy representatives are to be members is defined;

- + @@ -20588,7 +20588,7 @@

security responses to be automatically implemented are defined;

- + @@ -20651,7 +20651,7 @@

controls provided by cryptographic mechanisms that are to be under configuration management are defined;

- + @@ -20721,7 +20721,7 @@

the circumstances under which changes are to be reviewed are defined;

- + @@ -20786,7 +20786,7 @@

the circumstances under which changes are to be prevented or restricted are defined;

- + @@ -20823,7 +20823,7 @@ Impact Analyses - + @@ -20904,7 +20904,7 @@ Separate Test Environments - + @@ -21012,7 +21012,7 @@ Verification of Controls - + @@ -21105,7 +21105,7 @@ Access Restrictions for Change - + @@ -21209,7 +21209,7 @@

mechanisms used to automate the enforcement of access restrictions are defined;

- + @@ -21286,7 +21286,7 @@ Review System Changes - + @@ -21295,7 +21295,7 @@ Signed Components - + @@ -21323,7 +21323,7 @@

system-level information requiring dual authorization for changes is defined;

- + @@ -21410,7 +21410,7 @@

frequency at which to reevaluate privileges is defined;

- + @@ -21500,7 +21500,7 @@ Limit Library Privileges - + @@ -21555,7 +21555,7 @@ Automatic Implementation of Security Safeguards - + @@ -21589,7 +21589,7 @@

operational requirements necessitating approval of deviations are defined;

- + @@ -21770,7 +21770,7 @@

automated mechanisms to verify configuration settings are defined;

- + @@ -21857,7 +21857,7 @@

configuration settings requiring action upon an unauthorized change are defined;

- + @@ -21916,7 +21916,7 @@ Unauthorized Change Detection - + @@ -21925,7 +21925,7 @@ Conformance Demonstration - + @@ -21987,7 +21987,7 @@

services to be prohibited or restricted are defined;

- + @@ -22152,7 +22152,7 @@

services to be disabled or removed when deemed unnecessary or non-secure are defined;

- + @@ -22265,7 +22265,7 @@

policies, rules of behavior, and/or access agreements regarding software program usage and restrictions are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -22336,7 +22336,7 @@

registration requirements for functions, ports, protocols, and services are defined;

- + @@ -22405,7 +22405,7 @@

frequency at which to review and update the list of unauthorized software programs is defined;

- + @@ -22510,7 +22510,7 @@

frequency at which to review and update the list of authorized software programs is defined;

- + @@ -22610,7 +22610,7 @@

user-installed software required to be executed in a confined environment is defined;

- + @@ -22676,7 +22676,7 @@

personnel or roles to explicitly approve execution of binary or machine-executable code is/are defined;

- + @@ -22755,7 +22755,7 @@ Binary or Machine Executable Code - + @@ -22858,7 +22858,7 @@

frequency at which to review and update the list of authorized hardware components is defined;

- + @@ -22955,7 +22955,7 @@

frequency at which to review and update the system component inventory is defined;

- + @@ -23091,7 +23091,7 @@ Updates During Installation and Removal - + @@ -23196,7 +23196,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to maintain the availability of the system component inventory are defined;

- + @@ -23323,7 +23323,7 @@

personnel or roles to be notified when unauthorized components are detected is/are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -23446,7 +23446,7 @@ role - + @@ -23498,7 +23498,7 @@ No Duplicate Accounting of Components - + @@ -23507,7 +23507,7 @@ Assessed Configurations and Approved Deviations - + @@ -23571,7 +23571,7 @@ Centralized Repository - + @@ -23633,7 +23633,7 @@

automated mechanisms for tracking components are defined;

- + @@ -23697,7 +23697,7 @@

personnel or roles from which to receive an acknowledgement is/are defined;

- + @@ -23779,7 +23779,7 @@

personnel or roles to review and approve the configuration management plan is/are defined;

- + @@ -23940,7 +23940,7 @@ Assignment of Responsibility - + @@ -23981,7 +23981,7 @@ Software Usage Restrictions - + @@ -24074,7 +24074,7 @@

restrictions on the use of open-source software are defined;

- + @@ -24156,7 +24156,7 @@

frequency with which to monitor compliance is defined;

- + @@ -24248,7 +24248,7 @@ Alerts for Unauthorized Installations - + @@ -24257,7 +24257,7 @@ Software Installation with Privileged Status - + @@ -24333,7 +24333,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to monitor compliance are defined;

- + @@ -24410,7 +24410,7 @@

information for which the location is to be identified and documented is defined;

- + @@ -24560,7 +24560,7 @@

system components where the information is located are defined;

- + @@ -24618,7 +24618,7 @@ Data Action Mapping - + @@ -24702,7 +24702,7 @@

firmware components requiring verification of a digitally signed certificate before installation are defined;

- + @@ -24843,7 +24843,7 @@

events that would require procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -25098,7 +25098,7 @@

key contingency organizational elements to communicate changes to are defined;

- + @@ -25388,7 +25388,7 @@ Coordinate with Related Plans - + @@ -25436,7 +25436,7 @@ Capacity Planning - + @@ -25513,7 +25513,7 @@

the contingency plan activation time period within which to resume mission and business functions is defined;

- + @@ -25564,7 +25564,7 @@ Resume All Mission and Business Functions - + @@ -25581,7 +25581,7 @@ essential - + @@ -25652,7 +25652,7 @@ essential - + @@ -25713,7 +25713,7 @@ Coordinate with External Service Providers - + @@ -25766,7 +25766,7 @@ essential - + @@ -25842,7 +25842,7 @@

events necessitating review and update of contingency training are defined;

- + @@ -25951,7 +25951,7 @@ Simulated Events - + @@ -26001,7 +26001,7 @@ Mechanisms Used in Training Environments - + @@ -26079,7 +26079,7 @@

tests for determining readiness to execute the contingency plan are defined;

- + @@ -26180,7 +26180,7 @@ Coordinate with Related Plans - + @@ -26232,7 +26232,7 @@ Alternate Processing Site - + @@ -26310,7 +26310,7 @@

automated mechanisms for contingency plan testing are defined;

- + @@ -26361,7 +26361,7 @@ Full Recovery and Reconstitution - + @@ -26440,7 +26440,7 @@

system or system component on which to apply disruption mechanisms are defined;

- + @@ -26493,7 +26493,7 @@ Contingency Plan Update - + @@ -26502,7 +26502,7 @@ Alternate Storage Site - + @@ -26586,7 +26586,7 @@ Separation from Primary Site - + @@ -26630,7 +26630,7 @@ Recovery Time and Recovery Point Objectives - + @@ -26690,7 +26690,7 @@ Accessibility - + @@ -26762,7 +26762,7 @@

time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives is defined;

- + @@ -26859,7 +26859,7 @@ Separation from Primary Site - + @@ -26903,7 +26903,7 @@ Accessibility - + @@ -26956,7 +26956,7 @@ Priority of Service - + @@ -26999,7 +26999,7 @@ Preparation for Use - + @@ -27052,7 +27052,7 @@ Equivalent Information Security Safeguards - + @@ -27061,7 +27061,7 @@ Inability to Return to Primary Site - + @@ -27129,7 +27129,7 @@

time period within which to resume essential mission and business functions when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable is defined;

- + @@ -27183,7 +27183,7 @@ Priority of Service Provisions - + @@ -27258,7 +27258,7 @@ Single Points of Failure - + @@ -27300,7 +27300,7 @@ Separation of Primary and Alternate Providers - + @@ -27362,7 +27362,7 @@

frequency at which to obtain evidence of contingency training by providers is defined;

- + @@ -27459,7 +27459,7 @@

frequency at which alternate telecommunications services are tested is defined;

- + @@ -27545,7 +27545,7 @@

frequency at which to conduct backups of system documentation consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives is defined;

- + @@ -27675,7 +27675,7 @@

frequency at which to test backup information for information integrity is defined;

- + @@ -27735,7 +27735,7 @@ Test Restoration Using Sampling - + @@ -27795,7 +27795,7 @@

critical system software and other security-related information backups to be stored in a separate facility are defined;

- + @@ -27841,7 +27841,7 @@ Protection from Unauthorized Modification - + @@ -27869,7 +27869,7 @@

transfer rate consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives is defined;

- + @@ -27933,7 +27933,7 @@ Redundant Secondary System - + @@ -28005,7 +28005,7 @@

backup information for which to enforce dual authorization in order to delete or destroy is defined;

- + @@ -28067,7 +28067,7 @@

backup information to protect against unauthorized disclosure and modification is defined;

- + @@ -28138,7 +28138,7 @@

time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives for the reconstitution of the system is determined;

- + @@ -28207,7 +28207,7 @@ Contingency Plan Testing - + @@ -28216,7 +28216,7 @@ Transaction Recovery - + @@ -28268,7 +28268,7 @@ Compensating Security Controls - + @@ -28287,7 +28287,7 @@

restoration time period within which to restore system components to a known, operational state is defined;

- + @@ -28340,7 +28340,7 @@ Failover Capability - + @@ -28349,7 +28349,7 @@ Component Protection - + @@ -28417,7 +28417,7 @@

alternative communications protocols in support of maintaining continuity of operations are defined;

- + @@ -28489,7 +28489,7 @@

conditions detected to enter a safe mode of operation are defined;

- + @@ -28566,7 +28566,7 @@

security functions are defined;

- + @@ -28691,7 +28691,7 @@

events that would require identification and authentication procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -28889,7 +28889,7 @@ Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) - + @@ -28986,7 +28986,7 @@ Multi-factor Authentication to Privileged Accounts - + @@ -29040,7 +29040,7 @@ Multi-factor Authentication to Non-privileged Accounts - + @@ -29093,7 +29093,7 @@ Local Access to Privileged Accounts - + @@ -29102,7 +29102,7 @@ Local Access to Non-privileged Accounts - + @@ -29111,7 +29111,7 @@ Individual Authentication with Group Authentication - + @@ -29189,7 +29189,7 @@

the strength of mechanism requirements to be enforced by a device separate from the system gaining access to accounts is defined;

- + @@ -29259,7 +29259,7 @@ Network Access to Non-privileged Accounts — Separate Device - + @@ -29276,7 +29276,7 @@ non-privileged accounts - + @@ -29329,7 +29329,7 @@ Network Access to Non-privileged Accounts — Replay Resistant - + @@ -29346,7 +29346,7 @@

system accounts and services for which a single sign-on capability must be provided are defined;

- + @@ -29400,7 +29400,7 @@ Remote Access — Separate Device - + @@ -29409,7 +29409,7 @@ Acceptance of PIV Credentials - + @@ -29479,7 +29479,7 @@

conditions under which out-of-band authentication is to be implemented are defined;

- + @@ -29552,7 +29552,7 @@ network - + @@ -29630,7 +29630,7 @@ network - + @@ -29685,7 +29685,7 @@ Cryptographic Bidirectional Network Authentication - + @@ -29713,7 +29713,7 @@

lease duration to be employed to standardize dynamic address allocation for devices is defined;

- + @@ -29801,7 +29801,7 @@

configuration management process to be employed to handle device identification and authentication based on attestation is defined;

- + @@ -29875,7 +29875,7 @@

a time period for preventing reuse of identifiers is defined;

- + @@ -29982,7 +29982,7 @@ Prohibit Account Identifiers as Public Identifiers - + @@ -30034,7 +30034,7 @@ Supervisor Authorization - + @@ -30043,7 +30043,7 @@ Multiple Forms of Certification - + @@ -30061,7 +30061,7 @@

characteristics used to identify individual status is defined;

- + @@ -30117,7 +30117,7 @@

a dynamic identifier policy for managing individual identifiers is defined;

- + @@ -30177,7 +30177,7 @@

external organizations with whom to coordinate the cross-organization management of identifiers are defined;

- + @@ -30226,7 +30226,7 @@ In-person Registration - + @@ -30235,7 +30235,7 @@ Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifiers - + @@ -30293,7 +30293,7 @@

protected central storage used to maintain the attributes for each uniquely identified individual, device, or service is defined;

- + @@ -30360,7 +30360,7 @@

events that trigger the change or refreshment of authenticators are defined;

- + @@ -30542,7 +30542,7 @@

authenticator composition and complexity rules are defined;

- + @@ -30666,7 +30666,7 @@ Public Key-based Authentication - + @@ -30769,7 +30769,7 @@ In-person or Trusted External Party Registration - + @@ -30778,7 +30778,7 @@ Automated Support for Password Strength Determination - + @@ -30787,7 +30787,7 @@ Change Authenticators Prior to Delivery - + @@ -30837,7 +30837,7 @@ Protection of Authenticators - + @@ -30889,7 +30889,7 @@ No Embedded Unencrypted Static Authenticators - + @@ -30949,7 +30949,7 @@

security controls implemented to manage the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple systems are defined;

- + @@ -31006,7 +31006,7 @@

external organizations to be used for federating credentials are defined;

- + @@ -31064,7 +31064,7 @@

rules for dynamically binding identities and authenticators are defined;

- + @@ -31117,7 +31117,7 @@ Hardware Token-based Authentication - + @@ -31135,7 +31135,7 @@

biometric quality requirements for biometric-based authentication are defined;

- + @@ -31196,7 +31196,7 @@

the time period after which the use of cached authenticators is prohibited is defined;

- + @@ -31246,7 +31246,7 @@ Managing Content of PKI Trust Stores - + @@ -31299,7 +31299,7 @@ GSA-approved Products and Services - + @@ -31382,7 +31382,7 @@

the personnel or roles who authorize the issuance of authenticators are defined;

- + @@ -31434,7 +31434,7 @@ Presentation Attack Detection for Biometric Authenticators - + @@ -31502,7 +31502,7 @@

controls for protecting passwords are defined;

- + @@ -31570,7 +31570,7 @@ Authentication Feedback - + @@ -31619,7 +31619,7 @@ Cryptographic Module Authentication - + @@ -31674,7 +31674,7 @@ Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users) - + @@ -31747,7 +31747,7 @@ Acceptance of PIV Credentials from Other Agencies - + @@ -31812,7 +31812,7 @@ Acceptance of External Authenticators - + @@ -31893,7 +31893,7 @@ Use of FICAM-approved Products - + @@ -31910,7 +31910,7 @@

identity management profiles are defined;

- + @@ -31969,7 +31969,7 @@

a policy for using federated or PKI credentials is defined;

- + @@ -32041,7 +32041,7 @@

disassociability measures are defined;

- + @@ -32102,7 +32102,7 @@

system services and applications to be uniquely identified and authenticated are defined;

- + @@ -32158,7 +32158,7 @@ Information Exchange - + @@ -32167,7 +32167,7 @@ Transmission of Decisions - + @@ -32193,7 +32193,7 @@

circumstances or situations that require individuals accessing the system to employ supplemental authentication techniques or mechanisms are defined;

- + @@ -32256,7 +32256,7 @@

circumstances or situations requiring re-authentication are defined;

- + @@ -32314,7 +32314,7 @@ Identity Proofing - + @@ -32414,7 +32414,7 @@ Supervisor Authorization - + @@ -32462,7 +32462,7 @@ Identity Evidence - + @@ -32519,7 +32519,7 @@

methods of validation and verification of identity evidence are defined;

- + @@ -32567,7 +32567,7 @@ In-person Validation and Verification - + @@ -32623,7 +32623,7 @@ notice of proofing - + @@ -32681,7 +32681,7 @@

an identity assurance level for accepting externally proofed identities is defined;

- + @@ -32751,7 +32751,7 @@

mechanisms supporting authentication and authorization decisions are defined;

- + @@ -32824,7 +32824,7 @@ Protection of Cryptographic Keys - + @@ -32895,7 +32895,7 @@ Verification of Identity Assertions and Access Tokens - + @@ -32962,7 +32962,7 @@ Token Management - + @@ -33170,7 +33170,7 @@

events that would require the incident response procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -33394,7 +33394,7 @@

events that initiate a review of the incident response training content are defined;

- + @@ -33498,7 +33498,7 @@ Simulated Events - + @@ -33556,7 +33556,7 @@

automated mechanisms used in an incident response training environment are defined;

- + @@ -33607,7 +33607,7 @@ Breach - + @@ -33680,7 +33680,7 @@

tests used to test the effectiveness of the incident response capability for the system are defined;

- + @@ -33742,7 +33742,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to test the incident response capability are defined;

- + @@ -33796,7 +33796,7 @@ Coordination with Related Plans - + @@ -33847,7 +33847,7 @@ Continuous Improvement - + @@ -33972,7 +33972,7 @@ Incident Handling - + @@ -34150,7 +34150,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to support the incident handling process are defined;

- + @@ -34216,7 +34216,7 @@

system components that require dynamic reconfiguration are defined;

- + @@ -34287,7 +34287,7 @@

actions to be taken in response to organization-defined classes of incidents are defined;

- + @@ -34345,7 +34345,7 @@ Information Correlation - + @@ -34413,7 +34413,7 @@

security violations that automatically disable a system are defined;

- + @@ -34466,7 +34466,7 @@ Insider Threats - + @@ -34524,7 +34524,7 @@

entities that require coordination for an incident handling capability for insider threats are defined;

- + @@ -34599,7 +34599,7 @@

incident information to be correlated and shared with organization-defined external organizations are defined;

- + @@ -34659,7 +34659,7 @@

dynamic response capabilities to be employed to respond to incidents are defined;

- + @@ -34710,7 +34710,7 @@ Supply Chain Coordination - + @@ -34769,7 +34769,7 @@

the time period within which an integrated incident response team can be deployed is defined;

- + @@ -34822,7 +34822,7 @@ Malicious Code and Forensic Analysis - + @@ -34896,7 +34896,7 @@

environments or resources which may contain or may be related to anomalous or suspected adversarial behavior are defined;

- + @@ -34950,7 +34950,7 @@ Security Operations Center - + @@ -35013,7 +35013,7 @@ Public Relations and Reputation Repair - + @@ -35071,7 +35071,7 @@ Incident Monitoring - + @@ -35168,7 +35168,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to analyze incident information are defined;

- + @@ -35248,7 +35248,7 @@

authorities to whom incident information is to be reported are defined;

- + @@ -35332,7 +35332,7 @@

automated mechanisms used for reporting incidents are defined;

- + @@ -35391,7 +35391,7 @@

personnel or roles to whom system vulnerabilities associated with reported incidents are reported to is/are defined;

- + @@ -35442,7 +35442,7 @@ Supply Chain Coordination - + @@ -35499,7 +35499,7 @@ Incident Response Assistance - + @@ -35574,7 +35574,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to increase the availability of incident response information and support are defined;

- + @@ -35625,7 +35625,7 @@ Coordination with External Providers - + @@ -35743,7 +35743,7 @@

organizational elements to which changes to the incident response plan are communicated are defined;

- + @@ -35962,7 +35962,7 @@ Breaches - + @@ -36067,7 +36067,7 @@

actions to be performed are defined;

- + @@ -36185,7 +36185,7 @@ Responsible Personnel - + @@ -36202,7 +36202,7 @@

frequency at which to provide information spillage response training is defined;

- + @@ -36256,7 +36256,7 @@

procedures to be implemented to ensure that organizational personnel impacted by information spills can continue to carry out assigned tasks while contaminated systems are undergoing corrective actions are defined;

- + @@ -36311,7 +36311,7 @@

controls employed for personnel exposed to information not within assigned access authorizations are defined;

- + @@ -36361,7 +36361,7 @@ Integrated Information Security Analysis Team - + @@ -36441,7 +36441,7 @@

events that would require the maintenance procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -36655,7 +36655,7 @@

information to be included in organizational maintenance records is defined;

- + @@ -36796,7 +36796,7 @@ Record Content - + @@ -36832,7 +36832,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to document maintenance, repair, and replacement actions for the system are defined;

- + @@ -36936,7 +36936,7 @@

frequency at which to review previously approved system maintenance tools is defined;

- + @@ -37015,7 +37015,7 @@ Inspect Tools - + @@ -37065,7 +37065,7 @@ Inspect Media - + @@ -37122,7 +37122,7 @@

personnel or roles who can authorize removal of equipment from the facility is/are defined;

- + @@ -37211,7 +37211,7 @@ Restricted Tool Use - + @@ -37265,7 +37265,7 @@ Execution with Privilege - + @@ -37319,7 +37319,7 @@ Software Updates and Patches - + @@ -37375,7 +37375,7 @@ Nonlocal Maintenance - + @@ -37538,7 +37538,7 @@

audit events to be logged for diagnostic sessions are defined;

- + @@ -37628,7 +37628,7 @@ Document Nonlocal Maintenance - + @@ -37638,7 +37638,7 @@ Comparable Security and Sanitization - + @@ -37744,7 +37744,7 @@

authenticators that are replay resistant are defined;

- + @@ -37848,7 +37848,7 @@

personnel and roles to be notified of the date and time of planned nonlocal maintenance is/are defined;

- + @@ -37923,7 +37923,7 @@

cryptographic mechanisms to be implemented to protect the integrity and confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications are defined;

- + @@ -37989,7 +37989,7 @@ Disconnect Verification - + @@ -38054,7 +38054,7 @@ Maintenance Personnel - + @@ -38157,7 +38157,7 @@

alternate controls to be developed and implemented in the event that a system component cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from the system are defined;

- + @@ -38248,7 +38248,7 @@ Security Clearances for Classified Systems - + @@ -38310,7 +38310,7 @@ Citizenship Requirements for Classified Systems - + @@ -38355,7 +38355,7 @@ Foreign Nationals - + @@ -38441,7 +38441,7 @@ Non-system Maintenance - + @@ -38504,7 +38504,7 @@

time period within which maintenance support and/or spare parts are to be obtained after a failure are defined;

- + @@ -38577,7 +38577,7 @@

time intervals within which preventive maintenance is to be performed on system components are defined;

- + @@ -38644,7 +38644,7 @@

time intervals within which predictive maintenance is to be performed are defined;

- + @@ -38703,7 +38703,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to transfer predictive maintenance data to a maintenance management system are defined;

- + @@ -38771,7 +38771,7 @@

trusted maintenance facilities that are not restricted or prohibited from conducting field maintenance are defined;

- + @@ -38897,7 +38897,7 @@

events that would require media protection procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -39125,7 +39125,7 @@

personnel or roles authorized to access non-digital media is/are defined;

- + @@ -39200,7 +39200,7 @@ Automated Restricted Access - + @@ -39209,7 +39209,7 @@ Cryptographic Protection - + @@ -39236,7 +39236,7 @@

controlled areas where media is exempt from marking are defined;

- + @@ -39362,7 +39362,7 @@

controlled areas within which to securely store non-digital media are defined;

- + @@ -39467,7 +39467,7 @@ Cryptographic Protection - + @@ -39503,7 +39503,7 @@

automated mechanisms to log access granted to media storage areas are defined;

- + @@ -39606,7 +39606,7 @@

controls used to control system media outside of controlled areas are defined;

- + @@ -39723,7 +39723,7 @@ Protection Outside of Controlled Areas - + @@ -39732,7 +39732,7 @@ Documentation of Activities - + @@ -39741,7 +39741,7 @@ Custodians - + @@ -39798,7 +39798,7 @@ Cryptographic Protection - + @@ -39862,7 +39862,7 @@

sanitization techniques and procedures to be used for sanitization prior to release for reuse are defined;

- + @@ -39968,7 +39968,7 @@ Review, Approve, Track, Document, and Verify - + @@ -40069,7 +40069,7 @@

frequency with which to test sanitization procedures is defined;

- + @@ -40142,7 +40142,7 @@

circumstances requiring sanitization of portable storage devices are defined;

- + @@ -40192,7 +40192,7 @@ Controlled Unclassified Information - + @@ -40201,7 +40201,7 @@ Classified Information - + @@ -40210,7 +40210,7 @@ Media Destruction - + @@ -40227,7 +40227,7 @@

system media to be sanitized using dual authorization is defined;

- + @@ -40306,7 +40306,7 @@

conditions under which information is to be purged or wiped are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -40391,7 +40391,7 @@

controls to restrict or prohibit the use of specific types of system media on systems or system components are defined;

- + @@ -40465,7 +40465,7 @@ Prohibit Use Without Owner - + @@ -40474,7 +40474,7 @@ Prohibit Use of Sanitization-resistant Media - + @@ -40551,7 +40551,7 @@

system media requiring downgrading is defined;

- + @@ -40654,7 +40654,7 @@ Documentation of Process - + @@ -40724,7 +40724,7 @@

the frequency with which to test downgrading procedures is defined;

- + @@ -40783,7 +40783,7 @@ Controlled Unclassified Information - + @@ -40841,7 +40841,7 @@ Classified Information - + @@ -40972,7 +40972,7 @@

events that would require the physical and environmental protection procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -41170,7 +41170,7 @@

frequency at which to review the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals is defined;

- + @@ -41285,7 +41285,7 @@ Access by Position or Role - + @@ -41346,7 +41346,7 @@

a list of acceptable forms of identification for visitor access to the facility where the system resides is defined;

- + @@ -41418,7 +41418,7 @@

physical access authorizations for unescorted access to the facility where the system resides are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -41559,7 +41559,7 @@

frequency at which to change keys is defined;

