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chore(frontend): update dependency vite to v4.5.3 [security] #537
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Visit the preview URL for this PR (updated for commit 44957a9): https://pluralsh-console--pr537-renovate-frontend-np-z1lqcjpj.web.app (expires Sat, 27 Jan 2024 05:04:25 GMT) 🔥 via Firebase Hosting GitHub Action 🌎 Sign: dd1ffa0705acc6ef7d6db370e6bd6fc390e945ce |
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⚠ Artifact update problemRenovate failed to update an artifact related to this branch. You probably do not want to merge this PR as-is. ♻ Renovate will retry this branch, including artifacts, only when one of the following happens:
The artifact failure details are included below: File name: assets/yarn.lock
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This PR contains the following updates:
4.5.0
->4.5.3
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2023-49293
Summary
When Vite's HTML transformation is invoked manually via
server.transformIndexHtml
, the original request URL is passed in unmodified, and thehtml
being transformed contains inline module scripts (<script type="module">...</script>
), it is possible to inject arbitrary HTML into the transformed output by supplying a malicious URL query string toserver.transformIndexHtml
.Impact
Only apps using
appType: 'custom'
and using the default Vite HTML middleware are affected. The HTML entry must also contain an inline script. The attack requires a user to click on a malicious URL while running the dev server. Restricted files aren't exposed to the attacker.Patches
Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Details
Suppose
index.html
contains an inline module script:This script is transformed into a proxy script like
due to Vite's HTML plugin:
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/html.ts#L429-L465
When
appType: 'spa' | 'mpa'
, Vite serves HTML itself, andhtmlFallbackMiddleware
rewritesreq.url
to the canonical path ofindex.html
,https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/73ef074b80fa7252e0c46a37a2c94ba8cba46504/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/htmlFallback.ts#L44-L47
so the
url
passed toserver.transformIndexHtml
is/index.html
.However, if
appType: 'custom'
, HTML is served manually, and ifserver.transformIndexHtml
is called with the unmodified request URL (as the SSR docs suggest), then the path of the transformedhtml-proxy
script varies with the request URL. For example, a request with path/
producesIt is possible to abuse this behavior by crafting a request URL to contain a malicious payload like
so a request to http://localhost:5173/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E produces HTML output like
which demonstrates XSS.
PoC
vite dev
middleware withappType: 'custom'
?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E
and navigatevite dev
(this shows that vanillavite dev
is not vulnerable, providedhtmlFallbackMiddleware
is used)Detailed Impact
This will probably predominantly affect development-mode SSR, where
vite.transformHtml
is called using the originalreq.url
, per the docs:https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/docs/guide/ssr.md?plain=1#L114-L126
However, since this vulnerability affects
server.transformIndexHtml
, the scope of impact may be higher to also include other ad-hoc calls toserver.transformIndexHtml
from outside of Vite's own codebase.My best guess at bisecting which versions are vulnerable involves the following test script
and using it I was able to narrow down to #13581. If this is correct, then vulnerable Vite versions are 4.4.0-beta.2 and higher (which includes 4.4.0).
CVE-2024-23331
Summary
Vite dev server option
server.fs.deny
can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.
Patches
Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Details
Since
picomatch
defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.See
picomatch
usage, wherenocase
is defaulted tofalse
: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from
config.server.fs.deny
fails to block access to sensitive files.PoC
Setup
npm create vite@latest
on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0
custom.secret
andproduction.pem
vite.config.js
withReproduction
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@​fs//
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@​fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@​fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT
Proof
Impact
Who
What
server.fs.deny
are both discoverable, and accessibleCVE-2024-31207
Summary
Vite dev server option
server.fs.deny
did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is/foo/**/*
.Impact
Only apps setting a custom
server.fs.deny
that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using--host
orserver.host
config option) are affected.Patches
Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Details
server.fs.deny
uses picomatch with the config of{ matchBase: true }
. matchBase only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug (https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/issues/89). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set{ dot: true }
and that causes dotfiles not to be denied unless they are explicitly defined.Reproduction
Set fs.deny to
['**/.git/**']
and then curl for/.git/config
.matchBase: true
, you can get any file under.git/
(config, HEAD, etc).matchBase: false
, you cannot get any file under.git/
(config, HEAD, etc).Release Notes
vitejs/vite (vite)
v4.5.3
Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v4.5.2
Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
v4.5.1
Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
Configuration
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