- + @@ -41758,7 +41758,7 @@

physical spaces containing one or more components of the system are defined;

- + @@ -41827,7 +41827,7 @@

the frequency at which to perform security checks at the physical perimeter of the facility or system for exfiltration of information or removal of system components is defined;

- + @@ -41890,7 +41890,7 @@

physical access points to the facility where the system resides are defined;

- + @@ -41952,7 +41952,7 @@

system components to be protected from unauthorized physical access are defined;

- + @@ -42023,7 +42023,7 @@

hardware components to be protected from physical tampering or alteration are defined;

- + @@ -42073,7 +42073,7 @@ Facility Penetration Testing - + @@ -42082,7 +42082,7 @@ Physical Barriers - + @@ -42130,7 +42130,7 @@

locations within the facility where access control vestibules are to be employed are defined;

- + @@ -42193,7 +42193,7 @@

security controls to be implemented to control physical access to system distribution and transmission lines within the organizational facility are defined;

- + @@ -42259,7 +42259,7 @@

output devices that require physical access control to output are defined;

- + @@ -42312,7 +42312,7 @@ Access to Output by Authorized Individuals - + @@ -42321,7 +42321,7 @@ Link to Individual Identity - + @@ -42377,7 +42377,7 @@ Marking Output Devices - + @@ -42404,7 +42404,7 @@

events or potential indication of events requiring physical access logs to be reviewed are defined;

- + @@ -42505,7 +42505,7 @@ Intrusion Alarms and Surveillance Equipment - + @@ -42593,7 +42593,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to recognize classes or types of intrusions and initiate response actions (defined in PE-06(02)_ODP) are defined;

- + @@ -42680,7 +42680,7 @@

time period for which to retain video recordings is defined;

- + @@ -42768,7 +42768,7 @@

physical spaces containing one or more components of the system are defined;

- + @@ -42824,7 +42824,7 @@ Visitor Control - + @@ -42858,7 +42858,7 @@

personnel to whom visitor access records anomalies are reported to is/are defined;

- + @@ -42955,7 +42955,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to review visitor access records are defined;

- + @@ -43013,7 +43013,7 @@ Physical Access Records - + @@ -43030,7 +43030,7 @@

elements identified in the privacy risk assessment to limit personally identifiable information contained in visitor access logs are defined;

- + @@ -43083,7 +43083,7 @@ Power Equipment and Cabling - + @@ -43145,7 +43145,7 @@

distance by which redundant power cabling paths are to be physically separated is defined;

- + @@ -43199,7 +43199,7 @@

the critical system components that require automatic voltage controls are defined;

- + @@ -43265,7 +43265,7 @@

location of emergency shutoff switches or devices by system or system component is defined;

- + @@ -43337,7 +43337,7 @@ Accidental and Unauthorized Activation - + @@ -43355,7 +43355,7 @@ transition of the system to long-term alternate power - + @@ -43413,7 +43413,7 @@ automatically - + @@ -43487,7 +43487,7 @@ full operational capability - + @@ -43564,7 +43564,7 @@ Emergency Lighting - + @@ -43631,7 +43631,7 @@ Essential Mission and Business Functions - + @@ -43681,7 +43681,7 @@ Fire Protection - + @@ -43773,7 +43773,7 @@

emergency responders to be notified in the event of a fire are defined;

- + @@ -43856,7 +43856,7 @@

emergency responders to be notified in the event of a fire are defined;

- + @@ -43938,7 +43938,7 @@ Automatic Fire Suppression - + @@ -43963,7 +43963,7 @@

a time period for resolving deficiencies identified by fire protection inspections is defined;

- + @@ -44051,7 +44051,7 @@

frequency at which to monitor environmental control levels is defined;

- + @@ -44124,7 +44124,7 @@

automatic environmental controls to prevent fluctuations that are potentially harmful to the system are defined;

- + @@ -44181,7 +44181,7 @@

personnel or roles to be notified by environmental control monitoring when environmental changes are potentially harmful to personnel or equipment is/are defined;

- + @@ -44239,7 +44239,7 @@ Water Damage Protection - + @@ -44324,7 +44324,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to detect the presence of water near the system are defined;

- + @@ -44402,7 +44402,7 @@

types of system components to be authorized and controlled when exiting the facility are defined;

- + @@ -44510,7 +44510,7 @@

controls to be employed at alternate work sites are defined;

- + @@ -44608,7 +44608,7 @@

physical and environmental hazards that could result in potential damage to system components within the facility are defined;

- + @@ -44659,7 +44659,7 @@ Facility Site - + @@ -44669,7 +44669,7 @@ Information Leakage - + @@ -44719,7 +44719,7 @@ National Emissions Policies and Procedures - + @@ -44804,7 +44804,7 @@

controlled areas within which asset location and movement are to be tracked and monitored are defined;

- + @@ -44875,7 +44875,7 @@

system and system components requiring protection against electromagnetic pulse damage are defined;

- + @@ -44932,7 +44932,7 @@

system hardware components to be marked indicating the impact level or classification level of the information permitted to be processed, stored, or transmitted by the hardware component are defined;

- + @@ -44987,7 +44987,7 @@ Facility Location - + @@ -45128,7 +45128,7 @@

events that would require procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -45342,7 +45342,7 @@

frequency to review system security and privacy plans is defined;

- + @@ -45785,7 +45785,7 @@ Concept of Operations - + @@ -45794,7 +45794,7 @@ Functional Architecture - + @@ -45803,7 +45803,7 @@ Plan and Coordinate with Other Organizational Entities - + @@ -45813,7 +45813,7 @@ System Security Plan Update - + @@ -45846,7 +45846,7 @@

frequency for individuals to read and re-acknowledge the rules of behavior is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -45959,7 +45959,7 @@ Social Media and External Site/Application Usage Restrictions - + @@ -46038,7 +46038,7 @@ Privacy Impact Assessment - + @@ -46047,7 +46047,7 @@ Security-related Activity Planning - + @@ -46064,7 +46064,7 @@

frequency for review and update of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is defined;

- + @@ -46141,7 +46141,7 @@

frequency for review and update to reflect changes in the enterprise architecture;

- + @@ -46335,7 +46335,7 @@

locations and architectural layers are defined;

- + @@ -46442,7 +46442,7 @@

locations and architectural layers are defined;

- + @@ -46506,7 +46506,7 @@

security and privacy controls and related processes to be centrally managed are defined;

- + @@ -46560,7 +46560,7 @@ Baseline Selection - + @@ -46628,7 +46628,7 @@ Baseline Tailoring - + @@ -46719,7 +46719,7 @@

events that trigger the review and update of the organization-wide information security program plan are defined;

- + @@ -46907,7 +46907,7 @@ Information Security Program Leadership Role - + @@ -46974,7 +46974,7 @@ Information Security and Privacy Resources - + @@ -47081,7 +47081,7 @@ Plan of Action and Milestones Process - + @@ -47254,7 +47254,7 @@

the frequency at which to update the inventory of organizational systems is defined;

- + @@ -47319,7 +47319,7 @@

the frequency at which to update the inventory of systems, applications, and projects that process personally identifiable information is defined;

- + @@ -47396,7 +47396,7 @@ Measures of Performance - + @@ -47482,7 +47482,7 @@ Enterprise Architecture - + @@ -47580,7 +47580,7 @@

non-essential functions or services to be offloaded are defined;

- + @@ -47634,7 +47634,7 @@ Critical Infrastructure Plan - + @@ -47733,7 +47733,7 @@

the frequency at which to review and update the risk management strategy is defined;

- + @@ -47868,7 +47868,7 @@ Authorization Process - + @@ -47969,7 +47969,7 @@

the frequency at which to review and revise the mission and business processes is defined;

- + @@ -48081,7 +48081,7 @@ Insider Threat Program - + @@ -48146,7 +48146,7 @@ Security and Privacy Workforce - + @@ -48207,7 +48207,7 @@ Testing, Training, and Monitoring - + @@ -48361,7 +48361,7 @@ Security and Privacy Groups and Associations - + @@ -48466,7 +48466,7 @@ Threat Awareness Program - + @@ -48521,7 +48521,7 @@ Automated Means for Sharing Threat Intelligence - + @@ -48596,7 +48596,7 @@

the frequency at which to review and update the procedures is defined;

- + @@ -48681,7 +48681,7 @@

the frequency of updates to the privacy program plan is defined;

- + @@ -48872,7 +48872,7 @@ Privacy Program Leadership Role - + @@ -48947,7 +48947,7 @@ Dissemination of Privacy Program Information - + @@ -49058,7 +49058,7 @@ Privacy Policies on Websites, Applications, and Digital Services - + @@ -49173,7 +49173,7 @@ Accounting of Disclosures - + @@ -49293,7 +49293,7 @@ Personally Identifiable Information Quality Management - + @@ -49473,7 +49473,7 @@

the responsibilities of a Data Governance Body are defined;

- + @@ -49523,7 +49523,7 @@ Data Integrity Board - + @@ -49624,7 +49624,7 @@

the frequency for updating procedures that address the use of personally identifiable information for internal testing, training, and research is defined;

- + @@ -49854,7 +49854,7 @@

the time period for responding to complaints is defined;

- + @@ -50010,7 +50010,7 @@

the frequency for reviewing and updating privacy reports is defined;

- + @@ -50115,7 +50115,7 @@

the frequency for reviewing and updating risk framing considerations is defined;

- + @@ -50270,7 +50270,7 @@ Risk Management Program Leadership Roles - + @@ -50364,7 +50364,7 @@

the frequency for reviewing and updating the supply chain risk management strategy is defined;

- + @@ -50515,7 +50515,7 @@ Suppliers of Critical or Mission-essential Items - + @@ -50649,7 +50649,7 @@

the frequency at which to report the privacy status of organizational systems is defined;

- + @@ -50859,7 +50859,7 @@

the systems or system components supporting mission-essential services or functions are defined;

- + @@ -50975,7 +50975,7 @@

events that would require the personnel security procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -51174,7 +51174,7 @@

the frequency at which to review and update position risk designations is defined;

- + @@ -51278,7 +51278,7 @@

the frequency of rescreening individuals where it is so indicated is defined;

- + @@ -51365,7 +51365,7 @@ Classified Information - + @@ -51422,7 +51422,7 @@ Formal Indoctrination - + @@ -51479,7 +51479,7 @@

additional personnel screening criteria to be satisfied for individuals accessing a system processing, storing, or transmitting information requiring special protection are defined;

- + @@ -51561,7 +51561,7 @@

citizenship requirements to be met by individuals to access a system processing, storing, or transmitting information are defined;

- + @@ -51627,7 +51627,7 @@

information security topics to be discussed when conducting exit interviews are defined;

- + @@ -51728,7 +51728,7 @@ Post-employment Requirements - + @@ -51815,7 +51815,7 @@

personnel or roles to be notified upon termination of an individual is/are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -51898,7 +51898,7 @@

time period within which to notify organization-defined personnel or roles when individuals are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the organization is defined;

- + @@ -52004,7 +52004,7 @@

the frequency at which to re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational information is defined;

- + @@ -52108,7 +52108,7 @@ Information Requiring Special Protection - + @@ -52117,7 +52117,7 @@ Classified Information Requiring Special Protection - + @@ -52194,7 +52194,7 @@ Post-employment Requirements - + @@ -52279,7 +52279,7 @@

time period within which third-party providers are required to notify organization-defined personnel or roles of any personnel transfers or terminations of external personnel who possess organizational credentials and/or badges or who have system privileges is defined;

- + @@ -52405,7 +52405,7 @@

the time period within which organization-defined personnel or roles must be notified when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated is defined;

- + @@ -52477,7 +52477,7 @@ Position Descriptions - + @@ -52607,7 +52607,7 @@

events that would require the personally identifiable information processing and transparency procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -52813,7 +52813,7 @@

the type of processing of personally identifiable information to be restricted is defined;

- + @@ -52909,7 +52909,7 @@

elements of personally identifiable information to be tagged are defined;

- + @@ -52979,7 +52979,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to manage enforcement of the authorized processing of personally identifiable information are defined;

- + @@ -53068,7 +53068,7 @@

requirements for changing the processing of personally identifiable information are defined;

- + @@ -53207,7 +53207,7 @@

elements of personally identifiable information to be tagged are defined;

- + @@ -53274,7 +53274,7 @@

automated mechanisms for tracking the processing purposes of personally identifiable information are defined;

- + @@ -53339,7 +53339,7 @@

the tools or mechanisms to be implemented for individuals to consent to the processing of their personally identifiable information are defined;

- + @@ -53401,7 +53401,7 @@

tailoring mechanisms for processing selected elements of personally identifiable information permissions are defined;

- + @@ -53476,7 +53476,7 @@

personally identifiable information processing to be presented in conjunction with organization-defined consent mechanisms is defined;

- + @@ -53533,7 +53533,7 @@

the tools or mechanisms to be implemented for revoking consent to the processing of personally identifiable information are defined;

- + @@ -53599,7 +53599,7 @@

information to be included with the notice about the processing of personally identifiable information is defined;

- + @@ -53718,7 +53718,7 @@

the frequency at which to present a notice of personally identifiable information processing is defined;

- + @@ -53765,7 +53765,7 @@ Privacy Act Statements - + @@ -53815,7 +53815,7 @@ System of Records Notice - + @@ -53910,7 +53910,7 @@

the frequency at which to review all routine uses published in the system of records notice is defined;

- + @@ -53964,7 +53964,7 @@

the frequency at which to review all Privacy Act exemptions claimed for the system of records is defined;

- + @@ -54034,7 +54034,7 @@

processing conditions to be applied for specific categories of personally identifiable information are defined;

- + @@ -54091,7 +54091,7 @@ Social Security Numbers - + @@ -54190,7 +54190,7 @@ First Amendment Information - + @@ -54237,7 +54237,7 @@ Computer Matching Requirements - + @@ -54427,7 +54427,7 @@

events that would require risk assessment procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -54616,7 +54616,7 @@ Security Categorization - + @@ -54713,7 +54713,7 @@ Impact-level Prioritization - + @@ -54803,7 +54803,7 @@

the frequency to update the risk assessment is defined;

- + @@ -54984,7 +54984,7 @@

the frequency at which to update the supply chain risk assessment is defined;

- + @@ -55062,7 +55062,7 @@ Use of All-source Intelligence - + @@ -55123,7 +55123,7 @@

means to determine the current cyber threat environment on an ongoing basis;

- + @@ -55204,7 +55204,7 @@

advanced analytics capabilities to predict and identify risks are defined;

- + @@ -55267,7 +55267,7 @@ Risk Assessment Update - + @@ -55311,7 +55311,7 @@

personnel or roles with whom information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and control assessments is to be shared;

- + @@ -55481,7 +55481,7 @@ Update Tool Capability - + @@ -55507,7 +55507,7 @@

the frequency for updating the system vulnerabilities to be scanned is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -55560,7 +55560,7 @@ Breadth and Depth of Coverage - + @@ -55619,7 +55619,7 @@

corrective actions to be taken if information about the system is discoverable are defined;

- + @@ -55706,7 +55706,7 @@

vulnerability scanning activities selected for privileged access authorization to system components are defined;

- + @@ -55773,7 +55773,7 @@

automated mechanisms to compare the results of multiple vulnerability scans are defined;

- + @@ -55825,7 +55825,7 @@ Automated Detection and Notification of Unauthorized Components - + @@ -55850,7 +55850,7 @@

a time period for a potential previous exploit of a system is defined;

- + @@ -55908,7 +55908,7 @@ Penetration Testing and Analyses - + @@ -55917,7 +55917,7 @@ Correlate Scanning Information - + @@ -55972,7 +55972,7 @@ Public Disclosure Program - + @@ -56060,7 +56060,7 @@

events or indicators which, if they occur, trigger a technical surveillance countermeasures survey are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -56108,7 +56108,7 @@ Risk Response - + @@ -56189,7 +56189,7 @@ Privacy Impact Assessments - + @@ -56306,7 +56306,7 @@

decision points in the system development life cycle when a criticality analysis is to be performed are defined;

- + @@ -56378,7 +56378,7 @@

the frequency at which to employ the threat hunting capability is defined;

- + @@ -56540,7 +56540,7 @@

events that would require the system and services acquisition procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -56736,7 +56736,7 @@ Allocation of Resources - + @@ -56860,7 +56860,7 @@

system development life cycle is defined;

- + @@ -57008,7 +57008,7 @@ Manage Preproduction Environment - + @@ -57067,7 +57067,7 @@ Use of Live or Operational Data - + @@ -57156,7 +57156,7 @@ Technology Refresh - + @@ -57239,7 +57239,7 @@

contract language is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -57469,7 +57469,7 @@ Functional Properties of Controls - + @@ -57550,7 +57550,7 @@

level of detail is defined;

- + @@ -57667,7 +57667,7 @@

quality control processes are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -57750,7 +57750,7 @@ Assignment of Components to Systems - + @@ -57767,7 +57767,7 @@

security configurations for the system, component, or service are defined;

- + @@ -57837,7 +57837,7 @@ Use of Information Assurance Products - + @@ -57912,7 +57912,7 @@ NIAP-approved Protection Profiles - + @@ -57986,7 +57986,7 @@ Continuous Monitoring Plan for Controls - + @@ -58043,7 +58043,7 @@ Functions, Ports, Protocols, and Services in Use - + @@ -58114,7 +58114,7 @@ Use of Approved PIV Products - + @@ -58179,7 +58179,7 @@

Privacy Act requirements for the operation of a system of records are defined;

- + @@ -58245,7 +58245,7 @@

time frame to remove data from a contractor system and return it to the organization is defined;

- + @@ -58339,7 +58339,7 @@

personnel or roles to distribute system documentation to is/are defined;

- + @@ -58589,7 +58589,7 @@ Functional Properties of Security Controls - + @@ -58598,7 +58598,7 @@ Security-relevant External System Interfaces - + @@ -58607,7 +58607,7 @@ High-level Design - + @@ -58616,7 +58616,7 @@ Low-level Design - + @@ -58625,7 +58625,7 @@ Source Code - + @@ -58635,7 +58635,7 @@ Software Usage Restrictions - + @@ -58645,7 +58645,7 @@ User-installed Software - + @@ -58674,7 +58674,7 @@

privacy engineering principles are defined;

- + @@ -58807,7 +58807,7 @@ Clear Abstractions - + @@ -58868,7 +58868,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of least common mechanism are defined;

- + @@ -58940,7 +58940,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of layering are defined;

- + @@ -59013,7 +59013,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of partially ordered dependencies are defined;

- + @@ -59074,7 +59074,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of efficiently mediated access are defined;

- + @@ -59137,7 +59137,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of minimized sharing are defined;

- + @@ -59199,7 +59199,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of reduced complexity are defined;

- + @@ -59260,7 +59260,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure evolvability are defined;

- + @@ -59322,7 +59322,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of trusted components are defined;

- + @@ -59387,7 +59387,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of hierarchical trust are defined;

- + @@ -59448,7 +59448,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of inverse modification threshold are defined;

- + @@ -59509,7 +59509,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of hierarchical protection are defined;

- + @@ -59570,7 +59570,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of minimized security elements are defined;

- + @@ -59631,7 +59631,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of least privilege are defined;

- + @@ -59695,7 +59695,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of predicate permission are defined;

- + @@ -59757,7 +59757,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of self-reliant trustworthiness are defined;

- + @@ -59818,7 +59818,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure distributed composition are defined;

- + @@ -59879,7 +59879,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of trusted communications channels are defined;

- + @@ -59943,7 +59943,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of continuous protection are defined;

- + @@ -60015,7 +60015,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure metadata management are defined;

- + @@ -60077,7 +60077,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of self-analysis are defined;

- + @@ -60150,7 +60150,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of traceability are defined;

- + @@ -60241,7 +60241,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure defaults are defined;

- + @@ -60327,7 +60327,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure recovery are defined;

- + @@ -60422,7 +60422,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of economic security are defined;

- + @@ -60485,7 +60485,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of performance security are defined;

- + @@ -60552,7 +60552,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of human factored security are defined;

- + @@ -60616,7 +60616,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of acceptable security are defined;

- + @@ -60683,7 +60683,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of repeatable and documented procedures are defined;

- + @@ -60753,7 +60753,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of procedural rigor are defined;

- + @@ -60817,7 +60817,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of secure system modification are defined;

- + @@ -60886,7 +60886,7 @@

systems or system components that implement the security design principle of sufficient documentation are defined;

- + @@ -60956,7 +60956,7 @@

processes that implement the privacy principle of minimization are defined;

- + @@ -61039,7 +61039,7 @@

processes, methods, and techniques employed to monitor control compliance by external service providers are defined;

- + @@ -61169,7 +61169,7 @@

personnel or roles that approve the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is/are defined;

- + @@ -61254,7 +61254,7 @@

external system services that require the identification of functions, ports, protocols, and other services are defined;

- + @@ -61323,7 +61323,7 @@

privacy requirements, properties, factors, or conditions defining acceptable trust relationships on which a trust relationship is maintained are defined;

- + @@ -61410,7 +61410,7 @@

actions to be taken to verify that the interests of external service providers are consistent with and reflect organizational interests are defined;

- + @@ -61493,7 +61493,7 @@

requirements or conditions for restricting the location of are defined;

- + @@ -61553,7 +61553,7 @@ Organization-controlled Cryptographic Keys - + @@ -61613,7 +61613,7 @@ Organization-controlled Integrity Checking - + @@ -61672,7 +61672,7 @@ Processing and Storage Location — U.S. Jurisdiction - + @@ -61760,7 +61760,7 @@

personnel to whom security flaws and flaw resolutions within the system, component, or service are reported is/are defined;

- + @@ -61922,7 +61922,7 @@ Software and Firmware Integrity Verification - + @@ -61984,7 +61984,7 @@ Alternative Configuration Management Processes - + @@ -62045,7 +62045,7 @@ Hardware Integrity Verification - + @@ -62103,7 +62103,7 @@ Trusted Generation - + @@ -62164,7 +62164,7 @@ Mapping Integrity for Version Control - + @@ -62222,7 +62222,7 @@ Trusted Distribution - + @@ -62316,7 +62316,7 @@

configuration change management and control processes in which privacy representatives are required to be included are defined;

- + @@ -62403,7 +62403,7 @@

depth and coverage of testing/evaluation is defined;

- + @@ -62555,7 +62555,7 @@ Static Code Analysis - + @@ -62684,7 +62684,7 @@

acceptance criteria to be met by produced evidence for vulnerability analyses are defined;

- + @@ -62856,7 +62856,7 @@

independence criteria to be satisfied by an independent agent are defined;

- + @@ -62959,7 +62959,7 @@

processes, procedures, and/or techniques used for manual code reviews are defined;

- + @@ -63045,7 +63045,7 @@

constraints of penetration testing are defined;

- + @@ -63137,7 +63137,7 @@ Attack Surface Reviews - + @@ -63214,7 +63214,7 @@

the depth of testing and evaluation of required controls is defined;

- + @@ -63280,7 +63280,7 @@ Dynamic Code Analysis - + @@ -63347,7 +63347,7 @@ Interactive Application Security Testing - + @@ -63415,7 +63415,7 @@ Supply Chain Protection - + @@ -63423,7 +63423,7 @@ Acquisition Strategies / Tools / Methods - + @@ -63432,7 +63432,7 @@ Supplier Reviews - + @@ -63441,7 +63441,7 @@ Trusted Shipping and Warehousing - + @@ -63450,7 +63450,7 @@ Diversity of Suppliers - + @@ -63459,7 +63459,7 @@ Limitation of Harm - + @@ -63468,7 +63468,7 @@ Minimizing Procurement Time - + @@ -63477,7 +63477,7 @@ Assessments Prior to Selection / Acceptance / Update - + @@ -63486,7 +63486,7 @@ Use of All-source Intelligence - + @@ -63495,7 +63495,7 @@ Operations Security - + @@ -63504,7 +63504,7 @@ Validate as Genuine and Not Altered - + @@ -63513,7 +63513,7 @@ Penetration Testing / Analysis of Elements, Processes, and Actors - + @@ -63522,7 +63522,7 @@ Inter-organizational Agreements - + @@ -63531,7 +63531,7 @@ Critical Information System Components - + @@ -63541,7 +63541,7 @@ Identity and Traceability - + @@ -63551,7 +63551,7 @@ Processes to Address Weaknesses or Deficiencies - + @@ -63561,7 +63561,7 @@ Trustworthiness - + @@ -63570,7 +63570,7 @@ Criticality Analysis - + @@ -63578,7 +63578,7 @@ Critical Components with No Viable Alternative Sourcing - + @@ -63615,7 +63615,7 @@

privacy requirements to be satisfied by the process, standards, tools, tool options, and tool configurations are defined;

- + @@ -63796,7 +63796,7 @@

program review milestones are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -63860,7 +63860,7 @@ Security and Privacy Tracking Tools - + @@ -63950,7 +63950,7 @@

the depth of criticality analysis is defined;

- + @@ -64036,7 +64036,7 @@ Threat Modeling and Vulnerability Analysis - + @@ -64053,7 +64053,7 @@

thresholds to which attack surfaces are to be reduced are defined;

- + @@ -64114,7 +64114,7 @@ Continuous Improvement - + @@ -64190,7 +64190,7 @@

personnel or roles to whom the outputs of tools and results of the analysis are to be delivered is/are defined;

- + @@ -64285,7 +64285,7 @@ Reuse of Threat and Vulnerability Information - + @@ -64341,7 +64341,7 @@ Use of Live Data - + @@ -64350,7 +64350,7 @@ Incident Response Plan - + @@ -64416,7 +64416,7 @@ Archive System or Component - + @@ -64464,7 +64464,7 @@ Minimize Personally Identifiable Information - + @@ -64533,7 +64533,7 @@

training on the correct use and operation of the implemented security and privacy functions, controls, and/or mechanisms provided by the developer of the system, system component, or system service is defined;

- + @@ -64589,7 +64589,7 @@ Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and Design - + @@ -64719,7 +64719,7 @@

organizational privacy policy to be enforced is defined;

- + @@ -64807,7 +64807,7 @@ Security-relevant Components - + @@ -64888,7 +64888,7 @@ Formal Correspondence - + @@ -65010,7 +65010,7 @@ informal demonstration, convincing argument with formal methods as feasible - + @@ -65125,7 +65125,7 @@ Conceptually Simple Design - + @@ -65195,7 +65195,7 @@ Structure for Testing - + @@ -65249,7 +65249,7 @@ Structure for Least Privilege - + @@ -65321,7 +65321,7 @@

capabilities to be implemented by systems or components are defined;

- + @@ -65382,7 +65382,7 @@

critical systems or system components to be designed differently are defined;

- + @@ -65433,7 +65433,7 @@ Tamper Resistance and Detection - + @@ -65441,7 +65441,7 @@ Multiple Phases of System Development Life Cycle - + @@ -65450,7 +65450,7 @@ Inspection of Systems or Components - + @@ -65459,7 +65459,7 @@ Component Authenticity - + @@ -65467,7 +65467,7 @@ Anti-counterfeit Training - + @@ -65476,7 +65476,7 @@ Configuration Control for Component Service and Repair - + @@ -65485,7 +65485,7 @@ Component Disposal - + @@ -65494,7 +65494,7 @@ Anti-counterfeit Scanning - + @@ -65513,7 +65513,7 @@

critical system components to be reimplemented or custom-developed are defined;

- + @@ -65595,7 +65595,7 @@

additional personnel screening criteria for the developer are defined;

- + @@ -65673,7 +65673,7 @@ Validation of Screening - + @@ -65699,7 +65699,7 @@

support from external providers is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -65768,7 +65768,7 @@ Alternative Sources for Continued Support - + @@ -65795,7 +65795,7 @@

systems or system components supporting mission-essential services or functions are defined;

- + @@ -65920,7 +65920,7 @@

events that would require the system and communications protection procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -66111,7 +66111,7 @@ Separation of System and User Functionality - + @@ -66167,7 +66167,7 @@ Interfaces for Non-privileged Users - + @@ -66219,7 +66219,7 @@ Disassociability - + @@ -66271,7 +66271,7 @@ Security Function Isolation - + @@ -66335,7 +66335,7 @@ Hardware Separation - + @@ -66386,7 +66386,7 @@ Access and Flow Control Functions - + @@ -66455,7 +66455,7 @@ Minimize Nonsecurity Functionality - + @@ -66505,7 +66505,7 @@ Module Coupling and Cohesiveness - + @@ -66565,7 +66565,7 @@ Layered Structures - + @@ -66617,7 +66617,7 @@ Information in Shared System Resources - + @@ -66676,7 +66676,7 @@ Security Levels - + @@ -66693,7 +66693,7 @@

procedures to prevent unauthorized information transfer via shared resources are defined;

- + @@ -66767,7 +66767,7 @@

controls to achieve the denial-of-service objective by type of denial-of-service event are defined;

- + @@ -66847,7 +66847,7 @@

denial-of-service attacks for which to restrict the ability of individuals to launch are defined;

- + @@ -66898,7 +66898,7 @@ Capacity, Bandwidth, and Redundancy - + @@ -66964,7 +66964,7 @@

system resources to be monitored to determine if sufficient resources exist to prevent effective denial-of-service attacks are defined;

- + @@ -67058,7 +67058,7 @@

controls to protect the availability of resources are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -67119,7 +67119,7 @@ logically - + @@ -67245,7 +67245,7 @@ Physically Separated Subnetworks - + @@ -67254,7 +67254,7 @@ Public Access - + @@ -67263,7 +67263,7 @@ Access Points - + @@ -67324,7 +67324,7 @@

the frequency at which to review exceptions to traffic flow policy is defined;

- + @@ -67491,7 +67491,7 @@

systems for which network communications traffic is denied by default and network communications traffic is allowed by exception are defined (if selected).

- + @@ -67550,7 +67550,7 @@ Response to Recognized Failures - + @@ -67567,7 +67567,7 @@

safeguards to securely provision split tunneling are defined;

- + @@ -67636,7 +67636,7 @@

external networks to which internal communications traffic is to be routed are defined;

- + @@ -67689,7 +67689,7 @@ Restrict Threatening Outgoing Communications Traffic - + @@ -67783,7 +67783,7 @@

the frequency for conducting exfiltration tests is defined;

- + @@ -67867,7 +67867,7 @@

authorized destinations to which incoming communications from authorized sources may be routed are defined;

- + @@ -67934,7 +67934,7 @@

system components where host-based boundary protection mechanisms are to be implemented are defined;

- + @@ -67993,7 +67993,7 @@

information security tools, mechanisms, and support components to be isolated from other internal system components are defined;

- + @@ -68055,7 +68055,7 @@

managed interfaces to be protected against unauthorized physical connections are defined;

- + @@ -68107,7 +68107,7 @@ Networked Privileged Accesses - + @@ -68172,7 +68172,7 @@ Prevent Discovery of System Components - + @@ -68224,7 +68224,7 @@ Automated Enforcement of Protocol Formats - + @@ -68276,7 +68276,7 @@ Fail Secure - + @@ -68339,7 +68339,7 @@

communication clients that are independently configured by end users and external service providers are defined;

- + @@ -68408,7 +68408,7 @@

system components to be dynamically isolated from other system components are defined;

- + @@ -68477,7 +68477,7 @@

missions and/or business functions to be supported by system components isolated by boundary protection mechanisms are defined;

- + @@ -68532,7 +68532,7 @@ Separate Subnets for Connecting to Different Security Domains - + @@ -68585,7 +68585,7 @@ Disable Sender Feedback on Protocol Validation Failure - + @@ -68645,7 +68645,7 @@

processing rules for systems that process personally identifiable information are defined;

- + @@ -68773,7 +68773,7 @@

the boundary protection device required for a direct connection to an external network is defined;

- + @@ -68833,7 +68833,7 @@

the boundary protection device required for a direct connection to an external network is defined;

- + @@ -68902,7 +68902,7 @@

the boundary protection device required for a direct connection of unclassified, non-national security system to an external network is defined;

- + @@ -68962,7 +68962,7 @@

the system that is prohibited from directly connecting to a public network is defined;

- + @@ -69030,7 +69030,7 @@

critical system components and functions to be isolated are defined;

- + @@ -69092,7 +69092,7 @@ integrity - + @@ -69171,7 +69171,7 @@ detect changes to information - + @@ -69232,7 +69232,7 @@ integrity - + @@ -69298,7 +69298,7 @@

alternative physical controls to protect message externals are defined;

- + @@ -69359,7 +69359,7 @@

alternative physical controls to protect against unauthorized disclosure of communication patterns are defined;

- + @@ -69428,7 +69428,7 @@ detect changes to information - + @@ -69479,7 +69479,7 @@ Transmission Confidentiality - + @@ -69496,7 +69496,7 @@

a time period of inactivity after which the system terminates a network connection associated with a communication session is defined;

- + @@ -69563,7 +69563,7 @@

security functions of the system are defined;

- + @@ -69642,7 +69642,7 @@

security functions of the system are defined;

- + @@ -69720,7 +69720,7 @@

requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction are defined;

- + @@ -69807,7 +69807,7 @@ Availability - + @@ -69865,7 +69865,7 @@ NSA-approved - + @@ -69943,7 +69943,7 @@ certificates issued in accordance with organization-defined requirements - + @@ -70011,7 +70011,7 @@ PKI Certificates - + @@ -70020,7 +70020,7 @@ PKI Certificates / Hardware Tokens - + @@ -70029,7 +70029,7 @@ Physical Control of Keys - + @@ -70097,7 +70097,7 @@

types of cryptography for each specified cryptographic use are defined;

- + @@ -70193,7 +70193,7 @@ FIPS-validated Cryptography - + @@ -70202,7 +70202,7 @@ NSA-approved Cryptography - + @@ -70211,7 +70211,7 @@ Individuals Without Formal Access Approvals - + @@ -70220,7 +70220,7 @@ Digital Signatures - + @@ -70230,7 +70230,7 @@ Public Access Protections - + @@ -70255,7 +70255,7 @@

exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed are defined;

- + @@ -70331,7 +70331,7 @@ logical - + @@ -70382,7 +70382,7 @@ Blocking Inbound and Outbound Communications Traffic - + @@ -70407,7 +70407,7 @@

secure work areas where collaborative computing devices are to be disabled or removed from systems or system components are defined;

- + @@ -70467,7 +70467,7 @@

online meetings and teleconferences for which an explicit indication of current participants is to be provided are defined;

- + @@ -70538,7 +70538,7 @@

privacy attributes to be associated with information exchanged are defined;

- + @@ -70610,7 +70610,7 @@ Integrity Verification - + @@ -70671,7 +70671,7 @@ Anti-spoofing Mechanisms - + @@ -70731,7 +70731,7 @@

mechanisms or techniques to bind security and privacy attributes to transmitted information are defined;

- + @@ -70792,7 +70792,7 @@

a certificate policy for issuing public key certificates is defined;

- + @@ -70865,7 +70865,7 @@ Mobile Code - + @@ -70988,7 +70988,7 @@

corrective actions to be taken when unacceptable mobile code is identified are defined;

- + @@ -71060,7 +71060,7 @@

mobile code requirements for the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code to be deployed in the system are defined;

- + @@ -71135,7 +71135,7 @@

unacceptable mobile code to be prevented from downloading and executing is defined;

- + @@ -71212,7 +71212,7 @@

actions to be enforced by the system prior to executing mobile code are defined;

- + @@ -71275,7 +71275,7 @@ Allow Execution Only in Confined Environments - + @@ -71331,7 +71331,7 @@ Voice Over Internet Protocol - + @@ -71342,7 +71342,7 @@ Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) - + @@ -71431,7 +71431,7 @@ Child Subspaces - + @@ -71440,7 +71440,7 @@ Data Origin and Integrity - + @@ -71499,7 +71499,7 @@ Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver) - + @@ -71568,7 +71568,7 @@ Data Origin and Integrity - + @@ -71578,7 +71578,7 @@ Architecture and Provisioning for Name/Address Resolution Service - + @@ -71647,7 +71647,7 @@ Session Authenticity - + @@ -71701,7 +71701,7 @@ Invalidate Session Identifiers at Logout - + @@ -71749,7 +71749,7 @@ User-initiated Logouts and Message Displays - + @@ -71766,7 +71766,7 @@

randomness requirements for generating a unique session identifier for each session are defined;

- + @@ -71827,7 +71827,7 @@ Unique Session Identifiers with Randomization - + @@ -71845,7 +71845,7 @@

certificate authorities to be allowed for verification of the establishment of protected sessions are defined;

- + @@ -71922,7 +71922,7 @@

system state information to be preserved in the event of a system failure is defined;

- + @@ -71990,7 +71990,7 @@

system components to be employed with minimal functionality and information storage are defined;

- + @@ -72048,7 +72048,7 @@ Decoys - + @@ -72116,7 +72116,7 @@ Detection of Malicious Code - + @@ -72134,7 +72134,7 @@

platform-independent applications to be included within organizational systems are defined;

- + @@ -72200,7 +72200,7 @@

information at rest requiring protection is defined;

- + @@ -72292,7 +72292,7 @@

system components or media requiring cryptographic protection is/are defined;

- + @@ -72362,7 +72362,7 @@

information to be removed from online storage and stored offline in a secure location is defined;

- + @@ -72438,7 +72438,7 @@

safeguards for protecting the storage of cryptographic keys are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -72499,7 +72499,7 @@

system components requiring a diverse set of information technologies to be employed in the implementation of the system are defined;

- + @@ -72561,7 +72561,7 @@

the frequency at which to change the diversity of operating systems and applications deployed using virtualization techniques is defined;

- + @@ -72641,7 +72641,7 @@

time periods to employ concealment and misdirection techniques for systems are defined;

- + @@ -72697,7 +72697,7 @@ Virtualization Techniques - + @@ -72714,7 +72714,7 @@

techniques employed to introduce randomness into organizational operations and assets are defined;

- + @@ -72790,7 +72790,7 @@

time frequency at which to change the location of processing and/or storage is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -72850,7 +72850,7 @@

system components for which realistic but misleading information about their security state or posture is employed are defined;

- + @@ -72917,7 +72917,7 @@

system components to be hidden or concealed using techniques (defined in SC-30(05)_ODP[01]) are defined;

- + @@ -72978,7 +72978,7 @@ timing - + @@ -73050,7 +73050,7 @@ Test Covert Channels for Exploitability - + @@ -73119,7 +73119,7 @@

values for the maximum bandwidth for identified covert channels are defined;

- + @@ -73183,7 +73183,7 @@

subset of identified covert channels whose bandwidth is to be measured in the operational environment of the system is defined;

- + @@ -73263,7 +73263,7 @@

circumstances for the physical or logical separation of components are defined;

- + @@ -73325,7 +73325,7 @@ Separate Physical Domains for Privileged Functions - + @@ -73381,7 +73381,7 @@ Transmission Preparation Integrity - + @@ -73406,7 +73406,7 @@

applications to be loaded and executed from hardware-enforced, read-only media are defined;

- + @@ -73490,7 +73490,7 @@

system components to be employed with no writeable storage are defined;

- + @@ -73546,7 +73546,7 @@ Integrity Protection on Read-only Media - + @@ -73615,7 +73615,7 @@ Hardware-based Protection - + @@ -73625,7 +73625,7 @@ External Malicious Code Identification - + @@ -73721,7 +73721,7 @@ logical domains - + @@ -73807,7 +73807,7 @@

actions to be taken in response to identified faults, errors, or compromise are defined;

- + @@ -73885,7 +73885,7 @@

duplicate systems or system components to be synchronized are defined;

- + @@ -73964,7 +73964,7 @@

individuals or systems to which physical delivery or electronic transmission of information, system components, or devices is to be achieved via the employment of out-of-band channels are defined;

- + @@ -74061,7 +74061,7 @@

information, system components, or devices that only individuals or systems are designated to receive are defined;

- + @@ -74130,7 +74130,7 @@

operations security controls to be employed to protect key organizational information throughout the system development life cycle are defined;

- + @@ -74196,7 +74196,7 @@ Process Isolation - + @@ -74250,7 +74250,7 @@ Hardware Separation - + @@ -74311,7 +74311,7 @@

multi-thread processing for which a separate execution domain is to be maintained for each thread is defined;

- + @@ -74405,7 +74405,7 @@

types of signal parameter attacks or references to sources for such attacks from which to protect internal wireless links are defined;

- + @@ -74478,7 +74478,7 @@

level of protection to be employed against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference is defined;

- + @@ -74545,7 +74545,7 @@

the level of reduction to be achieved to reduce the detection potential of wireless links is defined;

- + @@ -74603,7 +74603,7 @@ Imitative or Manipulative Communications Deception - + @@ -74668,7 +74668,7 @@

wireless transmitters for which cryptographic mechanisms are to be implemented are defined;

- + @@ -74749,7 +74749,7 @@

systems or system components with connection ports or input/output devices to be disabled or removed are defined;

- + @@ -74843,7 +74843,7 @@

group of users to whom an explicit indication of sensor use is to be provided is defined;

- + @@ -74923,7 +74923,7 @@

sensors to be used to collect data or information are defined;

- + @@ -74987,7 +74987,7 @@

measures to be employed so that data or information collected by sensors is only used for authorized purposes are defined;

- + @@ -75045,7 +75045,7 @@ Prohibit Use of Devices - + @@ -75070,7 +75070,7 @@

sensors that collect personally identifiable information are defined;

- + @@ -75140,7 +75140,7 @@

the sensors that are configured to minimize the collection of unneeded information about individuals are defined;

- + @@ -75211,7 +75211,7 @@

the components for which usage restrictions and implementation guidance are to be established are defined;

- + @@ -75308,7 +75308,7 @@

the system, system component, or location where a detonation chamber capability is to be employed is defined;

- + @@ -75366,7 +75366,7 @@ System Time Synchronization - + @@ -75442,7 +75442,7 @@

the time period to compare the internal system clocks with the authoritative time source is defined;

- + @@ -75507,7 +75507,7 @@ Secondary Authoritative Time Source - + @@ -75581,7 +75581,7 @@ logically - + @@ -75641,7 +75641,7 @@

alternate communication paths for system operations and operational command and control are defined;

- + @@ -75719,7 +75719,7 @@

conditions or circumstances for relocating sensors and monitoring capabilities are defined;

- + @@ -75798,7 +75798,7 @@

conditions or circumstances for dynamically relocating sensors and monitoring capabilities are defined;

- + @@ -75860,7 +75860,7 @@

security domains requiring hardware-enforced separation and policy enforcement mechanisms are defined;

- + @@ -75922,7 +75922,7 @@

security domains requiring software-enforced separation and policy enforcement mechanisms are defined;

- + @@ -75995,7 +75995,7 @@

authorized individuals requiring procedures for disabling and re-enabling hardware write-protect are defined;

- + @@ -76144,7 +76144,7 @@

events that would require the system and information integrity procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -76341,7 +76341,7 @@

time period within which to install security-relevant software updates after the release of the updates is defined;

- + @@ -76496,7 +76496,7 @@ Central Management - + @@ -76521,7 +76521,7 @@

the frequency at which to determine if applicable security-relevant software and firmware updates are installed on system components is defined;

- + @@ -76583,7 +76583,7 @@

the benchmarks for taking corrective actions are defined;

- + @@ -76661,7 +76661,7 @@

the system components requiring automated patch management tools to facilitate flaw remediation are defined;

- + @@ -76734,7 +76734,7 @@

system components requiring security-relevant software updates to be automatically installed are defined;

- + @@ -76796,7 +76796,7 @@

software and firmware components to be removed after updated versions have been installed are defined;

- + @@ -76900,7 +76900,7 @@

personnel or roles to be alerted when malicious code is detected is/are defined;

- + @@ -77061,7 +77061,7 @@ Central Management - + @@ -77070,7 +77070,7 @@ Automatic Updates - + @@ -77079,7 +77079,7 @@ Non-privileged Users - + @@ -77088,7 +77088,7 @@ Updates Only by Privileged Users - + @@ -77145,7 +77145,7 @@ Portable Storage Devices - + @@ -77162,7 +77162,7 @@

the frequency at which to test malicious code protection mechanisms is defined;

- + @@ -77243,7 +77243,7 @@ Nonsignature-based Detection - + @@ -77277,7 +77277,7 @@ prevent the execution of the command - + @@ -77367,7 +77367,7 @@

tools and techniques to be employed to analyze the characteristics and behavior of malicious code are defined;

- + @@ -77502,7 +77502,7 @@

a frequency for providing system monitoring to personnel or roles is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -77722,7 +77722,7 @@ System-wide Intrusion Detection System - + @@ -77787,7 +77787,7 @@ Automated Tools and Mechanisms for Real-time Analysis - + @@ -77850,7 +77850,7 @@ Automated Tool and Mechanism Integration - + @@ -77957,7 +77957,7 @@

unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions that are to be monitored in outbound communications traffic are defined;

- + @@ -78064,7 +78064,7 @@

compromise indicators are defined;

- + @@ -78127,7 +78127,7 @@ Restrict Non-privileged Users - + @@ -78154,7 +78154,7 @@

least-disruptive actions to terminate suspicious events are defined;

- + @@ -78230,7 +78230,7 @@ Protection of Monitoring Information - + @@ -78247,7 +78247,7 @@

a frequency at which to test intrusion-monitoring tools and mechanisms is defined;

- + @@ -78316,7 +78316,7 @@

system monitoring tools and mechanisms to be provided access to encrypted communications traffic are defined;

- + @@ -78381,7 +78381,7 @@

interior points within the system where communications traffic is to be analyzed are defined;

- + @@ -78473,7 +78473,7 @@

activities that trigger alerts to personnel or are defined;

- + @@ -78536,7 +78536,7 @@ Analyze Traffic and Event Patterns - + @@ -78647,7 +78647,7 @@ Wireless Intrusion Detection - + @@ -78719,7 +78719,7 @@ Wireless to Wireline Communications - + @@ -78777,7 +78777,7 @@ Correlate Monitoring Information - + @@ -78836,7 +78836,7 @@ Integrated Situational Awareness - + @@ -78908,7 +78908,7 @@

interior points within the system where communications traffic is to be analyzed are defined;

- + @@ -78992,7 +78992,7 @@

sources that identify individuals who pose an increased level of risk are defined;

- + @@ -79058,7 +79058,7 @@

additional monitoring of privileged users is defined;

- + @@ -79130,7 +79130,7 @@

the probationary period of individuals is defined;

- + @@ -79210,7 +79210,7 @@

personnel or roles to be alerted upon the detection of network services that have not been authorized or approved by authorization or approval processes is/are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -79303,7 +79303,7 @@

system components where host-based monitoring is to be implemented are defined;

- + @@ -79378,7 +79378,7 @@

personnel or roles to whom indicators of compromise are to be distributed is/are defined;

- + @@ -79451,7 +79451,7 @@ Optimize Network Traffic Analysis - + @@ -79563,7 +79563,7 @@

external organizations to whom security alerts, advisories, and directives are to be disseminated are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -79660,7 +79660,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to broadcast security alert and advisory information throughout the organization are defined;

- + @@ -79786,7 +79786,7 @@

alternative action(s) to be performed when anomalies are discovered are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -79907,7 +79907,7 @@ Notification of Failed Security Tests - + @@ -79916,7 +79916,7 @@ Automation Support for Distributed Testing - + @@ -79987,7 +79987,7 @@

personnel or roles designated to receive the results of security and privacy function verification is/are defined;

- + @@ -80107,7 +80107,7 @@

actions to be taken when unauthorized changes to information are detected are defined;

- + @@ -80350,7 +80350,7 @@

frequency with which to perform an integrity check (of information) is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -80425,7 +80425,7 @@

personnel or roles to whom notification is to be provided upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification is/are defined;

- + @@ -80484,7 +80484,7 @@ Centrally Managed Integrity Tools - + @@ -80538,7 +80538,7 @@ Tamper-evident Packaging - + @@ -80564,7 +80564,7 @@

controls to be implemented automatically when integrity violations are discovered are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -80621,7 +80621,7 @@ Cryptographic Protection - + @@ -80701,7 +80701,7 @@

security-relevant changes to the system are defined;

- + @@ -80787,7 +80787,7 @@

other actions to be taken upon the detection of a potential integrity violation are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -80866,7 +80866,7 @@

system components requiring integrity verification of the boot process are defined;

- + @@ -80938,7 +80938,7 @@

system components requiring mechanisms to protect the integrity of boot firmware are defined;

- + @@ -80995,7 +80995,7 @@ Confined Environments with Limited Privileges - + @@ -81012,7 +81012,7 @@

user-installed software requiring integrity verification prior to execution is defined;

- + @@ -81066,7 +81066,7 @@ Code Execution in Protected Environments - + @@ -81075,7 +81075,7 @@ Binary or Machine Executable Code - + @@ -81092,7 +81092,7 @@

software or firmware components to be authenticated by cryptographic mechanisms prior to installation are defined;

- + @@ -81156,7 +81156,7 @@

the maximum time period permitted for processes to execute without supervision is defined;

- + @@ -81217,7 +81217,7 @@

controls to be implemented for application self-protection at runtime are defined;

- + @@ -81273,7 +81273,7 @@ Spam Protection - + @@ -81369,7 +81369,7 @@ Central Management - + @@ -81386,7 +81386,7 @@

the frequency at which to automatically update spam protection mechanisms is defined;

- + @@ -81440,7 +81440,7 @@ Continuous Learning Capability - + @@ -81494,7 +81494,7 @@ Information Input Restrictions - + @@ -81516,7 +81516,7 @@

information inputs to the system requiring validity checks are defined;

- + @@ -81579,7 +81579,7 @@

authorized individuals who can use the manual override capability are defined;

- + @@ -81683,7 +81683,7 @@

the time period within which input validation errors are to be resolved is defined;

- + @@ -81746,7 +81746,7 @@ Predictable Behavior - + @@ -81808,7 +81808,7 @@ Timing Interactions - + @@ -81877,7 +81877,7 @@

formats to which the use of information inputs is to be restricted are defined;

- + @@ -81934,7 +81934,7 @@ Injection Prevention - + @@ -82000,7 +82000,7 @@

personnel or roles to whom error messages are to be revealed is/are defined;

- + @@ -82074,7 +82074,7 @@ Information Management and Retention - + @@ -82191,7 +82191,7 @@

elements of personally identifiable information being processed in the information life cycle are defined;

- + @@ -82279,7 +82279,7 @@

techniques used to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for training are defined;

- + @@ -82382,7 +82382,7 @@

techniques used to erase information following the retention period are defined;

- + @@ -82474,7 +82474,7 @@

mean time to failure (MTTF) substitution criteria to be used as a means to exchange active and standby components are defined;

- + @@ -82556,7 +82556,7 @@

the fraction or percentage of mean time to failure within which to transfer the responsibilities of a system component to a substitute component is defined;

- + @@ -82609,7 +82609,7 @@ Time Limit on Process Execution Without Supervision - + @@ -82626,7 +82626,7 @@

the percentage of the mean time to failure for transfers to be manually initiated is defined;

- + @@ -82711,7 +82711,7 @@

action to be taken when system component failures are detected is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -82800,7 +82800,7 @@

a failover capability for the system has been defined;

- + @@ -82882,7 +82882,7 @@

the frequency at which to terminate non-persistent components and services that are initiated in a known state is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -82953,7 +82953,7 @@

trusted sources to obtain software and data for system component and service refreshes are defined;

- + @@ -83036,7 +83036,7 @@

the information to be generated is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -83111,7 +83111,7 @@ a period of non-use - + @@ -83181,7 +83181,7 @@

software programs and/or applications whose information output requires validation are defined;

- + @@ -83244,7 +83244,7 @@

controls to be implemented to protect the system memory from unauthorized code execution are defined;

- + @@ -83318,7 +83318,7 @@

a list of failure conditions requiring fail-safe procedures is defined;

- + @@ -83410,7 +83410,7 @@

the frequency at which to check the completeness of personally identifiable information across the information life cycle is defined;

- + @@ -83515,7 +83515,7 @@

automated mechanisms used to correct or delete personally identifiable information that is inaccurate, outdated, incorrectly determined regarding impact, or incorrectly de-identified are defined;

- + @@ -83574,7 +83574,7 @@ Data Tags - + @@ -83632,7 +83632,7 @@ Collection - + @@ -83686,7 +83686,7 @@ Individual Requests - + @@ -83750,7 +83750,7 @@

recipients of personally identifiable information to be notified when the personally identifiable information has been corrected or deleted are defined;

- + @@ -83823,7 +83823,7 @@

the frequency at which to evaluate the effectiveness of de-identification is defined;

- + @@ -83899,7 +83899,7 @@ Collection - + @@ -83953,7 +83953,7 @@ Archiving - + @@ -84007,7 +84007,7 @@ Release - + @@ -84061,7 +84061,7 @@ Removal, Masking, Encryption, Hashing, or Replacement of Direct Identifiers - + @@ -84116,7 +84116,7 @@ Statistical Disclosure Control - + @@ -84185,7 +84185,7 @@ Differential Privacy - + @@ -84242,7 +84242,7 @@ Validated Algorithms and Software - + @@ -84304,7 +84304,7 @@ Motivated Intruder - + @@ -84367,7 +84367,7 @@

the systems or system components with data or capabilities to be embedded are defined;

- + @@ -84441,7 +84441,7 @@

the frequencies at which to refresh information are defined;

- + @@ -84524,7 +84524,7 @@

systems or system components that require an alternative information source for the execution of essential functions or services are defined;

- + @@ -84617,7 +84617,7 @@

systems or system components across which the fragmented information is to be distributed are defined;

- + @@ -84765,7 +84765,7 @@

events that require the supply chain risk management procedures to be reviewed and updated are defined;

- + @@ -84978,7 +84978,7 @@

the frequency at which to review and update the supply chain risk management plan is defined;

- + @@ -85162,7 +85162,7 @@

supply chain risk management activities are defined;

- + @@ -85252,7 +85252,7 @@

the document identifying the selected and implemented supply chain processes and controls is defined (if selected);

- + @@ -85393,7 +85393,7 @@

services with a diverse set of sources are defined;

- + @@ -85465,7 +85465,7 @@

controls to limit harm from potential supply chain adversaries are defined;

- + @@ -85527,7 +85527,7 @@ Sub-tier Flow Down - + @@ -85591,7 +85591,7 @@

systems, system components, and associated data that require valid provenance are defined;

- + @@ -85685,7 +85685,7 @@

supply chain elements, processes, and personnel associated with systems and critical system components that require unique identification are defined;

- + @@ -85758,7 +85758,7 @@

systems and critical system components that require unique identification for tracking through the supply chain are defined;

- + @@ -85843,7 +85843,7 @@

controls to validate that the system or system component received has not been altered are defined;

- + @@ -85932,7 +85932,7 @@

an analysis method to be conducted to validate the internal composition and provenance of critical or mission-essential technologies, products, and services to ensure the integrity of the system and system component is defined;

- + @@ -86007,7 +86007,7 @@

acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods to protect against, identify, and mitigate supply chain risks are defined;

- + @@ -86116,7 +86116,7 @@

critical system components of which an adequate supply is required are defined;

- + @@ -86178,7 +86178,7 @@ Assessments Prior to Selection, Acceptance, Modification, or Update - + @@ -86264,7 +86264,7 @@

the frequency at which to assess and review the supply chain-related risks associated with suppliers or contractors and the systems, system components, or system services they provide is defined;

- + @@ -86348,7 +86348,7 @@

supply chain elements, processes, and actors to be analyzed and tested are defined;

- + @@ -86413,7 +86413,7 @@

Operations Security (OPSEC) controls to protect supply chain-related information for the system, system component, or system service are defined;

- + @@ -86493,7 +86493,7 @@

information for which agreements and procedures are to be established are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -86555,7 +86555,7 @@ Tamper Resistance and Detection - + @@ -86621,7 +86621,7 @@ Multiple Stages of System Development Life Cycle - + @@ -86717,7 +86717,7 @@

indications of the need for an inspection of systems or system components are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -86807,7 +86807,7 @@

personnel or roles to whom counterfeit system components are to be reported is/are defined (if selected);

- + @@ -86915,7 +86915,7 @@

personnel or roles requiring training to detect counterfeit system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) is/are defined;

- + @@ -86979,7 +86979,7 @@

system components requiring configuration control are defined;

- + @@ -87053,7 +87053,7 @@

the frequency at which to scan for counterfeit system components is defined;

- + @@ -87129,7 +87129,7 @@

techniques and methods for disposing of data, documentation, tools, or system components are defined;

- + @@ -88548,7 +88548,7 @@ - NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.1.1 content and other OSCAL content examples + NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.1.1 content (with minor errors fixed) and other OSCAL content examples From 7ee639f18283a0e71ed77cf3a9ff6c846667c013 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 19:37:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 05/20] add new content --- .gitignore | 1 + .../ap/xml/assessment-plan-example-1.xml | 129 +++++ .../ar/xml/assessment-results-example-1.xml | 222 +++++++++ src/examples/catalog/xml/basic-catalog.xml | 53 +- .../xml/example-component-definition.xml | 100 ++-- .../xml/example-component.xml | 4 +- .../xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml | 138 ++++++ .../ssp/xml/oscal_leveraged-example_ssp.xml | 459 ++++++++++-------- .../ssp/xml/oscal_leveraging-example_ssp.xml | 153 +++--- src/examples/ssp/xml/ssp-example.xml | 54 ++- src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml | 264 ++++++++++ validate.sh | 10 + 12 files changed, 1225 insertions(+), 362 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/examples/ap/xml/assessment-plan-example-1.xml create mode 100644 src/examples/ar/xml/assessment-results-example-1.xml create mode 100644 src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml create mode 100644 src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml create mode 100755 validate.sh diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 5569c20d..6586c898 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ generated/ # Downloaded utilities for content transformation yq jq +.DS_Store diff --git a/src/examples/ap/xml/assessment-plan-example-1.xml b/src/examples/ap/xml/assessment-plan-example-1.xml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b4c7208c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/examples/ap/xml/assessment-plan-example-1.xml @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ + + + + IFA GoodRead Assessment Plan + 2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00 + 1.0 + 1.1.2 + + IFA Security Control Assessor + + + Amy Assessor + 3a675986-b4ff-4030-b178-e953c2e55d64 + + + Important Federal Agency + IFA + + + + e7730080-71ce-4b20-bec4-84f33136fd58 + + + + + + Examine System Elements for Least Privilege Design and Implementation + +

The activity and it steps will be performed by the assessor and facilitated by + owner, ISSO, and product team for the IFA GoodRead system with necessary + information and access about least privilege design and implementation of the + system's elements: the application, web framework, server, and cloud account + infrastructure.

+ + + + Obtain Network Access via VPN to IFA GoodRead Environment + +

The assessor will obtain network access with appropriately configured VPN + account to see admin frontend to the application for PAO staff, which is + only accessible via VPN with an appropriately configured role for PAO staff + accounts.

+ + + + Obtain Credentials and Access to AwesomeCloud Account for IFA GoodRead System + +

The assessor will obtain access to the GoodRead Product Team's AwesomeCloud + account with their single sign-on credentials to a read-only assessor role.

+ + + + Obtain Applcation Access Provided by Product Team + +

The assessor will obtain non-privileged account credentials with the PAO + staff role to test this role in the application does not permit excessive + administrative operations.

+ + + + Confirm Load Balancer Blocks Access to Admin Frontend from Internet + +

The assessor will confirm that the load balancer for public access does not + allow access to Admin Frontend of the application from the Internet.

+ + + + Confirm GoodRead's PAO Role Cannot Manage Users + +

The assessor will confirm that user's logged into the GoodRead Application + with the PAO staff role cannot add, modify, or disable users from the + system.

+ + + + Confirm Django Admin Panel Not Available + +

The assessor will confirm with web-based interface and API methods users with + the PAO Staff role cannot access the Django admin panel functions and + interactively change application's database records.

+ + + + + + + + + e7730080-71ce-4b20-bec4-84f33136fd58 + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

The assessor for the IFA GoodRead Project, including the application and + infrastructure for this information system, are within scope of this assessment.

+ + + + + Examine Least Privilege Design and Implementation + + + + + + + +

Per IFA's use of NIST SP-800 53A, the assessor, with the support of the owner, + information system security officer, and product team for the IFA GoodRead project, + will examine least privilege design and implementation with the following:

+
    +
  • list of security functions (deployed in hardware, software, and firmware) and + security-relevant information for which access must be explicitly authorized;
    • +
  • system configuration settings and associated documentation;
    • +
+ + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/examples/ar/xml/assessment-results-example-1.xml b/src/examples/ar/xml/assessment-results-example-1.xml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42e456ed --- /dev/null +++ b/src/examples/ar/xml/assessment-results-example-1.xml @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ + + + + IFA GoodRead Continuous Monitoring Assessment Results June 2023 + 2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00 + 202306-002 + 1.1.2 + + IFA Security Controls Assessor + + + Amy Assessor + 3a675986-b4ff-4030-b178-e953c2e55d64 + + + Important Federal Agency + IFA + + + + e7730080-71ce-4b20-bec4-84f33136fd58 + + + + + + Test System Elements for Least Privilege Design and Implementation + +

The activity and it steps will be performed by the assessor via their security + automation platform to test least privilege design and implementation of the + system's elements, specifically the cloud account infrastructure, as part of + continuous monitoring.

+ + + + Configure Cross-Account IAM Role Trust for GoodRead and Assessor AwesomeCloud + Accounts + +

The GoodRead system engineer will coordinate with the assessor's engineering + support staff to configure an IAM role trust. A service account for + automation with its own role with the assessor's AwesomeCloud account can + assume the role for read-only assessor operations within the GoodRead + Product Team's AwesomeCloud account for continuous monitoring of least + privilege.

+ + +

This step is complete.

+

GoodRead Product Team and SCA Engineering Support configured the latter's + cross-account role trust and authentication and authorization in to the + former's account on May 29, 2023.

+ + + + Automate Cross-Account Login to GoodRead AwesomeCloud Account + +

The assessor's security automation platform will create a session from their + dedicated will obtain access to the GoodRead Product Team's AwesomeCloud + account with their single sign-on credentials to a read-only assessor role.

+ + +

This step is complete.

+

GoodRead Product Team and SCA Engineering Support tested scripts from the + security automation platform interactively on May 30, 2023, to confirm they + work ahead of June 2023 continuous monitoring cycle.

+ + + + Analyze GoodRead Developer and System Engineer Roles for Least Privilege + +

Once authenticated and authorized with a cross-account session, the security + automation pipeline will execute scripts developed and maintained by the + assessor's engineering support staff. It will analyze the permitted actions + for the developer and system engineer roles in the GoodRead Product Team's + AwesomeCloud account to confirm they are designed and implement to + facilitate only least privilege operation. Examples are included below.

+
    +
  • For the GoodRead developer role in their AwesomeCloud account, the + developer role may only permit the user with this role to check the IP + addresses and status of the Awesome Compute Service server instances. + This role will not permit the user to create, change, or delete the + instances. Similarly, the developer will permit a user to perform + actions to see IP addresses of an Awesome Load Balancer instance, but + not add, change, or delete the instances.
    • +
  • For the GoodRead system engineer role in their AwesomeCloud account, the + system engineer role may only permit actions where the user can add, + change, or delete instances for approved services (i.e. Awesome Compute + Service, Awesome Load Balancer, et cetera). The role may not permit + actions by the user for any other service.
    • +
+ + + + + + + + + e7730080-71ce-4b20-bec4-84f33136fd58 + + + + + IFA GoodRead Continous Monitoring Results June 2023 + +

Automated monthly continuous monitoring of the GoodRead information system's cloud + infrastructure recorded observations below. Additionally, contingent upon the + confidence level of the observations and possible risks, confirmed findings may be + opened.

+ + 2023-06-02T08:31:20-04:00 + 2023-06-02T08:46:51-04:00 + + + Test System Elements for Least Privilege Design and Implementation + +

The activity and it steps will be performed by the assessor via their + security automation platform to test least privilege design and + implementation of the system's elements, specifically the cloud account + infrastructure, as part of continuous monitoring.

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + AwesomeCloud IAM Roles Test - GoodRead System Engineer Role + +

Test AwesomeCloud IAM Roles for least privilege design and implementation.

+ + TEST + finding + + 2023-06-02T08:31:20-04:00 + 2023-07-01T00:00:00-04:00 + +

The assessor's security automation platform analyzed all roles specific to the + GoodRead Product Team, not those managed by the Office of Information + Technology. The IFA-GoodRead-SystemEnginer role in their respective + AwesomeCloud account permitted use of the following high-risk actions.

+
    +
  • awesomecloud:auditlog:DeleteAccountAuditLog
    • +
  • awesomecloud:secmon:AdministerConfigurations
    • +
+

Both of these actions are overly permissive and not appropriate for the business + function of the staff member assigned this role.

+ + + + AwesomeCloud IAM Roles Test - GoodRead Developer Role + +

Test AwesomeCloud IAM Roles for least privilege design and implementation.

+ + TEST + finding + + 2023-06-02T08:31:20-04:00 + 2023-07-01T00:00:00-04:00 + +

The assessor's security automation platform detected that the developer's role is + permitted to perform only permissible actions in the GoodRead AwesomeCloud + account in accordance with the agency's least privilege policy and procedures.

+ + + + GoodRead System Engineers Have Over-Privileged Access to Cloud Infrastructure + Account + +

A user in the GoodRead cloud environment with the privileges of a system engineer + can exceed the intended privileges for their related business function. They can + delete all historical audit records and remove important security monitoring + functions for the IFA Security Operations Center staff.

+ + +

An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used + to surreptitiously add, change, or delete cloud infrastructure to the too + managing all links to IFA's communication to public citizens, potentially + causing significant harm with no forensic evidence to recover the system. + Regardless of the extent and duration of a potential incident, such a + configuration greatly increases the risk of an insider threat if there were + likely to a potential insider threat in the GoodRead Product Team.

+

If such an insider threat existed and acted with this misconfigruatio, the + resulting event could cause significant financial and reputational risk to IFA's + Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.

+ + investigating + + + GoodRead AwesomeCloud Account's System Engineer Role Permits High Risk Actions + +

The assessor's security automation platform detected that the system engineer's + role is permitted to perform the following actions in the GoodRead AwesomeCloud + account.

+
    +
  • Delete and reset account audit logs.
    • +
  • Add, change, or delete security monitoring configurations in the Awesome + Security Monitor service used by the IFA Security Operations Center.
    • +
+

The system engineer is not permitted to modify these services and their role was + incorrectly configured.

+ + + +

This is a finding.

+ + + + d5f9b263-965d-440b-99e7-77f5df670a11 + + + + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/examples/catalog/xml/basic-catalog.xml b/src/examples/catalog/xml/basic-catalog.xml index 3bda0181..a86489cf 100644 --- a/src/examples/catalog/xml/basic-catalog.xml +++ b/src/examples/catalog/xml/basic-catalog.xml @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ Sample Security Catalog <em>for Demonstration</em> and Testing 2023-10-12T00:00:00.000000-04:00 - 2023-10-12T00:00:00.000000-04:00 + 2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00 1.1 - 1.1.1 + 1.1.2

The following is a short excerpt from ISO/IEC 27002:2013, Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls. This work is provided here under copyright fair use for non-profit, educational purposes only. Copyrights for this work are held by the publisher, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).

 @@ -17,11 +17,7 @@ Internal Organization - - -

To establish a management framework to initiate and control the implementation and operation of information security within the organization.

- - + Information security roles and responsibilities @@ -34,19 +30,22 @@ + +

To establish a management framework to initiate and control the implementation and operation of information security within the organization.

+

All information security responsibilities should be defined and allocated.

A value has been assigned to .

A cross link has been established with a choppy syntax: (choppy).

 - +

Allocation of information security responsibilities should be done in accordance with the information security policies. Responsibilities for the protection of individual assets and for carrying out specific information security processes should be identified. Responsibilities for information security risk management activities and in particular for acceptance of residual risks should be defined. These responsibilities should be supplemented, where necessary, with more detailed guidance for specific sites and information processing facilities. Local responsibilities for the protection of assets and for carrying out specific security processes should be defined.

 - +

Individuals with allocated information security responsibilities may delegate security tasks to others. Nevertheless they remain accountable and should determine that any delegated tasks have been correctly performed.

 - +

Areas for which individuals are responsible should be stated. In particular the following should take place:

  1. the assets and information security processes should be identified and defined;
    2. @@ -57,7 +56,7 @@
- +

Many organizations appoint an information security manager to take overall responsibility for the development and implementation of information security and to support the identification of controls.

However, responsibility for resourcing and implementing the controls will often remain with individual managers. One common practice is to appoint an owner for each asset who then becomes responsible for its day-to-day protection.

@@ -70,14 +69,14 @@

Conflicting duties and areas of responsibility should be segregated to reduce opportunities for unauthorized or unintentional modification or misuse of the organization’s assets.

 - +

Care should be taken that no single person can access, modify or use assets without authorization or detection. The initiation of an event should be separated from its authorization. The possibility of collusion should be considered in designing the controls.

 - +

Small organizations may find segregation of duties difficult to achieve, but the principle should be applied as far as is possible and practicable. Whenever it is difficult to segregate, other controls such as monitoring of activities, audit trails and management supervision should be considered.

 - +

Segregation of duties is a method for reducing the risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of an organization’s assets.

 @@ -89,7 +88,7 @@ Business requirements of access control - +

To limit access to information and information processing facilities.

 @@ -99,16 +98,16 @@

An access control policy should be established, documented and reviewed based on business and information security requirements.

 - +

Asset owners should determine appropriate access control rules, access rights and restrictions for specific user roles towards their assets, with the amount of detail and the strictness of the controls reflecting the associated information security risks.

 - +

Access controls are both logical and physical and these should be considered together.

 - +

Users and service providers should be given a clear statement of the business requirements to be met by access controls.

 - +

The policy should take account of the following:

  1. security requirements of business applications;
    2. @@ -125,8 +124,8 @@
- - + +

Care should be taken when specifying access control rules to consider:

  1. establishing rules based on the premise “Everything is generally forbidden unless expressly permitted” rather than the weaker rule “Everything is generally permitted unless expressly forbidden”;
    2. @@ -135,13 +134,13 @@
  2. rules which require specific approval before enactment and those which do not.
 - +

Access control rules should be supported by formal procedures and defined responsibilities.

 - +

Role based access control is an approach used successfully by many organizations to link access rights with business roles.

 - +

Two of the frequent principles directing the access control policy are:

  1. Need-to-know: you are only granted access to the information you need to perform your tasks (different tasks/roles mean different need-to-know and hence different access profile);
    2. @@ -157,7 +156,7 @@

    Users should only be provided with access to the network and network services that they have been specifically authorized to use.

    - +

    A policy should be formulated concerning the use of networks and network services. This policy should cover:

    1. the networks and network services which are allowed to be accessed;
      2. @@ -168,11 +167,11 @@
    2. monitoring of the use of network service
     - +

    The policy on the use of network services should be consistent with the organization’s access control policy

         - + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component-definition.xml b/src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component-definition.xml index 3f408ee6..cf533665 100644 --- a/src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component-definition.xml +++ b/src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component-definition.xml @@ -1,43 +1,41 @@ + uuid="a7ba800c-a432-44cd-9075-0862cd66da6b"> MongoDB Component Definition Example - 2023-10-12T00:00:00.000000-04:00 + 2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00 20231012 - 1.1.1 + 1.1.2 Provider MongoDB - + - + MongoDB -

    MongoDB is a source-available, cross-platform document-oriented - database program. Classified as a NoSQL database program, MongoDB - uses JSON-like documents with optional schemas.

    +

    MongoDB is a source-available, cross-platform document-oriented database program. + Classified as a NoSQL database program, MongoDB uses JSON-like documents with optional + schemas.

     Provides a NoSQL database service ef7c799a-c50e-49ab-83e0-515e989e6df1 - + Primary daemon process for the MongoDB system. - + MongoDB protocol for sharding with shardsrv option. - + MongoDB protocol for configsrv operation. @@ -46,63 +44,71 @@ source="#ba047e56-faef-430c-bafb-c54e9a87c6e8">

    MongoDB control implementations for NIST SP 800-53 revision 5.

    -     + + uuid="cf8338c5-fb6e-4593-a4a8-b3c4946ee080" + control-id="sc-8"> -

    MongoDB's implementation of SC-8 control. The details of the implementation are provided at the statement level.

    +

    MongoDB's implementation of SC-8 control. The details of the implementation are + provided at the statement level.

     - confidentiality + confidentiality - - -

    MongoDB implements TLS 1.x to protect the of transmitted data by encrypting data in transit, preventing unauthorized disclosure or changes to information during transmission.

    -     + + +

    MongoDB implements TLS 1.x to protect the + of transmitted data by encrypting data in transit, preventing unauthorized disclosure + or changes to information during transmission.

    +     -

    MongoDB implements cryptographic mechanisms (TLS 1.x) to provide cryptographic protection for data in transit.

    +

    MongoDB implements cryptographic mechanisms (TLS 1.x) to provide cryptographic + protection for data in transit.

     - prevent unauthorized disclosure of information + prevent unauthorized disclosure of information - - -

    To implement cryptographic mechanisms (aka enable TLS 1.x) to , customers need to set the PEMKeyFile option in the configuration file /etc/mongod.conf to the certificate file's path and restart the component.

    -     - -     + + +

    To implement cryptographic mechanisms (aka enable TLS 1.x) to , customers need to set the PEMKeyFile option + in the configuration file /etc/mongod.conf to the certificate file's path + and restart the component.

    +     + +     -

    Must ensure that MongoDB only listens for network - connections on authorized interfaces by configuring the MongoDB - configuration file to limit the services exposure to only the - network interfaces on which MongoDB instances should listen for - incoming connections.

    +

    Must ensure that MongoDB only listens for network connections on authorized interfaces + by configuring the MongoDB configuration file to limit the services exposure to only the + network interfaces on which MongoDB instances should listen for incoming connections.

         - -

    NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5: Moderate Baseline Profile

    -     - - - + +

    NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5: Moderate Baseline Profile

    +     + + +     -     -     + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component.xml b/src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component.xml index d3dbca63..5a5dd7c4 100644 --- a/src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component.xml +++ b/src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component.xml @@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ Test Component Definition - 2023-10-12T00:00:00.000000-04:00 + 2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00 20231012 - 1.1.1 + 1.1.2 Test Vendor diff --git a/src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml b/src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a016ce84 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ + + + + IFA GoodRead Plan of Action and Milestones + 2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00 + 1.1 + 1.0.4 + + + 8101e04d-8305-4e73-bb95-6b59f645b143 + + Django Framework Examination + +

    Examine Django Framework for least privilege design and implementation.

    +     + EXAMINE + control-objective + + 2023-05-19T12:14:16-04:00 + +

    The assessor attempted to access the admin panel while logged into the GoodRead application as a PAO staff user. They were able to see the admin panel and directly edit database records for the application using the Django Framework's admin panel.

    +     +     + + AwesomeCloud IAM Roles Test - GoodRead System Engineer Role + +

    Test AwesomeCloud IAM Roles for least privilege design and implementation.

    +     + TEST + finding + + 2023-06-02T08:31:20-04:00 + 2023-07-01T00:00:00-04:00 + +

    The assessor's security automation platform analyzed all roles specific to the GoodRead Product Team, not those managed by the Office of Information Technology. The IFA-GoodRead-SystemEnginer role in their respective AwesomeCloud account permitted use of the following high-risk actions.

    +
      +
    • awesomecloud:auditlog:DeleteAccountAuditLog
      • +
    • awesomecloud:secmon:AdministerConfigurations
      • +
    +

    Both of these actions are overly permissive and not appropriate for the business function of the staff member assigned this role.

    +     +     + + IFA-GOODREAD-RISK-1: PAO Staff Have Over-Privileged Access to GoodRead System + +

    A user with the privileges of a PAO staff user can exceed the intended privileges for their related business function and directly edit the database for the GoodRead application.

    +     + +

    An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used to significantly damage links created by the tool for use by public citizens, potentially causing a national outage. If an outage were to occur, IFA and Government policy will require the CIO of the agency to notify the Department of Homeland Security and the public.

    +

    Such an event will cause significant financial and reputational risk to IFA's Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.

    +     + deviation-approved + + + + + + + + + +

    The GoodRead application is designed and implemented to only allow access to the administrative functions for those with PAO staff fole via the VPN via network configuration between the IFA Enterprise Support Systems and the GoodRead AwesomeCloud account. Additionally, the load balanacer configuration only allows access to view shortlinks from the public internet.

    +     +     + 2024-01-01T05:00:00-04:00 + + IFA-GOODREAD-RISK1-RESPONSE: IFA GoodRead Prouct Team Response + +

    The GoodRead Product Team does not have sufficient personnel and budget to implement the required changes in their use of the Django Framework and its configuration in this quarter. With the consultation of the ISSO and the assessor, the owner of the GoodRead system has decided to accept this risk until the end of December 2023. From September to December, budget will be available for the Good Read Product Team's developer and system engineer to completely disable the functionality that is the source of the risk and its originating finding.

    +     + + + End of Year Project Management Report of Developed Remediations + +

    The owner, ISSO, and product team of the GoodRead Project intend to complete the necessary development between September 2023 and December 2023. Whether or not the necessary development for remedation is complete, the product team's project manager will submit the final annual report. They will identify this work item and whether it has been completed.

    +     + + + +     +     + +     + + IFA-GOODREAD-RISK-2: GoodRead System Engineers Have Over-Privileged Access to Cloud Infrastructure Account + +

    A user in the GoodRead cloud environment with the privileges of a system engineer can exceed the intended privileges for their related business function. They can delete all historical audit records and remove important security monitoring functions for the IFA Security Operations Center staff.

    +     + +

    An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used to surreptitiously add, change, or delete cloud infrastructure to the too managing all links to IFA's communication to public citizens, potentially causing significant harm with no forensic evidence to recover the system. Regardless of the extent and duration of a potential incident, such a configuration greatly increases the risk of an insider threat if there were likely to a potential insider threat in the GoodRead Product Team.

    +

    If such an insider threat existed and acted with this misconfigruatio, the resulting event could cause significant financial and reputational risk to IFA's Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.

    +     + open + + + + + + + + 2023-06-23T17:00:00-04:00 + + IFA-GOODREAD-RISK1-RESPONSE: IFA GoodRead Prouct Team Response + +

    The GoodRead Product Team does not have siginficant mitigations or compensating controls to counter this risk, even if likelihood is low. The IFA CISO has cited ongoing guidance that potential insider threat risks be prioritized above alternative categories of risk for this quarter. Additionally, there is sufficient budget and unallocated time for the GoodRead and Office of Information Technology system engineers to modify AwesomeCloud IAM roles on or before the next continuous monitoring cycle beginning in July 2023. The planned completion data is June 23, 2023.

    +     + + + Completion of GoodRead Sprint Ending June 23, 2023 + +

    The owner, ISSO, and product team of the GoodRead Project intend to complete the necessary development by June 23. 2023, the last day of the coinciding sprint. Whether or not the necessary development for mitigation is complete, the product team's project manager will write a brief at the end of the sprint to thw owner and ISSO of this system with the final status and determination of this work item in this sprint.

    +     + + + +     +     + +     + + Update Django Framework Configuration to Disable Default Admin Panel + +

    Budget and technical staff are needed to re-design and re-implement a part of the GoodRead application's use of a web appplication programming framework to mitigate the risk of low privilege users directly modifying the database of this application. This application is a high-visibility service and integral to future operations of the IFA Office of Public Affairs and its staff.

    +     + + +     + + GoodRead System Engineers Have Over-Privileged Access to Cloud Infrastructure Account + +

    Budget and technical staff allocation are available and designated to fix a misconfiguration of the IAM roles for members of the GoodRead Product Team in their AwesomeCloud account to implement least privilege as designed.

    +     + + +     +     \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraged-example_ssp.xml b/src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraged-example_ssp.xml index 7b0b88c9..bf2aa596 100644 --- a/src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraged-example_ssp.xml +++ b/src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraged-example_ssp.xml @@ -1,30 +1,36 @@ - - CSP IaaS System Security Plan - 2023-10-12T00:00:00.000000-04:00 - 0.2 - 1.1.1 - - Administrator - - - External Customer - - - Internal POC for Customers - - - - - - csp_iaas_system - Leveraged IaaS System - -

    An example of three customers leveraging an authorized SaaS, which is running on an authorized IaaS.

    - 
    +    uuid="d197545f-353f-407b-9166-ebf959774c5a">
+    
+        CSP IaaS System Security Plan
+        2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00
+        0.3
+        1.1.2
+        
+            Administrator
+        
+        
+            External Customer
+        
+        
+            Internal POC for Customers
+        
+        
+            
+                
    Leveraged Authorization POC
    
+                
+            
+        
+        
+    
+    
+        csp_iaas_system
+        Leveraged IaaS System
+        
+            
    An example of three customers leveraging an authorized SaaS, which is running on an
+                authorized IaaS.
    
+            
     Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
   |         |         |
   +---------+---------+
@@ -39,193 +45,226 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
   |    this file      |
   +-------------------+
             
    
-         
    In this example, the IaaS SSP specifies customer responsibilities for certain controls.
    
-         
    The SaaS must address these for the control to be fully satisfied.
    
-         
    The SaaS provider may either implement these directly or pass the responsibility on to their customers. Both may be necessary.
    
-         
    For any given control, the Leveraged IaaS SSP must describe:
    
-         
      
-            
    1. HOW the IaaS is directly satisfying the control
      2. 
-            
    2. WHAT responsibilities are left for the Leveraging SaaS (or their customers) to implement.
      3. 
-         
    
-         
    For any given control, the Leveraging SaaS SSP must describe:
    
-         
      
-            
    1. WHAT is being inherited from the underlying IaaS
      2. 
-            
    2. HOW the SaaS is directly satisfying the control.
      3. 
-            
    3. WHAT responsibilities are left for the SaaS customers to implement. (The SaaS customers are Cust-A, B and C)
      4. 
-         
    
-          
-      low
-      
-         
-            System and Network Monitoring
+            
    In this example, the IaaS SSP specifies customer responsibilities for certain
+                controls.
    
+            
    The SaaS must address these for the control to be fully satisfied.
    
+            
    The SaaS provider may either implement these directly or pass the responsibility on
+                to their customers. Both may be necessary.
    
+            
    For any given control, the Leveraged IaaS SSP must describe:
    
+            
      
+                
    1. HOW the IaaS is directly satisfying the control
      2. 
+                
    2. WHAT responsibilities are left for the Leveraging SaaS (or their customers) to
+                    implement.
      3. 
+            
    
+            
    For any given control, the Leveraging SaaS SSP must describe:
    
+            
      
+                
    1. WHAT is being inherited from the underlying IaaS
      2. 
+                
    2. HOW the SaaS is directly satisfying the control.
      3. 
+                
    3. WHAT responsibilities are left for the SaaS customers to implement. (The SaaS
+                    customers are Cust-A, B and C)
      4. 
+            
    
+        
+        low
+        
+            
+                System and Network Monitoring
+                
+                    
    This IaaS system handles information pertaining to audit events.
    
+                    
+                
+                    C.3.5.8
+                
+                
+                    fips-199-moderate
+                    fips-199-low
+                    
+                        
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this
+                            type of adjustment.
    
+                        
+                    
+                
+                    fips-199-moderate
+                    fips-199-low
+                    
+                        
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this
+                            type of adjustment.
    
+                        
+                    
+                
+                    fips-199-moderate
+                    fips-199-low
+                    
+                        
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this
+                            type of adjustment.
    
+                        
+                    
+                
+            
+        
+            fips-199-low
+            fips-199-low
+            fips-199-low
+        
+        
+        
             
-               
    This IaaS system handles information pertaining to audit events.
    
+                
    The hardware and software supporting the virtualized infrastructure supporting
+                    the IaaS.
    
                 
-            
-               C.3.5.8
-            
-            
-               fips-199-moderate
-               fips-199-low
-               
-                  
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this type of adjustment.
    
-                   
-                
-            
-               fips-199-moderate
-               fips-199-low
-               
-                  
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this type of adjustment.
    
-                   
-                
-            
-               fips-199-moderate
-               fips-199-low
-               
-                  
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this type of adjustment.
    
-                   
-                
-             
-          
-      
-         fips-199-low
-         fips-199-low
-         fips-199-low
-      
-      
-      
-         
-            
    The hardware and software supporting the virtualized infrastructure supporting the IaaS.
    
-             
-          
-      
-         
    Most system-characteristics content does not support the example, and is included to meet the minimum SSP syntax requirements.
    
-          
-       
-   
-      
-         admin
-         
-            Administrator
-            Manages the components within the IaaS.
-         
-      
-      
-         This System
-         
-            
    The system described by this SSP.
    
-            
    This text was auto-generated by the OSCAL M3-RC1 data upgrade converter.
    
-             
-         
-          
-      
-         This System
-         
-            
    This Leveraged IaaS.
    
-            
    The entire system as depicted in the system authorization boundary
    
-             
-         
-          
-      
-         Application
-         
-            
    An application within the IaaS, exposed to SaaS customers and their downstream customers.
    
-            
    This Leveraged IaaS maintains aspects of the application.
    
-            
    The Leveraging SaaS maintains aspects of their assigned portion of the application.
    
-            
    The customers of the Leveraging SaaS maintain aspects of their sub-assigned portions of the application.
    
-             
-         
-         
-         
-            11111111-0000-4000-9000-100000000001
-         
-          
-       
-   
-   
-      
-         
    This is a collection of control responses.
    
-          
-      
-         
-            privileged and non-privileged
-         
-         
-            
-               
-                  
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
-                  
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
-                  
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
-                  
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
-                  
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
-                  
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
-                  
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
-                  
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
-                   
-               
-                  
-                     
    Optional description about what is being exported.
    
-                      
-                  
-                     
-                        
    Leveraging system's responsibilities with respect to inheriting this capability.
    
-                        
    In the context of the application component in satisfaction of AC-2, part a.
    
-                         
-                     
-                      
-                   
-                
-            
-               
-                  
    Describes how the application satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
-                   
-               
-                  
-                     
    Optional description about what is being exported.
    
-                      
-                  
-                     
-                        
    Consumer-appropriate description of what may be inherited.
    
-                        
    In the context of the application component in satisfaction of AC-2, part a.
    
-                         
-                     
-                      
-                  
-                     
-                        
    Leveraging system's responsibilities with respect to inheriting this capability.
    
-                        
    In the context of the application component in satisfaction of AC-2, part a.
    
-                         
-                     
-                      
-                   
-                
+        
+        
+            
    Most system-characteristics content does not support the example, and is included to
+                meet the minimum SSP syntax requirements.
    
+            
+    
+    
+        
+            admin
+            
+                Administrator
+                Manages the components within the IaaS.
+            
+        
+        
+            This System
+            
+                
    This Leveraged IaaS.
    
+                
    The entire system as depicted in the system authorization boundary
    
+                
+            
+            
+        
+            Application
+            
+                
    An application within the IaaS, exposed to SaaS customers and their downstream
+                    customers.
    
+                
    This Leveraged IaaS maintains aspects of the application.
    
+                
    The Leveraging SaaS maintains aspects of their assigned portion of the
+                    application.
    
+                
    The customers of the Leveraging SaaS maintain aspects of their sub-assigned
+                    portions of the application.
    
+                
+            
+            
+            
+                11111111-0000-4000-9000-100000000001
+            
+            
+        
+    
+    
+        
+            
    This is a collection of control responses.
    
+            
+        
+            
+                privileged and non-privileged
+            
+            
+                
+                    
+                        
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
+                        
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
+                        
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
+                        
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
+                        
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
+                        
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
+                        
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
+                        
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
+                        
+                    
+                        
+                            
    Optional description about what is being exported.
    
+                            
+                        
+                            
+                                
    Consumer-appropriate description of what a leveraging system may
+                                    inherite from THIS SYSTEM in the context of satisfying
+                                    satisfaction of AC-2, part a.
    
+                                
+                            
+                                11111111-0000-4000-9000-100000000001
+                            
+                            
+                        
+                            
+                                
    Leveraging system's responsibilities with respect to inheriting
+                                    this capability.
    
+                                
    In the context of the application component in satisfaction of
+                                    AC-2, part a.
    
+                                
+                            
+                                11111111-0000-4000-9000-100000000002
+                            
+                            
+                        
+                    
+                
+                    
+                        
    Describes how the application satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
+                        
+                    
+                        
+                            
    Optional description about what is being exported.
    
+                            
+                        
+                            
+                                
    Consumer-appropriate description of what may be inherited.
    
+                                
    In the context of the application component in satisfaction of
+                                    AC-2, part a.
    
+                                
+                            
+                                11111111-0000-4000-9000-100000000001
+                            
+                            
+                        
+                            
+                                
    Leveraging system's responsibilities with respect to inheriting
+                                    this capability.
    
+                                
    In the context of the application component in satisfaction of
+                                    AC-2, part a.
    
+                                
+                            
+                                11111111-0000-4000-9000-100000000002
+                            
+                            
+                        
+                    
+                
+                    
    a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts
+                        to support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment:
+                        privileged and non-privileged];
    
+                    
+                
             
-               
    a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: privileged and non-privileged];
    
+                
    The organization:
    
+                
    a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to
+                    support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment:
+                    organization-defined information system account types];
    
+                
    b. Assigns account managers for information system accounts;
    
+                
    c. Establishes conditions for group and role membership;
    
+                
    d. through j. omitted
    
                 
-             
-         
-            
    The organization:
    
-            
    a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: organization-defined information system account types];
    
-            
    b. Assigns account managers for information system accounts;
    
-            
    c. Establishes conditions for group and role membership;
    
-            
    d. through j. omitted
    
-             
-          
-       
-   
-      
-         
-      
-      
-         
-            
    NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4: Low Baseline Profile
    
-             
-         
-         
-         
-                
-       
-
+        
+    
+    
+        
+            
+        
+        
+            
+                
    NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4: Low Baseline Profile
    
+                
+            
+            
+            
+            
+        
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraging-example_ssp.xml b/src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraging-example_ssp.xml
index e5b062ea..36fd5b69 100644
--- a/src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraging-example_ssp.xml
+++ b/src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraging-example_ssp.xml
@@ -1,28 +1,33 @@
 
 
 
+   uuid="bb9219b1-e51c-4680-abb0-616a43bbfbb1">
    
       Leveraging SaaS System Security Plan
-      2023-10-12T00:00:00.000000-04:00
-      0.2
-      1.1.1
+      2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00
+      0.3
+      1.1.2
       
          Administrator
       
-      
-      
+      
          
-            
    Leveraged Authorization POC
    
+            
    Leveraging SaaS' Admin
    
+             
+          
+      
+         
+            
    Leveraged Authorization (IaaS) POC
    
              
           
        
-   
+   
    
       saas_system_iaas_customer
       Leveraging SaaS System
       
-         
    An example of three customers leveraging an authorized SaaS, which is running on an authorized IaaS.
    
+         
    An example of three customers leveraging an authorized SaaS, which is running on an
+            authorized IaaS.
    
          
     Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
   |         |         |
@@ -38,24 +43,28 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
   |  Leveraged IaaS   |
   +-------------------+
             
    
-         
    In this example, the IaaS SSP specifies customer responsibilities for certain controls.
    
-         
    The SaaS must address these for the control to be fully satisfied.
    
-         
    The SaaS provider may either implement these directly or pass the responsibility on to their customers. Both may be necessary.
    
+         
    In this example, the IaaS SSP (the leveraged SSP) specifies what IaaS provides and the
+            customer's responsibilities for certain controls.
    
+         
    The SaaS must address these responsibilities for the control to be fully satisfied.
    
+         
    The SaaS provider may either implement these directly or pass the responsibility on to
+            their customers. Both may be necessary.
    
          
    For any given control, the Leveraged IaaS SSP must describe:
    
          
      
             
    1. HOW the IaaS is directly satisfying the control
      2. 
-            
    2. WHAT responsibilities are left for the Leveraging SaaS (or their customers) to implement.
      3. 
+            
    3. WHAT responsibilities are left for the Leveraging SaaS (or their customers) to
+               implement.
      4. 
          
    
          
    For any given control, the Leveraging SaaS SSP must describe:
    
          
      
             
    1. WHAT is being inherited from the underlying IaaS
      2. 
             
    2. HOW the SaaS is directly satisfying the control.
      3. 
-            
    3. WHAT responsibilities are left for the SaaS customers to implement. (The SaaS customers are Cust-A, B and C)
      4. 
+            
    4. WHAT responsibilities are left for the SaaS' customers to implement. (The SaaS
+               customers are Cust-A, B and C)
      5. 
          
    
           
       low
       
-         
+         
             System and Network Monitoring
             
                
    This system handles information pertaining to audit events.
    
@@ -67,21 +76,24 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
                fips-199-moderate
                fips-199-low
                
-                  
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this type of adjustment.
    
+                  
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this type
+                     of adjustment.
    
                    
             
             
                fips-199-moderate
                fips-199-low
                
-                  
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this type of adjustment.
    
+                  
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this type
+                     of adjustment.
    
                    
                 
             
                fips-199-moderate
                fips-199-low
                
-                  
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this type of adjustment.
    
+                  
    This impact has been adjusted to low as an example of how to perform this type
+                     of adjustment.
    
                    
                 
              
@@ -91,21 +103,22 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
          fips-199-low
          fips-199-low
       
-      
+      
       
          
             
    The virtualized components deployed on the CSP IaaS.
    
              
           
       
-         
    Most system-characteristics content does not support the example, and is included to meet the minimum SSP syntax requirements.
    
+         
    Most system-characteristics content does not support the example, and is included to
+            meet the minimum SSP syntax requirements.
    
           
        
    
       
          CSP IaaS [Leveraged System]
-         
-         22222222-0000-4000-9000-100000000002
+         
+         11111111-0000-4000-9000-100000000001
          2018-01-01
       
       
@@ -115,14 +128,6 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
             Manages the components within the SaaS.
          
       
-      
-         This System
-         
-            
    The system described by this SSP.
    
-            
    This text was auto-generated by the OSCAL M3-RC1 data upgrade converter.
    
-             
-         
-          
       
          
             <strong>THIS SYSTEM (SaaS)</strong>
@@ -131,41 +136,41 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
             <p>This Leveraging SaaS.</p>
             <p>The entire system as depicted in the system authorization boundary</p>
          </description>
-         <prop name="implementation-point" value="system"/>
-         <status state="operational"/>
+         <status state="operational" />
       </component>
       <component uuid="22222222-0000-4000-9001-000000000002" type="system">
          <title>
             <strong>LEVERAGED SYSTEM (IaaS)</strong>
          
          
-            
    If the leveraged system owner provides a UUID for their system (such as in an OSCAL-based CRM), it should be used as the UUID for this component.
    
+            
    If the leveraged system owner provides a UUID for their system (such as in an
+               OSCAL-based CRM), it should be used as the UUID for this component.
    
              
-         
+         
          
-         
-         
+            value="22222222-0000-4000-9000-300000000001" />
+         
+         
           
       
          Access Control Appliance
          
             
    An access control virtual appliance, wich performs XYZ functions.
    
              
-         
-         
-         
+         
+         
+         
           
       
-         Leveraged Application
+         LEVERAGED APPLICATION
          
             
    Inherited from underlying IaaS.
    
              
-         
+         
          
-         
-         
+            value="22222222-0000-4000-9000-300000000001" />
+         
+         
           
        
    
@@ -179,7 +184,7 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
          
          
             
+               component-uuid="22222222-0000-4000-9001-000000000001">
                
                   
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
                   
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
@@ -190,32 +195,38 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
                   
    Response for the "This System" component.
    
                   
    Overall description of how "This System" satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
                    
-               
+               
+                  22222222-0000-4000-9000-100000000001
+               
                 
             
+               component-uuid="22222222-0000-4000-9001-000000000002">
                
                   
    Describe how this internal virtual appliance satisfies AC-2, Part a.
    
                    
                
+                  responsibility-uuid="11111111-0000-4000-9009-002001001001">
                   
-                     
    Description that directly addresses how the consumer responsibility was satisfied.
    
+                     
    Description that directly addresses how the consumer responsibility was
+                        satisfied.
    
                       
-                  
+                  
+                     22222222-0000-4000-9000-100000000001
+                  
                    
                 
             
+               component-uuid="22222222-0000-4000-9001-000000000003">
                
                   
    
-                     duplicated/tailored description of what was inherited, and description of what was configured.
+                     duplicated/tailored description of what was inherited, and description of
+                     what was configured.
                   
    
                   
    Consumer-appropriate description of what may be inherited.
    
                   
    In the context of the application component in satisfaction of AC-2, part a.
    
                    
                
+                  provided-uuid="11111111-0000-4000-9009-002001002001">
                   
                      
    Optional description.
    
                      
    
@@ -226,19 +237,23 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
                   
                
                
+                  responsibility-uuid="11111111-0000-4000-9009-002001002002">
                   
                      
    Description of how the responsibility was satisfied.
    
                       
                
                 
             
-               
    a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: privileged and non-privileged];
    
+               
    a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to
+                  support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: privileged and
+                  non-privileged];
    
                 
              
          
             
    The organization:
    
-            
    a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: organization-defined information system account types];
    
+            
    a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to
+               support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: organization-defined
+               information system account types];
    
             
    b. Assigns account managers for information system accounts;
    
             
    c. Establishes conditions for group and role membership;
    
             
    Omitted: d. through j.
    
@@ -247,23 +262,29 @@ Cust-A    Cust-B    Cust-C
    
    
       
-         
+         
       
       
          
             
    NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4: Low Baseline Profile
    
              
-         
-         
-         
+         
+         
+         
           
       
          
             
    Leveraged System Security Plan in OSCAL Data Formats
    
              
-         
-         
-         
-                
+         
+         
+         
+      
        
-    
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ssp-example.xml b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ssp-example.xml
index 5f563089..ba077838 100644
--- a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ssp-example.xml
+++ b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ssp-example.xml
@@ -4,12 +4,24 @@
     uuid="cff8385f-108e-40a5-8f7a-82f3dc0eaba8">
     
         Enterprise Logging and Auditing System Security Plan
-        2023-10-12T00:00:00.000000-04:00
+        2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00
         1.1
-        1.1.1
+        1.1.2
         
             Legal Officer
         
+        
+            System Maintainer
+        
+        
+            System Assets Owner
+        
+        
+            System Provider
+        
+        
+            System Assets Admin
+        
         
             Enterprise Asset Owners
         
@@ -34,8 +46,8 @@
             
    This is an example of a system that provides enterprise logging and log auditing
                 capabilities.
    
         
-        
-        
+        
+        
         moderate
         
             
@@ -80,6 +92,11 @@
             
             asset-administrator
         
+        
+            System Maintainer
+            
+            maintainer
+        
         
             Audit Team
             
@@ -90,6 +107,18 @@
             
             legal-officer
         
+        
+            Provider
+            
+            provider
+        
+        
+            This System
+            
+               
    The system described by this SSP.
    
+                
+            
+             
         
             Logging Server
             
@@ -124,7 +153,7 @@
                 
             
             
-            
+            
             
             
                 ec485dcf-2519-43f5-8e7d-014cc315332d
@@ -136,7 +165,7 @@
                 
    Ensures proper integration into the enterprise as new systems are brought into
                     production.
    
             
-            
+            
             
                 Ensures logs from components in new system are able to published to the
                     logging server. Ensures log monitoring capabilities recognize new system as
@@ -154,7 +183,7 @@
                     teams know about every asset that should be producing logs, thus should be
                     monitored.
    
             
-            
+            
             
                 Ensures that all host are known and authorized. Ensures that these hosts
                     publish log events to the logging server.
@@ -171,7 +200,7 @@
                     Splunk in the appropriate format. Also describes how to configure time
                     synchronization.
    
             
-            
+            
             
                 Ensures that all host are configured to publish log events to the logging
                     server.
@@ -192,8 +221,13 @@
             
                 3b2a5599-cc37-403f-ae36-5708fa804b27
             
-            
-            
+            
+                
+            
+
+            
+                
+                
         
         
             
    This is a partial implementation that addresses the logging server portion of the
diff --git a/src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml b/src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7ba147f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+
+
+    
+        IFA GoodRead System Security Plan
+        2023-05-19T14:46:54-04:00
+        2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00
+        1.1
+        1.0.4
+        
+            IFA GoodRead Owner
+        
+        
+            IFA GoodRead Developer
+        
+        
+            IFA GoodRead System Engineer
+        
+        
+            IFA Public Affairs Office
+        
+        
+            Owen Owner
+            3a675986-b4ff-4030-b178-e953c2e55d64
+        
+        
+            Nikita Wootten
+            3a675986-b4ff-4030-b178-e953c2e55d64
+        
+        
+            A.J. Stein
+            3a675986-b4ff-4030-b178-e953c2e55d64
+        
+        
+            Important Federal Agency
+            IFA
+            
+        
+        
+            ba9c12bd-e5ef-46b6-95a2-4d8e7f864c1a
+        
+        
+            67c04291-dbf6-495a-a3ba-0011638acc94
+        
+        
+            4ba3f2b7-e894-48d7-b940-91c68661df55
+        
+    
+    
+    
+        8101e04d-8305-4e73-bb95-6b59f645b143
+        IFA GoodRead
+        
+            
    This system acts as a link shortener for IFA employees
    
+        
+        2023-05-19
+        moderate
+        
+            
+                User-provided Links
+                
+                    
    This system maintains a set of user-provided links and their associated
+                        shortlinks
    
+                    
+                
+                    C.2.8.12
+                
+                
+                    fips-199-low
+                
+                
+                    fips-199-low
+                    fips-199-moderate
+                    
+                        
    Maliciously modified links are a concern
    
+                        
+                    
+                
+                    fips-199-low
+                
+                
+            
+        
+            low
+            medium
+            low
+        
+        
+        
+            
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the authorization boundary for IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                
+            
+        
+            
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the network architecture for IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                        
+            
+        
+            
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of various dataflows for application and related elements of the IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                        
+            
+    
+    
+        
+            Application Administrator
+            
+                
    The developer of the application supports IFA Public Affairs Officers by administering the application and its infrastructure.
    
+                
+            developer
+            
+                Application Administrator Privilege
+                user-creation
+                user-enablement
+                user-disablement
+                user-role-modification
+                popular-shortlink-cache-reset
+                database-export
+                database-migration
+            
+            
+        
+            Public Affairs Officers
+            
+                
    IFA Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in each division of the agency review public communications to citizens who are customers of the IFA. PAOs review requests from colleagues to generate and publish content that is the target of a shortlink and can unpublish shortlinks.
    
+                
+            public-affairs-office
+            
+                Public Affairs Officer Privilege
+                shortlink-generation
+                shortlink-approval
+                shortlink-rejection
+                shortlink-publication
+                shortlink-unpublication
+            
+            
+        
+            General Public
+            
+                
    The general public is free to click on shortlinks
    
+                
+            
+                General Public Privilege
+                shortlink-view
+            
+            
+        
+            IFA GoodRead System
+            
+                
    IFA develops, operates, and maintains the GoodRead link shortener system to 
    
+                
+            
+            
+                67c04291-dbf6-495a-a3ba-0011638acc94
+            
+            
+                4ba3f2b7-e894-48d7-b940-91c68661df55
+            
+            
+        
+            
+                
    This is the custom GoodRead application within the system.
    
+                
+            
+            
+            
+            
+                
+            
+            
+        
+            
+                
    This is the web application framework upon which the developer writes the custom GoodRead application for the user interface and API of this system.
    
+                
+            
+            
+            
+            
+                
+            
+            
+        
+            
+                
    This is the database for the custom GoodRead application within the system.
    
+                
+            
+            
+            
+            
+                
+            
+            
+        
+            
+                
    This is the operating system for the web server that runs the custom GoodRead application within the system.
    
+                
+            
+            
+            
+                
+            
+            
+        
+            
+                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Compute Service (ACS) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
+                
+            
+            
+            
+            
+            
+            
+                
+            
+            
+        
+            
+                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Load Balancer (ALB) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
+                
+            
+            
+            
+            
+                
+            
+            
+        
+    
+        
+            
    This is the control implementation for the application and infrastructure that compose to the IFA GoodRead Project's system.
    
+            
+        
+            individuals and roles with authorized access to security functions and security-relevant information are defined and not available to all users of the system;
+        
+        
+            security functions (deployed in hardware) for authorized access are defined;
+        
+        
+            security functions (deployed in soware) for authorized access are defined;
+        
+        
+            security functions (deployed in firmware) for authorized access are defined;
+        
+        
+            security-relevant information for authorized access is defined;
+        
+        
+            
+                
+                    
    The IFA GoodRead application and infrastructure are composed as designed and implemented with lease privilege for the elements of this system.
    
+                    
    For the IFA GoodRead application, the custom application is designed and implemented on top of the Django Framework to enforce least privilege. The application has a role for IFA Public Affairs Officers and one for the developers for privileged permissions, respectively. Only the latter can access or change administrative and security configurations and related data.
    
+                    
    The Django Framework and Django REST Framework (DRF), by default, allows any user with the is_staff role attribute to access administrative functions in an application using the framework. IFA GoodRead developers have disabled this behavior, relying on the custom roles identified in the relevant section.
    
+                    
    For the IFA GoodRead database, the system account and accredentials for the application to read and write to the system datastore has specific read and write authorization for specific tables. This database service account does not have full administrative permissions to add, modify, or delete all respective tables. For the production environment, only the IFA GoodRead developer has a dedicated account with equivalent permissions. Only local network socket access, within in the Linux server, is permitted by host firewall configuration. Remote access, privileged or unprivileged, is not allowed remotely and the system engineer must locally authenticate for access.
    
+                    
    For the RedHat Linux server upon which the IFA GoodRead application is deployed in this system, only the system engineer has a non-privileged user to log in remotely via the SSH protocol to perform ad-hoc inspection, monthly log review as required by policy and procedure, and emergency debugging of the system. Privileged system administration operations may only be performed with the sudo subsystem which requires a password, two-factor authentication, and has enhanced logging of all commands executed. The system engineer must log in remotely and then use sudo to elevate privileges. Remote access with the privileged account is prohibited by configuration and attempts are logged.
    
+                    
    For this remote SSH access, least privilege is additionally enforced by allowing this access via a specific network zone in the IFA GoodRead AwesomeCloud account accessible to only the system engineer via IFA's VPN solution, which requires the system engineer use a dedicated account with their own password and two-factor authentication token.
    
+                    
    For cloud account and API access to reconfigure the Linux server and its load balancer, administrative access is only allowed for the system engineer via a special AwesomeCloud IAM role. The authentication and authorization for this role is controlled by an integration with the organization's single sign-on solution. This solution will only be accessible and correctly execute for them when they are on the VPN with their account with traffic forwarded to the appropriate network zone in the IFA GoodRead account in AwesomeCloud. It will not work the developer or any staff users of the application.
    
+                             
+                
+                
+            
+        
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/validate.sh b/validate.sh
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..b1f2fd8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/validate.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+oscal-cli catalog validate ./src/examples/catalog/xml/basic-catalog.xml
+oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraged-example_ssp.xml
+oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraging-example_ssp.xml
+oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/ssp-example.xml
+oscal-cli ap validate ./src/examples/ap/xml/assessment-plan-example-1.xml
+oscal-cli ar validate ./src/examples/ar/xml/assessment-results-example-1.xml
+oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml
+oscal-cli component-definition validate ./src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component-definition.xml
+oscal-cli poam validate ./src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml

From fa5866557c15a011840deb7563d1f0093f7fd293 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 20:24:25 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 06/20] update file-names & oscal versions

---
 ...-1.xml => ifa_assessment-plan-example.xml} |   0
 ...xml => ifa_assessment-results-example.xml} |   0
 .../xml/ifa_plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml | 198 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml     | 138 ------------
 ...op-ssp-example.xml => ifa_ssp-example.xml} | 162 +++++++++-----
 validate.sh                                   |   8 +-
 6 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
 rename src/examples/ap/xml/{assessment-plan-example-1.xml => ifa_assessment-plan-example.xml} (100%)
 rename src/examples/ar/xml/{assessment-results-example-1.xml => ifa_assessment-results-example.xml} (100%)
 create mode 100644 src/examples/poam/xml/ifa_plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml
 delete mode 100644 src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml
 rename src/examples/ssp/xml/{workshop-ssp-example.xml => ifa_ssp-example.xml} (67%)

diff --git a/src/examples/ap/xml/assessment-plan-example-1.xml b/src/examples/ap/xml/ifa_assessment-plan-example.xml
similarity index 100%
rename from src/examples/ap/xml/assessment-plan-example-1.xml
rename to src/examples/ap/xml/ifa_assessment-plan-example.xml
diff --git a/src/examples/ar/xml/assessment-results-example-1.xml b/src/examples/ar/xml/ifa_assessment-results-example.xml
similarity index 100%
rename from src/examples/ar/xml/assessment-results-example-1.xml
rename to src/examples/ar/xml/ifa_assessment-results-example.xml
diff --git a/src/examples/poam/xml/ifa_plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml b/src/examples/poam/xml/ifa_plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e71c0b6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/examples/poam/xml/ifa_plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+
+
+    
+        IFA GoodRead Plan of Action and Milestones
+        2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00
+        1.1
+        1.1.2
+    
+    
+    8101e04d-8305-4e73-bb95-6b59f645b143
+    
+        Django Framework Examination
+        
+            
    Examine Django Framework for least privilege design and implementation.
    
+            
+        EXAMINE
+        control-objective
+        
+        2023-05-19T12:14:16-04:00
+        
+            
    The assessor attempted to access the admin panel while logged into the GoodRead
+                application as a PAO staff user. They were able to see the admin panel and directly
+                edit database records for the application using the Django Framework's admin panel.
    
+            
+        
+    
+        AwesomeCloud IAM Roles Test - GoodRead System Engineer Role
+        
+            
    Test AwesomeCloud IAM Roles for least privilege design and implementation.
    
+            
+        TEST
+        finding
+        
+        2023-06-02T08:31:20-04:00
+        2023-07-01T00:00:00-04:00
+        
+            
    The assessor's security automation platform analyzed all roles specific to the
+                GoodRead Product Team, not those managed by the Office of Information Technology.
+                The IFA-GoodRead-SystemEnginer role in their respective AwesomeCloud
+                account permitted use of the following high-risk actions.
    
+            
      
+                
    • awesomecloud:auditlog:DeleteAccountAuditLog
      • 
+                
    • awesomecloud:secmon:AdministerConfigurations
      • 
+            
    
+            
    Both of these actions are overly permissive and not appropriate for the business
+                function of the staff member assigned this role.
    
+            
+        
+    
+        IFA-GOODREAD-RISK-1: PAO Staff Have Over-Privileged Access to GoodRead System
+        
+            
    A user with the privileges of a PAO staff user can exceed the intended privileges for
+                their related business function and directly edit the database for the GoodRead
+                application.
    
+            
+        
+            
    An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used to
+                significantly damage links created by the tool for use by public citizens,
+                potentially causing a national outage. If an outage were to occur, IFA and
+                Government policy will require the CIO of the agency to notify the Department of
+                Homeland Security and the public.
    
+            
    Such an event will cause significant financial and reputational risk to IFA's
+                Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.
    
+            
+        deviation-approved
+        
+            
+                
+            
+            
+            
+        
+        
+            
+                
    The GoodRead application is designed and implemented to only allow access to the
+                    administrative functions for those with PAO staff fole via the VPN via network
+                    configuration between the IFA Enterprise Support Systems and the GoodRead
+                    AwesomeCloud account. Additionally, the load balanacer configuration only allows
+                    access to view shortlinks from the public internet.
    
+                
+            
+        2024-01-01T05:00:00-04:00
+        
+            IFA-GOODREAD-RISK1-RESPONSE: IFA GoodRead Prouct Team Response
+            
+                
    The GoodRead Product Team does not have sufficient personnel and budget to
+                    implement the required changes in their use of the Django Framework and its
+                    configuration in this quarter. With the consultation of the ISSO and the
+                    assessor, the owner of the GoodRead system has decided to accept this risk until
+                    the end of December 2023. From September to December, budget will be available
+                    for the Good Read Product Team's developer and system engineer to completely
+                    disable the functionality that is the source of the risk and its originating
+                    finding.
    
+                
+            
+            
+                End of Year Project Management Report of Developed Remediations
+                
+                    
    The owner, ISSO, and product team of the GoodRead Project intend to complete
+                        the necessary development between September 2023 and December 2023. Whether
+                        or not the necessary development for remedation is complete, the product
+                        team's project manager will submit the final annual report. They will
+                        identify this work item and whether it has been completed.
    
+                    
+                
+                    
+                
+                
+            
+        
+        
+    
+        IFA-GOODREAD-RISK-2: GoodRead System Engineers Have Over-Privileged Access to Cloud
+            Infrastructure Account
+        
+            
    A user in the GoodRead cloud environment with the privileges of a system engineer can
+                exceed the intended privileges for their related business function. They can delete
+                all historical audit records and remove important security monitoring functions for
+                the IFA Security Operations Center staff.
    
+            
+        
+            
    An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used to
+                surreptitiously add, change, or delete cloud infrastructure to the too managing all
+                links to IFA's communication to public citizens, potentially causing significant
+                harm with no forensic evidence to recover the system. Regardless of the extent and
+                duration of a potential incident, such a configuration greatly increases the risk of
+                an insider threat if there were likely to a potential insider threat in the GoodRead
+                Product Team.
    
+            
    If such an insider threat existed and acted with this misconfigruatio, the resulting
+                event could cause significant financial and reputational risk to IFA's
+                Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.
    
+            
+        open
+        
+            
+                
+            
+            
+            
+        
+        2023-06-23T17:00:00-04:00
+        
+            IFA-GOODREAD-RISK1-RESPONSE: IFA GoodRead Prouct Team Response
+            
+                
    The GoodRead Product Team does not have siginficant mitigations or compensating
+                    controls to counter this risk, even if likelihood is low. The IFA CISO has cited
+                    ongoing guidance that potential insider threat risks be prioritized above
+                    alternative categories of risk for this quarter. Additionally, there is
+                    sufficient budget and unallocated time for the GoodRead and Office of
+                    Information Technology system engineers to modify AwesomeCloud IAM roles on or
+                    before the next continuous monitoring cycle beginning in July 2023. The planned
+                    completion data is June 23, 2023.
    
+                
+            
+            
+                Completion of GoodRead Sprint Ending June 23, 2023
+                
+                    
    The owner, ISSO, and product team of the GoodRead Project intend to complete
+                        the necessary development by June 23. 2023, the last day of the coinciding
+                        sprint. Whether or not the necessary development for mitigation is complete,
+                        the product team's project manager will write a brief at the end of the
+                        sprint to thw owner and ISSO of this system with the final status and
+                        determination of this work item in this sprint.
    
+                    
+                
+                    
+                
+                
+            
+        
+        
+    
+        Update Django Framework Configuration to Disable Default Admin Panel
+        
+            
    Budget and technical staff are needed to re-design and re-implement a part of the
+                GoodRead application's use of a web appplication programming framework to mitigate
+                the risk of low privilege users directly modifying the database of this application.
+                This application is a high-visibility service and integral to future operations of
+                the IFA Office of Public Affairs and its staff.
    
+            
+        
+        
+        
+    
+        GoodRead System Engineers Have Over-Privileged Access to Cloud Infrastructure Account
+        
+            
    Budget and technical staff allocation are available and designated to fix a
+                misconfiguration of the IAM roles for members of the GoodRead Product Team in their
+                AwesomeCloud account to implement least privilege as designed.
    
+            
+        
+        
+        
+    
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml b/src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml
deleted file mode 100644
index a016ce84..00000000
--- a/src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-
-
-    
-        IFA GoodRead Plan of Action and Milestones
-        2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00
-        1.1
-        1.0.4
-    
-    
-    8101e04d-8305-4e73-bb95-6b59f645b143
-    
-        Django Framework Examination
-        
-            
    Examine Django Framework for least privilege design and implementation.
    
-            
-        EXAMINE
-        control-objective
-        
-        2023-05-19T12:14:16-04:00
-        
-            
    The assessor attempted to access the admin panel while logged into the GoodRead application as a PAO staff user. They were able to see the admin panel and directly edit database records for the application using the Django Framework's admin panel.
    
-            
-        
-    
-        AwesomeCloud IAM Roles Test - GoodRead System Engineer Role
-        
-            
    Test AwesomeCloud IAM Roles for least privilege design and implementation.
    
-            
-        TEST
-        finding
-        
-        2023-06-02T08:31:20-04:00
-        2023-07-01T00:00:00-04:00
-        
-            
    The assessor's security automation platform analyzed all roles specific to the GoodRead Product Team, not those managed by the Office of Information Technology. The IFA-GoodRead-SystemEnginer role in their respective AwesomeCloud account permitted use of the following high-risk actions.
    
-            
      
-                
    • awesomecloud:auditlog:DeleteAccountAuditLog
      • 
-                
    • awesomecloud:secmon:AdministerConfigurations
      • 
-            
    
-            
    Both of these actions are overly permissive and not appropriate for the business function of the staff member assigned this role.
    
-            
-        
-    
-        IFA-GOODREAD-RISK-1: PAO Staff Have Over-Privileged Access to GoodRead System
-        
-            
    A user with the privileges of a PAO staff user can exceed the intended privileges for their related business function and directly edit the database for the GoodRead application.
    
-            
-        
-            
    An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used to significantly damage links created by the tool for use by public citizens, potentially causing a national outage. If an outage were to occur, IFA and Government policy will require the CIO of the agency to notify the Department of Homeland Security and the public.
    
-            
    Such an event will cause significant financial and reputational risk to IFA's Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.
    
-            
-        deviation-approved
-        
-            
-                
-            
-            
-            
-        
-        
-            
-                
    The GoodRead application is designed and implemented to only allow access to the administrative functions for those with PAO staff fole via the VPN via network configuration between the IFA Enterprise Support Systems and the GoodRead AwesomeCloud account. Additionally, the load balanacer configuration only allows access to view shortlinks from the public internet.
    
-                
-            
-        2024-01-01T05:00:00-04:00
-        
-            IFA-GOODREAD-RISK1-RESPONSE: IFA GoodRead Prouct Team Response
-            
-                
    The GoodRead Product Team does not have sufficient personnel and budget to implement the required changes in their use of the Django Framework and its configuration in this quarter. With the consultation of the ISSO and the assessor, the owner of the GoodRead system has decided to accept this risk until the end of December 2023. From September to December, budget will be available for the Good Read Product Team's developer and system engineer to completely disable the functionality that is the source of the risk and its originating finding.
    
-                
-            
-            
-                End of Year Project Management Report of Developed Remediations
-                
-                    
    The owner, ISSO, and product team of the GoodRead Project intend to complete the necessary development between September 2023 and December 2023. Whether or not the necessary development for remedation is complete, the product team's project manager will submit the final annual report. They will identify this work item and whether it has been completed.
    
-                    
-                
-                    
-                
-                
-            
-        
-        
-    
-        IFA-GOODREAD-RISK-2: GoodRead System Engineers Have Over-Privileged Access to Cloud Infrastructure Account
-        
-            
    A user in the GoodRead cloud environment with the privileges of a system engineer can exceed the intended privileges for their related business function. They can delete all historical audit records and remove important security monitoring functions for the IFA Security Operations Center staff.
    
-            
-        
-            
    An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used to surreptitiously add, change, or delete cloud infrastructure to the too managing all links to IFA's communication to public citizens, potentially causing significant harm with no forensic evidence to recover the system. Regardless of the extent and duration of a potential incident, such a configuration greatly increases the risk of an insider threat if there were likely to a potential insider threat in the GoodRead Product Team.
    
-            
    If such an insider threat existed and acted with this misconfigruatio, the resulting event could cause significant financial and reputational risk to IFA's Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.
    
-            
-        open
-        
-            
-                
-            
-            
-            
-        
-        2023-06-23T17:00:00-04:00
-        
-            IFA-GOODREAD-RISK1-RESPONSE: IFA GoodRead Prouct Team Response
-            
-                
    The GoodRead Product Team does not have siginficant mitigations or compensating controls to counter this risk, even if likelihood is low. The IFA CISO has cited ongoing guidance that potential insider threat risks be prioritized above alternative categories of risk for this quarter. Additionally, there is sufficient budget and unallocated time for the GoodRead and Office of Information Technology system engineers to modify AwesomeCloud IAM roles on or before the next continuous monitoring cycle beginning in July 2023. The planned completion data is June 23, 2023.
    
-                
-            
-            
-                Completion of GoodRead Sprint Ending June 23, 2023
-                
-                    
    The owner, ISSO, and product team of the GoodRead Project intend to complete the necessary development by June 23. 2023, the last day of the coinciding sprint. Whether or not the necessary development for mitigation is complete, the product team's project manager will write a brief at the end of the sprint to thw owner and ISSO of this system with the final status and determination of this work item in this sprint.
    
-                    
-                
-                    
-                
-                
-            
-        
-        
-    
-        Update Django Framework Configuration to Disable Default Admin Panel
-        
-            
    Budget and technical staff are needed to re-design and re-implement a part of the GoodRead application's use of a web appplication programming framework to mitigate the risk of low privilege users directly modifying the database of this application. This application is a high-visibility service and integral to future operations of the IFA Office of Public Affairs and its staff.
    
-            
-        
-        
-        
-    
-        GoodRead System Engineers Have Over-Privileged Access to Cloud Infrastructure Account
-        
-            
    Budget and technical staff allocation are available and designated to fix a misconfiguration of the IAM roles for members of the GoodRead Product Team in their AwesomeCloud account to implement least privilege as designed.
    
-            
-        
-        
-        
-    
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
similarity index 67%
rename from src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml
rename to src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
index 7ba147f3..dca6a249 100644
--- a/src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml
+++ b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
         2023-05-19T14:46:54-04:00
         2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00
         1.1
-        1.0.4
+        1.1.2
         
             IFA GoodRead Owner
         
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
         
             Important Federal Agency
             IFA
-            
+            
         
         
             ba9c12bd-e5ef-46b6-95a2-4d8e7f864c1a
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
             4ba3f2b7-e894-48d7-b940-91c68661df55
         
         
-    
+    
     
         8101e04d-8305-4e73-bb95-6b59f645b143
         IFA GoodRead
@@ -86,28 +86,32 @@
             medium
             low
         
-        
+        
         
             
-                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the authorization boundary for IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the authorization boundary for IFA
+                    GoodRead Project's information system.
    
                 
             
         
             
-                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the network architecture for IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
-                        
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the network architecture for IFA
+                    GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+            
             
         
             
-                
    This section describes an attached diagram of various dataflows for application and related elements of the IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
-                        
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of various dataflows for application
+                    and related elements of the IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+            
             
         
     
         
             Application Administrator
             
-                
    The developer of the application supports IFA Public Affairs Officers by administering the application and its infrastructure.
    
+                
    The developer of the application supports IFA Public Affairs Officers by
+                    administering the application and its infrastructure.
    
                 
             developer
             
@@ -124,7 +128,10 @@
         
             Public Affairs Officers
             
-                
    IFA Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in each division of the agency review public communications to citizens who are customers of the IFA. PAOs review requests from colleagues to generate and publish content that is the target of a shortlink and can unpublish shortlinks.
    
+                
    IFA Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in each division of the agency review public
+                    communications to citizens who are customers of the IFA. PAOs review requests
+                    from colleagues to generate and publish content that is the target of a
+                    shortlink and can unpublish shortlinks.
    
                 
             public-affairs-office
             
@@ -151,7 +158,7 @@
             
                 
    IFA develops, operates, and maintains the GoodRead link shortener system to 
    
                 
-            
+            
             
                 67c04291-dbf6-495a-a3ba-0011638acc94
             
@@ -163,76 +170,84 @@
             
                 
    This is the custom GoodRead application within the system.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
         
         
             
-                
    This is the web application framework upon which the developer writes the custom GoodRead application for the user interface and API of this system.
    
+                
    This is the web application framework upon which the developer writes the custom
+                    GoodRead application for the user interface and API of this system.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
             
                 
    This is the database for the custom GoodRead application within the system.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
             
-                
    This is the operating system for the web server that runs the custom GoodRead application within the system.
    
+                
    This is the operating system for the web server that runs the custom GoodRead
+                    application within the system.
    
                 
-            
-            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
             
-                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Compute Service (ACS) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
+                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Compute Service
+                    (ACS) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
             
-                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Load Balancer (ALB) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
+                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Load Balancer
+                    (ALB) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
     
         
-            
    This is the control implementation for the application and infrastructure that compose to the IFA GoodRead Project's system.
    
+            
    This is the control implementation for the application and infrastructure that
+                compose to the IFA GoodRead Project's system.
    
             
         
-            individuals and roles with authorized access to security functions and security-relevant information are defined and not available to all users of the system;
+            individuals and roles with authorized access to security functions and
+                security-relevant information are defined and not available to all users of the
+                system;
         
         
             security functions (deployed in hardware) for authorized access are defined;
@@ -247,17 +262,58 @@
             security-relevant information for authorized access is defined;
         
         
-            
+            
                 
-                    
    The IFA GoodRead application and infrastructure are composed as designed and implemented with lease privilege for the elements of this system.
    
-                    
    For the IFA GoodRead application, the custom application is designed and implemented on top of the Django Framework to enforce least privilege. The application has a role for IFA Public Affairs Officers and one for the developers for privileged permissions, respectively. Only the latter can access or change administrative and security configurations and related data.
    
-                    
    The Django Framework and Django REST Framework (DRF), by default, allows any user with the is_staff role attribute to access administrative functions in an application using the framework. IFA GoodRead developers have disabled this behavior, relying on the custom roles identified in the relevant section.
    
-                    
    For the IFA GoodRead database, the system account and accredentials for the application to read and write to the system datastore has specific read and write authorization for specific tables. This database service account does not have full administrative permissions to add, modify, or delete all respective tables. For the production environment, only the IFA GoodRead developer has a dedicated account with equivalent permissions. Only local network socket access, within in the Linux server, is permitted by host firewall configuration. Remote access, privileged or unprivileged, is not allowed remotely and the system engineer must locally authenticate for access.
    
-                    
    For the RedHat Linux server upon which the IFA GoodRead application is deployed in this system, only the system engineer has a non-privileged user to log in remotely via the SSH protocol to perform ad-hoc inspection, monthly log review as required by policy and procedure, and emergency debugging of the system. Privileged system administration operations may only be performed with the sudo subsystem which requires a password, two-factor authentication, and has enhanced logging of all commands executed. The system engineer must log in remotely and then use sudo to elevate privileges. Remote access with the privileged account is prohibited by configuration and attempts are logged.
    
-                    
    For this remote SSH access, least privilege is additionally enforced by allowing this access via a specific network zone in the IFA GoodRead AwesomeCloud account accessible to only the system engineer via IFA's VPN solution, which requires the system engineer use a dedicated account with their own password and two-factor authentication token.
    
-                    
    For cloud account and API access to reconfigure the Linux server and its load balancer, administrative access is only allowed for the system engineer via a special AwesomeCloud IAM role. The authentication and authorization for this role is controlled by an integration with the organization's single sign-on solution. This solution will only be accessible and correctly execute for them when they are on the VPN with their account with traffic forwarded to the appropriate network zone in the IFA GoodRead account in AwesomeCloud. It will not work the developer or any staff users of the application.
    
-                             
-                
+                    
    The IFA GoodRead application and infrastructure are composed as designed and
+                        implemented with lease privilege for the elements of this system.
    
+                    
    For the IFA GoodRead application, the custom application is designed and
+                        implemented on top of the Django Framework to enforce least privilege. The
+                        application has a role for IFA Public Affairs Officers and one for the
+                        developers for privileged permissions, respectively. Only the latter can
+                        access or change administrative and security configurations and related
+                        data.
    
+                    
    The Django Framework and Django REST Framework (DRF), by default, allows any
+                        user with the is_staff role attribute to access administrative
+                        functions in an application using the framework. IFA GoodRead developers
+                        have disabled this behavior, relying on the custom roles identified in the
+                        relevant section.
    
+                    
    For the IFA GoodRead database, the system account and accredentials for the
+                        application to read and write to the system datastore has specific read and
+                        write authorization for specific tables. This database service account does
+                        not have full administrative permissions to add, modify, or delete all
+                        respective tables. For the production environment, only the IFA GoodRead
+                        developer has a dedicated account with equivalent permissions. Only local
+                        network socket access, within in the Linux server, is permitted by host
+                        firewall configuration. Remote access, privileged or unprivileged, is not
+                        allowed remotely and the system engineer must locally authenticate for
+                        access.
    
+                    
    For the RedHat Linux server upon which the IFA GoodRead application is
+                        deployed in this system, only the system engineer has a non-privileged user
+                        to log in remotely via the SSH protocol to perform ad-hoc inspection,
+                        monthly log review as required by policy and procedure, and emergency
+                        debugging of the system. Privileged system administration operations may
+                        only be performed with the sudo subsystem which requires a
+                        password, two-factor authentication, and has enhanced logging of all
+                        commands executed. The system engineer must log in remotely and then use 
+                        sudo to elevate privileges. Remote access with the privileged account
+                        is prohibited by configuration and attempts are logged.
    
+                    
    For this remote SSH access, least privilege is additionally enforced by
+                        allowing this access via a specific network zone in the IFA GoodRead
+                        AwesomeCloud account accessible to only the system engineer via IFA's VPN
+                        solution, which requires the system engineer use a dedicated account with
+                        their own password and two-factor authentication token.
    
+                    
    For cloud account and API access to reconfigure the Linux server and its load
+                        balancer, administrative access is only allowed for the system engineer via
+                        a special AwesomeCloud IAM role. The authentication and authorization for
+                        this role is controlled by an integration with the organization's single
+                        sign-on solution. This solution will only be accessible and correctly
+                        execute for them when they are on the VPN with their account with traffic
+                        forwarded to the appropriate network zone in the IFA GoodRead account in
+                        AwesomeCloud. It will not work the developer or any staff users of the
+                        application.
    
+                
+                
                 
             
         
diff --git a/validate.sh b/validate.sh
index b1f2fd8c..e3c52969 100755
--- a/validate.sh
+++ b/validate.sh
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ oscal-cli catalog validate ./src/examples/catalog/xml/basic-catalog.xml
 oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraged-example_ssp.xml
 oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraging-example_ssp.xml
 oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/ssp-example.xml
-oscal-cli ap validate ./src/examples/ap/xml/assessment-plan-example-1.xml
-oscal-cli ar validate ./src/examples/ar/xml/assessment-results-example-1.xml
-oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/workshop-ssp-example.xml
+oscal-cli ap validate ./src/examples/ap/xml/ifa_assessment-plan-example.xml
+oscal-cli ar validate ./src/examples/ar/xml/ifa_assessment-results-example.xml
+oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
 oscal-cli component-definition validate ./src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component-definition.xml
-oscal-cli poam validate ./src/examples/poam/xml/plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml
+oscal-cli poam validate ./src/examples/poam/xml/ifa_plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml

From 5ff7718c1db8644e3a268dd4436571ba71efe9dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2024 02:16:31 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 07/20] change names

---
 src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
index dca6a249..246555de 100644
--- a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
+++ b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
@@ -21,15 +21,15 @@
             IFA Public Affairs Office
         
         
-            Owen Owner
+            Owen Stilskin
             3a675986-b4ff-4030-b178-e953c2e55d64
         
         
-            Nikita Wootten
+            Juno Styles
             3a675986-b4ff-4030-b178-e953c2e55d64
         
         
-            A.J. Stein
+            Xavier Jones
             3a675986-b4ff-4030-b178-e953c2e55d64
         
         

From e774c4978e6792b64b5fa1cce8e20f03f28fda8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2024 11:50:40 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 08/20] Update ifa_ssp-example.xml

---
 src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml | 98 ++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
index 246555de..4e17ec09 100644
--- a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
+++ b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
@@ -59,25 +59,15 @@
         
             
                 User-provided Links
-                
-                    
    This system maintains a set of user-provided links and their associated
-                        shortlinks
    
+                
    This system maintains a set of user-provided links and their associated    shortlinks
    
                     
-                
-                    C.2.8.12
+                C.2.8.12
                 
-                
-                    fips-199-low
+                fips-199-low
                 
-                
-                    fips-199-low
-                    fips-199-moderate
-                    
-                        
    Maliciously modified links are a concern
    
-                        
+                fips-199-lowfips-199-moderate    
    Maliciously modified links are a concern
    
                     
-                
-                    fips-199-low
+                fips-199-low
                 
                 
             
@@ -89,20 +79,17 @@
         
         
             
-                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the authorization boundary for IFA
-                    GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the authorization boundary for IFAGoodRead Project's information system.
    
                 
             
         
             
-                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the network architecture for IFA
-                    GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the network architecture for IFAGoodRead Project's information system.
    
                 
             
         
             
-                
    This section describes an attached diagram of various dataflows for application
-                    and related elements of the IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of various dataflows for applicationand related elements of the IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
                 
             
     
@@ -110,8 +97,7 @@
         
             Application Administrator
             
-                
    The developer of the application supports IFA Public Affairs Officers by
-                    administering the application and its infrastructure.
    
+                
    The developer of the application supports IFA Public Affairs Officers byadministering the application and its infrastructure.
    
                 
             developer
             
@@ -128,10 +114,7 @@
         
             Public Affairs Officers
             
-                
    IFA Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in each division of the agency review public
-                    communications to citizens who are customers of the IFA. PAOs review requests
-                    from colleagues to generate and publish content that is the target of a
-                    shortlink and can unpublish shortlinks.
    
+                
    IFA Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in each division of the agency review publiccommunications to citizens who are customers of the IFA. PAOs review requestsfrom colleagues to generate and publish content that is the target of ashortlink and can unpublish shortlinks.
    
                 
             public-affairs-office
             
@@ -179,8 +162,7 @@
         
         
             
-                
    This is the web application framework upon which the developer writes the custom
-                    GoodRead application for the user interface and API of this system.
    
+                
    This is the web application framework upon which the developer writes the customGoodRead application for the user interface and API of this system.
    
                 
             
             
@@ -202,8 +184,7 @@
             
         
             
-                
    This is the operating system for the web server that runs the custom GoodRead
-                    application within the system.
    
+                
    This is the operating system for the web server that runs the custom GoodReadapplication within the system.
    
                 
             
             
@@ -213,8 +194,7 @@
             
         
             
-                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Compute Service
-                    (ACS) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
+                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Compute Service(ACS) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
                 
             
             
@@ -227,8 +207,7 @@
             
         
             
-                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Load Balancer
-                    (ALB) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
+                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Load Balancer(ALB) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
                 
             
             
@@ -264,54 +243,7 @@
         
             
-                
-                    
    The IFA GoodRead application and infrastructure are composed as designed and
-                        implemented with lease privilege for the elements of this system.
    
-                    
    For the IFA GoodRead application, the custom application is designed and
-                        implemented on top of the Django Framework to enforce least privilege. The
-                        application has a role for IFA Public Affairs Officers and one for the
-                        developers for privileged permissions, respectively. Only the latter can
-                        access or change administrative and security configurations and related
-                        data.
    
-                    
    The Django Framework and Django REST Framework (DRF), by default, allows any
-                        user with the is_staff role attribute to access administrative
-                        functions in an application using the framework. IFA GoodRead developers
-                        have disabled this behavior, relying on the custom roles identified in the
-                        relevant section.
    
-                    
    For the IFA GoodRead database, the system account and accredentials for the
-                        application to read and write to the system datastore has specific read and
-                        write authorization for specific tables. This database service account does
-                        not have full administrative permissions to add, modify, or delete all
-                        respective tables. For the production environment, only the IFA GoodRead
-                        developer has a dedicated account with equivalent permissions. Only local
-                        network socket access, within in the Linux server, is permitted by host
-                        firewall configuration. Remote access, privileged or unprivileged, is not
-                        allowed remotely and the system engineer must locally authenticate for
-                        access.
    
-                    
    For the RedHat Linux server upon which the IFA GoodRead application is
-                        deployed in this system, only the system engineer has a non-privileged user
-                        to log in remotely via the SSH protocol to perform ad-hoc inspection,
-                        monthly log review as required by policy and procedure, and emergency
-                        debugging of the system. Privileged system administration operations may
-                        only be performed with the sudo subsystem which requires a
-                        password, two-factor authentication, and has enhanced logging of all
-                        commands executed. The system engineer must log in remotely and then use 
-                        sudo to elevate privileges. Remote access with the privileged account
-                        is prohibited by configuration and attempts are logged.
    
-                    
    For this remote SSH access, least privilege is additionally enforced by
-                        allowing this access via a specific network zone in the IFA GoodRead
-                        AwesomeCloud account accessible to only the system engineer via IFA's VPN
-                        solution, which requires the system engineer use a dedicated account with
-                        their own password and two-factor authentication token.
    
-                    
    For cloud account and API access to reconfigure the Linux server and its load
-                        balancer, administrative access is only allowed for the system engineer via
-                        a special AwesomeCloud IAM role. The authentication and authorization for
-                        this role is controlled by an integration with the organization's single
-                        sign-on solution. This solution will only be accessible and correctly
-                        execute for them when they are on the VPN with their account with traffic
-                        forwarded to the appropriate network zone in the IFA GoodRead account in
-                        AwesomeCloud. It will not work the developer or any staff users of the
-                        application.
    
+                
    The IFA GoodRead application and infrastructure are composed as designed and    implemented with lease privilege for the elements of this system.
    For the IFA GoodRead application, the custom application is designed and    implemented on top of the Django Framework to enforce least privilege. The    application has a role for IFA Public Affairs Officers and one for the    developers for privileged permissions, respectively. Only the latter can    access or change administrative and security configurations and related    data.
    The Django Framework and Django REST Framework (DRF), by default, allows any    user with the is_staff role attribute to access administrative    functions in an application using the framework. IFA GoodRead developers    have disabled this behavior, relying on the custom roles identified in the    relevant section.
    For the IFA GoodRead database, the system account and accredentials for the    application to read and write to the system datastore has specific read and    write authorization for specific tables. This database service account does    not have full administrative permissions to add, modify, or delete all    respective tables. For the production environment, only the IFA GoodRead    developer has a dedicated account with equivalent permissions. Only local    network socket access, within in the Linux server, is permitted by host    firewall configuration. Remote access, privileged or unprivileged, is not    allowed remotely and the system engineer must locally authenticate for    access.
    For the RedHat Linux server upon which the IFA GoodRead application is    deployed in this system, only the system engineer has a non-privileged user    to log in remotely via the SSH protocol to perform ad-hoc inspection,    monthly log review as required by policy and procedure, and emergency    debugging of the system. Privileged system administration operations may    only be performed with the sudo subsystem which requires a    password, two-factor authentication, and has enhanced logging of all    commands executed. The system engineer must log in remotely and then use     sudo to elevate privileges. Remote access with the privileged account    is prohibited by configuration and attempts are logged.
    For this remote SSH access, least privilege is additionally enforced by    allowing this access via a specific network zone in the IFA GoodRead    AwesomeCloud account accessible to only the system engineer via IFA's VPN    solution, which requires the system engineer use a dedicated account with    their own password and two-factor authentication token.
    For cloud account and API access to reconfigure the Linux server and its load    balancer, administrative access is only allowed for the system engineer via    a special AwesomeCloud IAM role. The authentication and authorization for    this role is controlled by an integration with the organization's single    sign-on solution. This solution will only be accessible and correctly    execute for them when they are on the VPN with their account with traffic    forwarded to the appropriate network zone in the IFA GoodRead account in    AwesomeCloud. It will not work the developer or any staff users of the    application.
    
                     
                 
                 

From 337245378fcc55b2c2574558fcf821f5feaccdbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2024 11:58:17 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 09/20] remove extra spaces

---
 src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
index 4e17ec09..cb5356fd 100644
--- a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
+++ b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
@@ -59,13 +59,13 @@
         
             
                 User-provided Links
-                
    This system maintains a set of user-provided links and their associated    shortlinks
    
+                
    This system maintains a set of user-provided links and their associated shortlinks
    
                     
                 C.2.8.12
                 
                 fips-199-low
                 
-                fips-199-lowfips-199-moderate    
    Maliciously modified links are a concern
    
+                fips-199-lowfips-199-moderate
    Maliciously modified links are a concern
    
                     
                 fips-199-low
                 
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@
         
             
-                
    The IFA GoodRead application and infrastructure are composed as designed and    implemented with lease privilege for the elements of this system.
    For the IFA GoodRead application, the custom application is designed and    implemented on top of the Django Framework to enforce least privilege. The    application has a role for IFA Public Affairs Officers and one for the    developers for privileged permissions, respectively. Only the latter can    access or change administrative and security configurations and related    data.
    The Django Framework and Django REST Framework (DRF), by default, allows any    user with the is_staff role attribute to access administrative    functions in an application using the framework. IFA GoodRead developers    have disabled this behavior, relying on the custom roles identified in the    relevant section.
    For the IFA GoodRead database, the system account and accredentials for the    application to read and write to the system datastore has specific read and    write authorization for specific tables. This database service account does    not have full administrative permissions to add, modify, or delete all    respective tables. For the production environment, only the IFA GoodRead    developer has a dedicated account with equivalent permissions. Only local    network socket access, within in the Linux server, is permitted by host    firewall configuration. Remote access, privileged or unprivileged, is not    allowed remotely and the system engineer must locally authenticate for    access.
    For the RedHat Linux server upon which the IFA GoodRead application is    deployed in this system, only the system engineer has a non-privileged user    to log in remotely via the SSH protocol to perform ad-hoc inspection,    monthly log review as required by policy and procedure, and emergency    debugging of the system. Privileged system administration operations may    only be performed with the sudo subsystem which requires a    password, two-factor authentication, and has enhanced logging of all    commands executed. The system engineer must log in remotely and then use     sudo to elevate privileges. Remote access with the privileged account    is prohibited by configuration and attempts are logged.
    For this remote SSH access, least privilege is additionally enforced by    allowing this access via a specific network zone in the IFA GoodRead    AwesomeCloud account accessible to only the system engineer via IFA's VPN    solution, which requires the system engineer use a dedicated account with    their own password and two-factor authentication token.
    For cloud account and API access to reconfigure the Linux server and its load    balancer, administrative access is only allowed for the system engineer via    a special AwesomeCloud IAM role. The authentication and authorization for    this role is controlled by an integration with the organization's single    sign-on solution. This solution will only be accessible and correctly    execute for them when they are on the VPN with their account with traffic    forwarded to the appropriate network zone in the IFA GoodRead account in    AwesomeCloud. It will not work the developer or any staff users of the    application.
    
+                
    The IFA GoodRead application and infrastructure are composed as designed and implemented with lease privilege for the elements of this system.
    For the IFA GoodRead application, the custom application is designed and implemented on top of the Django Framework to enforce least privilege. The application has a role for IFA Public Affairs Officers and one for the developers for privileged permissions, respectively. Only the latter can access or change administrative and security configurations and related data.
    The Django Framework and Django REST Framework (DRF), by default, allows any user with the is_staff role attribute to access administrative functions in an application using the framework. IFA GoodRead developers have disabled this behavior, relying on the custom roles identified in the relevant section.
    For the IFA GoodRead database, the system account and accredentials for the application to read and write to the system datastore has specific read and write authorization for specific tables. This database service account does not have full administrative permissions to add, modify, or delete all respective tables. For the production environment, only the IFA GoodRead developer has a dedicated account with equivalent permissions. Only local network socket access, within in the Linux server, is permitted by host firewall configuration. Remote access, privileged or unprivileged, is not allowed remotely and the system engineer must locally authenticate for access.
    For the RedHat Linux server upon which the IFA GoodRead application is deployed in this system, only the system engineer has a non-privileged user to log in remotely via the SSH protocol to perform ad-hoc inspection, monthly log review as required by policy and procedure, and emergency debugging of the system. Privileged system administration operations may only be performed with the sudo subsystem which requires a password, two-factor authentication, and has enhanced logging of all commands executed. The system engineer must log in remotely and then use sudo to elevate privileges. Remote access with the privileged account is prohibited by configuration and attempts are logged.
    For this remote SSH access, least privilege is additionally enforced by allowing this access via a specific network zone in the IFA GoodRead AwesomeCloud account accessible to only the system engineer via IFA's VPN solution, which requires the system engineer use a dedicated account with their own password and two-factor authentication token.
    For cloud account and API access to reconfigure the Linux server and its load balancer, administrative access is only allowed for the system engineer via a special AwesomeCloud IAM role. The authentication and authorization for this role is controlled by an integration with the organization's single sign-on solution. This solution will only be accessible and correctly execute for them when they are on the VPN with their account with traffic forwarded to the appropriate network zone in the IFA GoodRead account in AwesomeCloud. It will not work the developer or any staff users of the application.
    
                     
                 
                 

From 4b0e2ff896b6e6b2c29afa81fbd9ba1d786672ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2024 12:03:42 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 10/20] Update ifa_ssp-example.xml

---
 src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml | 126 +++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
index cb5356fd..06b42f8b 100644
--- a/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
+++ b/src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
     
         IFA GoodRead System Security Plan
         2023-05-19T14:46:54-04:00
-        2024-02-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00
+        2024-03-01T13:57:28.355446-04:00
         1.1
         1.1.2
         
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
         
             Important Federal Agency
             IFA
-            
+            
         
         
             ba9c12bd-e5ef-46b6-95a2-4d8e7f864c1a
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
             4ba3f2b7-e894-48d7-b940-91c68661df55
         
     
-    
+    
     
         8101e04d-8305-4e73-bb95-6b59f645b143
         IFA GoodRead
@@ -59,15 +59,25 @@
         
             
                 User-provided Links
-                
    This system maintains a set of user-provided links and their associated shortlinks
    
+                
+                    
    This system maintains a set of user-provided links and their associated
+                        shortlinks
    
                     
-                C.2.8.12
+                
+                    C.2.8.12
                 
-                fips-199-low
+                
+                    fips-199-low
                 
-                fips-199-lowfips-199-moderate
    Maliciously modified links are a concern
    
+                
+                    fips-199-low
+                    fips-199-moderate
+                    
+                        
    Maliciously modified links are a concern
    
+                        
                     
-                fips-199-low
+                
+                    fips-199-low
                 
                 
             
@@ -76,28 +86,28 @@
             medium
             low
         
-        
+        
         
             
-                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the authorization boundary for IFAGoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the authorization boundary for IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
                 
             
         
             
-                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the network architecture for IFAGoodRead Project's information system.
    
-                
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of the network architecture for IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                        
         
         
             
-                
    This section describes an attached diagram of various dataflows for applicationand related elements of the IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
-                
+                
    This section describes an attached diagram of various dataflows for application and related elements of the IFA GoodRead Project's information system.
    
+                    
             
     
     
         
             Application Administrator
             
-                
    The developer of the application supports IFA Public Affairs Officers byadministering the application and its infrastructure.
    
+                
    The developer of the application supports IFA Public Affairs Officers by administering the application and its infrastructure.
    
                 
             developer
             
@@ -114,7 +124,7 @@
         
             Public Affairs Officers
             
-                
    IFA Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in each division of the agency review publiccommunications to citizens who are customers of the IFA. PAOs review requestsfrom colleagues to generate and publish content that is the target of ashortlink and can unpublish shortlinks.
    
+                
    IFA Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in each division of the agency review public communications to citizens who are customers of the IFA. PAOs review requests from colleagues to generate and publish content that is the target of a shortlink and can unpublish shortlinks.
    
                 
             public-affairs-office
             
@@ -141,7 +151,7 @@
             
                 
    IFA develops, operates, and maintains the GoodRead link shortener system to 
    
                 
-            
+            
             
                 67c04291-dbf6-495a-a3ba-0011638acc94
             
@@ -153,80 +163,76 @@
             
                 
    This is the custom GoodRead application within the system.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
             
-                
    This is the web application framework upon which the developer writes the customGoodRead application for the user interface and API of this system.
    
+                
    This is the web application framework upon which the developer writes the custom GoodRead application for the user interface and API of this system.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
             
                 
    This is the database for the custom GoodRead application within the system.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
             
-                
    This is the operating system for the web server that runs the custom GoodReadapplication within the system.
    
+                
    This is the operating system for the web server that runs the custom GoodRead application within the system.
    
                 
-            
-            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
             
-                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Compute Service(ACS) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
+                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Compute Service (ACS) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
         
             
-                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Load Balancer(ALB) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
+                
    This inventory item is an instance from the AwesomeCloud Awesome Load Balancer (ALB) Service. It is a Linux server.
    
                 
-            
-            
-            
+            
+            
+            
             
-                
+                
             
             
     
     
         
-            
    This is the control implementation for the application and infrastructure that
-                compose to the IFA GoodRead Project's system.
    
+            
    This is the control implementation for the application and infrastructure that compose to the IFA GoodRead Project's system.
    
             
         
-            individuals and roles with authorized access to security functions and
-                security-relevant information are defined and not available to all users of the
-                system;
+            individuals and roles with authorized access to security functions and security-relevant information are defined and not available to all users of the system;
         
         
             security functions (deployed in hardware) for authorized access are defined;
@@ -241,11 +247,17 @@
             security-relevant information for authorized access is defined;
         
         
-            
-                
    The IFA GoodRead application and infrastructure are composed as designed and implemented with lease privilege for the elements of this system.
    For the IFA GoodRead application, the custom application is designed and implemented on top of the Django Framework to enforce least privilege. The application has a role for IFA Public Affairs Officers and one for the developers for privileged permissions, respectively. Only the latter can access or change administrative and security configurations and related data.
    The Django Framework and Django REST Framework (DRF), by default, allows any user with the is_staff role attribute to access administrative functions in an application using the framework. IFA GoodRead developers have disabled this behavior, relying on the custom roles identified in the relevant section.
    For the IFA GoodRead database, the system account and accredentials for the application to read and write to the system datastore has specific read and write authorization for specific tables. This database service account does not have full administrative permissions to add, modify, or delete all respective tables. For the production environment, only the IFA GoodRead developer has a dedicated account with equivalent permissions. Only local network socket access, within in the Linux server, is permitted by host firewall configuration. Remote access, privileged or unprivileged, is not allowed remotely and the system engineer must locally authenticate for access.
    For the RedHat Linux server upon which the IFA GoodRead application is deployed in this system, only the system engineer has a non-privileged user to log in remotely via the SSH protocol to perform ad-hoc inspection, monthly log review as required by policy and procedure, and emergency debugging of the system. Privileged system administration operations may only be performed with the sudo subsystem which requires a password, two-factor authentication, and has enhanced logging of all commands executed. The system engineer must log in remotely and then use sudo to elevate privileges. Remote access with the privileged account is prohibited by configuration and attempts are logged.
    For this remote SSH access, least privilege is additionally enforced by allowing this access via a specific network zone in the IFA GoodRead AwesomeCloud account accessible to only the system engineer via IFA's VPN solution, which requires the system engineer use a dedicated account with their own password and two-factor authentication token.
    For cloud account and API access to reconfigure the Linux server and its load balancer, administrative access is only allowed for the system engineer via a special AwesomeCloud IAM role. The authentication and authorization for this role is controlled by an integration with the organization's single sign-on solution. This solution will only be accessible and correctly execute for them when they are on the VPN with their account with traffic forwarded to the appropriate network zone in the IFA GoodRead account in AwesomeCloud. It will not work the developer or any staff users of the application.
    
-                    
-                
+            
+                
+                    
    The IFA GoodRead application and infrastructure are composed as designed and implemented with lease privilege for the elements of this system.
    
+                    
    For the IFA GoodRead application, the custom application is designed and implemented on top of the Django Framework to enforce least privilege. The application has a role for IFA Public Affairs Officers and one for the developers for privileged permissions, respectively. Only the latter can access or change administrative and security configurations and related data.
    
+                    
    The Django Framework and Django REST Framework (DRF), by default, allows any user with the is_staff role attribute to access administrative functions in an application using the framework. IFA GoodRead developers have disabled this behavior, relying on the custom roles identified in the relevant section.
    
+                    
    For the IFA GoodRead database, the system account and accredentials for the application to read and write to the system datastore has specific read and write authorization for specific tables. This database service account does not have full administrative permissions to add, modify, or delete all respective tables. For the production environment, only the IFA GoodRead developer has a dedicated account with equivalent permissions. Only local network socket access, within in the Linux server, is permitted by host firewall configuration. Remote access, privileged or unprivileged, is not allowed remotely and the system engineer must locally authenticate for access.
    
+                    
    For the RedHat Linux server upon which the IFA GoodRead application is deployed in this system, only the system engineer has a non-privileged user to log in remotely via the SSH protocol to perform ad-hoc inspection, monthly log review as required by policy and procedure, and emergency debugging of the system. Privileged system administration operations may only be performed with the sudo subsystem which requires a password, two-factor authentication, and has enhanced logging of all commands executed. The system engineer must log in remotely and then use sudo to elevate privileges. Remote access with the privileged account is prohibited by configuration and attempts are logged.
    
+                    
    For this remote SSH access, least privilege is additionally enforced by allowing this access via a specific network zone in the IFA GoodRead AwesomeCloud account accessible to only the system engineer via IFA's VPN solution, which requires the system engineer use a dedicated account with their own password and two-factor authentication token.
    
+                    
    For cloud account and API access to reconfigure the Linux server and its load balancer, administrative access is only allowed for the system engineer via a special AwesomeCloud IAM role. The authentication and authorization for this role is controlled by an integration with the organization's single sign-on solution. This solution will only be accessible and correctly execute for them when they are on the VPN with their account with traffic forwarded to the appropriate network zone in the IFA GoodRead account in AwesomeCloud. It will not work the developer or any staff users of the application.
    
+                             
+                
                 
             
         

From 77733d71912895e9bc96d5303e99be6a5e1d6901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michaela Iorga 
Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2024 23:47:55 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 11/20] updated metadata/OSCAL version to 1.1.2 and validated

---
 .../xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_HIGH-baseline_profile.xml     | 8 ++++----
 .../rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_LOW-baseline_profile.xml | 8 ++++----
 .../xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_MODERATE-baseline_profile.xml | 8 ++++----
 .../xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_PRIVACY-baseline_profile.xml  | 6 +++---
 .../SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml     | 4 ++--
 5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_HIGH-baseline_profile.xml b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_HIGH-baseline_profile.xml
index 66731c2b..d7c49ec8 100644
--- a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_HIGH-baseline_profile.xml
+++ b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_HIGH-baseline_profile.xml
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 
 
 
+         uuid="ad6ca352-8b0e-40e7-b6e2-279706ef5456">
    
       NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 HIGH IMPACT BASELINE
-      2023-12-04T14:55:00.000000-04:00
-      5.1.1+u2
-      1.1.1
+      2024-02-04T23:16:00.000000-00:00
+      5.1.1+u4
+      1.1.2
       
          Document Creator
       
diff --git a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_LOW-baseline_profile.xml b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_LOW-baseline_profile.xml
index 7d4167c9..f5660cbb 100644
--- a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_LOW-baseline_profile.xml
+++ b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_LOW-baseline_profile.xml
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 
 
 
+         uuid="7eca4589-7ed9-4552-9da6-738126660be3">
    
       NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 LOW IMPACT BASELINE
-      2023-12-04T14:55:00.000000-04:00
-      5.1.1+u2
-      1.1.1
+      2024-02-04T23:16:00.000000-00:00
+      5.1.1+u4
+      1.1.2
       
          Document Creator
       
diff --git a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_MODERATE-baseline_profile.xml b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_MODERATE-baseline_profile.xml
index f6bad1b7..8eed6da5 100644
--- a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_MODERATE-baseline_profile.xml
+++ b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_MODERATE-baseline_profile.xml
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 
 
 
+         uuid="f4faee53-d96f-4fdb-b491-4a1a79066b9b">
    
       NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 MODERATE IMPACT BASELINE
-      2023-12-04T14:55:00.000000-04:00
-      5.1.1+u2
-      1.1.1
+      2024-02-04T23:16:00.000000-00:00
+      5.1.1+u4
+      1.1.2
       
          Document Creator
       
diff --git a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_PRIVACY-baseline_profile.xml b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_PRIVACY-baseline_profile.xml
index 91636b8c..988dc3b2 100644
--- a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_PRIVACY-baseline_profile.xml
+++ b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_PRIVACY-baseline_profile.xml
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 
 
 
+         uuid="6a917bb8-b705-4b60-bcf9-6f10bdf24d3b">
    
       NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5.1.1 PRIVACY BASELINE
       2023-12-04T14:55:00.000000-04:00
-      5.1.1+u2
-      1.1.1
+      5.1.1+u4
+      1.1.2
       
          Document Creator
       
diff --git a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml
index 4e5d0089..9d7d849d 100644
--- a/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml
+++ b/src/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5/xml/NIST_SP-800-53_rev5_catalog.xml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 
   
     Electronic Version of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.1.1 Controls and SP 800-53A Rev 5.1.1 Assessment Procedures
-    2024-01-18T22:10:00.000000-00:00
+    2024-02-04T23:16:00.000000-00:00
     5.1.1+u4
-    1.1.1
+    1.1.2
     
       
         Electronic Version of NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Controls and SP 800-53A Rev 5 Assessment Procedures

From fca0967f381c4d706bf76156c98e0e5fbc81fbd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dependabot[bot]" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 20:23:34 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 12/20] Bump actions/cache from 3.3.2 to 4.0.0

Bumps [actions/cache](https://github.com/actions/cache) from 3.3.2 to 4.0.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/cache/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/cache/blob/main/RELEASES.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/cache/compare/704facf57e6136b1bc63b828d79edcd491f0ee84...13aacd865c20de90d75de3b17ebe84f7a17d57d2)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/cache
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] 
---
 .github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml b/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml
index dcacd666..8b414548 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Install xmllint
         run: sudo apt-get install -y libxml2-utils          
       - name: Cache generated content for OSCAL build artifacts
-        uses: actions/cache@704facf57e6136b1bc63b828d79edcd491f0ee84
+        uses: actions/cache@13aacd865c20de90d75de3b17ebe84f7a17d57d2
         with:
           path: |
             build/oscal/build/node_modules

From 9b88303798e911bf4616abd25a94210d4b598d81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dependabot[bot]" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 20:23:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 13/20] Bump actions/upload-artifact from 3.1.3 to 4.3.0

Bumps [actions/upload-artifact](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact) from 3.1.3 to 4.3.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/compare/a8a3f3ad30e3422c9c7b888a15615d19a852ae32...26f96dfa697d77e81fd5907df203aa23a56210a8)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/upload-artifact
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] 
---
 .github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml b/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml
index 8b414548..f5dc4be1 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           zip ${{ runner.temp }}/generated-content.zip -r README.md examples/ nist.gov/
         working-directory: ${{ github.workspace }}
-      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@a8a3f3ad30e3422c9c7b888a15615d19a852ae32
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@26f96dfa697d77e81fd5907df203aa23a56210a8
         if: always()
         with:
           name: generated-content

From e3349c4f6c5b0ddedc82fde79810df61cd5ff94a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "dependabot[bot]" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 17:18:44 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 14/20] Bump actions/upload-artifact from 4.3.0 to 4.3.1

Bumps [actions/upload-artifact](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact) from 4.3.0 to 4.3.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/compare/26f96dfa697d77e81fd5907df203aa23a56210a8...5d5d22a31266ced268874388b861e4b58bb5c2f3)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/upload-artifact
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] 
---
 .github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml b/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml
index f5dc4be1..ef5eb49a 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/content-artifacts.yml
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           zip ${{ runner.temp }}/generated-content.zip -r README.md examples/ nist.gov/
         working-directory: ${{ github.workspace }}
-      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@26f96dfa697d77e81fd5907df203aa23a56210a8
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@5d5d22a31266ced268874388b861e4b58bb5c2f3
         if: always()
         with:
           name: generated-content

From 06321609e4d338bea7bb06d1817d66068228b676 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2024 09:11:13 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 15/20] install and validate oscal-cli in the make file

---
 .gitignore     |  1 +
 build/Makefile | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 validate.sh    | 10 ----------
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100755 validate.sh

diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 6586c898..32d93e87 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ generated/
 yq
 jq
 .DS_Store
+build/oscal-cli/
diff --git a/build/Makefile b/build/Makefile
index 8e10f851..6afe455c 100644
--- a/build/Makefile
+++ b/build/Makefile
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ all: artifacts checks ## Run all steps for content preparation
 artifacts: copy-readmes copy-xml-content resolve-xml-profiles convert-min-json-content reformat-json-content convert-yaml-content ## Generate all artifacts
 
 .PHONY: checks
-checks: validate-xml-content validate-json-content validate-yaml-content ## Check all content with schema and other validation methods
+checks: validate-xml-content validate-json-content validate-yaml-content validate-xml-by-cli ## Check all content with schema and other validation methods
 
 .PHONY: clean
 clean: clean-core-artifacts clean-readmes clean-json-content clean-xml-content clean-yaml-content ## Clean all generated content
@@ -26,6 +26,22 @@ clean: clean-core-artifacts clean-readmes clean-json-content clean-xml-content c
 # Dependencies
 #
 
+
+
+
+OSCAL_CLI_VERSION:=1.0.3
+OSCAL_CLI_BIN:=oscal-cli
+OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL:=https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/gov/nist/secauto/oscal/tools/oscal-cli/cli-core/$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)/cli-core-$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)-oscal-cli.zip
+OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH:=./oscal-cli/bin
+OSCAL_CLI_PATH:=$(shell which $(OSCAL_CLI_BIN) > /dev/null && dirname `which $(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)` || echo $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH))
+
+$(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH):
+	@echo Downloading OSCAL CLI Tool...
+	@mkdir -p $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
+	@curl $(CURL_INSTALL_OPTS) -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL)
+	@unzip -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip -d $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
+	@chmod +x $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)
+
 CURL_INSTALL_OPTS:=--silent --location
 
 # Used to automatically install certain executables
@@ -157,6 +173,21 @@ validate-xml-content: $(GEN_XML_FILES) ## Validate XML files
 	$(MAKE) -C $(OSCAL_CORE_DIR) $(subst $(OSCAL_CORE_DIR)/,,$(OSCAL_COMPLETE_XML_SCHEMA))
 	$(XMLLINT_PATH) --schema $(OSCAL_COMPLETE_XML_SCHEMA) --noout $(GEN_XML_FILES)
 
+
+#
+# Validate XML with oscal-cli
+#
+.PHONY: validate-xml-by-cli
+validate-xml-by-cli: $(OSCAL_CLI_PATH) ## Validate XML files by directory using OSCAL CLI Tool
+	@find $(SRC_DIR)/examples -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d | while read example_dir; do \
+		example_type=$$(basename "$$example_dir"); \
+		echo "Processing example type: $$example_type"; \
+		find "$$example_dir" -name '*.xml' | while read xml_file; do \
+			echo "Validating $$xml_file with OSCAL CLI as $$example_type"; \
+			$(OSCAL_CLI_PATH)/oscal-cli "$$example_type" validate "$$xml_file"; \
+		done \
+	done
+
 .PHONY: clean-xml-content
 clean-xml-content: ## Clean generated XML content
 	@echo Cleaning XML content
diff --git a/validate.sh b/validate.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index e3c52969..00000000
--- a/validate.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-oscal-cli catalog validate ./src/examples/catalog/xml/basic-catalog.xml
-oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraged-example_ssp.xml
-oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/oscal_leveraging-example_ssp.xml
-oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/ssp-example.xml
-oscal-cli ap validate ./src/examples/ap/xml/ifa_assessment-plan-example.xml
-oscal-cli ar validate ./src/examples/ar/xml/ifa_assessment-results-example.xml
-oscal-cli ssp validate ./src/examples/ssp/xml/ifa_ssp-example.xml
-oscal-cli component-definition validate ./src/examples/component-definition/xml/example-component-definition.xml
-oscal-cli poam validate ./src/examples/poam/xml/ifa_plan-of-action-and-milestones.xml

From 48b6beb748641213a1c81f1db968b0158372c7d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2024 09:24:27 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 16/20] Update Makefile

---
 build/Makefile | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/build/Makefile b/build/Makefile
index 6afe455c..5c059638 100644
--- a/build/Makefile
+++ b/build/Makefile
@@ -32,15 +32,15 @@ clean: clean-core-artifacts clean-readmes clean-json-content clean-xml-content c
 OSCAL_CLI_VERSION:=1.0.3
 OSCAL_CLI_BIN:=oscal-cli
 OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL:=https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/gov/nist/secauto/oscal/tools/oscal-cli/cli-core/$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)/cli-core-$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)-oscal-cli.zip
-OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH:=./oscal-cli/bin
-OSCAL_CLI_PATH:=$(shell which $(OSCAL_CLI_BIN) > /dev/null && dirname `which $(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)` || echo $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH))
+OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH:=./oscal-cli
+OSCAL_CLI_PATH:=$(shell which $(OSCAL_CLI_BIN) 2>/dev/null || echo $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH))
 
 $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH):
 	@echo Downloading OSCAL CLI Tool...
 	@mkdir -p $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
 	@curl $(CURL_INSTALL_OPTS) -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL)
 	@unzip -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip -d $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
-	@chmod +x $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)
+	@chmod +x $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)
 
 CURL_INSTALL_OPTS:=--silent --location
 
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ validate-xml-by-cli: $(OSCAL_CLI_PATH) ## Validate XML files by directory using
 		echo "Processing example type: $$example_type"; \
 		find "$$example_dir" -name '*.xml' | while read xml_file; do \
 			echo "Validating $$xml_file with OSCAL CLI as $$example_type"; \
-			$(OSCAL_CLI_PATH)/oscal-cli "$$example_type" validate "$$xml_file"; \
+			$(OSCAL_CLI_PATH)/bin/oscal-cli "$$example_type" validate "$$xml_file"; \
 		done \
 	done
 

From 3fcaf57d4dca9ee718d80c5d5cc37ede484bc217 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 18:07:43 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 17/20] Update Makefile

---
 build/Makefile | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/build/Makefile b/build/Makefile
index 5c059638..4fe078f9 100644
--- a/build/Makefile
+++ b/build/Makefile
@@ -33,8 +33,6 @@ OSCAL_CLI_VERSION:=1.0.3
 OSCAL_CLI_BIN:=oscal-cli
 OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL:=https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/gov/nist/secauto/oscal/tools/oscal-cli/cli-core/$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)/cli-core-$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)-oscal-cli.zip
 OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH:=./oscal-cli
-OSCAL_CLI_PATH:=$(shell which $(OSCAL_CLI_BIN) 2>/dev/null || echo $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH))
-
 $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH):
 	@echo Downloading OSCAL CLI Tool...
 	@mkdir -p $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
@@ -178,13 +176,13 @@ validate-xml-content: $(GEN_XML_FILES) ## Validate XML files
 # Validate XML with oscal-cli
 #
 .PHONY: validate-xml-by-cli
-validate-xml-by-cli: $(OSCAL_CLI_PATH) ## Validate XML files by directory using OSCAL CLI Tool
+validate-xml-by-cli: $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH) ## Validate XML files by directory using OSCAL CLI Tool
 	@find $(SRC_DIR)/examples -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d | while read example_dir; do \
 		example_type=$$(basename "$$example_dir"); \
 		echo "Processing example type: $$example_type"; \
 		find "$$example_dir" -name '*.xml' | while read xml_file; do \
 			echo "Validating $$xml_file with OSCAL CLI as $$example_type"; \
-			$(OSCAL_CLI_PATH)/bin/oscal-cli "$$example_type" validate "$$xml_file"; \
+			$(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/oscal-cli "$$example_type" validate "$$xml_file"; \
 		done \
 	done
 

From e8850b0a5119426771c6df553718ef65d619c156 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: magic wand 
Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2024 15:22:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 18/20] get latest oscal cli version

---
 build/Makefile | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/build/Makefile b/build/Makefile
index 4fe078f9..204933d2 100644
--- a/build/Makefile
+++ b/build/Makefile
@@ -29,16 +29,6 @@ clean: clean-core-artifacts clean-readmes clean-json-content clean-xml-content c
 
 
 
-OSCAL_CLI_VERSION:=1.0.3
-OSCAL_CLI_BIN:=oscal-cli
-OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL:=https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/gov/nist/secauto/oscal/tools/oscal-cli/cli-core/$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)/cli-core-$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)-oscal-cli.zip
-OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH:=./oscal-cli
-$(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH):
-	@echo Downloading OSCAL CLI Tool...
-	@mkdir -p $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
-	@curl $(CURL_INSTALL_OPTS) -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL)
-	@unzip -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip -d $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
-	@chmod +x $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)
 
 CURL_INSTALL_OPTS:=--silent --location
 
@@ -76,8 +66,21 @@ NPM_PKGS_DIR:=node_modules
 $(NPM_PKGS_DIR):
 	$(MAKE) -C $(OSCAL_CORE_DIR) dependencies
 
+
+OSCAL_CLI_VERSION=`curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/usnistgov/oscal-cli/releases/latest | jq -r '.name[1:]'`
+OSCAL_CLI_BIN:=oscal-cli
+OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL:=https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/gov/nist/secauto/oscal/tools/oscal-cli/cli-core/$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)/cli-core-$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)-oscal-cli.zip
+OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH:=./oscal-cli
+$(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH):
+	@echo Downloading OSCAL CLI Tool...
+	@echo $(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)
+	@mkdir -p $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
+	@curl $(CURL_INSTALL_OPTS) -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL)
+	@unzip -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip -d $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
+	@chmod +x $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)
+
 .PHONY: dependencies
-dependencies: $(JQ_PATH) $(XMLLINT_PATH) $(YQ_PATH) $(NPM_PKGS_DIR) ## Install needed jq and yq binaries, and download needed downstream dependencies
+dependencies: $(JQ_PATH) $(XMLLINT_PATH) $(YQ_PATH) $(NPM_PKGS_DIR) $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH) ## Install needed jq and yq binaries, and download needed downstream dependencies
 
 # By default we install xmllint with operating system package manager, so
 # to be sensible, we will not uninstall or delete it even with the package

From 3639fe9132f070ab1b5fe465bfc7f60b1979708c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "~ . ~" <156969148+wandmagic@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2024 23:11:01 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 19/20] Update Makefile

---
 build/Makefile | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/build/Makefile b/build/Makefile
index 204933d2..9ab754b6 100644
--- a/build/Makefile
+++ b/build/Makefile
@@ -66,18 +66,22 @@ NPM_PKGS_DIR:=node_modules
 $(NPM_PKGS_DIR):
 	$(MAKE) -C $(OSCAL_CORE_DIR) dependencies
 
-
 OSCAL_CLI_VERSION=`curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/usnistgov/oscal-cli/releases/latest | jq -r '.name[1:]'`
 OSCAL_CLI_BIN:=oscal-cli
 OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL:=https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/gov/nist/secauto/oscal/tools/oscal-cli/cli-core/$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)/cli-core-$(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)-oscal-cli.zip
-OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH:=./oscal-cli
-$(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH):
-	@echo Downloading OSCAL CLI Tool...
-	@echo $(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)
-	@mkdir -p $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
-	@curl $(CURL_INSTALL_OPTS) -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL)
-	@unzip -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip -d $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)
-	@chmod +x $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)
+OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH := $(shell which oscal-cli 2>/dev/null)
+ifeq ($(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH),)
+OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH := ./oscal-cli/
+else
+OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH := $(shell dirname $$(dirname $$(which oscal-cli)))
+endif
+$(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH):	
+	@echo "Downloading OSCAL CLI version $(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)..."; \
+	mkdir -p $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH); \
+	curl $(CURL_INSTALL_OPTS) -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL); \
+	unzip -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip -d $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH); \
+	chmod +x $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)
+
 
 .PHONY: dependencies
 dependencies: $(JQ_PATH) $(XMLLINT_PATH) $(YQ_PATH) $(NPM_PKGS_DIR) $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH) ## Install needed jq and yq binaries, and download needed downstream dependencies
@@ -180,6 +184,9 @@ validate-xml-content: $(GEN_XML_FILES) ## Validate XML files
 #
 .PHONY: validate-xml-by-cli
 validate-xml-by-cli: $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH) ## Validate XML files by directory using OSCAL CLI Tool
+	@echo "Validating XML files by directory using OSCAL CLI Tool"
+	@$(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN) --version
+	@echo "latest oscal-cli version is $(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)"
 	@find $(SRC_DIR)/examples -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d | while read example_dir; do \
 		example_type=$$(basename "$$example_dir"); \
 		echo "Processing example type: $$example_type"; \

From 2225aad716978b790b96ec3d0a0b58d001331014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: magic wand 
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 02:56:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 20/20] adjust makefile

---
 build/Makefile | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/build/Makefile b/build/Makefile
index 9ab754b6..048447a3 100644
--- a/build/Makefile
+++ b/build/Makefile
@@ -72,15 +72,15 @@ OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL:=https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/gov/nist/secauto/oscal/too
 OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH := $(shell which oscal-cli 2>/dev/null)
 ifeq ($(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH),)
 OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH := ./oscal-cli/
-else
-OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH := $(shell dirname $$(dirname $$(which oscal-cli)))
-endif
 $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH):	
 	@echo "Downloading OSCAL CLI version $(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)..."; \
 	mkdir -p $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH); \
 	curl $(CURL_INSTALL_OPTS) -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_URL); \
 	unzip -o $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/oscal-cli.zip -d $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH); \
 	chmod +x $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN)
+else
+OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH := $(shell dirname $$(dirname $$(which oscal-cli)))
+endif
 
 
 .PHONY: dependencies
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ validate-xml-by-cli: $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH) ## Validate XML files by director
 	@echo "Validating XML files by directory using OSCAL CLI Tool"
 	@$(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/$(OSCAL_CLI_BIN) --version
 	@echo "latest oscal-cli version is $(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)"
+	@echo "Validating OSCAL content with $(OSCAL_CLI_INSTALL_PATH)/bin/oscal-cli version $(OSCAL_CLI_VERSION)"
 	@find $(SRC_DIR)/examples -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d | while read example_dir; do \
 		example_type=$$(basename "$$example_dir"); \
 		echo "Processing example type: $$example_type"; \